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HANDUOUiND 
AT  THE 


UNIVERSITY  OF 


L.. 


/  ^  /^ 


THE  LOEB  CLASSICAL  LIBRARY 

FOUNDED    BY    JAAIES    I.OEB,    I-I^.D. 
EDITED    BY 

T.  E.  PAGE,  C.H.,  MTT.D. 

C/.  VPS,   PH.D.,   LL.».  W      H.    D.     ROUSE,  LITT.D. 


ARISTOTLE 

THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION 
THE  EUDEMIAN  ETHICS 
ON  VIRTUES  AND  VICES 


AKISTOTLE 

THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION 
THE  EUDEMIAN  ETHICS 
ON  VIRTUES  AND  VICES 


WITH  AN  ENGLISH  TRANSLATION  BY 

H.  RACKHAM,  MA. 

FELLOW    AND    LECTURER   OF   CHRIST'S    COLLEGE,    CAMBRIDGE 


fc^3 


3fc 


LONDON 

WILLIAM   HEINEMANN  LTD 

CAMBRIDGE,    MASSACHLSE'lTS 

HARVARD    UNIVERSITY    PRESS 

MCMXXXV 


CONTENTS 


THE  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION 

Introduction     .... 

Outline  of  Contents 
Text  and  Translation 
Index        ..... 


2 
6 

8 
183 


THE  EUDEMIAN  ETHICS  : 

Introduction   .... 

.       190 

Text  and  Translation  : 

Book        I 

198 

Book      II 

234 

Book     III 

.        308 

Book    VII 

358 

BookVIII 

450 

Index      .          .          .          .          .         . 

479 

ON  VIRTUES  AND  VICES : 

Introduction    .... 

484 

Text  and  Translation 

488 

Index      ..... 

.       505 

ARISTOTLE 

THE    ATHENIAN 
CONSTITUTION 


INTRODUCTION 

The  Po  lit  EI  a  I 

The  place  of  the  Athenian  Constitution  in  the  encyclo- 
pedia of  Aristotle's  writings  is  known  to  us  from 
the  concluding  paragraph  of  the  Nicomachean  Ethics. 
That  work  forms  the  first  volume  of  a  treatise  on 
the  welfare  of  man  as  a  social  being,  of  which  the 
Politics  forms  the  second  volume  ;  and  at  the  end 
of  the  former  {N.E.  x.  ix.  21 ,  23)  a  prefatory  outline 
of  the  latter  is  given,  in  which  occur  the  phrases  '  the 
collections  of  constitutions,'  '  the  collected  con- 
stitutions '  ;  it  is  stated  that  on  these  will  be  based 
that  division  of  the  Politics  (i.e.  Books  III.-VI.)  which 
will  deal  with  the  stability  of  states  in  general  and 
of  the  various  special  forms  of  constitution,  and  with 
the  causes  of  good  and  bad  government. 

These  treatises  are  said  in  ancient  lists  of  Aristotle's 
writings  to  have  been  a  hundred  and  fifty-eight  in 
number.  Each  no  doubt  consisted,  like  the  volume 
before  us,  of  a  constitutional  history  of  the  state  in 
question  followed  by  a  description  of  its  constitution 
at  the  time  of  writing.  They  are  frequently  spoken 
of  as  the  work  of  Aristotle,  but  he  may  well  have 
employed  the  aid  of  pupils  in  their  compilation. 
They  were  not  preserved  through  the  Middle  Ages 
in  the  Aristotelian  Corpus,  and  until  fifty  years  ago 
2 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION 

were  only  known  to  modern  students  from  numerous 
references  and  quotations  in  later  writers. 

The  Athenian  Constitution:  MSS. 

But  in  1880  two  small  and  much  damaged  sheets 
of  papyrus  were  found  in  the  sands  of  Egypt  which 
scholars  eventually  proved  to  come  from  a  copy  of 
the  most  important  of  all  these  constitutional 
treatises,  the  one  on  the  Constitution  of  Athens. 
These  sheets  are  now  in  the  Berlin  Museum.  Palaeo- 
graphers ascribe  them  to  the  fourth  century  a.d. 
Ten  years  later,  among  some  papyrus  rolls  acquired 
from  Egypt  by  the  British  Museum,  the  Librarian 
F.  G.  Kenyon  recognized  four  sheets  as  containing 
a  copy  of  almost  the  whole  treatise.  These  sheets 
have  writing  on  both  sides.  On  the  front  are  some 
accounts  of  receipts  and  expenses  kept  by  a  farm 
bailiif  named  Didymus  for  his  master  Epimachus, 
near  the  Egyptian  town  of  Hermopolis,  in  the  tenth 
and  eleventh  years  of  Vespasian,  a.d.  78  and  79-  On 
the  back  is  the  Aristotelian  treatise  ;  its  beginning 
is  wanting,  and  the  first  page  of  the  book  is  blank, 
showing  that  it  was  copied  from  a  damaged  copy  of 
the  work  ;  and  the  last  roll  is  very  fragmentary. 
Different  parts  are  written  in  different  hands,  four 
in  all  ;  the  script  is  said  to  date  the  copy  at  about 
A.D.  100.  It  was  doubtless  made  for  a  private  person 
(perhaps  the  writer  of  one  of  the  four  hands),  and 
probably  buried  with  its  owner  at  his  death. 

Editions 

In  1891  Sir  Frederick  Kenyon  published  a  facsimile 
of  the  papyrus,  and  a  printed  edition  of  the  text  with 


ARISTOTLE 

an  introduction  and  notes.  In  1893  a  revised  text 
with  a  full  and  valuable  commentary  was  put  out 
by  Sandys.  Kenyon  prepared  an  edition  for  the 
Royal  Academy  of  Berlin,  published  in  1903,  in  which 
he  included  the  fragments  of  the  fourth  roll  con- 
jecturally  arranged  in  a  consecutive  text  ;  and  his 
latest  edition  was  published  at  Oxford  in  1920.  Of 
several  published  abroad,  the  latest  is  the  Teubner 
text  of  1928  by  Oppermann,  based  on  the  previous 
editions  of  Blass  and  Thalheim. 


Text 

The  text  of  the  present  edition  is  based  on  the 
editio  princeps  of  Kenyon,  but  it  has  been  corrected 
by  later  scholars'  readings  of  the  papyrus.  A  few 
critical  notes  and  suggested  emendations  are  ap- 
pended ;  but  in  regard  to  inaccuracies  of  grammar 
and  arithmetic,  trifling  inelegancies  of  phrase  (e.g. 
T0v8e  τρόπον,  for  which  most  editors  substitute  rovOe 
τον  τρόπον),  exactly  how  many  are  due  to  a  copyist's 
carelessness  and  how  many  are  to  be  saddled  on  the 
author,  no  two  scholars  will  agree.  To  the  papyrus 
text  have  here  been  prefixed  and  appended  the 
principal  passages  from  the  lost  beginning  and  end 
of  the  treatise  that  the  learned  industry  of  scholars 
has  gleaned  from  the  quotations  of  later  Greek 
authors. 

Dates  of  Composition 

The  latest  event  mentioned  in  the  Athenian 
Constitution  (liv.  7)  is  the  archonship  of  Cephisophon, 
329  B.C.  The  book  also  mentions  (xlvi.  1)  triremes 
4 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION 

and  quadriremes,  but  not  quinquiremes  ;  and  the 
earliest  date  at  which  quinquiremes  in  the  Athenian 
navy  are  recorded  is  325  B.C.  The  treatise  can  thus 
be  dated  between  328  and  325  B.C.  Moreover  it 
speaks  (Ixii.  16)  of  officials  still  being  sent  to  Samos, 
and  Samos  ceased  to  be  under  the  control  of  Athens 
in  the  autumn  of  322  B.C.,  the  year  of  Aristotle's 
death. 


OUTLINE  OF  CONTENTS 
Part  I,  Constitutional  History  of  Athens  to  403  b.c. 

(1)  FrA.  Original  hereditary  absolute  monarchy.   Military 

command  transferred  from  king  to  war-lord  in  time 

of  Ion. 
Fr.  2.  Local  division  of  royal  power  among  four  sons  of 

Pandion. 
Fr.  3.  Unity  restored  by  Theseus. 
Fr.  4.  Growth  of  popular  power  under  Theseus. 

(2)  Fr.  5.  Constitution  in  time  of  Theseus  :    four  Tribes, 

Thirds,  Brotherhoods,  Clans. 

Fr.  6.  Murder  of  Theseus.  Recovery  of  his  bones  by 
Athens. 

Fr.  7.  End  of  hereditary  monarchy. 

Fr.  8.  Conspiracy  of  Cylon  put  down  by  Megacles. 

MS.  c.  i.     Pollution  and  purification  of  Athens. 

c.  ii.  Civil  disorders  from  forced  labour  of  debtors.  — 

c.  iii.  Constitution  before  Draco.  Third  archon  in- 
stituted, the  king  retaining  religious  functions. 
Three  archonships  finally  made  annual,  and  six 
Thesmothetae  added.  An  aristocracy,  the  nine 
archons  being  elected  by  the  Areopagus,  whose 
members  were  ex-archons.  Conspiracy  of  Cylon. 
Discontent  and  poverty  of  lower  orders. 

(3)  c.  iv.  Constitution  of  Draco,  the  first  code  of  laws. 

Council  of  Four  Hundred  and  One.     Punishment  of 
Alcmaeonidae. 

(4)  cc.  v.-ix.  Constitution  of  Solon  :   four  property-classes 

with  graded  functions,  the  fourth  takes  part  in  the  - 
assembly  and  law-courts. 

6 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION 

c.  X.  Solon's    cancellation    of  debts,  and   system  of 

weights  and  measures, 
cc.  xi.,  xii.  Ten  years  of  party  strife.     Solon's  poems. 

(5)  cc.  xiii.-xix.  Tyranny  of  Peisistratus  and  his  sons. 

(6)  cc.  xx.-xxii.   Reforms   of  Cleisthenes.       Creation   of 

democracy. 

(7)  cc.    xxiii.,  xxiv.      Supremacy    of    Areopagus    after 

Persian  wars.     Aristeides  and  Themistocles.     Con- 
federacy of  Delos  ;  taxation  of  allies. 

(8)  cc.  xxv.,  xxvi.  Democracy  restored  by  Ephialtes,  and 

extended  by  Pericles. 
.,...^  c.  xxviii.  Popular  leadership,  historical  review. 

(Sj  cc.  xxix.,  XXX.  Revolution  of  the  Four  Hundred  ;  after 
failure  of  Sicilian  expedition  Athens  forced  to 
abandon  democracy;  citizenship  to  be  limited  to 
Five  Thousand, 
c.  xxxi.  The  Council  of  Four  Hundred  govern  as  an 
oligarchy. 

(10)  cc.  xxxii.-xxxiv.  Counter-revolution :  democracy  re- 
stored. Then  Sparta  defeats  Athens  in  the  war 
and  sets  up  the  Thirty. 

(11)  cc.  xxxv.-xxxviii.  Despotic  rule  of  the  Thirty.    They 

are  put  down  by  exiles  led  by  Thrasybulus. 

(12)  cc.  xxxix.,  xl.  Extreme     democracy     restored  :     the 

people  supreme ;  payment  for  attending  Assembly, 
c.  xli.  The  eleven  revolutions  recapitulated. 


Part  II.  The  Existing  Constitution 

c.  xlii.  The  franchise. 

cc.  xliii.-lx.  The    officials    (a)    elected    by    lot — the 

Council,  archons,  and  others ; 
c.  Ixi.  (b)  elected  by  vote — military  officers. 
c.  Ixii.  Payment  of  officials. 
c.  Ixiii.  and  foil.  The  law-courts  :  procedure. 


ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ 
ΑΘΗΝΑΙΩΝ    ΠΟΑΙΤΕΙΑ 

Primae  partis  Epitoma  Heraclidis 

[Heracleides  Lembos  in  ike  second  century  b.c.  compiled 
a  book  called  Ίστοριαι  which  contained  quotations  from 
Aristotle's  Constitutions.  Excerpts  made  from  this  book, 
or  from  a  later  treatise  by  another  author  based  upon  it, 
have  come  down  to  us  in  a  fragmentary  form  in  a 
Vatican  us.  of  the  8th  century,  now  at  Paris,  under 
the  title  Έκ  των  Ήρακλειδου  ττερι  Πολιτειών.  These 
were  edited  by  Schneidewin  in  1847  and  by  others  later. 

1.    Αθηναίοι  το  μεν  i^  αρχής  εχρώντο  βασιλεία, 
συνοικησάντος     δέ     "Ιωνος     αντοΐς     rare     πρώτον 
Ιωνβς  εκλήθησαν. 

(Τούτου  γαρ  οίκησαντος  την  Άττικην,  ώς 
*  Αριστοτέλης  φησί,  τους  'Αθηναίους  "Ιωνας  κλη- 
^iyvat,  και  Άττόλλωνα  Πατρώοι'  αύτοΐς  όνο- 
/Αασθτ^'^'^'••     (Harpocration  s.v.  Άττόλλων  ΙΙατρωος.) 

ΪΙατρώον  τιμώσιν  Άττόλλωνα  'Αθηναίοι  επει 
"Ιων  ό  πολέμαρχος  'Αθηναίων  εζ  'Απόλλωνος  και 
Κρεούσης  της  Ή,ούθον^  εγενετο.  (Schol.  Aristoph. 
Αυ.  1537.)) 

1  Έονθον  ■CyvvaiKOsy  Rose. 

"  A  word  has  perhaps  been  lost  in  the  Greek,  giving 
'  the  wife  of  Xuthus ' — unless  indeed  the  text  is  a  ddiberate 


ARISTOTLE— THE   ATHENIAN 
CONSTITUTION 

Heracleides'  Epitome  of  the  first  part 

For  a  complete  study  of  these  contributions  to  the  recon- 
struction of  The  Athenian  Constitution  readers  must 
consult  the  standard  commentators  on  the  latter;  only 
those  fragments  which  belong  to  the  lost  early  part  of  the 
treatise  are  given  here.  Quotations  of  the  same  passages 
of  Aristotle  made  by  other  writers  have  been  collected  by 
scholars,  and  are  inserted  in  the  text  in  brackets  {  >  where 
they  βΙΙ  gaps  in  Heracleides.^ 

Fr.  1 .  The  Athenians  originally  had  a  royal  govern- 
ment. It  was  when  Ion  came  to  dwell  with  them  that 
they  were  first  called  lonians. 

(For  when  he  came  to  dwell  in  Attica,  as  Aristotle 
says,  the  Athenians  came  to  be  called  lonians,  and 
Apollo  was  named  their  Ancestral  god. 

The  Athenians  honour  Ancestral  Apollo  because 
their  War-lord  Ion  was  the  son  of  Apollo  and  Creusa 
the  daughter  *  of  Xuthus.) 

bowdlerization  of  the  legend.  Xuthus,  King  of  Peloponnesus, 
married  Creusa,  daughter  of  Erechtheus,  King  of  Athens, 
after  whose  death  he  was  banished ;  but  Creusa's  son  Ion 
was  recalled  to  aid  Athens  in  war  with  Eleusis,  won  them 
victory,  and  died  and  was  buried  in  Attica. 

9 


ARISTOTLE 

2.  Ϊ1αν8ίων  8e  βασιλ^ΰσας  μβτά  'Epe^^ea 
SteVei/xe  την  αρχήν  τοις  νΐοΐς  (Atyet  μβν  Βούς  την 
TTepL  το  άστυ  χώραν,  Ανκω  δε  την  8ίακρίαν, 
Πάλλαΐ'τι  8e  την  παραλίαν,  Νισω  8e  την  Meyaplha 
(Id.  Vesp,  1223.))  3.  /cat  διετελουΐ'  ourot  στασι'α- 
ζοντε?•  Θτ^σευ?  8e  €κηρυξε  καΐ  σννφίβασ€  τούτους 
67Γ  ίστ^  και  όμοια}  (eVciAet  ττάι^τα?  eVt  τοΓ? 
ίσοι?  /cat  το  "  δείϊρ'  tre,  ττάι^τε?  λβω "  κήρυγμα 
θησ€ωζ  yeveadai  φασί  ττανΒημίαν  tlvol  καθιστάντος. 
(Plutarch,  Theseus  25.)> 

4.  (oTt  δε  πρώτος  άπβκλινε  ττρός  τον  οχλον,  ώς 

Αριστοτέλης  φησίν,  καΐ  άφηκβ  το  μοναρχ€Ϊν,  eoi/ce 

μαρτυρ€Ϊν  και  "Ομηρος  iv  veatv  καταλόγω  μόνους 

Αθηναίους  Βήμον  προσαγορβύσας .     (Plutarch,  ib.)) 

5.  {ζϊς  Ιστορεί  iv  τη  ^Αθηναίων  ΐίολίτζία 
Αριστοτέλης  λέγων  οϋτως•  φυλάς  δε  αυτών  συν- 

νενεμησθαί  δ',  άπομιμησαμένων  τάς  iv  τοΐς 
ενιαυτοΐς  ώρας,  ίκάστην  δε  8ιηρησθαι  βίς  τρία 
μ€ρη  τών  φυλών,  όπως  yiVTyrat  τα  πάντα  δώδεκα 
μ^ρη,  καθάπερ  οι  μήνες  εις  τον  ενιαυτόν,  καλεΐσθαι 
δε  α73τά  τριττΰς  και  φρατρίας•  εις  δε  την  φρατρίαν 
τριάκοντα  γένη  Βιακεκοσμησθαι,  καθάπερ  αϊ  ημεραι 
εις  τον  μήνα,  το  δε  γένος  εΐναι  τριάκοντα  άν8ρών. 
(Lexicon  Patm.  p.  152  Sakkel.)) 

6.  Ούτος  ελθών  εις  Ίΐκΰρον  (Αριστοτέλης 
ιστορεί  ότι  ελθών  θήσευς  εις  Έκΰρον  iπι  κατα- 
σκοπην  εικοτως  δια  την  Αίγεως  συγγενειαν  .  .  . 
(Schol.    Vatic,    ad    Eurip.    Hipp.   11))     ετελεύτησεν 

^  Schneidewin :  bμoίq.  μοίρφ  (aut  τιμ^)  codd. 

"  Perhaps  the  formula  of  the  crier  sent  round  to  announce 
the  meetings  of  the  Ecclesia :  cf.  άκούβτΐ,  \^ψ  ('  Oyez  '). 

10 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  Frr.  2-6 

Fr.  2.  Ereehtheus  was  succeeded  as  king  by  Pandion, 
who  divided  up  his  realm  among  his  sons  (giving  the 
citadel  and  its  neighbourhood  to  Aegeus,  the  hill 
country  to  Lycus,  the  coast  to  Pallas  and  the  district 
of  Megara  to  Nisus).  Fr.  3.  And  these  sections  were 
continually  quarrelling  ;  but  Theseus  made  a  pro- 
clamation and  brought  them  together  on  an  equal 
and  like  footing.  <He  summoned  all  on  equal  terms, 
and  it  is  said  that  the  phrase  '  Come  hither,  all  ye 
folks  ' "  was  the  proclamation  of  Theseus  made  when 
he  was  instituting  an  assembly  of  the  whole  people.) 

Fr.  4.  (And  that  Theseus  first  leant  towards  the 
mob,  as  Aristotle  says,  and  relinquished  monarchical 
government,  even  Homer  seems  to  testify,  when  he 
applies  the  term  '  people '  ^  in  the  Catalogue  of 
Ships  to  the  Athenians  only.) 

Fr.  5.  (.  .  .  As  Aristotle  narrates  in  his  Athenian 
Constitution,  where  he  says  :  '  And  they  were  grouped 
in  four  tribal  divisions  in  imitation  of  the  seasons  in 
the  year,  and  each  of  the  tribes  was  divided  into 
three  parts,  in  order  that  there  might  be  twelve 
parts  in  all,  like  the  months  of  the  year,  and  they 
were  called  Thirds  and  Brotherhoods  ;  and  the 
arrangement  of  clans  was  in  groups  of  thirty  to  the 
brotherhood,  as  the  days  to  the  month,  and  the  clan 
consisted  of  thirty  men.')  '^ 

Fr.  6.  He  having  come  to  Scyros  (probably  in  order 
to  inspect  it  because  of  his  kinship  with  Aegeus  ^) 

*  Iliad,  ii.  547. 

"  After  Cleisthenes'  reforms,  510  B.C.,  there  were  ten  tribes, 
each  divided  into  Thirds  and  also  into  ten  or  more 
Demes ;  each  Deme  was  divided  into  Brotherhoods  (number 
unknown),  and  these  perhaps  into  Clans. 

**  Aegeus,  King  of  Athens,  father  of  Theseus,  is  not  con- 
nected in  any  extant  myth  with  the  Aegean  island  of  Scyros. 

11 


ARISTOTLE 

ώσθζΐς  κατά.  ττβτρών  ύπο  Αυκομη^ονς,  φοβηθ€ντος 
μη  σφετβρίζηται.  την  νησον.  ^Αθηναΐοί  8e  ύστερον 
μ€τά  τά  Μηδικά  μ€Τ€κόμίσαν  αύτοΰ  τά  οστά. 
<  Αθηναίοι  μετά  τά  Μτ^δικά  κατά  μαντείαν  άν- 
eXovTes  αύτοΰ  τά  οστά  βθαφαν.  (Schol.  I.e.)) 

7.  Άττό  8e  Κοδριδών  ονκετι  βασιλείς  ηροΰντο, 
δια    το    SoKelv    τρνφάν    και    μαλακούς    γεγονεναι. 

Ιττττομενης  δε  εΐς  των  Κοδριδών  βουλόμενος 
άττώσασθαι  την  ^ιαβολην,  λαβών  επΙ  τη  θνγατρι 
Aei/xcovry  μοιχόν,  εκείνον  μεν  άνεΐλεν  ύποζεύζας 
μετά  της  θυγατρός^  τω  άρματι,  την  δε  ΐππω 
συνεκλεισεν  εως  άπώλετο. 

8.  Του?  μετά  Κ,νλωνος  Βιά  την  τυραννίδα 
επι  τον  βωμον  της  θεον  ττεφενγότας  οι  περί 
Μεγακλεα  άπεκτειναν.  και  τους  Βράσαντας  ως 
εναγείς  ηλαυνον. 

Incipit  codex 

1      I.   .    .    .  (κατηγορονντοςΥ   Μ^νρωνος,  καθ     ιερών 
όμόσαντες,    άριστίν^ην.      καταγνωσθ εντός    δε    του 
άγους,  αύτοι  μεν  εκ  τών  τάφων   εζεβληθησαν,   το 
δε  γένος  αυτών  εφνγεν  άειφυγίαν.     'ΈιττιμενίΒης  δ 
ό  }ίρης  επί  τούτοις  εκάθηρε  την  πόλιν. 

1      Π.  Μετά   δε   ταύτα    συνέβη    στασιάσαι   του?   τε 

^  μΐτα  των  ξνγίων  (sic  Aristoph.  Nub.  122)  coni.  Blass:  seel. 
Koehler.  ^  Wilamowitz  e  Plut.  Sol.  12. 

»  King  of  Athens,  died  1068  b.c.  (by  the  mythical  chron- 
ology). 

^  722  B.C. ;  the  Attic  nobles  deposed  him  in  punishment. 

"  This  nobleman  seized  the  Acropolis  to  make  himself 
tyrant.  When  blockaded  he  escaped.  His  comrades  were 
induced    to   surrender   by   the    archon,    Megacles    of    the 

12 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  Fb.  6— ii.  1 

met  his  end  by  being  thrust  down  a  cliiF  by  Lyco- 
medes,  who  was  afraid  that  he  might  appropriate 
the  island.  But  subsequently  the  Athenians  after 
the  Persian  Wars  brought  back  his  bones.  (The 
Athenians,  after  the  Persian  Wars,  in  conformity 
with  an  oracle  took  up  his  bones  and  buried  them.) 

Fr.  7.  Kings  were  no  longer  chosen  from  the  house 
of  Codrus,"  because  they  were  thought  to  be  luxurious 
and  to  have  become  soft.  But  one  of  the  house  of 
Codrus,  Hippomenes,  who  wished  to  repel  the  slander, 
taking  a  man  in  adultery  with  his  daughter  Leimone, 
killed  him  by  yoking  him  to  his  chariot  with  his 
daughter  [?  emend  '  with  his  team  '],  and  locked  her 
up  with  a  horse  till  she  died.^ 

Fr.  8.  The   associates    of  Cylon"  because    of  his  <'>-Ob.c.? 
tyranny  were  killed  by  the  party  of  Megacles  when 
they  had  taken  refuge  at  the  altar  of  Athena.    And 
those  who  had  done  this  were  then  banished  as  being 
under  a  curse. 

The  MS.  begins  here 

I.  (The  Alcmaeonids  were  tried,  on  the  prosecu-  1 
tion)   of  Myron,  (by  jurymen)   solemnly  sworn  in,** 
selected  according  to  noble  birth.      The  charge  of  sog  b.c. 
sacrilege  having  been  confirmed  by  the  verdict,  the 
bodies  of  the  guilty  men  themselves  were  cast  out 

of  their  tombs,  and  their  family  was  sentenced  to 
everlasting  banishment.  Thereupon  Epimenides  of 
Crete  purified  the  city.  596  b.c. 

II.  Afterwards  it  came  about  that  a  party  quarrel  1 

Alcmaeonid  family,  who  promised  to  spare  their  lives,  but 
then  put  them  to  death.     From  what  follows  in  the  text  it 
appears  that  the  movement  to  punish  this  sacrilege  only 
came  to  a  head  after  Megacles  was  dead  and  buried. 
"*  Lit.  '  having  taken  an  oath  over  the  sacred  victims.' 

13 


ARISTOTLE 

2  γνωρίμους  καΐ  το  πλήθος  πολύν  χρόνον}  ην 
γαρ  αυτών  η  πολιτεία  τοις  τ'  άλλοι?  ολιγαρχική 
ττασι  και  δη  και  ε^ούλευον  οι  πένητες  τοις 
πλουσιοις  και  αύτοι  και  τα  τέκνα  και  αϊ 
γυναίκες'  και  εκαλοΰντο  πελάται,  και  εκτημόροί' 
κατά  ταυτην  γαρ  την  μίσθωσιν  ηργάζοντο  των 
πλουσίων  τους  αγρούς  (η  δε  πάσα  γη  Si*  ολίγων 
ην),  και  ει  μη  τάς  μισθώσεις  άποΒώοΐεν ,  αγώγιμοι 
και  αύτοι  και  οι  παίδες  εγίγνοντο'  και  οι  Βανεισμοι 
πάσιν  επι  τοις  σώ/χασιρ"  ήσαν  μέχρι  δόλωνος• 
ούτος   δε   πρώτος   εγενετο   του   8ημου   προστάτης. 

3  χαλεπώτατον  μεν  ουν  και  πικρότατον  ην  τοις 
πολλοίς  τών  κατά  την  πολιτείαν  το  ^ουλεύειν  ού 
μην  άλλα  και  επι  τοις  άλλοις  εΒυσχεραινον,  ού8εν6ς 
γαρ  ώς  ειπείν  ετύγχανον  μετέχοντες . 

1  III.  Ή  ν  δ  η  τάζις  της  αρχαίας  πολιτείας  της 
προ  Αράκοντος  τοιάΒε.  τάς  μεν  αρχάς  καθίστασαν 
άριστίν^ην  και  πλουτίν^ην  ηρχον  δε  το  μεν  πρώτον 

2  δια  βίου,  μετά  δε  ταύτα  Βεκαετειαν.  μεγισται  δε 
και  πρώται  τών  αρχών  ήσαν  ^ασιλευ?  και  πολέμ- 
αρχος και  άρχων,  τούτων  δε  πρώτη  μεν  η  του 
βασιλέως,  αύτη  γάρ  ην  πάτριος.  Βευτερα  δ' 
επικατεστη  πολεμαρχία  δια  του  γενε'σ^αι  τινάς 
τών  ^δασιλε'ωΐ'  τα.  πολέμια  μαλακούς•  όθεν  και  τον 

3  "Ιωι^α  μετεπεμφαντο  χρείας  καταλαβούσης .  τελευ- 
ταία  δ'    η   τού  άρχοντος•   οι  μεν   γάρ   πλειους   επι 

^  χρονοντονδ-ημον  cod. :  secl.  Kenyon. 

<»  χβλάττ;?,  '  one  who  approaches  as  a  dependent,'  was  later 
used  as  the  Greek  for  cliens. 

*  Apparently   this    became    almost    an   official   title,   see 
c.  xxviii. 
14 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  π.  1— πι.  3 

took  place  between  the  notables  and  the  multitude 
that  lasted  a  long  time.  For  the  Athenian  constitu-  2 
tion  was  in  all  respects  oligarchical,  and  in  fact  the 
poor  themselves  and  also  their  wives  and  children 
were  actually  in  slavery  to  the  rich  ;  and  they  were 
called  Clients,'*  and  Sixth-part-tenants  (for  that  was 
the  rent  they  paid  for  the  rich  men's  land  which 
they  farmed,  and  the  whole  of  the  country  was  in 
few  hands),  and  if  they  ever  failed  to  pay  their  rents, 
they  themselves  and  their  children  were  liable  to 
arrest ;  and  all  borrowing  was  on  the  security  of  the 
debtors'  persons  down  to  the  time  of  Solon  :  it  was 
he  who  first  became  head  ^  of  the  People.  Thus  the  3 
most  grievous  and  bitter  thing  in  the  state  of  public 
affairs  for  the  masses  was  their  slavery  ;  not  but 
what  they  were  discontented  also  about  everything 
else,  for  they  found  themselves  virtually  without  a 
share  in  anything.  ,    -,  '     '"■ 

III.  The   form   of  the    ancient   constitution   that  1 
existed  before  Draco  was  as  follows.     Appointment 
to  the  supreme  offices  of  state  went  by  birth  and 
wealth  ;    and  they  were  held  at  first  for  life,  and 
afterwards  for  a  term  of  ten  years.    The  greatest  and  2 
oldest  of  the  offices  were  the  King,  the  War-lord  and 
the  Archon.     Of  these  the  office  of  King  was  the 
oldest,  for  it  was  ancestral.     The  second  established 
was  the  office  of  War-lord,  which  was  added  because 
some    of    the    Kings    proved    cowardly    in    warfare 
(which    was    the    reason    why    the    Athenians    had 
summoned    Ion    to    their    aid   in    an    emergency)." 
The    last    of   these    three    offices    established    was  3 
that    of  the    Archon,    the    institution    of   which    is 
dated  by  a  majority  of  authorities  in  the  time  of 

"  See  Fr.  1  above. 

15 


ARISTOTLE 

MeSovros,  evLoi  δ'  εττι  ^Ακάστον  φασί  yeveaOai, 
ταντην  τ€κμηριον  δ'  ετηφβρονσιν  or  ι,  οι  ivvea 
άρχοντες  όμνύουσιν  fj  τα}  βττΐ  ^Ακάστον  ορκια^ 
ποίήσείν,  ώς  €7τΙ  τούτου  της  βασιλείας  τταρα- 
χωρησάντων  των  Κοδριδών  αντί  των  8οθ€ΐσών^  τω 
αρχοντι  δωρεών.  τοΰτο  μεν  ονν  όποτερως  ποτ' 
έχει  μικρόν  αν  τταραΧλάττοι  τοις  χρόνοις•  δτι  δε 
τελευταία  τούτων  εγενετο  των  αρχών,  σημεΐον  και 
το  μηΒεν  των  πατρίων  τον  άρχοντα  Βιοικεΐν,  ώσπερ 
6  ^ασιλεύ?  και  6  πολέμαρχος,  αλλ'  απλώς  τά 
επίθετα'   διό    και   νεωστι  γεγονεν  η  αρχή  μεγάλη, 

4  τοις  επιθετοις  αύζηθεΐσα.  θεσμοθεται  δε  πολλοίς 
ύστερον  ετεσιν  ηρεθησαν,  η8η  κατ  ενιαυτον  αιρου- 
μενων  τάς  αρχάς,  όπως  άναγράφαντες  τά  ^εσ/χια 
φυλάττωσι  προς  την  τών  αμφισβητούντων  κρίσιν 
διό    και     μόνη    τών    αρχών    ουκ    εγενετο    πλείων 

β  εΐΊαυσιας•.  τοις  μεν  οΰν  χρόνοις  τοσούτον  προεχου- 
σιν  αλλήλων,  ήσαν  δ  ούχ  άμα  πάντες  οι  εννέα 
άρχοντες,  αλλ'  6  μεν  )3ασιλ€ΐ;$•  εϊχε  το  νυν  καλού- 
μενον  ^ουκόλιον,  πλησίον  του  πρυτανείου  {σημεΐον 
δε•  €τι  και  νΰν  γάρ  της  του  βασιλέως  γυναικός  η 
σύμμειζις  ενταύθα  γίνεται  τω  Αιονύσω  και  6  γάμος), 
6  δε  άρχων  το  πρυτανεΐον,  ό  δε  πολέμαρχος  το 
*Έιπιλυκεΐον     (ο     πρότερον    μεν     εκαλεΐτο    πολεμ- 

^  9j  </oi7jf>  τά  Wilamowitz. 

*  δίκαια  (cf.  Iv.  5  St/ca/os  &p^fiv)  Richards. 

'  αντιτωνδοθεισων  uteris  valde  obscuris  scriptum :    άνταπο- 
δοθΐΐσών  ?  Sandys. 

"  Son  of  Codrus  (see  Fr.  7  above)  and  life-archon. 

*  Medon's  successor. 

"  Or,   with   Sandys's   reading,   '  corresponding  privileges 
being  (at  the  same  time)  assigned  to  the  Archon.' 
<*  The  official  title  of  the  six  junior  Archons. 

16 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  in.  3-5 

Medon,"  though  some  put  it  in  that  of  Acastus,*^  ad- 
ducing in  evidence  the  fact  that  the  Nine  Archons 
swear  that  they  will  perform  their  oaths  even  as  in 
the  time  of  Acastus,  showing  that  in  his  time  the 
house  of  Codrus  retired  from  the  Kingship  in  return 
for  the  privileges  bestowed  on  the  Archon.''  Which- 
ever of  the  two  accounts  is  true,  it  would  make  very 
little  difference  in  the  dates  ;  but  that  this  was  the 
last  of  these  offices  to  be  instituted  is  also  indicated 
by  the  fact  that  the  Archon  does  not  administer  any 
of  the  ancestral  rites,  as  do  the  King  and  the  War- 
lord, but  merely  the  duties  added  later  ;  on  ac- 
count of  which  also  the  Archonship  only  became 
great  in  recent  times,  when  augmented  by  the 
added  duties.  Legislators'*  were  elected  many  years  4 
later,  when  the  elections  to  the  offices  were  now  683  b.c. 
yearly,  to  perform  the  function  of  publicly  recording 
the  ordinances  and  to  preserve  them  for  the  trial  of 
litigants  ;  hence  this  alone  of  the  supreme  offices  was 
never  tenable  for  more  than  a  year.  These  are  the  5 
intervals  between  the  dates  of  the  institution  of  the 
various  supreme  offices.  And  the  Nine  Archons  ^ 
were  not  all  together,  but  the  King  had  what  is  now 
called  the  Bucolium,^  near  the  town  hall  ^  (as  is  indi- 
cated by  the  fact  that  even  at  the  present  day  the 
union  and  marriage'*  of  the  King's  Wife  with  Dionysus 
takes  place  there),  while  the  Archon  had  the  Presi- 
dent's Hall,  and  the  War-lord  the  Epilyceum  (which 
formerly  used  to  be  called  the  War-lord's  House,  but 

*  i.e.  their  official  residences  and  courts. 
'  Otherwise  unknown. 

»  Position  uncertain. 

*  An  annual  ceremony  by  which  the  god  Dionysus  was 
incorporated  as  an  Athenian:  the  lady  personifying  his 
consort  passed  a  night  in  his  temple. 

c  17 


ARISTOTLE 

αρχβΐον,  €7Τ€ΐ  he  Εττίλυκος  άνωκο^όμησ^  καΐ  κατ- 
eaKevaaev  αυτό  ττολβμαρχησας,  ΈτηλυκτβΓον  €κλή- 
θη),  θ^σμοθ^ται  δ'  et)(^ov  το  θ€σμοθ€Τ€Ϊον .  ΙπΙ  he 
ΎιόΧωνος  ατταντέ?  elς  το  θeσμoθeτeΐov  συνήλθαν. 
KvpioL  δ'  ήσαν  καΐ  τάς  δικά?  αΰτοτελει?  KpLveiv, 
/cat  ονχ  ωσ^τep  νυν  TrpoavaKplveLV.  τα  /xev  οΰν 
6  7Γ€/)ΐ  τα?  ap-)(^as  τούτον  el^e  τον  τρόπον.  ή  he 
των  ApeoπaγLτώv  βουλή  την  μέν  τάζιν  et^e  του 
8ίατηρ€Ϊν  τους  νόμους,  hicuKet  he  τα  πλeΐστa  καΐ 
τα  μέγιστα  των  iv  ττ)  rroXeL,  καΐ  κολάζουσα  καΐ 
ζημίοΰσα  πάντας  τους  άκοσμοΰντας  κυρίως'  η 
γαρ  aΐpeσις  των  αρχόντων  άpίστLvhηv  και  πλουτίν- 
8ην  ην,  e^  ων  οΐ  ^ Αρ€οπαγΐταί  καθίσταντο,  διό 
και  μόνη  των  αρχών  αυτή  μeμevηκe  δια  βίου  και 
νυν.  η  μεν  ουν  ττρώτη  πολιτεία  ταύτην  είχε  την 
ύπογραφην . 

1  IV.  Μετά  he  ταΰτα,  χρόνου  τινός  ου  πολλού 
Βιελθόντος,  €π'  * Αρισταίχμου  άρχοντος  δράκων 
τους  θεσμούς  εθηκεν  η   he  τάζις  αϋτη  τόι^δε  τον 

2  τρόπον  elχe.  άπehehoτo  μεν  η  πολιτεία  τοις  όπλα 
παρεχομενοις•  ηροΰντο  δε  τους  μεν  εννέα  άρχοντας 
και  τους  τα^Μία?  ούσίαν  κεκτημένους  ουκ  ελάττω 
δέκα  μνών  ελευθεραν,  τας  δ'  άλλα?  άρχας  τας^ 
ελαττους  εκ  των  όπλα  παρεχομένων,  στρατηγούς 
he  και  Ιππάρχους  ούσίαν  άποφαίνοντας  ουκ  ελάτ- 
τον  η  εκατόν  μνών  ελευθεραν^  και  πaΐhaς  εκ 
γαμέτης  γυναικός  γνησίους  υπέρ  δβκα  ετη  γεγονό- 

^  τάϊ  suppletum  a  Richards  et  aliis. 
^  edd. :   e'KeiSepwv  cod. 

"  Draco  was  presumably  one  of  the  Thesmothetae,  Arist- 
aechmus  being  Archon  Eponymus.     For  Draco's  work  see 

18 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  iii.  5— iv.  2 

because  Epilycus  on  becoming  War-lord  rebuilt  and 
furnished  it,  it  received  the  name  of  Epilyceum)  ; 
and  the  Legislators  had  the  Legislators'  Court.  But 
in  Solon's  time  they  all  came  together  in  the  Legis- 
lators' Court.  They  also  had  power  to  give  final 
judgement  in  lawsuits,  and  not  as  now  merely  to  hold 
a  preliminary  trial.  Such  then  were  the  regulations 
relating  to  the  supreme  offices.  The  Council  of  6 
Areopagus  had  the  official  function  of  guarding  the 
laws,  but  actually  it  administered  the  greatest  number 
and  the  most  important  of  the  affairs  of  state,  inflict- 
ing penalties  and  fines  upon  offenders  agairist  public 
order  without  appeal ;  for  the  elections  of  the 
Archons  went  by  birth  and  wealth,  and  the  members 
of  the  Areopagus  were  appointed  from  them,  owing 
to  which  this  alone  of  the  offices  has  remained  even 
to  the  present  day  tenable  for  life.  This*  then,  was  the 
outline  of  the  first  form  of  the  constitution. 

IV.  And  after  this  when  a  certain  moderate  length  1 
of  time  had  passed,  in  the  archonship  of  Aristaechmus,  «21  β  . 
Draco  enacted  his  ordinances « ;  and  this  system  was 
on  the  following  lines.    Citizenship  had  already  been  2 
bestowed  on  those   who  provided  themselves   with 
arms ;  and  these  elected  as  the  Nine  Archons  and  the 
Treasurers^ '^  who  Λvere  owners  of  an  unencumbered 
estate  worth  not  less  than  10  minae,''  and  the  other 
minor  offices  from  those  who  provided  themselves  with 
arms,  and  as   Generals   and   Masters  of  the  Horse 
persons  proving  their  possession  of  unencumbered 
estate  worth  not  less  than  100  minae  and  sons  legiti- 
mately born  in  wedlock  over  ten  years  of  age.     The 

Politics  1274  b  15  fF. ;  it  is  there  said  that  he  '  adapted  his 
laws  to  a  constitution  that  already  existed.' 

*  For  the  Treasurers  of  Athena  see  xlvii.  I. 

"  Sav  £40. 

19 


ARISTOTLE 

τα?•  τούτους  δ  e8et  8ί€γγναν  τους  7τρντάν€ΐς  και 
τους  στρατηγούς  καΐ  τους  ίπττάρχους  τους  '4νους 
μ^χρι  ευθυνών,  εγγυητάς  δ'  e/c  τοΰ  αύτοϋ  τέλους 
θιγομένους  οΰπερ  οι   στρατηγοί   και   οΐ  ίππαρχοι. 

3  βουλ€υ€ΐν  8e  τετρακόσιους  και  eva  τους  λαχόντας 
€κ  της  πολιτείας•  κληροΰσθαι  Se  και  ταύτην  και  τας 
αΛΛα?  αρχάς  τους  υπέρ  τριάκοντα  ετη  γεγονοτας• 
και  οις  τον  αυτόν  μη  αρχειν  προ  του  παντας 
εξελθεΐν,  τότε  δε  πάλιν  εξ  ύπαρχης  κληροΰν.  εΐ  δε 
τις  των  βουλευτών ,  όταν  Ι'δρα  βουλής  η  εκκλησίας 
η,  εκΑειποι  την  συνοοον,  απετινον  ο  μεν  πεντα- 
κοσιομεΒιμνος   τρεις    8ραχμάς,    ό    δε    ιππεύς    δυο, 

4  ζευγίτης^  δε  μίαν.  η  δε  βουλή  ή  εξ  'Αρείου  πάγου 
φύλαξ  ην  των  νόμων,  και  Βιετήρει  τάς  αρχάς  όπως 
κατά  τους  νόμους  άρχωσιν.  εξην  δε  τω  α6ικουμένω 
προς  την  των  Αρεοπαγιτών  βουλην  είσαγγέλλειν, 
αποφαίνοντι  παρ*  δν  άΒικεΐται  νόμον.  επι  δε  τοις 
σώ^ασιν  ήσαν  οι  δανεισμοί,  καθάπερ  ε'ίρηται,  και 
η  χώρα  δι'   ολίγων  ην. 

1  V.  Τοιαύτης  δε  της  τάξεως  οϋσης  εν  τη  πολιτεία 
και  τών  πολλών  Βουλευόντων  τοις  ολίγοις,  άντεστη 

2  TOtS"  γνωριμοις  ό  8ημος.  ίσχυράς  δε  της  στάσεως 
ούσης  και  πολύν  χρόνον  άντικαθη μένων  άλλήλοις, 
εΐλοντο  κοινή  Βιαλλακτην  και  άρχοντα  Σόλωι^α  και 
την  πολιτείαν  έπετρεφαν  αύτώ,  ποιησαντι  την 
εΛε•}/ειαν  ης  εστίν  αρχή' 

^  δταν  .  .  .  rj]  δτ€  .  .  .  €Ϊη  ?  Richards. 

*  (κλίτΓοι  Heerwerden,  Leeuwen. 

^  <ό>  ^(υ-/ίτη^  Kontos. 

"  Probably  before  Solon's  time  this  denotes  the  Archons. 

'  See  vii.  3.  A  drachma  (say  D^d.  or  1  franc)  was  a 
hundredth  part  of  a  mina  (say  £4). 

'  On  these  quotations  from  Solon  see  Έ.άιηοηάΒ,  Elegy  and 
20 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  iv.  2— v.  2 

new  officials  had  to  bail  the  outgoing  Presidents  <*  and 
Generals  and  Masters  of  the  Horse  till  the  audit, 
accepting   four    sureties   from    the    same    rating  as 
that  to  which  the  Generals  and  Masters  of  the  Horse 
belonged.    And  the  Council  was  to  be  formed  of  four  3 
hundred  and  one  members  chosen  by  lot  from  the 
citizen  bod}*,  and  lots  were  to  be  cast  both  for  this 
and  for  the  other  offices  by  the  citizens  over  thirty 
years  of  age  ;    and  the  same  person  was  not  to  hold 
office  twice  until  the  whole  num.ber  had  been  gone 
through,  and  then  lots  were  to  be  cast  among  them 
again  from  the  beginning.     And  if  any  Councillor, 
whenever   there    was    a   sitting    of  the    Council    or 
Assembly,  failed  to  attend  the  meeting,  he  paid  a 
fine  of  3  drachmae  if  of  Five-hundred-measure  rank, 
2  drachmae  if  a  Knight,  and  1  if  a  Teamster.*     The  4 
Council  of  Areopagus  was  guardian  of  th.p  laws,  and 
kept   a   watch   on   the   magistrates   to   make   them 
govern  in  accordance  with  the  laws.     A  person  un- 
justly   treated   might   lay    a   complaint   before   the 
Council  of  the  Areopagites,  stating  the  law  in  con- 
travention of  which  he  was  treated  unjustly.     Loans 
were  secured  on  the  person,  as  has  been  said,  and  the  ϋ.  2. 
land  was  divided  among  few  OAvners. 
'      V.  Such  being  the  system  in  the  constitution,  and  1 
the  many  being  enslaved  to  the  few,  the  people  rose 
against    the    notables.      The    party    struggle    being  2 
violent  and  the  parties  remaining  arrayed  in  opposi- 
tion to  one  another  for  a  long  time,  they  jointly 
chose  Solon  as  arbitrator  and  Archon,  and  entrusted  594  b.c. 
the  government  to  him,  after  he  had  composed  the 
elegy  "  that  begins  : 

Iambus  (L.C.L,),  vol.  i.  pp.  104  fF.,  especially  pp.  120-121, 
142-143,  and  148-153. 

21 


ARISTOTLE 

γινώσκω,  και  μοι  φρενός  evSodev  άλγ€α  κείται 

πρεσβντάτην  εσορών  γαΐαν  Ίαονίας 
καινομενην^' 

ev  fj  ττρος  εκατβρους  ύπβρ  εκατερων  μάχεται  και 
8ιαμφισβητ€Ϊ,  καΐ  μετά  ταΰτα  Koivij  παραινεί 
3  καταπαύειν  την  ενεστώσαν  φιλονικίαν.  ην  δ'  6 
Σίόλων  τη  μεν  φύσει  και  τη  8όζη  των  πρώτων, 
τη  δ'  ουσία  και  τοις  πράγμασι  των  μέσων, 
ώς  εκ  τε  των  άλλων  ομολογείται  και  αυτός  εν 
τοΐσ8ε  τοις  ποιημασιν  μαρτυρεί,  παραινών  τοις 
πλουσίοις  μη   πλεονεκτεΐν 

ύμεΐς  δ'  ησυχάσαντες  ενι  φρεσι  καρτερόν  ητορ, 
οι  πολλών  aya^oil•'  ες  κόρον  ηλάσατε, 

εν  μετρίοισι^  τίθεσθε  μεγαν  νόον  οϋτε  γαρ  ημείς 
πεισόμεθ\  οΰθ'  ύμΐν  άρτια  ταυτ'*  εσεται. 

και  όλως  atet  την  αιτι'αν  της  στάσεως  άνάπτει  τοις 
πλουσίοις•  δίο  και  εν  αρχή  της  ελεγείας  8ε8οικεναι 
φησί 

την  τε  φιλαργυρίαν*  την  θ*  ύπερηφανίαν, 

ώς  δια  ταΰτα  ^ς  έχθρας  ενεστώσης . 
1  VI.  Κύριο?  δε  γενόμενος  των  πραγμάτων  Σόλων 
τόν  τε  δημον  ηλευθερωσε  και  εν  τω  παρόντι  και 
εις  το  μέλλον,  κωλύσας  ^ανείζειν  επι  τοις  σίό/χασιρ-, 
και  νόμους  εθηκε,  και  χρεών  άποκοπάς  εποίησε 
και  τών  ίδιων  και  τών  8ημοσίων,  ας  σ€ΐσά;ΐ(^€ΐαΓ 

1  κΚίνομένην,  καρφομένην  nonnulli  legunt :  καιομένην  ?  Ed- 
monds. 

*  μέτροισι  Wilamowitz-Kaibel  metri  gratia  (et  Ημεσθε, 
'  cut  to  measure,'  Edmonds). 

8  iravT  nonnulli  legunt :  τ&στ  Edmonds. 

22 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  v.  2— vi.  i 

I  mark,  and  sorrow  fills  my  breast  to  see, 
Ionia's  oldest  land  being  done  to  death, — 

in  which  he  does  battle  on  behalf  of  each  party 
against  the  other  and  acts  as  mediator,  and  after  this 
exhorts  them  jointly  to  stop  the  quarrel  that  pre- 
vailed between  them.  Solon  was  by  birth  and  re-  3 
putation  of  the  first  rank,  but  by  wealth  and  position 
belonged  to  the  middle  class,  as  is  admitted  on  the 
part  of  the  other  authorities,  and  as  he  himself  testi- 
fies in  these  poems,  exhorting  the  wealthy  not  to  be 
covetous  : 

\ 
Refrain  ye  in  your  hearts  those  stubborn  moods. 
Plunged  in  a  surfeit  of  abundant  goods, 
And  moderate  your  pride  !     We'll  not  submit, 
Nor  even  you  yourselves  will  this  befit." 

And  he  always  attaches  the  blame  for  the  civil  strife 
wholly  to  the  rich  ;  owing  to  which  at  the  beginning 
of  the  elegy  he  says  that  he  fears 

Both  love  of  money  and  o'erweening  pride — , 

implying  that  these  were  the  causes  of  the  enmity 
that  prevailed. 

VI.  Solon  having  become  master  of  affairs  made  i 
the  people  free  both  at  the  time  and  for  the  future 
by  prohibiting  loans  secured  on  the  person,  and  he 
laid  down  laws,  and  enacted  cancellations  of  debts 
both  private  and  public,  the  measures  *  that  are  known 

"  '  Nor  shall  ye  possess  what  ye  have  now  without  decrease  ' 
(Edmonds). 

*  Their  actual  provisions  are  quite  uncertain. 

*  φίλοχρηίαΐ'   legit  Edmonds  (cf.  φιΚοχρηματιαν   Plutarch. 
Solon  14). 

23 


ARISTOTLE 

2  καΧοϋσιν ,  ώς  άποσ€ΐσαμ€νων^  το  βάρος,  ev  οις 
π€ΐρώνταί  rives'  ^ιαβάλλβίν  αυτόν  συνββη  γαρ  τω 
Σιόλωνι  μζλλοντι  ποί€Ϊν  την  σ^ισάχθ^ιαν  rrpo^nrelv 
τισΐ  των  γνωρίμων y  eVet^',  ώς  μέν  οΐ  δημοτικοί 
Χ4γουσι,  τταραστρατηγηθηναι  δια  των  φίλων,  ως 
δ'  οι  βονλόμ€νοί  βλασφημ€Ϊν,  καΐ  αυτόν  κοινων€Ϊν. 
8αν€ΐσάμ€νοι  γαρ  ούτοι  συν€πρίαντο  πολλην  χώραν, 
καΐ  μ€τ^  ου  πολύ  της  των  χρ€ών  αποκοπής 
γ€νομ€νης^    €πλούτουν•    όθεν    φασί    yevea^ai    τους 

3  ϋστ€ρον  Βοκοΰντας  eivai  παλαιοπλούτους .  ου  μην 
αλλά  πιθανώτβρος  6  των  Βημοτικών  λόγος•  ου 
γαρ  €ίκός  iv  μεν  τοις  άλλοι?  οΰτω  μίτριον  ytvea^at 
καΐ  κοινόν  ωστ',  εζόν  αύτω  τους  ίτίρους  υπο- 
ποιησάμενον  τυραννεΐν  της  πόλεως,  άμφοτεροις  άπ- 
εχθεσθαί  καΐ  περί  πλείονος  ποιησασθαί  το  καλόν 
και  την  της  πόλεως  σωτηρίαν  η  την  αύτοΰ  πλεον- 
εξίαν,  εν  οΰτω  hk  μικροΐς  και  άναζίοις^  καταρρυπαί- 

4  νειν  εαυτόν.  Οτι  δε  ταύτην  εσχε  την  εζουσίαν,  τά 
τε  πράγματα  νοσοϋντα  μαρτυρεί,  καΐ  εν  τοις  ποιη- 
/Αασιν  αυτό?  πολλαχοϋ  μεμνηται,  και  οι  άλλοι 
συνομολογοϋσι  πάντες,  ταύτην  μεν  οΰν  χρη  νομί- 
ζειν  φευ^η  την  αιτιαν  efvat. 

1  VII.  Πολιτειαν  8ε  κατέστησε  και  νόμους  εθηκεν 
άλλους,  τοις  Βε  /Δράκοντος  θεσμοΐς  επαύσαντο  χρώ- 
μενοι   πλην  των  φονικών,     άναγράφαντες   8ε  τους 

^  Mayor:  αττοσισαμενοι  cod. 

*  Rutherford  :  -γινομένης  cod. 

8  φανεροιζ  incerte  legit  Rutherford. 

24. 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  vi.  l— vii.  l 

as  '  the  Shaking-oiF  of  Burdens,'  meaning  that  the 
people  shook  off  their  load.  In  these  matters  some 
people  try  to  misrepresent  him  ;  for  it  happened  2 
that  when  Solon  was  intending  to  enact  the  Shaking- 
off  of  Burdens,  he  informed  some  of  the  notables 
beforehand,  and  afterwards,  as  those  of  popular 
sympathies  say,  he  was  out-manceuvred  by  his• 
friends,  but  according  to  those  who  want  to  malign 
him  he  himself  also  took  a  share.  For  these  persons 
borrowed  money  and  bought  up  a  quantity  of  land, 
and  when  not  long  afterwards  the  cancellation  of 
debts  took  place  they  were  rich  men  ;  and  this  is 
said  to  be  the  origin  of  the  families  subsequently 
reputed  to  be  ancestrally  wealthy."  Nevertheless,  3 
the  account  of  those  of  popular  sympathies  is  more 
credible  ;  for  considering  that  he  was  so  moderate 
and  public-spirited  in  the  rest  of  his  conduct  that, 
when  he  had  the  opportunity  to  reduce  one  of  the 
two  parties  to  subjection  and  so  to  be  tyrant  of 
the  city,  he  incurred  the  enmity  of  both,  and  valued 
honour  and  the  safety  of  the  state  more  than  his  own 
aggrandizement,  it  is  not  probable  that  he  besmirched 
himself  in  such  worthless  trifles.  And  that  he  got  4 
this  opportunity  is  testified  by  the  disordered  state  of 
affairs,  and  also  he  himself  alludes  to  it  in  many  places 
in  his  poems,  and  everybody  else  agrees  with  him. 
We  are  bound  therefore  to  consider  this  charge  to 
be  false. 

VII.  And  he  established  a  constitution  and  made  1 
other  laws,  and  they  ceased  to  observe  the  ordinances 
of  Draco,  except  those  relating  to  homicide.    They 

"  Apparently  certain  well-known  families,  but  not  alluded 
to  elsewhere. 

25 


ARISTOTLE 

νόμους  els  τους  κύρβεις  έστησαν  eV  rij  στοά  rfj 
^δασιλειω  και  ώμοσαν  χρησβσθαι  vavres'  οι  δ' 
evvea  άρχοντΐς  όμννντβς  ττρός  τω  λίθω  κατβφάτιζον 
avadrjaeiv  ανδριάντα  χρυσονν  εάν  τίνα  παραβώσι 
των    νομών    bdev    ert    /cat    νυν    ούτως    ομνυουσι. 

2  κατ€κΧ€ΐσ€ν   8e  τους  νόμους  εΙς  εκατόν  €τη.      καΐ 

3  δΐ€τα^€  την  πολιτβίαν  TOvSe  τρόττον  τιμηματί 
SielXev^  εΙς  τβτταρα  τέλη,  καθάπερ  Βιγιρητο  καΐ 
πρότ€ρον,  εις  πεντακοσιομβ^ιμνον  καΐ  ίππεα  καΐ 
ζευγίτην  καΐ  θητα'  καΐ  τάς  μεν  αλλα?^  άρχας 
άττένειμεν  άρχειν  €Κ  πεντακοσιομεΒίμνων  καΐ  Ιπ- 
πέων καΐ  ζευγιτών,  τους  εννέα  άρχοντας  και 
τους  ταμίας  και  τους  πωλητάς  και  τους  ένδεκα 
και  τους  κωλακρετας,  εκάστοις  ανά  Χόγον  τω  μεγε- 
θει  του  τιμήματος  άποΒώούς  εκάστην^  αρχήν 
τοις  8e  το   θητικόν   τελοΰσιν   εκκλησίας   και  8ικα- 

4  στηρίων  μετεΒωκε    μόνον.     ε8ει   8ε   τελεΐν   πεντα- 

κοσιομε8ιμνον   μεν    ος    αν    εκ    της*    οικείας    ποιη 

πεντακόσια   μέτρα    τα    συνάμφω    ζηρά    και    υγρά, 

ίππά8α  δε  τους  τριακόσια  ποιοΰντας — ώς  δ'   ενιοί 

φασι,    τους    Ιπποτροφεΐν    8υναμενους•    σημεΐον    8ε 

φερουσι    τό    τε    όνομα    του    τέλους,    ώς    από*    του 

πράγματος      κείμενον,     και     τά     αναθήματα     τών 

αρχαίων     άνάκειται     γαρ     εν     ακροπόλει     είκών 

Αιφίλου^  εφ'  ^  επιγεγραπται  τά8ε' 

1  SieiXev  <avTT]vy  ?  Rutherford. 

*  μέι>  dWas  Diels :  μ  ...  at  cod, :  μΐ-γίσταί  Blass  olim. 

*  ed. :  την  cod.         *  yrjs  Bywater.         *  άτό  ed. :  αναπω  cod. 

'  [Δί0ίλοι/]  Thompson. 

"  Three-sided  (or  perhaps  four-sided)  structures  of  wood 
(or  perhaps  stone)  revolving  on  pivots;  set  up  in  the  Stoa 
Basilike,  the  court  of  the  King-Archon,  on  the  west  side  of 
the  Agora. 

26 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  vii.  1-4 

wrote  up  the  laws  on  the  Boards  °•  and  set  them  in 
the  Royal  Colonnade,  and  all  swore  to  observe  them  ; 
and  the  Nine  Archons  used  to  make  affirmation  on  oath 
at  the  Stone  ^  that  if  they  transgressed  any  one  of  the 
laws  they  would  dedicate  a  gold  statue  of  a  man; 
owing  to  which  they  are  even  now  still  sworn  in  with 
this  oath.  And  he  fixed  the  laws  to  stay  unaltered  for  2 
a  hundred  years.  And  he  arranged  the  constitution  in 
the  following  way  :  he  divided  the  people  by  assess-  3 
ment  into  four  classes,  as  they  had  been  divided 
before,  Five-hundred-measure  nnian.  Horseman,  Team- 
ster and  Labourer,  and  he  distributed  the  other  offices 
to  be  held  from  among  the  Five-hundred-measure 
men,  Horsemen  and  Teamsters — the  Nine  Archons, 
the  Treasurers,"  the  \^endors  of  Contracts,^  the 
Eleven «  and  the  Paymasters,  assigning  each  office 
to  the  several  classes  in  proportion  to  the  amount 
of  their  assessment ;  while  those  who  were  rated  in 
the  Labourer  class  he  admitted  to  the  membership 
of  the  assembly  and  law-courts  alone.  Any  man  had  4 
to  be  rated  as  a  Five-hundred-measure  man  the 
produce  from  whose  estate  was  five  hundred  dry  and 
liquid  measures  jointly,-'^  and  at  the  cavalry-rate  those 
who  made  three  hundred, — or  as  some  say,  those 
who  were  able  to  keep  a  horse,  and  they  adduce  as 
a  proof  the  name  of  the  rating  as  being  derived  from 
the  fact,  and  also  the  votive  offerings  of  the  ancients  ; 
for  there  stands  dedicated  in  the  Acropolis  a  statue 
of  Diphilus  y  on  which  are  inscribed  these  lines  : 

*  Perhaps  the  altar  of  Zeus  Agoraios. 

"  See  xlvii.  1.  "*  See  xlvii.  2.  «  See  Hi.  1. 

f  i.e.  measures  of  corn  and  of  wine  and  oil  amounting  in 
all  to  five  hundred. 

^  '  Of  J^iphilus '  is  probably  a  mistaken  insertion ;  pre- 
sumably the  statue  was  of  Anthemion  himself. 

27 


< 


ARISTOTLE 

Αίφίλον   ^Ανθ€μίων  την8^   άνεθηκε   θεοΐς   .    .    . 
θητικοΰ  άντΙ  τέλους   ίτΓττάδ'   άμειφάμενος — 

/cat  παρεστηκεν  ΐππος  εκμαρτυρών^  ώς  την  ίπττά^α 
τοντο  σημαίνουσαν.  ου  μην  αλλ"  εύλογώτερον 
τοις  μετροις  8ιηρησθαί  καθάπερ  τους  ττεντα- 
κοσιομεΒίμνους .  ζευγίσιον  8e  τελεΐν  τους  Βίακόσια 
τά  συνάμφω  ττοιοϋντας-  τους  δ'  άλλου?  θητικόν, 
ουδεμιάς  μετέχοντας  άρχης,  διό  /cat  νΰν  επεώάν 
ερηται  τον  μέλλοντα  κληροϋσθαί  τιν"  ο,ρχην  ττοΐον 
τέλος  τελεί,  ουδ'  αι^  εις  είττοι  θητικόν. 

1  VIII.  Τά?  δ'  άρχας  εποίησε  κληρωτάς  εκ  προ- 
κρίτων ους  εκάστη  προκρίνειε^  των  φυλών,  ττροΰ- 
κρινεν  δ'  εις  τους  εννέα  άρχοντας  εκάστη  Βέκα, 
/cat'  τούτων  εκληρουν*•  όθεν  ετι  Βυαμένει  ταΐς 
φυλαΐς  το  8εκα  κληροΰν  εκάστην,  εΐτ*  εκ  τούτων 
κυαμεύειν.  ση  μείον  δ'  οτι  κληρωτάς  έττοίησεν^ 
εκ  των  τιμημάτων  ο  περί  των  ταμιών  νόμος 
ω  χρώμενοι  ^ιατελοϋσιν  ετι  και  νυν  κελεύει 
γαρ  κληροΰν  τους  ταμίας  εκ  πεντακοσιομε^ίμνων. 

2  Σόλων  μεν  οΰν  οϋτως  ενομοθέτησεν  περί  τών 
εννέα  αρχόντων  το  γαρ  άρχαΐον  η  εν  "Αρείω 
πάγω  βουλή  άνακαλεσαμενη  και  κρίνασα  καθ* 
αύτην  τον  επιτηΒειον  εφ"   εκάστη  τών  αρχών  επ* 

3  ενιαυτον   άρζοντα^   άπέστελλεν .     φυλαι  δ'   ήσαν    δ* 

^  ds  μαρτύρων  coni.  Blass.  ^  Gertz :  ιτροκριν^ι  cod. 

lu        *  κάκ  Gomperz  fsed  cf.  xxx.  1,  xxxi.  1), 
\V  *  Kaibel-Wilamowitz :  του  .  .  .  ληρονν  cod. 
^  Bury :  ινοιησαν  cod . 

•  Kaibel :  διατάξασα  Kenyon :  ...  τα  vel  ...  σα  cod. 

"  Apparently  the  property  qualification  was  ignored,  with- 
out being  formally  repealed. 

*  i.e.  nine  were  taken  by  lot  out  of  forty  elected  by  vote 
28 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  vii.  4— viii.  3 

Anthemion  Diphilus's  son  dedicated  this  statue  to  tiie  gods 
.  .  .  having  exchanged  the  Labourer  rating  for  the  Cavalry — 

and  a  horse  stands  beside  him,  in  evidence  that 
'  cavalry  '  meant  the  class  able  to  keep  a  horse. 
Nevertheless  it  is  more  probable  that  the  cavalry  were 
distinguished  by  their  amounts  of  produce  as  the 
Five-hundred-measure  men  were.  And  men  had  to 
be  rated  in  the  Teamster  class  who  made  two  hundred 
measures,  wet  and  dry  together  ;  while  the  rest  were 
rated  in  the  Labourer  class,  being  admitted  to  no 
office  :  hence  even  now  when  the  presiding  official 
asks  a  man  who  is  about  to  draw  lots  for  some  office 
what  rate  he  pays,  no  one  whatever  would  say  that 
he  was  rated  as  a  Labourer.'' 

VIII.  For  the  offices  of  state  he  instituted  election  1 
by  lot  from  candidates  selected  by  the  tribes  severally 
by  a  preliminary  vote.  For  the  Nine  Archons  each 
tribe  made  a  preliminary  selection  of  ten,  and  the 
election  was  made  from  among  these  by  lot  ^  ;  hence 
there  still  survives  with  the  tribes  the  system  that  each 
elects  ten  by  lot  and  then  they  choose  from  among 
these  by  ballot.*'  And  a  proof  that  he  made  the 
offices  elective  by  lot  according  to  assessments  is  the 
law  in  regard  to  the  Treasurers  that  remains  in  force 
even  at  the  present  day  ;  for  it  orders  the  Treasurers 
to  be  elected  by  lot  from  the  Five-hundred-measure 
men.  Solon,  therefore,  legislated  thus  about  the  Nine  2 
Archons  ;  for  in  ancient  times  the  Council  on  the 
Areopagus  used  to  issue  a  summons  and  select  inde- 
pendently the  person  suitable  for  each  of  the  offices, 
and  commission  him  to  hold  office  for  a  year.     And  3 

by  the  four  tribes;  whereas  in  the  writer's  day  the  pre- 
liminary election  was  also  by  lot  and  produced  one  hundred 
from  the  ten  tribes.  "  i.e.  by  lot  again. 

29 


ARISTOTLE 

καθάττ€ρ  ττρότζρον  και  φυλοβασιλέΐς  τέσσαρες. 
€Κ  δε  τί^?  φνλης  βκάστης  ήσαν  νβν^μ-ημεναι  τριτ- 
τυ€ς  μεν  τρεις,  ναυκραρίαί  δε  δώδεκα  καθ'  εκαστην, 
€πΙ  δε  τών^  ναυκραριών  αρχή  καθεστηκυία  ναν- 
κραροι,  τεταγμένη  ττρός  τε  τάς  εισφοράς  και  τας 
δαπάνα?  τα?  γινομενας•  διό  και  εν  τοις  νομοις 
τοις  Έόλωνος,  οΐς  ονκετι  χρώνται,  πολλαχον 
γεγραπται  τους  νανκράρονς  είσπράττειν,  και  ανα- 

'ί  λίσκειν  εκ  τοΰ  ναυκραρικον  αργυρίου,  βουλην  ο 
εποίησε  τετρακόσιους,  εκατόν  εζ  εκάστης  φυλής, 
TTjv  δε  των  Αρεοπαγιτών  εταζεν  εττι  το  νομο- 
φυλακεΐν,  ωσττερ  ύττηρχεν  και  ττρότερον  επίσκοπος 
ούσα  της  πολιτείας ,  rj  τά  τε  άλλα  και  τα  πλείστα 
και  τά  ]υ,ε')/ιστα  των  πολιτικών^  Βιετήρει  και 
τους  άμαρτάνοντας  ηϋθυνεν  κυρία  ούσα  και  ζη- 
μιοΰν  και  κολάζειν,  και  τάς  εκτίσεις  άνεφερεν  εις 
πάλιν  ουκ  επιγράφουσα  την  πρόφασιν  τοΰ  εκτινε- 
σθαι/  και  τους  επι  καταλύσει  τοΰ  Βημου  συνιστά- 
μενους εκρινεν,  δόλωνος  θεντος  νόμον  εΙσαγγελίας 

5  περί  αυτών.  ορών  δε  την  μεν  πόλιν  πολλάκις 
στασιάζουσαν  τών  δε  πολιτών  ενίους  δια  την 
ραθυμίαν  αγαπώντας  το  αύτόματον,  νόμον  εθηκε 
προς  αυτούς  ί,'διον,  δς  αν  στασιαζούσης  της  πόλεως 
μη  θήται  τά  όπλα  μηΒε  μεθ*  έτερων  άτιμον  είΡ'αι 
και  της  πόλεως  μη  μετεχειν. 

1  IX.  Τά  μεν  οΰν  περί  τάς  αρχάς  τούτον  είχε  τον 
τρόπον.     δοκεΓ    δε    της    Σίόλωνος    πολιτείας    τρία 

^  ^ν  δ'  έτΓΐ  των  nonnulli  legunt. 
*  ΊΓοΧιτικΰν  coni.  Richards :  πολιτωρ  cod, 
'  ενθνν^σθαί  nonnulli  legunt,  δι'  δ  τό  έκτίνΐσθαι  alii. 

"  The  Naucrariae  were  forty-eight  administrative  districts 
into  which  the  country  was  divided  for  taxation,  each  having 

30 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  viii.  3— ix.  1 

there  were  four  Tribes,  as  before,  and  four  Tribal 
Kings.  And  from  each  Tribe  there  had  been  assigned 
three  Thirds  and  twelve  Ship-boards  "•  to  each,  and 
over  the  Ship-boards  there  was  established  the  office 
of  Ship-commissioners,  appointed  for  the  levies  and 
the  expenditures  that  were  made  ;  because  of  which 
in  the  laws  of  Solon,  which  are  no  longer  in  force, 
the  clauses  frequently  occur,  '  the  Ship-commissioner 
to  levy  '  and  '  to  spend  out  of  the  Ship-commission 
Fund.'  And  he  made  a  Council  of  four  hundred  4 
members,  a  hundred  from  each  tribe,  but  appointed  ^ 
the  Council  of  the  Areopagus  to  the  duty  of  guarding 
the  laws,  just  as  it  had  existed  even  before  as  over- 
seer of  the  constitution,  and  it  was  this  Council  that 
kept  watch  over  the  greatest  number  and  the  most 
important  of  the  affairs  of  state,  in  particular  correct- 
ing offenders  with  sovereign  powers  both  to  fine  and 
punish,  and  making  returns  of  its  expenditure  to  the 
Acropolis  without  adding  a  statement  of  the  reason 
for  the  outlay,  and  trying  persons  that  conspired  to 
put  down  the  democracy,  Solon  having  laid  down  a 
law  of  impeachment  in  regard  to  them.  And  as  he  5 
saw  that  the  state  was  often  in  a  condition  of  party 
strife,  while  some  of  the  citizens  through  slackness 
were  content  to  let  things  slide,  he  laid  down  a  special 
law  to  deal  with  them,  enacting  that  whoever  when 
civil  strife  prevailed  did  not  join  forces  with  either 
party  was  to  be  disfranchised  and  not  to  be  a  member 
of  the  state. 

IX.  This  then  was  the  nature  of  his  reforms  in  1 
regard  to  the  offices  of  state.     And  the  three  most 

to  defray  the  equipment  of  one  battle-ship.  Their  presidents 
were  Naucrari.  Every  four  Naucrariae  formed  a  Trittys,  of 
which  there  were  three  in  each  Tribe. 

31 


ARISTOTLE 


A  > 


ταυτ  €Lvai  τα  όημοηκωτατα,  πρώτον  /xev  /cat 
μεγιστον  το  μτ]  8αν€ίζ€ΐν  ΙπΙ  τοις  σω/^ασιν,  έττειτα 
το  i^eLvai  τω  βουλομβνω  τιμωρ^ΐν  vrrep  των 
αδικούμενων,  τρίτον  δε,  ω^  μάλιστα  φασιν  Ισ^υ- 
κβναι  το  πλήθος,  η  et?  το  ^ικαστηριον  €φ€σις• 
κύριος  γαρ  ων  6  δη/χο?  της-  φηφου  κύριος  γίνεται 
2  της  πολιτείας .  ετι  he  και  δια  το  μη  γεγράφθαι 
τους  νόμους  απλώς  μηΒε  σαφώς,  αλλ  ώσπερ  ο 
περί  τών  κλήρων  και  επικληρων,  ανάγκη  πολλάς 
αμφισβητήσεις  ytVea^at  και  πάντα  βραβευβιν  και 
τα  κοινά  και  τα  ί,'δια  το  ^ικαστηριον.  οϊονται  μεν 
οΰν  τίνες  επίτηδες  ασαφείς  αύτον  ποιησαι  τους 
νόμους  όπως  fj  της  κρίσεως  6  8ημος  κύριος'  ου 
μην  εΙκός,  αλλά  δια  το  μη  δυι^ασθα6  καθόλου  περι- 
λαβεΐν  το  βελτιστον  ον  γάρ  δίκαιον  εκ  τών  νυν 
γινομένων  αλλ'  εκ  της  άλλης  πολιτείας  θεωρεΐν 
την  εκείνου  βούλησιν. 

1  Χ.  Έν  μεν  οΰν  τοις  νόμοις  ταύτα  δό/ίβι  ^etvai 
δημοτικά,  προ  δε  της  νομοθεσίας  ποιησας^  την 
τών  χρεών  άποκοπην  και  μετά  ταύτα  την  τε  τών 
μέτρων    και    σταθμών    και    την    του    νομίσματος 

2  αυ^τ^σίΓ.  εττ'  εκείνου  γάρ  εγενετο  και  τά  μέτρα 
μείζω  τών  Φεώωνείων,  και  η  μνα  πρότερον  έχουσα 
σταθμόν  εβ^ομηκοντα  ^ραχμάς  άνεπληρώθη  ταΓ? 
εκατόν.  ην  δ'  ό  αρχαίος  χαρακτηρ  8ι8ραχμον. 
εποίησε  δε  και  σταθμά  προς  το  ι^ό/χισ/χα,  τρεις  και 

^  δέ,  φ  Lipsius :  δε  cod.  *  νοιησαι  legit  Kenyon. 

"  King  of  Argos,  probably  early  7th  century  b.c,  see 
Politics  1310  b  26.  His  standards  of  coinage  and  weights 
and  measures  came  to  prevail  through  most  of  Greece. 

'  i.e.  seventy   of  the  new  drachmae :    the  drachma  coin 

32 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  ix.  l— x.  2 

democratic  features  in  Solon's  constitution  seem  to 
be  these  :  first  and  most  important  the  prohibition 
of  loans  secured  upon  the  person,  secondly  the  liberty  ■^ 
allowed  to  anybody  who  wished  to  exact  redress  on 
behalf  of  injured  persons,  and  third,  what  is  said  to 
have  been  the  chief  basis  of  the  powers  of  the 
multitude,  the  right  of  appeal  to  the  jury-court — for 
the  people,  having  the  power  of  the  vote,  becomes 
sovereign  in  the  government.  And  also,  since  the  2 
laws  are  not  drafted  simply  nor  clearly,  but  like  the 
law  about  inheritances  and  heiresses,  it  inevitably 
results  that  many  disputes  take  place  and  that  the 
jury-court  is  the  umpire  in  all  business  both  public 
and  private.  Therefore  some  people  think  that 
Solon  purposely  made  his  laws  obscure,  in  order  that 
the  people  might  be  sovereign  over  the  verdict.  But 
this  is  unlikely — probably  it  was  due  to  his  not  being 
able  to  define  the  ideal  in  general  terms  ;  for  it  is 
not  fair  to  -study  his  intention  in  the  light  of  what 
happens  at  the  present  day,  but  to  judge  it  from  the 
rest  of  his  constitution. 

X.  Solon  therefore  seems  to  have  laid  down  these  1 
enactments  of  a  popular  nature  in  his  laws  ;  while 
before  his  legislation  his  democratic  reform  was  his 
cancellation  of  debts,  and  afterwards  his  raising  the 
standard  of  the  measures  and  weights  and  of  the 
coinage.  For  it  was  in  his  time  that  the  measures  2 
were  made  larger  than  those  of  Pheidon,"  and  that 
the  mina,  which  previously  had  a  weight  of  seventy 
drachmae,^  was  increased  to  the  full  hundred.  The 
ancient  coin-type  was  the  two-drachma  piece.  Solon 
also  instituted  weights  corresponding  to  the  cur- 
was  also  enlarged,  so  that  seventy  of  the  new  equalled  one 
hundred  of  the  old  ;  and  see  note  on  iv.  1. 

D  33 


ARISTOTLE 

ζζήκοντα  μνας  το  τάλαντον  άγουσας,  καΐ  ctti- 
8ιβν€μηθησαν  at  τρ€Ϊς  μναΐ  τω  στατηρι  καΐ  τοις 
άλλοι?   σταθμοΐς. 

1  XI.  Διάταζα?  δε  την  ττολιτβίαν  ovTrep  ζΐρηται 
τρόπον,  irretSr]  προσιόντ^ς  αύτω  irepl  των  νόμων 
€νώγλουν  τά  μ^ν  βπιτιμώντβς  τά  δβ  άνακρίνοντζς.) 
βουλόμβνοζ  μητζ  ταύτα  klvclv  μήτ^  άπβχθάνεσθαί 
παρών,  άπο^ημίαν  €ποίήσατο  κατ'  €μπορίαν  άμα 
και  θβωρίαν  ets"  Α!ίγυπτον ,  ειπών  ώς  ούχ  ηζει  δέκα 
ετών,  ου  γαρ  ο'ίεσθαι  δίκαιον  elvai  τους  νόμους 
ζζηγεΐσθαι    παρών    αλλ'    εκαστον    τά    γεγραμμενα 

2  ποιησαι.  άμα  δε  /cat  συνέβαιναν  αντώ  τών  τε 
γνωρίμων  διαφόρους  γεγενησθαι  πολλούς  8ιά  τάς 
τών  χρεών  άποκοπάς,  και  τάς  στάσεις  άμφοτερας 
μεταθεσθαι  δια  το  παρά  8όζαν  αύτοΐς  '^εΐ'ε'σ^αι 
την  καταστασιν.  ο  μεν  γαρ  8ημος  ώετο  πάντ 
άρ'άδαστα  ποιησειν  αυτόν,  οί  δε  γνώριμοι  πάλιν  η 
την  αύτην  τάζιν  άπο8ώσειν  η  μικρόν  παραλ- 
λάζαντα•  ό  δε  Σόλων  άμφοτέροις  ηναντιώθη,  και 
εζόν  αύτω  μεθ'  όποτερων  ηβούλετο  συστάντα 
τυραννεΐν  εΐλετο  προς  αμφότερους  άπεχθεσθαι^ 
σώσας  την  πατρίΒα  και  τά  βέλτιστα  νομοθετησας. 

1  XII.  Ταΰτα  δ'  OTt  τούτον  τρόπον  εσχεν^  οι  τ' 
άλλοι  συμφωνοΰσι  πάντες  και  αύτος  εν  τη  ποιήσει 
μεμνηται  περί  αυτώι^  εν  τοΓσδε• 

8ημω  μεν  γάρ   ε^ωκα    τόσον    γέρας   δσσον    απ- 
αρκεΐ, 
τιμής  οϋτ^  αφελών  ού'τ'  επορεξάμενος, 
^  Wyse :  απεχθΐσθηναι  cod.  *  eixivWilamowitz-Kaibpl. 


The  weight  of  a  fiftieth  part  of  a  mina. 
*  See  V.  2  n. 


34 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  χ.  2— χπ.  ι 

rency,  the  talent  weighing  sixty-three  minae,  and  a 
fraction  proportionate  to  the  additional  three  minae 
was  added  to  the  stater  *  and  the  other  weights. 

XI.  When  Solon  had  organized  the  constitution  \ 
in  the  manner  stated,  people  kept  coming  to  him   j 
and  worrying  him  about  his  laws,  criticizing  some  I 
points  and  asking  questions  about  others  ;    so  as  he  / 
did  not  wish  either  to  alter  these  provisions  or  to  stay  ( 
and  incur  enmity,  he  went  abroad  on  a  journey  to  \ 
Egypt,  for  the  purpose  both  of  trading  and  of  seeing   \ 
the  country,  saying  that  he  would  not  come  back 
for  ten  years,  as  he  did  not  think  it  fair  for  him  to  j 
stay  and  explain  his  laws,  but  for  everybody  to  carry 
out  their  provisions  for  himself.     At  the  same  time  2 
it  befell  him  that  many  of  the  notables  had  become 
at  variance  with  him  because  of  the  cancellations  of 
debts,  and  also  that  both  the  factions  changed  their 
attitude   to   him   because   the   settlement   had   dis- 
appointed them.     For  the  people  had  thought  that 
he  would  institute  universal  communism  of  property,  ^ 
whereas  the   notables   had   thought   that  he  would 
either  restore  the  system  in  the  same  form  as  it  was 
before   or  with  slight   alteration  ;    but   Solon   went 
against  them  both,  and  when  he  might  have  been 
tyrant  if  he  had  taken  sides  with  whichever  of  the 
two  factions  he  wished,  he  chose  to  incur  the  enmity 

of  both  by  saving  the  country  and  introducing  the 
legislation  that  was  best. 

XII.  That  this  is  how  it  happened  is  the  unanimous  1 
account  of  everybody,  and  in  particular  Solon  him- 
self in  his  poetry  ^  recalls  the  matter  in  these  words  : 

For  to  the  people  gave  I  grace  enough, 

Nor  from  their  honour  took,  nor  proffered  more ; 

35 


ARISTOTLE 

ol  δ'  βΐχον  Βυναμίν  /cat  χρημασιν  ήσαν  άγητοί, 
και  τοις  βφρασάμην  μηΒβν  aet/ce?  €χ€ίν• 

€στην  δ  άμφίβαλών  Kparepov  σάκος  άμφοτεροισι 
νικαν  δ    ουκ  βί'ασ    ovSerepovs  ά8ίκως. 

2  τταλιν  δ  άποφαινόμ€νος  Trepl  του  πλ-ηθους  ώς  αύτώ 
Bel  χρησθαί• 

Βημος  δ'  οϋδ'  άν  άριστα  συν  -ηγ^μόν^σσιν  eVotro, 
μητβ  λίαν  άνβθβΐς  μ'ήτ€  βιαζόμ^νος' 

τίκτζΐ  γαρ  κόρος  ϋβρίν  όταν  πολύς  όλβος  '^ττ-ηται 
άνθρώτΓοισιν  δσοις  μη  νόος  άρτιος  rj. 

3  καΐ  πάλιν  δ  €τ€ρωθί  που  Aeyet  π€ρΙ  των  Sla- 
ve ίμασθαι  την  γην  βουλομ^νων 

OL  δ    60    άρπαγαΐσιν  ήλθον  βλττ/δ'  βΐχ^ον^  άφν€άν, 
κάΒόκουν  €καστος  αυτών  ολβον  ^ύρησ^ιν  πύλύν, 
και  μ€  κωτίλλοντα  λίίως  τραχύν  €κφαν€Ϊν  νόον. 
;\;awa  μβν  τότ'  ^φράσαντο,  νυν  δε  μοι  χολούμ^νοι 
λοξόν  όφθαλμοΐσ'  όρώσι  πάντες  ώστ€  Βηιον, 
ου  χρεών  α  μεν  γαρ  είπα  συν  θεοΖσιν  ηνυσα, 
άλλα  δ'  ου  μάτην  εερΒον,  ούΒε  μοι  τυραννίΒος 
ηνΒάνεν'^  βία  τι  ρεζειν,  ούΒέ  πιείρας  χθονος 
πατριΒος  κακοΐσιν  εσθλούς  ίσομοιρίαν  εχειν. 

4  πάλιν^  Βέ  και  περί  της  αποκοπής  τών  χρεών  και 
τών  Βουλευόντων  μεν  πρότερον  ελευθερωθεντων  Βε 
Βιά  την  σ€ΐσάχ^6ί.αν• 

^  έφ'  apirayij  συνηΧθον  κάλττίδ'  ^ΐχον  (commate  infra  post  νόον 
posito)  Ziegler  :  έψ'  άρπαΎαΐ$  ^xovres  ΐλττίδ'  ΐ/λθον  Richards. 

*  Richards :  οί'δαΐ'ίΐ  cod. 

^  πάλιν  Kenyon  :  λ^7"  Kontos  :  lacunam  cod. 
36 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  xii.  1-4 

While  those  possessing  power  and  graced  with  wealth, 
These  too  I  made  to  suffer  nought  unseemly  ; 
I  stood  protecting  both  with  a  strong  shield, 
And  suffered  neither  to  prevail  unjustly. 

And  again,  when  declaring  about  how  the  multi-  2 
tude  ought  to  be  treated  : 

Thus  would  the  people  with  the  chiefs  best  follow, 
With  neither  too  much  freedom  nor  compulsion ; 
Satiety  breeds  insolence  when  riches 
Attend  the  men  whose  mind  is  not  prepared. 

And  again  in  a  different  place  he  says  about  those  3 
who  wish  to  divide  up  the  land  : 

They  that  came  on  plunder  bent  were  filled  with  over-lavish 

hope, 
Each   and   all  imagining  that  they   would   find   abundant 

wealth, 
And  that  I,  though  smoothly  glozing,  would  display  a  purpose 

rough. 
Vain  and  boastful  then  their  fancies ;   now  their  bile  'gainst 

me  is  stirred. 
And  with  eyes  askance  they  view  me,  and  all  deem  me  as  a 

foe — 
Wrongly :  for  the  things  I  promised,  those  by  heaven's  aid 

I  did,  ^ 

And  much  else,  no  idle  exploits  ;   nothing  did  it  please  my 

mind 
By  tyrannic  force  to  compass,  nor  that  in  our  fatherland 
Good  and  bad  men  should  have  equal  portion  in  her  fertile 

soil. 

And  again  about  the  cancellation  of  debts,  and  4 
those  who  were  in  slavery  before  but  were  liberated 
by  the  Shaking-off  of  Burdens  : 

37 


V 


ARISTOTLE 

€γω  δε  των  aev  οϋν€κα  ζυνηγαγον 
οημον,  TL  τούτων  ττριν  τυχ€ΐν  €πανσαμην; 
συμμαρτνροίη  ταντ    αν  iv  Slkt]  \ρόνου 
μήτηρ  μεγίστη  Βαιμόνων  ^Ολυμπίων 
άριστα.  Τη  /xeAatt'a,  της  €γώ  ποτ€ 
ορονς  αν€Ϊλον  πολλαχή  πβπηγότας , 
προσθεν  δε  SovXevovaa,  νυν  iXeudepa} 
πολλούς  δ'  'A^ryj/a?  ττατριδ'  et?  θβόκτιτον 
ανήγαγον  πραθεντας,  άλλον  €κ8ίκως, 
άλλον  Βίκαίως,  τους  δ'  άναγκαίης  ΰπο 
χρειοΰς  φνγόντας,  γλώσσαν  ονκ4τ    ^Αττικην 
ί€ντας,  ως  αν''  πολλαχη  ττλανωμζνους, 
τους  δ    ενθα8*  αύτοϋ  8ουλίην  aeiKea 
έχοντας,  ηθη  Βεσποτών  τρομευμένους, 
ελευθέρους  εθηκα.     ταύτα  μεν  κρατείν, 
ομοΰ^  βίαν  τε  και  Βίκην  συναρμόσας , 
ερεξα  καΐ  Βιηλθον  ώς  ύπεσχόμην 
θεσμούς  θ'  ομοίως  τω  κακω  τε  κάγαθώ, 
ευθείαν  εις  εκαστον  αρμόσας  8ικην, 
έγραφα,     κεντρον  δ'  άλλο?  ώς  εγώ  λαβών, 
κακοφρα8ής  τε  καΐ  φιλοκτημων  άνήρ, 
ουκ  αν  κατεσχε  Βημσν•  εΐ  γαρ  ηθελον 
α  τοις  εναντίοισιν  ην8α)/εν  τότε, 
αυθίς  δ'  α  τόΐσιν  οΰτι^βφ^φρασαίατο , 
πολλών  αν  άν8ρών  ηδΐ  εχηρώθη  πόλις. 
των  οϋνεκ    άλκην  πάντοθεν  ποιούμενος 
ως  εν  κυσίν  πολλησιν  ^^ράφην  λύκος. 

5  και    τταλιν    όνειΒίζων    προς    τάς    ύστερον    αυτών 
μεμφιμοιρίας  αμφοτέρων  \ 

οημω  μεν  ει  χρη  8ιαφρα8ην*  6νει8ίσαι, 
α  νυν  εχουσιν  οϋποτ^  όφθαλμρΐσιν  άν 
38  ' 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  xii.  4-5 

But  what  did  I  leave  unachieved,  of  all 
The  ends  for  which  I  did  unite  the  people  ? 
Whereof  before  the  judgement-seat  of  Time 
The  mighty  mother  of  the  Olympian  gods. 
Black  Earth,  would  best  bear  witness,  for  'twas  I 
Removed  her  many  boundary-posts  "  implanted  : 
^re  then  she  was  a  slave,  but  now  is  free.      ■^K' 
/And  many  sold  away  I^did  bring  home 
To  god-built  Athens,  this  one  sold  unjustly. 
That  otherjustlxj._othiers-tEatTiad  iled 
From'dire  constraint  of  need,  uttering  no  more 
Their  Attic  tongue,  so  widely  had  they  wandered, 
And  others  suffering  base  slavery 
Even  here,  trembling  before  their  master;^'  humour 
I  did  set  free. /These  deeds  I  made  prevaiT 
Adjusting  might  and  right  to  fit  together, 
/And  did  accomplish  even  as  Τ  had  promised. 
And  rules  of  law  alike  for  base  and  noble,        ,  , 
Jitting  straight  Justice  unto  each  man's  case,  ^J-^ 
I  drafted.     Had  anofKerTRaiir myself  '/) 

Taken  the  goad,  unwise  and  covetous. 
He'd  not  have  held  the  people  !     Had  I  willed 
Now  that  pleased  one  of  the  opposing  parties. 
And  then  whate'er  the  other  party  bade  them. 
The  city  had  been  bereft  of  many  men. 
Wherefore  I  stood  at  guard  on  every  side, 
A  wolf  at  bay  among  a  pack  of  houndsJ_______«_ 


And    again   in   his    taunting   reply    to    the    later  5 
querulous  complaints  of  both  the  parties  : 

If  openly  I  must  reprove  the  people. 

Ne'er  in  the  dreams  of  sleep  could  they  have  seen 

"  i.e.  posts  marking  mortgaged  estates. 

^  πρόσθΐν  SedovXevKvTa  vdv  δ'  iXevdipa  Ziegler. 

*  ωσάν  cod.  et  fr.  Berol. :  ώ?  7^  ?  ed. 

'  κρατ€€ίΐ'ομου  cod.,  κρ  ■  τηομου  fr.  Berol. :  Kparei  |  νόμου  edd. 
nonnulli ;  cf.  vi.  1 . 

*  διαφάδην  coni.  edd. 

39 


ARISTOTLE 

evSovres  elSov.   .   .    . 

όσοι  he  μ^ίζους  καΐ  βίαν  άμείνονες 

aivoXev  αν  μ€  και  φιλον  ττοιοίατο• 

et  γάρ  τις  άλλος,  φησί,  ταύτης  της  τιμής  €τυχ€ν, 

ουκ  αν  κατβσχε  8ημον,  ουδ'  επαυσατο 
ττρίν  άνταράζας  ττΐαρ^  e^etAev  γάλα' 
€γώ  8e  τούτων  ωσττερ  ev  μ€ταιχμίω 
όρος  κατβστην. 

1  XIII.  Την  μ€ν  ονν  άποΒημίαν  €ποιησατο  δια 
ταύτας  τάς  αίτιας.  Σ^όλωνος  δ'  άποΒημησαντος, 
€Τί  της  πόλεως  τεταραγμενης ,  επΙ  μεν  ετη  τετταρα 
Βιηγον  εν  ησυχία-  τω  δβ  πεμτττω  μετά  την  Έόλωνος 
άρχην  ουκ  κατέστησαν  άρχοντα  δια  την  στάσιν, 
καΐ    ττάλιν    ετει    ττεμτττω    διά^    την    αύτην    αΐτίαν 

2  άναρχίαν  εποίησαν,  μετά  Βε  ταϋτα  δια  των  αυτών 
χρόνων  Δα/χασια?  αίρεθείς  άργων  ετη  Βυο  και  δυο 
μήνας  ηρζεν,  εως  εζηλάθη  βία  της  άρχης.  είτ* 
εΒοζεν  αύτοΐς  δια  το  στασιάζειν  άρχοντας  ελεσ^αι 
Βεκα,  πέντε  μεν  εύπατρώών  τρεις  δε  άγροίκων 
δυο  δε  Βημιουργών,  και  ούτοι  τον  μετά  Δαμ.ασιαν 
ηρζαν  ενιαυτόν.  ω  και  Βηλον  δτι  μεγίστην  €Ϊχεν 
δυνα/χιν  ο  άρχων  φαίνονται  γάρ  aiei  στασιάζοντες 

3  περί  ταυττ^?  της  άρχης.  δλως  δε  διετεΆουι^  νοσοΰν- 
τες  τα  προς  εαυτούς,  οι  μεν  άρχην  και  πρόφασιν 
έχοντες  την  των  χρεών  άποκοπην  (^συνεβεβηκει  γάρ 
αύτοΐς  γεγονεναι  πενησιν),  οί  δε  τη  πολιτεία 
Βυσχεραίνοντες  δια  το  μεγάλην^  γεγονεναι  ^ετα- 
βολην,  ενιοι  δε  δια  την  προς  αλλήλους  φιλονικίαν . 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  xii.  5— xiii.  4 

The  things  that  they  have  now  .  .  . 
While  all  the  greater  and  the  mightier  men 
Might  praise  me  and  might  deem  me  as  a  friend ; 

for  had  another,  he  says,  won  this  office, 

He  had  not  checked  the  people  nor  refrained, 
Ere  he  had  churned  and  robbed  the  milk  of  cream ; 
But  I  as  'twere  betwixt  their  armed  hosts 
A  frontier-post  did  stand. 

XIII.  Accordingly  Solon  made  his  journey  abroad  1 
for  these  reasons.     And  when  he  had  gone  abroad, 
though  the  city  was  still  disturbed,  foi^our  years 
they  kept  at  peace  ;  but  in  the  fifth  year  after  Solon's  589  b.c.  ? 
archonship   because    of  party    strife    they    did    not 
appoint  an  archon,  and  again  in  the  fifth  year  after  "iss  b.c.  ? 
that  they  enacted  a  suspension  of  the  archonship  for 
the  same  cause.     After  this  at  the  same  interval  of  2 
time  Damasias  was   elected  Archon,  and  held  thessiBx.? 
post  for  two  years  and  two  months,  until  he  was 
driven  out  of  the  office  by  force.     Then  because  of    y 
the  civil  strife  they  decided  to  elect  ten  Archons, 
five  from  the  nobles,  three  from  the  farmers  and  two  " 
from  the  artisans,  and  these  held  office  for  the  year  579  b.c.  ? 
after  Damasias.     This  shows  that  the  Archon  had 
very  great  power  ;  for  we  find  that  they  were  always 
engaging  in  party  strife  about  this  office.    And  they  3 
continued  in   a  state   of  general  internal  disorder, 
some  having  as  their  incentive  and  excuse  the  can- 
cellation of  debts  (for  it  had  resulted  in  their  having 
become  poor),  others  discontented  with  the  constitu- 
tion because  a  great  change  had  taken  place,  and 
some  because  of  their  mutual  rivalry.     The  factions  4 

^  ■κΐα.ρ  edd.  ex  Plutarcho :  ττυαρ  cod. 
^  δίά  fr.  Berol. :  om.  cod. 
^  <ού>  μβ-γάλην  VoUgraf. 

41 


ARISTOTLE 

4  ήσαν  δ'  at  στάσ€ίς  τρεις•  μία  μεν  των  παραλίων, 
ών  προειστηκει  Μεγακλης  6  ^Αλκμεωνος,  οίττ€ρ 
iSoKovv  /ζάλιστα  Βίώκβίν  την  μεσην  ττοΧιτβίαν 
άλλη  δε  των  π€8ιακών,  οι  την  ολίγαρχιαν  εζητονν, 
ηγβΐτο  δ  αυτών  Αυκοΰργος-  τρίτη  δ  η  των 
Βι,ακρίων,     ζφ*     rj     τεταγμένος     ην     Πεισίστρατο?, 

5  Βημοτίκώτατος  eii^at  8οκών.  ττροσεκεκόσμηντο  δε 
τουτοίς  ο?  τε  αφηρημένοι  τα  χρεα  δια  την  άπορίαν, 
καΐ  οι  τω  γένει  μη  καθαροί  δια  τον  φόβον  σημεΐον 
δ'  δτι  μετά  την  των  τυράννων  κατάλυσιν  εποίησαν 
^ιαφηφισμόν^  ως  πολλών  κοινωνούντων  της  πολι- 
τείας ου  προσήκον,  εΐχον  δ  έκαστοι  τάς  επω- 
νυμίας άπο  τών  τόπων  εν  οΐς  εγεώργουν. 

1  XIV.  /^ημοτικώτατος  δ'  efi'ai  Βοκών  ο  Πεισί- 
στρατο? και  σφό^ρ*  εύΒοκιμηκώς  εν  τω  προς 
Μ,εγαρεας  πολεμώ,  κατατραυματίσας  εαυτόν  συν- 
επεισε  τον  Βημον,  ως  ύπο  τών  αντιστασιωτών 
ταύτα  πεπονθώς,  φυλακην  εαυτώ  Souvai  του 
σώματος,  ^Αριστίωνος  γράφοντος  την  γνώμην. 
λαβών  δε  τους  κορυνηφόρους  καλουμένους ,  επανα- 
στάς  μετά  τούτων  τω  Βημω  κατεσχε  την  άκρό- 
πολιν  έ'τει  Βευτερω^   και  τριακοστώ  μετά  την  τών 

2  νόμων  θεσιν,  επί  Κωμεου  άρχοντος,  λέγεται  δε 
Σόλωνα  Πεισιστράτου  την  φυλακην  αιτούντος  άντι- 
λε^αι,  και  εΙπεΐν  οτι  τών  μεν  εϊη  σοφώτερος  τών 
δ'    άι/δρειότερο?•    όσοι    μεν    γάρ    άγνοοΰσι    Πεισι- 

^  διαψηφισμον  edd.  :  διαφημισμον  cod. 
*  δ'  (i.e.  τΐτάρτψ)  coni.  Bauer. 

"  i.e.  by  Solon's  legislation. 

*"  Perhaps  the   hostilities  that   ended   in   the   Athenians' 
capture  of  Nisaea  about  570  b.c. 
42 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  xiii.  4— xiv.  2 

were  three :  one  was  the  party  of  the  Men  of  the 
Coast,  whose  head  was  Megacles  the  son  of  Alcmaeon, 
and  they  were  thought  chiefly  to  aim  at  the  middle 
form  of  constitution  ;  another  was  the  party  of  the 
Men  of  the  Plain,  who  desired  the  oligarchy,  and  their 
leader  was  Lycurgus  ;  third  was  the  party  of  the 
Hillmen,  which  had  appointed  Peisistratus  over  it, 
as  he  was  thought  to  be  an  extreme  advocate  of  the 
people.  And  on  the  side  of  this  party  were  also  5 
arrayed,  from  the  motive  of  poverty,  those  who  had 
been  deprived  <^  of  the  debts  due  to  them,  and,  from 
the  motive  of  fear,  those  who  were  not  of  pure 
descent ;  and  this  is  proved  by  the  fact  that  after  the 
deposition  of  the  tyrants  the  Athenians  enacted  a 
revision  of  the  roll,  because  many  people  shared  the 
citizenship  who  had  no  right  to  it.  The  different 
parties  derived  their  names  from  the  places  where 
their  farms  were  situated. 

XIV.  Peisistratus,  being  thought  to  be  an  extreme  1 
advocate  of  the  people,  and  having  won  great  fame 
in  the  war  against  Megara,**  inflicted  a  wound  on 
himself  with  his  own  hand  and  then  gave  out  that 
it  had  been  done  by  the  members  of  the  opposite 
factions,  and  so  persuaded  the  people  to  give  him  a 
bodyguard,  the  resolution  being  proposed  by  Aristo- 
phon.    He  was  given  the  retainers  called  Club-bearers, 
and  with  their  aid  he  rose  against  the  people  and 
seized  the  Acropolis,  in  the  thirty-second  year  after- 
the    enactment   of  his   laws,   in   the   archonship   of560B.c 
Comeas.     It  is  said  that  when  Peisistratus  asked  for  2 
the  guard  Solon  opposed  the  request,  and  said  that 
he  was  wiser  than  some  men  and  braver  than  others 
— he  was  wiser  than  those  who  did  not  know  that 


43 


ARISTOTLE 

στρατον  εττίπθίμ^νον  rvpavvihi,  σοφώτΐρος  elvat 
τούτων,  δσοι  δ'  ειδότβ?  κατασιωπώσιν ,  avSpeio- 
τερος.  €7Γ€ΐ  8e  Χ^γων  ουκ  eneudev,  ^ζαραμ^νος  τα 
οττλα  ττρο  των  θυρών  αύτος  μ€ν  βφη  β€βοηθηκ€ΐ^αί 
TTJ  πατριοί  καθ^  όσον  ην  δυνατός  {ηΒη  γαρ  σφόΒρα 
πρ€σβύτης   ην),   άζίοΰν   8e   καΐ   τους   άλλους   ταύτό 

3  τοϋτο  TTOLelv.  ΊΰόΧων  μεν  ούν  ούΒβν  ηνυσεν  τοτ€ 
τταρακαλών  ΙΙεισίστρατος  8e  λαβών  την  αρχήν 
8ίωκ€ΐ  τα  κοινά  πολιτικώς  μάλλον  η  τυραννικώς . 
οϋπω  8e  της  αρχής  ερριζωμάνης  ομοφρονησαντες 
οι  7Τ€ρι  τον  MeyaicAea  και  τον  Αυκοΰργον  εζεβα- 
λον  αύτον  €κτω  eVet  μετά  την  ττρώτην  καταστασιν, 

4  6^'  Ήγησίου  άρχοντος.  eVet  δε  δωδεκ-άτω^  μετά 
ταΰτα  περιελαυνόμενος  ο  Μεγακλής  τή  στάσει 
πάλιν  επικηρυκευσάμενος  προς  τον  ΙΙεισίστρατον, 
εφ^  ω  τε  την  θυγατέρα  αύτοΰ  ληφεται  κατηγαγεν 
αύτον  άρχαίως  και  λίαν  απλώς,  προ^ιασπειρας 
γάρ  λόγον  ως  της  ^Αθηνάς  καταγούσης  ΥΙεισί- 
στρατον,  και  γυναίκα  μεγάλην  και  καλήν  εζευρών, 
ώς  μεν  'Ηρόδοτο?  φησιν  εκ  του  8ημου  τών 
riatat'ecuv,  ώς  δ'  ενιοι  λεγουσιν  εκ  του  Κολυττοΰ 
στεφανόπωλιν  θρήτταν  fj  όνομα  Φύη,  την  θεόν 
άπομιμησάμενος  τω  κόσμω  συνεισηγαγεν  μετ 
αύτοΰ,  και  ό  μεν  ΥΙεισίστρατος  εφ  άρματος 
είσηλαυνε  παραιβατούσης  της  γυναικός,  οι  δ  εν 
τω   άστει  προσκυνοΰντες  ε^εχοντο   θαυμάζοντες. 

1  XV.  Ή  μεν  ούν  πρώτη  κάθοδος  εγενετο  τοιαύτη, 
μετά  δε  ταΰτα  ώ?"  έζεπεσε  το  8εύτερον  ετει  μάλιστα 
ζβΒόμω  μετά  την  κάθοΒον, — ού  γάρ  πολύν  χρόνον 


^  τίτάρτφ  Thompson. 
"  ώί  del.  Wilamowitz-Kaibel. 


44 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  xiv.  2— xv.  1 

Peisistratus  was  aiming  at  tyranny,  and  braver  than 
those  who  knew  it  but  held  their  tongues.  But  as 
he  failed  to  carry  them  with  him  by  saying  this,  he 
brought  his  armour  out  "  in  front  of  his  door  and  said 
that  for  his  part  he  had  come  to  his  country's  aid  as 
far  as  he  could  (for  he  was  now  a  very  old  man),  and 
that  he  called  on  the  others  also  to  do  the  same. 
Solon's  exhortations  on  this  occasion  had  no  effect ;  3 
and  Peisistratus  having  seized  the  government  pro- 
ceeded to  carry  on  the  public  business  in  a  manner  "/-^ 
more  constitutional  than  tyrannical.  But  before  his 
government  had  taken  root  the  partisans  of  Megacles 
and  Lycurgus  made  common  cause  and  expelled  him, 
in  the  sixth  year  after  his  first  establishment,  in  the  556  b.c 
archonship  of  Hegesias.  In  the  twelfth  year  after  4 
this  Megacles,  being  harried  by  party  faction,  made 
overtures  again  to  Peisistratus,  and  on  terms  of  re- 
ceiving his  daughter  in  marriage  brought  him  back, 
in  an  old-fashioned  and  extremely  simple  manner. 
Having  first  spread  a  rumour  that  Athena  was  bring- 
ing Peisistratus  back,  he  found  a  tall  and  beautiful 
woman,  according  to  Herodotus  ^  a  member  of  the 
Paeanian  deme,  but  according  to  some  accounts  a 
Thracian  flower-girl  from  Colly tus  named  Phye, 
dressed  her  up  to  look  like  the  goddess,  and  brought 
her  to  the  city  with  him,  and  Peisistratus  drove  in  a 
chariot  with  the  woman  standing  at  his  side,  while  the 
people  in  the  city  marvelled  and  received  them  with 
acts  of  reverence. 

XV.  In  this  way  his  first  return  took  place.     After-  1 
wards,  as  he  was  expelled  a  second  time  in  about  the 
seventh  year  after  his  return — for  he  did  not  main-  539  rc 
tain  his  hold  for  long,  but  came  to  be  afraid  of  both 

"  Apparently,  for  some  younger  man  to  use.         *  i.  60. 

45 


ARISTOTLE 

κατ€σχ€ν,  άλλα  δια  το  μη  βούλβσθαι  rfj  τον  Meya- 
κΧΙους    θυγατρί    συγγίνεσθαι    φοβηθείς    άμφοτερας 

2  τα?  στάσζΐζ  ύπβζηλθβν — •  καΐ^  πρώτον  μβν  συν- 
φκισε  π€ρΙ  τον  θ€ρμαίον  κόλπον  χωρίον  ο  καλείται 
'Ραίκηλος,  €Κ€Ϊθ€ν  δε  TraprjXdev  ei?  τους  nepl 
nayyaiop'  τόπους,  odev  χρηματισάμ€νοζ  και 
στρατί,ώτας  μισθωσάμ€νος ,  βλθών  ei?  'Έιρ€τρίαν 
evheKaTO)  πάλιν  eVei  τό^  πρώτον  ανασώσασθαι  βία 
την  άρχην  βπβχβιρβι,  σνμπροθυμονμ€νων  αυτώ 
πολΧών  μ€ν  καΐ  άλλων  μάλιστα  δε  Θηβαίων  και 
Αυγ8άμιος   τον   Να^ιΌυ,  έτι   δε   τών    Ιππ€ων   των 

3  εχόντων  ev  'Ερέτρια  την  πολιτβίαν.  νικησας  δε 
την  ετΓΐ  Παλλτ^νιδι  μάχην  και  λαβών  την  πόλιν 
και  παρελόμβνος  τον  8ημον  τα  όπλα,  κατ€Ϊχ€ν  η^η 
την  Tvpavviha  β€βαίως,  και  Νάζον  ίλών  άρχοντα 

4  κατίστησβ  Ανγ^αμιν .  τταρειλε^  δε  του  Βημου  τά 
όπλα  τόνδε  τον  τρόπον  Ιζοπλασίαν  iv  τω  θησ€ΐω* 
ποιησάμ€νος  βκκλησιάζβιν  Ιπβχείρ^ι,  της  δε  φωνής 
€χάλασ€ν^  μικρόν,  ου  φασκόντων  δε  κατακούΐΐν 
ε/<:ε'λευσεν  αυτού?  προσαναβηναι  προς  το  πρόπυλον 
της  άκροπόλξως  ίνα  γεγώνη  μα?<λον•  iv  ω  δ' 
€Κ€Ϊνος  Βιίτριβζ  Βημηγορών,  άνβλόντΐς  οι  εττι 
τοντω  τβταγμίνοι  τά  όπλα  και  κατακλησαντβς  ει? 
τά    πλησίον    οικήματα    τον    θησ€ίον    8ΐ€σημηναν 

δ  €λθόντ€ς  προς  τον  ΙΙβισίστρατον.  ο  δε  εττει  τόι^ 
άλλον  λόγον  εττετε'λεσεν,  είπε  και  ττερι  τών  οπλών 
το    γεγονός    ως    ου   χρη    θαυμάζειν    ούδ'    άθνμβΐν, 

^  καΐ  fortasse  delendum  Kenyon.  *  τύτ€  Blass. 

'  irapelXero  Rutherford. 

*  Άνακΐίφ  legunt  nonnulli. 

*  Kontos :  τ a^ec  (?)  cod. :   φθέγ^ΐσθα,ι  δ' 

έσίΓούδασΐν     Wilamowitz-Kaibel :      καΐ     χρόνον     irpoa^yoptvev 
Kenyon. 

46 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  xv.  1-5 

the  factions  owing  to  his  unwilhngness  to  live  with 
Megacles'  daughter  as  his  wife,  and  secretly  with- 
drew— ;  and  first  he  collected  a  settlement  at  a  place  2 
near  the  Gulf  of  Thermae  called  Rhaecelus,  but  from 
there  he  went  on  to  the  neighbourhood  of  Pangaeus, 
from  where  he  got  money  and  hired  soldiers,  and  in 
the  eleventh  year  went  again  to  Eretria,  and  now  for  528 b.c? 
the  first  time  set  about  an  attempt  to  recover  his 
power  by  force,  being  supported  in  this  by  a  number 
of  people,  especially  the  Thebans  and  Lygdamis  of 
Naxos,  and  also  the  knights  who  controlled  the 
government  of  Eretria.  Winning  the  battle  of  3 
Pallenis,"  he  seized  the  government  and  disarmed  the 
people  ;  and  now  he  held  the  tyranny  firmly,  and  he 
took  Naxos  and  appointed  Lygdamis  ruler.  The  4 
way  in  which  he  disarmed  the  people  was  this  :  he 
held  an  armed  muster  at  the  Temple  of  Theseus,  and 
began  to  hold  an  Assembly,  but  he  lowered  his  voice 
a  little,  and  when  they  said  they  could  not  hear  him, 
he  told  them  to  come  up  to  the  forecourt  of  the  Acro- 
polis, in  order  that  his  voice  might  carry  better  ;  and 
while  he  used  up  time  in  making  a  speech,  the  men 
told  off  for  this  purpose  gathered  up  the  arms,^  locked 
them  up  in  the  neighbouring  buildings  of  the  Temple 
of  Theseus,  and  came  and  informed  Peisistratus.  He,  5 
when  he  had  finished  the  rest  of  his  speech,  told  his 
audience  not  to  be  surprised  at  what  had  happened 
about  their  arms,  and  not  to  be  dismayed,  but  to  go 

"  The  deme  Pallene,  dedicated  to  Athena  Pallenis,  lay  just 
N.E.  of  Athens. 

*  The  citizens  had  piled  their  arms  when  Peisistratus 
began  to  make  a  speech,  and  left  them  behind  when  they 
went  up  the  hill. 

47 


ARISTOTLE 

αλλ  απβλθόντας  εττι  τών  ί^ίων  eti^ai,  των  δε  κοινών 
αυτός  €7ημ€λήσ€σθαί  πάντων. 

1  XVI.  Ή  μ€ν  οδν  ΐΐ€ίσίστράτου  τυραννίς  i^ 
ο-ρχης   re    κατέστη   τούτον  τον  τρόπον   καΐ   μ€τα- 

2  βολάς  €σχζ  τοσαντας .  8ίωκ€ΐ  δ'  ο  Πεισίστρατο?, 
ωσπβρ  βϊρηται,  τα  περί  την  πάλιν  μετρίως  και 
μάλλον  πολιτικώς  η  τυραννικώς•  ev  τ€  γαρ  τοις 
άλλοις  φιλάνθρωπος  ην  και  πράος  και  τοις  άμαρ- 
τανουσι   συγγνωμονικός ,   και   8η   και  τοις  άπόροις 

Χπροβ^άνειζε  χρήματα  προς  τάς  εργασίας,  ώστε 
3ίβιατρεφεσθαι  γεωργοΰντας .  τοντο  δ'  εποίει  hvolv 
χάριν,  ίνα  μήτε  εν  τω  άστει  Βιατρίβωσιν  άλλα 
διεσπαρμένοι  κατά  την  χώραν,  και  όπως  εν- 
ποροΰντες  τών  μέτριων  και  προς  τοις  ίδιοι?  δντες 
μητ      επιθνμώσι    μήτε     σχολάζωσιν     επίιαελεισ^αι 

4  τών  κοινών.  άμα  δε  συνεβαινεν  αύτώ  και  τάς 
προσόδους  γινεσ^αι  μείζονς  εζεργαζομενης  της 
■χωράς'  επραττετο  γαρ  απο  τών  γιγνομενων  Βεκά- 

5  την.  διό  και  τους  κατά  Βημους  κατεσκεύασε^ 
Βικαστας ,  και  αύτος  ^ζηει  πολλάκις  εις  την  χώραν 
επισκοπών  και  διαλύωι^  τους  Βιαφερομενονς ,  όπως 
μη    καταβαίνοντες    εις    το    άστυ    παραμελώσι    τών 

6  έργων.  τοιαύτης  γάρ  τίνος  εξόδου  τω  Πεισί- 
στρατο) γιγνομενης  συμβηναί  φασι  τά  περί  τον  εν 
τω  Ύμηττώ  γεωργοΰντα  το  κληθέν  ύστερον  χωρίον 
ατελές.  ώων  γάρ  τίνα  παντελώς  πέτρας  σκά- 
πτοντα  και  εργαζόμενον,  δια  το  ^αυ/^άσαι  τον 
τταιδα  εκελευσεν  ερεσθαι  τί  γίγνεται  εκ  του  χωρίου' 
ο  δε  "  οσα  κακά  και  οδιίι^αι  "  εφη,  "  και  τούτων 
τών    κακών    και    τών    ό8υνών^    ΐίεισίστρατον    δει 

^  Wilamowitz-Kaibel :  κατεσκβναξ'ΐ  cod. 
*  [τών  κακών  καΐ  ύδινώΐ']  Hude. 

48 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  xv.  5— x\i.  6 

away  and  occupy  themselves  with  their  private  affairs,  '  ι 
while  he  would  attend  to  all  public  business.  '  ^ 

XVI.   This  was  the  way,  therefore,  in  which  the  1 
tyranny  of  Peisistratus  was  originally  set  up,  and 
this   is   a   list    of  the    changes   that    it    underwent. 
Peisistratus 's  administration  of  the  state  was,  as  has  2 
been  said,"  moderate,  and  more  constitutional  than 
tyrannic  ;  he  was  kindly  and  mild  in  everything,  and 
in  particular  he  was  merciful  to  offenders,  and  more- 
over he  advanced  loans  of  money  to  the  poor  for  their 
industries,  so  that  they  might  support  themselves  by  i/ 
farming.     In  doing  this  he  had  two  objects,  to  pre-  3 
vent  their  stopping  in  the  city  and  make  them  stay 
scattered  about  the  country,  and  to  cause  them  to 
have  a  moderate  competence  and  be  engaged  in  their 
private  affairs,  so  as  not  to  desire  nor  to  have  time 
to  attend  to  public  business.*     And  also  the  land's  4 
being  thoroughly  cultivated  resulted  in  increasing  his 
revenues  ;    for  he  levied  a  tithe  from  the  produce. 
And  for  this  reason  he  organized  the  Local  Justices,"  5 
and  often  went  to  the  country  on  circuit  in  person, 
inspecting  and  settling  disputes,  in  order  that  men 
might  not  neglect  their  agriculture  by  coming  into 
the  city.     For  it  was  when  Peisistratus  was  making  6 
an  expedition  of  this  kind  that  the  affair  of  the  man 
on  Hymettus  cultivating  the  farm  afterwards  called 
Tax-free  Farm  is  said  to  have  occurred.     He  saw  a 
man  at  farm-work,  digging  mere  rocks,  and  because 
of  his  surprise  ordered  his  servant  to  ask  what  crop 
the  farm  grew  ;  and  the  man  said,  "  All  the  aches  and 
pains  that  there  are,  and  of  these  aches  and  pains 

"  ch.  xiv.  §  3. 

''  This  policy  will  be  found  expressed  in  general  formulae 
in  Politics  1311  a  13,  1318  b  6,  1319  a  30,  1320  b  7. 
"  See  xxvi.  5,  liii.  1. 

Ε  49 


ARISTOTLE 

λαββΐν  ΤΎΐν  ^€κάτην."  ο  μ€ν  οΰν  άνθρωπος  άπ- 
εκρίνατο  άγνοών,  6  8e  Πεισίστρατο?  rjadels  δια 
την   τταρρησίαν   και  την  φιλ^ργιαν   areXri  άτταντων 

7  €ποίησ€ν  αυτόν.  ovSev  δε  το  πλήθος  ουδ'  iv  τοις 
άλλοις  παρηνώχλ€ΐ^  κατά  την  αρχήν,  αλλ'  atet 
παρ€σκβύαζ€ν  βίρήνην  και  ^τηρβι  την  ησυχιαν 
διό  καΐ  πολλάκις  άκούβιν  ήν^  ώς  ή  Πεισίστρατου 
τυραννίς  6  εττι  Κρόνου  βίος  €Ϊη•  συνββη  γάρ  ύστερον 
διαδε^α/χενων    τών    νΐ€ων    πολλω   "γβνέσθαι    τρα- 

8  χυτβραν  την  αρχήν.  μ€γιστον  δε  τταντων  ην  τών 
^ψημένων  το  Βημοτικόν  είναι  τω  ήθει  και 
φιλάνθρωπον.  ev  τε  yap  τοΓ?  άλλοι?  ε^ουλετο 
πάντα  διοικεΐν  κατά  τους  νόμους  ουδερ,ι'αν  εαυτώ 
ττλεονε^ιαν  διδου?,  και  77θτε  προσκληθείς  φόνου 
8ικην  ει?  "ΑρειΌν  Trciyov  αυτό?  ρ,εν  άπτ^νττ^σεν  ώ? 
άπολογησόμενος    ό    δε    προσκαλεσάμβνος    φοβηθείς 

9  ελιπεν.  διό  και  ττολυν  χρόνον  εμεινεν  ev'  ττ]  άρχη, 
και  οτ'  εκττε'σοι  ττάλιν  ανελάμβανε  ραΒίως.  εβού- 
λοντο  γάρ  και  τών  γνωρίμων  και  τών  δημοτικών 
οι  πολλοί•  τους  μεν  γάρ  ταΐς  όρ,ιλιαι?  του?  δε  ται? 
ει?    τά   ί'δια    βοηθέ ίαις   προσήγετο,   και    προς    άμ- 

10  φοτερους  επεφύκει  καλώς.  ήσαν  δε  και  τοι? 
Αθηναίοις  οι  περί  τών  τυράννων  νόμοι  πράοι 
κατ  εκείνους  τους  καιρούς  οι  τ  άλλοι  και  8ή 
και  ο  μάλιστα  καθήκων  προς  την  της  τυραννιδο? 
κατάστασιν.*  νόμος  γάρ  αύτοΐς  ην  οδε•  θεσμια 
τάδε    Αθηναίων   και   πάτρια,   εάν   τίνες   τυραννεΐν 

^  Wyse  :  παρωχλ€ΐ  cod. 

*  άκού€ΐν  ijv  Blass  e  [Plat.]  Ilipparch.  229  β  :  abrasus  cod. 

'  iv  supplevit  Blass. 

*  κατάστασιν  insertuni  a  Wilaniowitz-Kaibel. 

50 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  xvi.  6-10 

Peisistratus  has  to  get  the  tithe."  The  man  did  not 
know  who  it  was  when  he  answered,  but  Peisistratus 
was  pleased  by  his  free  speech  and  by  his  industry, 
and  made  him  free  from  all  taxes.  And  in  all  other  7 
matters  too  he  gave  the  multitude  no  trouble  during 
his  rule,  but  always  worked  for  peace  and  safeguai-ded 
tranquillity  ;  so  that  men  were  often  to  be  heard 
saying  that  the  tyranny  of  Peisistratus  was  the  Golden 
Age  of  Cronos  ;  for  it  came  about  later  when  his  sons 
had  succeeded  him  that  the  government  became 
much  harsher.  And  the  greatest  of  all  the  things  8 
said  of  him  was  that  he  was  popular  and  kindly  in 
temper.  For  he  was  willing  to  administer  everything  y 
according  to  the  laws  in  all  matters,  never  giving 
himself  any  advantage  ;  and  once  in  particular  when 
he  was  summoned  to  the  Areopagus  to  be  tried  on  a 
charge  of  murder,  he  appeared  in  person  to  make  his 
defence,  and  the  issuer  of  the  summons  was  frightened 
and  left.  Owing  to  this  he  remained  in  his  office  for  9 
a  long  period,  and  every  time  that  he  was  thrown 
out  of  it  he  easily  got  it  back  again.  For  both  the 
notables  and  the  men  of  the  people  were  most  of 
them  willing  for  him  to  govern,  since  he  won  over  the 
former  by  his  hospitality  and  the  latter  by  his  assist- 
ance in  their  private  affairs ,  and  was  good-natured 
to  both.  And  also  the  laws  of  Athens  concerning  lo 
tyrants  were  mild  at  those  periods,  among  the  rest 
particularly  the  one  that  referred  to  the  establish- 
ment of  tyranny.  For  they  had  the  following  law  : 
'  These  are  the  ordinances  and  ancestral  principles 
of  Athens  :    if  any  persons  rise  in  insurrection  in 

51 


ARISTOTLE 

€7τανιστώνται    [eTrl    τυραννί8ίΥ    η    συγκαθισττ)    την 
τυραννίδα  ατιμον  elvai  αντον  καΐ  yevog.^ 

1  XVII.  ΐΐ€ΐσίστρατος  μ^ν  οΰν  εγκατβγ-ήρασβ  rfj 
apxfj  καΐ  airedave  νοσησας  βττΐ  Φιλόν6ω  άρχοντος, 
αφ  ου  μβν  κατβστη  το  πρώτον  τύραννος  βτη 
τριάκοντα  καΐ  τρία  βιώσας,  α  δ  iv  ττ)  αρχ-η 
8te/xeivev  βνος  δέοντα  είκοσι,  e^euye  γαρ  τα  Χοίττά. 

2  διό  καΐ  φανξρώς  ληροΰσι^  φάσκοντ€ς  €ρώμ€νον 
elvai  ΐΐβίσίστρατον  Έόλωνος  καΐ  στρατηγ€Ϊν  ev 
τω  ττρός  Meyapea?  ττοΧάμω  περί  Έαλαμΐνος•  ου 
γαρ  ivSexeTai  ταΐς  ηλικίαις,  βάν  τις  άναλογίζηται 
τον  εκατβρου  βιον  και  βφ  ου  αττεθανεν  άρχοντος. 
τ€λ€υτησαντος  δε  Πεισιστράτου  κατ€Ϊχον  οι  υΐίΐς 
την  αρχήν,  ττροαγαγόντβς*  τα  πράγματα  τον  αύτον 
τρόπον,  ήσαν  δε  δυο  μ€ν  €Κ  της  γαμ€της  Ιππίας 
και  "Ιππαρχος,  δυο  δ'  €Κ  της  ^Αργείας  Ίοφών  και 
'Υίγησίστρατος      ω      παρωνύμιον      ην      Θετταλο?. 

3  ξ,γημεν^  γαρ  Πεισίστρατο?  ef  "Αργού?  ανδρός 
^Αργβίου  θυγατέρα  ω  όνομα  ην  Τόργιλος,  Ύιμώνασ- 
σαν,  ην  πρότ€ρον  €σχ€ν  γυναίκα  ^Αρχΐνος  6  Αμ- 
πρακιώτης  των  Κυι/τελιδώι^•    δθβν  και  η  προς  τους 

Αργβιους  ανέστη  φιλία,  και  συνβμαχβσαντο  χίλιοι 
την  ετΓΐ  Παλληνιδι  μάχην,  ΥΙγησιτρατου  κομι- 
σαντος.  γτ^ρ,αι  δε'  ^ασι  την  ^Αργίίαν  οι  μέν 
€κπ€σόντα  το  πρώτον,  οΐ  δε  κατέχοντα  την  άρχην. 
1  XVIII.  Ήσαν  δε  κύριοι  μέν  τών  πραγμάτων 
δια  τα  άζιώματα  και  δια  τα?  ηλικίας  "Ιππαρχος 
και  ΊτττΓία?,  πρεσβύτερος  δ'  ων  6  *\ππίας  και  τη 

1  Keil. 

*  ijirav  δέ  .  .  .  y^vos]  totus  locus  conflatus  et  interpolatus  ?  ed. 

'  Χηροΰσιν  <οί>  edd.  *  vpoayovres  edd. 

'  <,έττ^4γημΐν  edd.,  coll.  Pint.  Cato  mat.  24. 

52 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  xvi.  10— xviii.  1 

order  to  govern  tyrannically,  or  if  any  person  assists 
in  establishing  the  tyranny,  he  himself  and  his  family 
shall  be  disfranchised.''' 

XVII.  Peisistratus,therefore,grew  old  in  office,  and  1 
died  of  disease  in  the  archonship  of  Philoneos,  having  528  b.c. 
lived   thirty-three   years    since   he   first    established 
himself  as  tyrant,  but  the  time  that  he  remained  in 
office  was  nineteen^  years,  as  he  was  in  exile  for  the 
remainder.    Therefore  the  story  that  Peisistratus  was  2 

a  lover  of  Solon  and  that  he  commanded  in  the 
war  against  Megara  for  the  recovery  of  Salamis 
is  clearly  nonsense,  for  it  is  made  impossible  by  their 
ages,  if  one  reckons  up  the  life  of  each  and  the 
archonship  in  which  he  died.  When  Peisistratus  was 
dead,  his  sons  held  the  government,  carrying  on 
affairs  in  the  same  Λvay.  He  had  two  sons  by  his 
wedded  wife,  Hippias  and  Hipparchus,  and  two  by  his 
Argive  consort,  lophon  and  Hegesistratus  surnamed 
Thettalus.  For  Peisistratus  married  a  consort  from  3 
Argos,  Timonassa,  the  daughter  of  a  man  of  Argos 
named  Gorgilus,  who  had  previously  been  the  wife 
of  Archinus,  a  man  of  Ambracia  of  the  Cypselid 
family.  This  was  the  cause  of  Peisistratus 's  friend- 
ship with  Argos,  and  a  thousand  Argives  brought  by 
Hegesistratus  fought  for  him  in  the  battle  of  Pallenis." 
Some  people  date  his  marriage  with  the  Argive  lady 
during  his  first  banishment,  others  in  a  period  of 
office. 

XVIII.  Affairs  were  now  under  the  authority  of  1 
Hipparchus  and  Hippias,  owing  to  their  station  and 
their  ages,  but   the  government  was  controlled  by 

"  The  genuineness  of  §  10  may  be  questioned.  ^ 

*  Politics  1315  b  31  says  '  seventeen.' 
"  See  XV.  8. 

53 


ARISTOTLE 

φύσβι  τΓολίτίκος  /cat  βμφρων  εττεστάτει  της  άρχης' 
6  δε  "Ιππαρχος  τταιδιώδτ^ς•  καΐ  ερωτικός  καΐ 
φιλόμουσος  ην  {και  τους  πβρι  ^Ανακρέοντα  και 
Έιίμωνώην    και   τους    άλλους    ποιητάς    ούτος    ην    6 

2  μεταπεμπόμβνος)  y  Θετταλος  Se  νεώτερος  πολύ  και 
τω  βίω  θρασύς  και  υβριστής,  άφ^  ου  και  συνέβη 
την  αρχήν  αύτοΐς  yerea^ac  πάντων  των  κακών, 
ερασθεις  γαρ  του  'Αρμοδίου  και  ^ιαμαρτάνων  της 
προς  αυτόν  φιλίας  ου  κατείχε  τήν  οργήν,  αλλ'  εν 
τε  τοις  άλλοις  ενεσημαίνετο  πικρώς  και  το 
τελενταΐον  μελλουσαν  αύτοϋ  τήν  άΒελφήν  κανη- 
φορεΐν  ΐΐαναθηναίοις  εκώλυσεν,  λοώορήσας  τι  τον 
ΆρμόΒιον  ώς  μαλακόν  οντά'  όθεν  συνέβη  παρ- 
οζυνθεντα    τον  ΆρμόΒιον   και  τον    ^ Αριστογείτονα 

3  πράττειν  τήν  πράξιν  μετεχόντων^  πολλών.^  ή8η 
δε  παρατηροΰντες  εν  άκροπόλει  τοις  Παι^- 
αθηναίοις  Ίππίαν  {ετύγχανεν  γαρ  ούτος  μεν  δε- 
χόμενος 6  δ'  "\ππαρχος  άποστελλων  τήν  πομπήν), 
ιδοΓτε?  τινά  τών  κοινωνούντων  της  πράξεως 
φιλανθρώπως  εντυγχάνοντα  τω  Ιππία  και  νομί- 
σαντες  μηνύειν,  βουλόμενοί  τι  δράσαι  προ  της 
συλλήψεως,  καταβάντες  και  προεζαναστάντες  τών 
άλλων,     τον     μεν     "Ιππαρχον     8ιακοσμοΰντα     τήν 

4  πομπήν  παρά  το  Αεωκόρειον  άπεκτειναν,  τήν  δ' 
ολην  ελυμήναντο  πράζιν,  αυτών  δ'  6  μεν  'Αρ- 
μόδιος   ευθέως    ετελεύτησεν    ΰπο    τών    8ορυφόρων, 

r 

^  μετά  ΊΓοΧιτών  nonnulli  legunt. 
*  <οΰ>  πολλών  Kaibel  e  Thuc. 
54 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  xviii.  1-4 

Hippias,  who  was  the  elder  and  was  statesmanUke 
and  wise  by  nature  ;  whereas  Hipparchus  was  fond 
of  amusement  and  love-making,  and  had  literary 
tastes  :  it  was  he  who  brought  to  Athens  poets  such  as 
Anacreon  and  Simonides,  and  the  others.  Thettalus  2 
was  much  younger,  and  bold  and  insolent  in  his  mode 
of  life,  which  proved  to  be  the  source  of  all  their  mis- 
fortunes. For  he  fell  in  love  with  Harmodius,  and 
when  his  advances  were  continually  unsuccessful  he 
could  not  restrain  his  anger,  but  displayed  it  bitterly 
in  various  ways,  and  finally  when  Harmodius's  sister 
was  going  to  be  a  Basket-carrier "  in  the  procession 
at  the  Panathenaic  Festival  he  prevented  her  by 
uttering  some  insult  against  Harmodius  as  being 
effeminate  ;  and  the  consequent  wrath  of  Harmodius 
led  him  and  Aristogeiton  to  enter  on  their  plot  with  a 
number  **  of  accomplices.  At  the  Panathenaic  Festival  3 
on  the  Acropolis  they  were  already  keeping  a  watch  514  b.c•. 
on  Hippias  (who  happened  to  be  receiving  the  pro- 
cession, while  Hipparchus  was  directing  its  start), 
when  they  saw  one  of  their  partners  in  the  plot  con- 
versing in  a  friendly  way  with  Hippias.  They  thought 
that  he  was  giving  information,  and  wishing  to  do 
something  before  their  arrest  they  went  down  and 
took  the  initiative  without  waiting  for  their  confeder- 
ates, killing  Hipparchus  as  he  was  arranging  the  pro- 
cession by  the  Leocoreum."  This  played  havoc  with  4 
the  whole  plot.  Of  the  two  of  them  Harmodius  was 
at  once  dispatched  by  the  spearmen,  and  Aristogeiton 

"  Baskets  holding  the  requisites  for  the  religious  service 
were  carried  by  maidens  of  high  birth. 

*  Thucydides  (vi.  56.  3)  says  '  not  many.' 

"  A  monument  to  three  daughters  of  Leon  who  in  obedience 
to  an  oracle  gave  their  lives  for  their  country  by  running 
against  the  enemy's  ranks  in  battle. 

55 


ARISTOTLE 

6  δ'  Άρίστογβίτων  varepov,  συλληφθείς  και  ττολυν 
χρόνον  αΐκισθβίς.  κατηγόρησεν  δ'  ev  ταΐς  άνάγ- 
καίς  πολλών  οι  καΐ  rfj  φύσει  των  επιφανών  και 
φίλοι  τοις  τνράννοις  ήσαν.  ου  γαρ  iSvvavro  παρα- 
χρήμα λαβείν  ονΒεν  'ίχνος  της  πράξεως,  αλλ'  6 
λεγόμενος  λόγος  ώς  6  Ιππίας  αποστησας  απο 
των  οπλών  τους  πομπευοντας  εφώρασε  τους  τα 
εγχειρίδια  έχοντας  ουκ  άληθ-ής  εστίν  ου  γαρ 
επεμπον    τότε^    μεθ^    οπλών,   αλλ'    ύστερον    τοΰτο 

5  κατεσκεύασεν  6  ^ημος.  κατηγορεί  δε  των  του 
τυράννου  φίλων,  ώς  μεν  οι  δημοτικοί  φασιν, 
επίτηδες  ίνα  άσεβησαιεν  άμα  και  γενοιντο  ασθενείς 
άνελόντες  τους  αναίτιους  και  φίλους  βαυτώρ»,  ώς 
δ'    ενιοι    λεγουσιν ,    ούχι    πλαττόμενος    αλλά    τους 

6  συνει^ότας  έμηνυεν.  και  τέλος  ώς  ουκ  ε8ύνατο 
πάντα  ποιών  άποθανεΐν,  επαγγειλάμενος  ώς  άλλους 
μηνυσων  πολλούς  και  πείσας  αύτω  τον  Ιππιαν 
8οΰναι  την  Βεζιάν  πίστεως  χάριν,  ώς  ελαβεν 
όνεώίσας  δτι  τω  φονεΐ  του  άΒελφοΰ  την  8εζιάν 
Βε8ωκε,  οϋτω  παρώζυνε  τον  Ίππίαν  ώσθ*  ύπό  της 
οργής  ου  κατεΐχεν  εαυτόν  άλλα  σπασάμενος  την 
μάχαιραν  Βιεφθειρεν  αυτόν. 

1  XIX.  Μετά  δε  ταϋτα  συνεβαινεν  πολλώ  τραχύ - 
τεραν  eiv'at  την  τυραννίδα-  και  γαρ  δια  το  τιμωρών^ 
τω  ά8ελφώ  [και  δια  τό]^  πολλούς  άνηρηκεναι  και 

2  εκβεβληκεναι  πάσιν  ην  άπιστος  και  πικρός.  Ιτει 
δε  τετάρτω  μ,άλιστα  μετά  τον  Ίππαρχου  θάνατον, 
επεί  κακώς  είχεν  τα  εν  τω  άστει,  την  ^ίουνυχίαν 

^  €ΊΓ€μ.ττον  τότε  Rutherford  :  επεμττοντο  cod. 
*  Kokalos :  τιμωρών  cod.  '  Kokalos. 

"  A  hill  above  the  sea  S.  of  the  city,  commanding  Peiraeus 
and  the  two  other  harbours. 

56 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  xviii.  4— xix.  2 

died  later,  having  been  taken  into  custody  and 
tortured  for  a  long  time.  Under  the  strain  of  the 
tortures  he  gave  the  names  of  a  number  of  men  that 
belonged  by  birth  to  families  of  distinction,  and  were 
friends  of  the  tyrants,  as  confederates.  For  they 
were  not  able  immediately  to  find  any  trace  of  the 
plot,  but  the  current  story  that  Hippias  made  the 
people  in  the  procession  fall  out  away  from  their  arms 
and  searched  for  those  that  retained  their  daggers  is 
not  true,  for  in  those  days  they  did  not  walk  in  the  ^--o/ 
procession  armed,  but  this  custom  was  instituted  Ο 
later  by  the  democracy.  According  to  the  account  5 
of  people  of  popular  sympathies,  Aristogeiton  accused 
the  tyrants'  friends  for  the  purpose  of  making  his 
captors  commit  an  impiety  and  weaken  themselves 
at  the  same  time  by  making  away  with  men  who  were 
innocent  and  their  own  friends,  but  others  say  that 
his  accusations  were  not  fictitious  but  that  he  dis- 
closed his  actual  accomplices.  Finally,  as  do  what  6 
he  would  he  was  unable  to  die,  he  offered  to  give 
information  against  many  more,  and  induced  Hippias 
to  give  him  his  right  hand  as  a  pledge  of  good  faith, 
and  when  he  grasped  it  he  taunted  him  with  giving 
his  hand  to  his  brother's  murderer,  and  so  enraged 
Hippias  that  in  his  anger  he  could  not  control  himself 
but  drew  his  dagger  and  made  away  with  him. 

XIX.  After  this  it  began  to  come  about  that  the  1 
tyranny  was  much  harsher  ;  for  Hippias 's  numerous 
executions  and  sentences  of  exile  in  revenge  for  his 
brother  led  to  his  being  suspicious  of  everybody  and 
embittered.  About  four  years  after  Hipparchus's  2 
death  the  state  of  affairs  in  the  city  was  so  bad  that 
he  set  about  fortifying  Munychia,**  with  the  intention 

57 


ARISTOTLE 

€7Τ€χβίρησ€  τβίχίζβιν,  ώς  €Κ€Ϊ^  μ€θώρνσόμ€νος .  ev 
τούτοις  δ'  ων  e^eneaev  νττο  KAeojUeVofs•  του  Λα/ce- 
8'ήμονος  βασίΧ4α>ς ,  χρησμών  γινομένων  ael  τοΐς 
Αάκωσι  κατάλυαν  την  τυραννίδα  δια  Totavh*  αίτίαν. 

3  οι  φνγά^βς  ων  οι  ^Αλκμεωνβαι  ττροβιστηκ€σαν 
αύτοΙ  μέν  δι'  αυτών  ουκ  iSxjvavTO  ττοιησασθαι  την 
κάθοΒον,  αλλ'  aiet  προσβπταιον  ev  re  γαρ  τοΐς 
άλλοις  οΐς  βπραττον  Βιβσφάλλοντο,  και  τ€ΐχίσαντ€ς 
iv  Tjj  χωρά  ΑαφύΒριον  το  ύπ€ρ  ΥΙάρνηθος,  €ΐς  ο 
συνβζηλθόν  Ttve?  τών  €κ  του  αστ^ω?,  έζβπολιορκη- 
θησαν  ύττο  τών  τυράννων,  όθεν  ύστερον  ei'?^  ταύτην 
την  συμφοράν  η^ον  iv  τοΐς  σκολίοις^' 

atat  Αειφύ^ριον  προΒωσβταιρον, 
οίους  άνδρα?  απώλεσα?,  ^ααχεσ^αι 
αγαθούς  re   και  €ύπατρι8ας, 
οι  τότ    έ'δει^αΐ'  οΐων  πατέρων  eaav. 

4  άποτυγχάνοντ€ς  οΰν  iv  άττασι  τοΐς  άλλοις  €μισθώ- 
σαντο  τον  iv  Α^λφοΐς  ν€ών  οίκοΒομβΐν,  odev  ηύ- 
πόρησαν  χρημάτων  προς  την  τών  Αακώνων  βοηθζίαν. 
η  δ€  ΙΙυθία  προίφζρβν  aiel  τοΐς  Αακζ^αιμονιοις 
χρηστηριαζομένοις  iλ€υθepoΰv  τάς  Α^τ^να?,  et? 
τοΰθ^  €ως*  προΰτρζφζ  τους  Σιπαρτιάτας,  καίπ€ρ 
όντων  ζένων  αύτοΐς  τών  ΪΙβισιστρατιΒών  σνν- 
€βάλλ€το  δε  ουκ  iλάττω  μοΐραν  της  •6ρμης  τοΐς 
Αάκωσιν  η  προς  τους  Άργειου?  τοΐς  ΓΙίίσιστρατί- 

5  δαι?  υπάρχουσα  φιλία,  το  μβν  οΰν  πρώτον  ^Αγχί- 
μολον  απέστειλαν  κατά  θάλατταν  έχοντα  στρατιάν 

^  ^/cf<<(7e>  Mayor._^ 

^  els  Wilamowitz-Kaibel  ex  Etym.  Mag.  :  ^era  cod. 

*  σκοΚίοίί  edd. :  σκολιοισαΐίΐ  cod. 

*  roO^'  iws  Blass :  TovTevdews  cod, 

58 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  xix.  2-5 

of  moving  his  establishment  there.  While  engaged  511  b.c. 
in  this  he  was  driven  out  by  the  king  of  Sparta, 
Cleomenes,  as  oracles  were  constantly  being  given 
to  the  Spartans  to  put  down  the  tyranny,  for  the 
following  reason.  The  exiles  headed  by  the  Alcmeon-  3 
idae  were  not  able  to  effect  their  return  by  their  own 
unaided  efforts,  but  were  always  meeting  reverses ;  for 
besides  the  other  plans  that  were  complete  failures, 
they  built  the  fort  of  Leipsydrion  <*  in  the  country, 
on  the  slopes  of  Parnes,  where  some  of  their  friends  in 
the  city  came  out  and  joined  them,  but  they  were 
besieged  and  dislodged  by  the  tyrants,  owing  to 
which  afterwards  they  used  to  refer  to  this  disaster 
in  singing  their  catches  : 

Faithless  Dry  Fountain  !     Lackaday, 
What  good  men's  lives  you  threw  away  ! 
True  patriots  and  fighters  game. 
They  showed  the  stock  from  which  they  came ! 

So  as  they  were  failing  in  everything  else,  they  con-  4 
tracted  to  build  the  temple  at  Delphi,'' and  so  acquired 
a  supply  of  money  for  the  assistance  of  the  Spartans. 
And  the  Pythian  pi'iestess  constantly  uttered  a  com- 
mand to  the  Spartans,  when  they  consulted  the 
oracle,  to  liberate  Athens,  until  she  brought  the 
Spartiates  to  the  point,  although  the  Peisistratidae 
were  strangers  to  them  ;  and  an  equally  great  amount 
of  incitement  was  contributed  to  the  Spartans  by 
the  friendship  that  subsisted  between  the  Argives  and 
the  Peisistratidae.  As  a  first  step,  therefore,  they  5 
dispatched  Anchimolus  with  a  force  by  sea  ;   but  he 

"  The  name  suggests  'water-failure.'  Parnes  is  a  moun- 
tain in  N.E.  Attica. 

''  It  had  been  burnt  down  in  548  b.c.  Apparently  they 
made  a  profit  on  the  contract,  but  rebuilt  it  to  the  satisfaction 
of  the  priestess. 

59 


ARISTOTLE 

ητττηθζντος  δ'  αύτοΰ  και  reXevT'qaavros  δια  το 
Ktveav  βοηθησαι  τον  Θΐσσαλον  βχοντα  χίλιους 
Ιππείς,  προσοργισθέντβς  τω  γβνομβνω  KAeo/xeVTyv 
εζβπβμφαν  τον  βασιλέα  στόλον  έχοντα  μείζω  κατά 
γην,  ος  επεί  τους  των  Θεσσαλών  Ιππείς  ενίκησεν 
κωλύοντας  αυτόν  εις  την  ^Αττικην  παριεναι,  κατα- 
κλείσας  τον  Ίππίαν  εις  το  καλού μενον  ΙΙελαργίκον 
6  τείχος  επολιόρκει  μετά  των  ^Αθηναίων .  προσκαθ- 
ημενου  δ'  αύτοΰ  συνεπεσεν  ύπεζιόντας  άλώναι  τους 
των  Πεισιστρατιδών"  υΐεΐς•  ων  ληφθέντων  ομο- 
λογίαν  επΙ  τη  των  τταιδων  σωτήρια  ποιησαμενοι 
και  τα  εαυτών  εν  πενθ^  ημεραις  εκκομισάμενοι 
παρε^ωκαν  την  ακρόπολιν  τοις  ^Αθηναίοις  επΙ 
'Αρπακτικού  άρχοντος,  κατασχόντες  την  τυραννίδα 
μετά  την  του  πατρός  τελευτην  ετη  /χάλιστα  βτττα- 
καίΒεκα,  τα  δε  σύμπαντα  συν  οΐς  ό  πατήρ  ηρζεν 
ενός  Βεΐν^  πεντήκοντα. 

1  XX.  Κ^αταλυΘείσης  δε  της  τυραννικός  εστασιαζον 
προς  αλλήλους  ^Ισαγόρας  6  ΎεισάνΒρου,  φίλος  ων 
τών  τυράννων,  και  Ιίλεισθενης  του  γένους  ών  τών 
*Αλκμεονώών.  ηττημένος^  δβ  ταΓ?  εταίρε ιαις  ο 
Κλεισθένης    προσηγάγετο^    τον    Βημον,    άπο8ώούς 

2  τω  πληθει  την  πολιτείαν.  6  δε  Ισαγόρας  επιλειπό- 
μενος  τη  δυνάμει,  πάλιν  επικαλεσάμενος  τον  Κλεο- 
μενην  οντά  εαυτώ  ξένον  συνεπεισεν  ελαυί'ειν  το 
άγος,  δια  το  τους  ^Αλκμεωνί8ας  Βοκεΐν  είι^αι  τών 

3  εναγών,     ύπεζελθόντος    δε    του    Κλεισθένους,   μετ 


^  Mayor:  Seicod. 

■ήττώμ€νοί  edd.  ex  Herod,  v.  66 

*  ττροσήΎΐτο  Thalheim. 


"  The  fortification  surrounding  the  west  end  of  the  Acropolis. 
60 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  xix.  5— xx.  3 

was  defeated  and  lost  his  life,  because  the  Thessalian 
Cineas  came  to  the  defence  with  a  thousand  cavalry. 
Enraged  at  this  occurrence,  they  dispatched  their 
king  Cleomenes  by  land  with  a  larger  army  ;  he 
won  a  victory  over  the  Thessalian  cavalry  who  tried 
to  prevent  his  reaching  Attica,  and  so  shut  up  Hippias 
in  the  fortress  called  the  Pelargicum  "  and  began  to 
lay  siege  to  it  with  the  aid  of  the  Athenians.  While  he  6 
was  sitting  down  against  it,  it  occurred  that  the  sons 
of  the  Peisistratidae  were  caught  when  trying  secretly 
to  get  away  ;  and  these  being  taken  they  came  to 
terms  on  the  condition  of  the  boys'  safety,  and  con- 
veyed away  their  belongings  in  five  days,  surrender- 
ing the  Acropolis  to  the  Athenians  ;  this  was  in  the 
archonship  of  Harpactides,  and  Peisistratus's  sons5iiB.c. 
had  retained  the  tyranny  for  about  seventeen  years 
after  their  father's  death,  making  when  added  to  the 
period  of  their  father's  power  a  total  of  forty-nine 
years. 

XX.  When  the  tyranny  had  been  put  down,  there  1 
was  a  period  of  faction-strife  between  Isagoras  son 
of  Teisander,  who  was  a  friend  of  the  tyrants,  and 
Cleisthenes,    who    belonged    to    the    family    of   the 
Alcmaeonidae.     Cleisthenes  having  got  the  worst  of 
it  in  the  Comradeships  *  enlisted  the  people  on  his  side, 
offering  to  hand  over  the  government  to  the  multi- 
tude.    Isagoras  began  to  lose  power,  so  he  again  2 
called  in  the  aid  of  Cleomenes,  who  was  a  great  friend 
of  his,  and  jointly  persuaded  him  to  drive  out  the 
curse,"  because  the  Alcmaeonidae  were  reputed  to 
be  a  family   that  was   under   a   curse.     Cleisthenes  3 
secretly  withdrew,  and  Cleomenes  with  a  few  troops 

*  Political  clubs  with  anti-democratic  leanings. 
"  Cf.  ch.  i. 

61 


ARISTOTLE 

ολίγων^  ηγηλάτ€ΐ  των  'Αθηναίων  επτακόσια? 
οικίας'  ταύτα  δέ  ^ιαττραξάμζνος  την  μ^ν  βονλην 
€π€ψατο  κατάλυαν  Ίσαγόραν  δε  καΐ  τριακόσιους 
των  φίλων  μ€τ'  αύτοΰ  κυρίους  καθισταναι  της 
ττόλβως.  της  δε  βουλής  αντίστασης  καΐ  συν- 
αθροισθέντος  του  ττληθους  οι  /χέν  ττερι  τον  Κλεομίνην 
και  Ίσαγόραν  κατίφυγον  €ΐς  την  άκρόπολιν,  6  δε 
8ημος  δυο  μβν  ημέρας  προσκαθεζόμβνος  €πολιορκ€ΐ, 
τη  δε  τρίτη  Κλβομβνην  μβν  και  τους  μ,ετ'  αυτού 
ττάντας   άφβΐσαν   ύποσπόνΒους ,   Ιίλΐΐσθένην   δε    και 

4  τους  άλλους  φυγάδας  μβτβπβμφαντο.  κατασχόντος 
δε  τοΰ  Βημου  τα  πράγματα  Κλβισθβνης  ηγεμων  ην 
καΐ  του  8ήμου  προστάτης,  αιτιώτατοι  γαρ  σχβΒον 
εγβνοντο  της  βκβολης  των  τυράννων  οι  Άλκ- 
μεωνί^αι,  /cat"  στασιάζοντβς  τα  πολλά  διετε'λεσαν. 

5  έτι  δε  πρότ€ρον  των  'Αλκμ€ονώών  Κη^ων  επίθετο 
τοΙς  τυράννοις•  διό  και  η8ον  και  εις  τούτον  εν  τοις 
σκολίοις' 

εγχει  και  Κτ^δωνι,  διάκονε,  μη^'  επιληθου, 
ει  χρη  τοις  άγαθοΐς  άν^ράσιν  οινοχοεΐν. 

1  XXI.  Δια  μεν  οΰν  ταύτας  τάς  αιτίας  επίστευεν 
6  Βημος  τω  Κλεισθενει.  τότε  δε  τοΰ  πλήθους  προ- 
εστηκώς    έ'τει    τετάρτω    μετά    την    των    τυράννων 

2  κατάλυσιν  επι  Ίσαγόρου  άρχοντος,  πρώτον  μεν 
συνενειμε^  πάντας  εις  δέκα  φυλάς  άντι  των  τετ- 
τάρων,  άνα/ιχεΓ^αι  βουλόμενος,  όπως  μετάσχωσι 
πλείους    της    πολιτείας-    όθεν    ελέχθη    και    το    μη 

^  ζάφικόμεΐΌ^  ό  Κλεομένη^'}  μ(τ   όλί-γων  Wilamowitz-Kaibel 
ex  Herod,  v.  72. 

*  <οί>  καΐ  Richards. 

*  συνένΗμε  Newman :  oweui^t  cod. 

62 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  xx.  3— xxi.  2 

proceeded  to  expel  as  accursed  seven  hundred 
Athenian  households  ;  and  having  accomplished  this 
he  tried  to  put  down  the  Council  and  set  up  Isagoras 
and  three  hundred  of  his  friends  with  him  in  sovereign 
power  over  the  state.  But  the  Council  resisted,  and 
the  multitude  banded  together,  so  the  forces  of 
Cleomenes  and  Isagoras  took  refuge  in  the  Acropolis, 
and  the  people  invested  it  and  laid  siege  to  it  for 
two  days.  On  the  third  day  they  let  Cleomenes  and 
his  comrades  go  away  under  a  truce,  and  sent  for 
Cleisthenes  and  the  other  exiles  to  come  back.  The  4 
people  having  taken  control  of  affairs,  Cleisthenes  was 
their  leader  and  was  head  of  the  People.  For  almost 
the  chief  initiative  in  the  expulsion  of  the  tyrants 
was  taken  by  the  Alcmaeonids,  and  they  accomplished 
most  of  it  by  party  faction.  And  even  before  the  5 
Alcmaeonids  Cedon  had  attacked  the  tyrants,  owing 
to  which  people  also  sang  in  his  honour  in  their 
catches  : 

Now  fill  to  Cedon,  boy  !  let's  drink  him  too, 
If  duty  bids  us  toast  good  men  and  true. 

/    XXI.  These  were  the  causes,  therefore,  that  led  the  1 
people  to  trust  in  Cleisthenes.     And  when  this  time 
he  had  become  Chief  of  the  multitude,  in  the  fourth  oos  n.c. 
year  after  the  deposition  of  the  tyrants,  in  the  archon- 
ship  of  Isagoras,  he  first  divided  the  whole  body  into  2 
ten  tribes   instead  of  the  existing   four,  wishing  to 
mix  them  up,  in  order  that  more  might  take  part 
in  the  government «  ;  from  which  arose  the  saying, 
'  Don't  draw  distinctions  between  tribes,'  addressed 

"  Less  incompletely  stated  in  Politics  iii.  275  b  37  ff. 
Members  of  the  same  class  might  now  belong  to  different 
tribes;  and  a  number  of  new  citizens  were  enrolled  (see 
§  4),  free-born  aliens  and  emancipated  slaves,  who  were  not 
members  of  clans. 

63 


ARISTOTLE 

φυΧοκρινβίν,  προς  τους  e^erct^etv  τα  γβνη  βονλο- 

3  μένους .  eVeira  τ'ην  βουλην  ττ^ντακοσίονς  αντί 
τ€τρακοσίων  κατ€στησ€ν,  TrevTiqKovra  i^  €κάστης 
φυλής'  rare  δ'  τίσαν  βκατόν.  δια  τοϋτο  he  ουκ 
els  δώδεκα  φυλάς  συνέταζβν,  οττως  αύτω  μη  συμ- 
βαίντ)  μέριζαν  κατά  τάς  προϋπάρχουσας  τρίττΰς 
(jjaav  γάρ  €Κ  δ'  φυλών  δώδε/ία  τριττύίς),  ωστ 
ου     συνβτηπτβν     άν^     άναμίσγβσθαι     το     ττληθος. 

4  8ί€ν€ΐ,μ€  δε  καΐ  την  χώραν  κατά  δήμους  τριάκοντα 
μέρη,  SeKa  μ^ν  των  Trepl  το  άστυ,  δέκα  δε  της 
παραλίας,  δέκα  δε  της  μ€σογ€ίου•  καΐ  ταιίτα? 
έπονομάσας  τριττΰς  Ικληρωσβν  τρεις  ει?  την 
φυλην  €κάστην,  δπως  έκαστη  μετέχη  πάντων  των 
τόπων,  καΐ  Βημότας  έποίησεν  άλλτ^λων  τους  οίκοΰν- 
τας  iv  έκάστω  των  Βημων,  ΐνα  μη  πατρόθβν  ττροσ- 
αγορ€ύοντ€ς  έζελέγχωσιν  τους  νεοπολίτας,  άλλα 
των     8ημων     άναγορζύωσιν     odev     καΐ     καλοϋσιν 

5  *  Αθηναίοι  σφάς  αυτούς  των  Βημων.  κατέστησε 
δε  /cat  δημάρχους  την  αύτην  έχοντας  έπιμέλειαν 
τοις  πρότερον  ναυκράροις•  καΐ  γάρ  τους  Βημους 
άντΙ  των  ναυκραρίών  έποίησεν.  προσηγόρευσε  δε 
των  Βημων  τους  μέν  άπο  των  τόπων,  τους  δε  απο 
των  κτίσάντων ,  ου  γάρ  άπαντες  ύπηρχον  εν*  τοις 

6  τόποις.  τά  δε  γένη  καΐ  τάς  φρατρίας  και  τα? 
ίερωσύνας  είασεν  εχειν  έκαστους  κατά  τά  πάτρια. 

^  kf  supplevit  Hude. 
^  ev  fr.  Berol. :  in  cod.  alii  ec,  alii  en  legunt. 

"  See  viii.  3  n. 

•"  i.e.  he  made  the  deme  a  social  group,  united  by  almost 
a  family  feeling. 

"  C/.,  e.g.,  xxviii.  3  '  Callicrates  of  the  Paeanian  deme,'  and 
subsequent  designations  of  persons  by  their  demes ;  up  to 
that  point  the  father's  name  is  used. 
64 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  xxi.  2-6 

to  those  who  want   to    inquire   into  people's  clans. 
Next  he  made  the  Council  to  consist  of  five  hundred  3 
members  instead  of  four  hundred,  fifty  from  each 
Tribe,  whereas  under  the  old  system  there  had  been 
a  hundred.     This  was  the  reason  why  he  did  not 
arrange  them  in  twelve  tribes,  in  order  that  he  might 
not  have  to  use  the  existing  division  of  the  Thirds  " 
(for  the  four  Tribes  contained  twelve  Thirds),  with 
the  result  that  the  multitude  would  not  have  been 
mixed  up.    He  also  portioned  out  the  land  among  the  4 
demes  into  thirty  parts,  ten  belonging  to  the  suburbs, 
ten  to  the  coast,   and  ten  to  the  inland  district  ; 
and  he  gave  these  parts  the  name  of  Thirds,  and 
assigned  them  among  the  Tribes  by  lot,  three  to  each, 
in  order  that  each  Tribe  might  have  a  share  in  all  the 
districts.    And  he  made  all  the  inhabitants  in  each  of   j>^ 
the  demes  fellow-demesmen  of  one  another,''  in  order 
that   they   might   not   call   attention   to   the   newly 
enfranchised  citizens  by  addressing  people  by  their 
fathers'   names,   but   designate  people   officially   by 
their  demes  ;    owing  to  which  Athenians  in  private 
life  also  use  the  names  of  their  demes  as  surnames." 
And  he  also  appointed  Demarchs,  having  the  same  5 
duties  as  the  former  Ship-commissioners,**  for  he  put 
the  demes  in  the  place  of  the  Ship-commissions.    He 
named  some  of  the  demes  from  their  localities,  but 
others  from  their  founders,  for  the  demes  were  no 
longer  all  corresponding  to  the  places.     The  clans  6 
and  brotherhoods  ^  and  priesthoods  belonging  to  the 
various  demes  he  allowed  to  remain  on  the  ancestral 

"*  See  viii.  3  n. 

*  In  Politics  1319  b  23  it  is  said  that '  Cleisthenes  increased 
the  number  of  the  brotherhoods,'  but  that  no  doubt  refers  to 
the  new  citizens. 

F  65 


ARISTOTLE 

ταΓ?  δε  φνλαΐς,  inoirjaev  Ιττωννμονς  €κ  των  ττρο- 
κρίθβντων  ίκατον  άρχηγβτών  ους  avelXev  η  ΐίνθία 
Se/ca . 

1  XXII,  Τούτων  Se  γ^νομβνων  Βημοτίκωτίρα  ττολύ 
της  Έόλωνος  iyevcTO  η  77θλιτ€ΐα•  /cat  γαρ  συνέβη 
τους  μ€ν  Σιόλωνος  νόμους  άφανίσαι  την  τυραννίδα 
δια  το  μη  χρησθαί,  καινούς  δ'  άλλους  deivai  τον 
Ιίλβίσθενη  στοχαζόμενον  του  πλήθους,  iv  οΐς  €Τ€θη 

2  /cat  6  TTcpi  του  οστρακισμοϋ  νόμος,  πρώτον  μεν 
ουν  eVet  πεμπτω^  μετά  ταύτην  την  κατάστασιν 
€φ*  'Έ,ρμοκρεοντος  άρχοντος  τη  βουλή  τοις  πεν- 
τακοσίοις  τον  ορκον  εποίησαν  ον  ετί  /cat  νυν 
ομνύουσιν .  έπειτα  τους  στρατηγούς  ηροΰντο  κατά 
φυλάς,    εξ    εκάστης    φυλής    ενα,    της    δε    άπάσης 

3  στρατιάς  ήγεμών  ην  ό  πολέμαρχος,  ετει  δε  jLtera 
ταύτα  Βω^εκάτω  νικήσαντες  την  εν  Ma/oa^cDi't 
μάχην,  επί  Φαινίππου  άρχοντος,  ^ιαλιπόντες  ετη 
Βύο  μετά  την  νίκην,  θαρροΰντος  ηΒη  του  Βημου, 
τότε  πρώτον  εχρησαντο  τώ  νόμω  τώ  περί  τον 
όστρακισμόν,  ος  ετέθη  Βιά  την  ύποφίαν  τών  εν 
ταΓ?  Βυνάμεσιν  δτι*   ΐίεισίστρατος  Βημαγωγός  και 

4  στρατηγός  ών  τύραννος  κατέστη.  και  πρώτος 
ωστρακισθη  τών  εκείνου  συγγενών  "Ιππαρχος 
\άρμου  Κ,ολλυτεύς ,  δι'  ον  και  μάλιστα  τον  νόμον 
εθηκεν  ο  Κ,λεισθενης,  e^eAciaat  βουλόμενος  αυτόν. 
οί  γάρ  'Αθηναίοι  τους  τών  τυράννων  φίλους,  όσοι 
μη  συνεζαμαρτάνοιεν^  εν  ταΓ?  ταραχαΐς,  εϊων  οι- 
κεΐν   την    πόλιν,  χρώμενοι   τη    είωθυία  του  Βήμου 

^  τέμιττω  (  =  e')  Cod. :  6-γ56φ  {  —  η')?  Kenyon. 

*  Kenyon :  ore  cod. 

'  Poste  :  αννεξαμαρταΐΌν  Cod. 

66 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  xxi.  6— xxii.  4 

plan.  As  eponymous  deities  of  the  Tribes  he  insti- 
tuted ten  tutelary  heroes  selected  by  an  oracle  of 
the  Pythian  priestess  from  a  previously  chosen  list 
of  a  hundred. 

XXII.  These  reforms  made  the  constitution  much  i 
more  democratic  than  that  of  Solon  ;  for  it  had  come 
about  that  the  tyranny  had  obliterated  the  laws  of 
Solon    by    disuse,    and    Cleisthenes    aiming    at    the  «^ 
multitude  had  instituted  other  new  ones,  including 
the  enactment  of  the  law  about  ostracism.     First  of  2 
all,  in  the  fifth  year''  after  these  enactments,  in  the 
archonship  of  Hermocreon,  they  instituted  the  oath 
of  induction  for  the  Council  of  Five  Hundred  that  is 
still  in  use.    Next  they  began  to  elect  the  Generals 
by   tribes,  one   from    each    tribe,   while    the    whole  , 
army   was    under   the    command   of  the    War-lord. 
Eleven  years  afterwards  came  their  victory  in  the  3 
battle  of  Marathon  ;  and  in  the  archonship  of  Phaen-  490  b.c. 
ippus,  two  years  after  the  victory,  the  people  being  488  b.c. 
now  in  high  courage,  they  put  in  force  for  the  first 
time  the  law  about  ostracism,  which  had  been  enacted 
owing  to  the  suspicion  felt  against  the  men  in  the 
positions  of  power  because  Peisistratus  when  leader 
of  the  people  and  general  set  himself  up  as  tyrant. 
The  first  person  banished  by  ostracism  was  one  of  his  4 
relatives,  Hipparchus  son  of  Charmus  of  the  deme 
of  Collytus,  the  desire  to  banish  whom  had  been 
Cleisthenes'    principal    motive    in    making  the   law. 
For  the  Athenians  permitted  all  friends  of  the  tyrants 
that  had  not  taken  part  with  them  in  their  offences 
during  the  disorders  to  dwell  in  the  city, — in  this  the 
customary  mildness  of  the  people  was  displayed  ;  and 

"  i.e.  in  504  b.c.  ;  but  if  Marathon  (490  b.c.)  was  eleven 
years  later  (§  3),  perhaps  the  Greek  should  be  altered  here 
to  give  '  in  the  eighth  year  after.' 

67 


ARISTOTLE 

πραότητι-  ών  ηγ^μών  καΐ  προστάτης  ην  Ίππαρχος, 
δ  €νθύς  δε  τω  νστβρω  erei  €πΙ  TeXeaivov  άρχοντος 
€κυάμ€υσαν  τους  ivvea  άρχοντας  κατά  φυλάς  e/c 
-^  των  προκριθέντων  ύπο  των  Βημοτών^  πεντακοσίων 
TOTe^  μ€τά  την  τυραννίΒα  πρώτον  gl_hk  πρότεροι 
πάντες  ήσαν  αιρετοί,     καΐ  ώστρακίσθη  Μεγακλης 

6  'Ιπποκράτους  Άλωπεκηθεν.  επΙ  μεν  ουν  ετη  γ 
τους  των  τυράννων  φίλους  ώστράκιζον,  ών  χάριν 
6  νόμος  ετέθη,  μετά  δε  ταύτα  τω  τεταρτω  ετει 
και  τών  άλλων  ε'ί  τι?  Βοκοίη  μείζων  etvai  μεθιστατο' 
και  πρώτος  ώστρακίσθη   τών  άπωθεν  της  τυραν- 

7  νίΒος  Ή^άνθ ίππος  6  ^ Αρίφρονος .  ετει  δε  τριτω 
μετά  ταΰτα  ΝικομηΒου^  άρχοντος,  ώς  εφάνη*  τα 
μέταλλα  τά  εν  Μαρώνεια  καΐ  περιεγενετο  τη 
πόλει  τάλαντα  εκατόν  εκ  τών  έργων,  συμβουλευ- 
όντων τινών  τω  Βημω  διαι^ει/χασ^αι  το  άργύριον 
Θεμιστοκλής  εκώλυσεν,  ου  λέγων  ο  τι  χρήσεται 
τοις  χρημασιν,  άλλα  δανεΓσαι  κελεύων  τοις  πλου- 
σιωτάτοις  ^Αθηναίων  εκατόν  εκάστω  τάλαντον, 
είτ'  ε'άν  μεν  άρεσκη  το  άνάλωμα,  της  πόλεως 
είναι/  ει  δε  μη,  κομίσασθαι  τά  χρήματα  παρά 
τών  Βανεισαμενων .  λαβών  Β  επι  τούτοις  εναυ- 
πηγήσατο  τριήρεις  εκατόν,  εκάστου  ναυπηγού- 
μενου τών  εκατόν  μίαν,  αΐς  εναυμάχησαν  εν 
Σαλα/xtvt  προς  τους  βαρβάρους.  ώστρακίσθη  δ' 
εν  τούτοις  τοις  καιροΐς  ΆριστείΒης  ό  Αυσιμάχου. 

^  δήμων  fr.  Berol.  *  rore  Whibley :  rots  cod. 

*  Ί^ικοδημον  fr.  Berol. 

*  <λνσιτ(\έστΐρα>  έφάν-η  Richards  coll.  Xen.  Red.  4.  31. 

^  post  dvai,  in  cod.  alia  manus  τηνδαπανην  supra  lineam 
scripsit. 
68 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  xxii.  4-7 

Hipparchus  was  the  leader  and  chief  of  these  persons. 
But  directly  afterwards,  in  the  next  year,  in  the  5 
archonship  of  Telesinus,  they  elected  the  Nine  +87  b.c. 
Archons  by  lot,  tribe  by  tribe,  from  a  preliminary 
list  of  five  hundred  chosen  by  the  demesmen  :  this 
was  the  date  of  the  first  election  on  these  lines,  after 
the  tyranny,  the  previous  Archons  having  all  been 
elected  by  vote.  And  Megacles  son  of  Hippocrates 
of  the  deme  Alopeke  was  ostracized.  For  three  years  6 
they  went  on  ostracizing  the  friends  of  the  tyrants, 
at  whom  the  legislation  had  been  aimed,  but  after- 
wards in  the  fourth  year  it  was  also  used  to  remove 
any  other  person  who  seemed  to  be  too  great  ;  the 
first  person  unconnected  with  the  tyranny  to  be 
ostracized  was  Xanthippus  son  of  Ariphron.  Two  7 
years  later,  in  the  archonship  of  Nicomedes,  in  con-  483  b.c. 
sequence  of  the  discovery  of  the  mines  at  Maronea,*^ 
the  working  of  which  had  given  the  state  a  profit  of  a 
hundred  talents,  the  advice  \vas  given  by  some  per- 
sons that  the  money  should  be  distributed  among  the 
people  ;  but  Themistocles  prevented  this,  not  saying 
what  use  he  would  make  of  the  money,  but  recom- 
mending that  it  should  be  lent  to  the  hundred  richest 
Athenians,  each  receiving  a  talent,  so  that  if  they 
should  spend  it  in  a  satisfactory  manner,  the  state 
would  have  the  advantage,  but  if  they  did  not,  the 
state  should  call  in  the  money  from  the  boiTowers. 
On  these  terms  the  money  was  put  at  his  disposal, 
and  he  used  it  to  get  a  fleet  of  a  hundred  triremes 
built,  each  of  the  hundred  borrowers  having  one  ship 
built,  and  with  these  they  fought  the  naval  battle  at 
Salamis  against  the  barbarians.  And  it  was  during 
this  period  that  Aristeides  son  of  Lysimachus  was 

"  Possibly  five  miles  north  of  Cape  Suniuni. 

69 


ARISTOTLE 

8  τ€ταρτω^  δ  eret  KareSe^avro  ττάντας  τους  ώστρα- 
κισμίνους  άρχοντος  ΎφηχίΒου,  δια  την  Έέρζον 
στρατβίαν  καΐ  το  λοιπόν  ωρισαν  τοΐζ  όστρακίζο- 
μένοίς  ivTOs  TepaiaTov  καΐ  Έικυλλαίονζμ,η^/κατ- 
OLKelv  η  άτιμους  elvai  καθάτταζ. 

1  XXIII.  Tore  μεν  οΰν  μεχρί  τούτον  προηλθεν 
η  ττόλίς,  α/χα  τη  Βημοκρατία  κατά  μικρόν  ανζανο- 
μάνη•  μβτά  Be  τά  ΜηΒικά  πάλιν  ΐσχνσ€ν  η  iv 
'Apeio)  πάγω  βουλή  και  Βιωκ€ΐ  την  πάλιν,  ovSevi 
Βόγματι  λαβοΰσα  την  ηγβμονίαν  άλλα  δια  το 
yevea^at  της  περϊ  Σαλα/χΓνα  ναυμαχίας  αιτία, 
των  γαρ  στρατηγών  εζαπορησάντων  τοις  πράγ- 
/χασι  και  κηρνζάντων  σωζβιν  €καστον  iavTov, 
πορίσασα     Βραχμάς     ίκάστω     οκτώ     Βι^Βωκε     και 

2  Ινφίβασεν  €ΐς  τάς  ναΰς.  Βιά  ταυτην  Βη  την 
αιτίαν  παραχωρούν  αύτης^  τώ  άζιώματι  και  εττο- 
λιτευ^τ^σαν  'Αθηναίοι  καλώς  κατά*  τούτους  τους 
καιρούς-  συνάβη  γάρ  αντοΐς  κατά  τον  χρόνον 
τούτον  τά  τ€  eis"  τον  πόλαμον  άσκησαι  και  παρά 
τοις  "Έαλλησιν  βνΒοκιμησαι  και  την  της  θαλαττης 
ηγαμονίαν    λαβείν    ακόντων    τών    ΑακεΒαιμονίων . 

3  ήσαν  Be  προστάται  του  Βημου  κατά  τούτους  τους 
καιρούς  ^ΑριστείΒης  ό  Αυσιμάχον  και  Θεμιστο- 
κλής ό  ^εοκλεους,  6  μεν  τά  πολέμια  ασκών' 
ό  Be  τά  πολιτικά  Βεινός  eiv'ai  και  Βικαιοσύνη  τών 

1  τρίτψ  Wilamowitz-Kaibel  coUato  Plut.  Aristid.  8. 

*  μη  supplevit  Kaibel  (e'/cros  pro  ivrbs  Wyse). 

^  Blass:  αυττ^ΐ' cod. 

*  κατ&  (vel  και  ζμ€τpίωίy  κατά  ?)  Kenyon :  καικατα  cod. 

'  δοκών  Richards :  δοκύν  άσκΐϊν  Kenyon. 

70 


?6- 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  xxii.  8— xxiii.  3 

ostracized.  Three  years  later  in  the  archonship  of  8 
Hypsechides  they  allowed  all  the  persons  ostracized 
to  return,  because  of  the  expedition  of  Xerxes  ;  and  +80  b. 
they  fixed  a  boundary  thenceforward  for  persons 
ostracized,  prohibiting  them  from  living'*  within  a 
line  drawn  from  Geraestus  ^  to  Scyllaeum "  under 
penalty  of  absolute  loss  of  citizenship. 

XXIII.    At    this    date,    therefore,    the   state   had  1 
advanced  to  this  point,  growing  by  slow  stages  with 
the  growth  of  the  democracy  ;   but  after  the  Persian  ^ 
Wars  the  Council  on  the  Areopagus  became  powerful 
again,    and   carried   on   the    adminrstraBon,   having 
g-ainer|  the  leadprship  by  no  definite  resolution  but 
*owmg  to  its  having  been  the  cause  of  the  naval  battle 
of  Salarnis.     For  the  Generals  had  been  reduced  to 
utter  despair  by  the  situation  and  had  made  a  pro- 
clamation that   every  man  should  see   to   his   own 
safety ;  but  the  Council  provided  a  fund  and  distri- 
buted eight  drachmas  a  head  and'got  them  to  man  the 
ships.     For  this  reason,  therefore,  the  Generals  gave  "i! 
place  to  the  Council  in  esteem.    And  Athens  was  well    J 
governed  in  these  periods  ;    for  during  this  time  it 
occurred  that  the  people  practised^ilitary  duties  and 
wonliigh  esteem  among  the  Greeks  and  gained  the  r 
supremacy  of  the  sea  against  the  will  of  the  Lacedae- 
monians.   The  heads  of  the  People  '^  in  these  periods  3 
were  Acigtejdes  son  of  Lysimachus  and  Themistocles 
son  of  Neocles,  the  latter  practising  to  be  skilful  in  mili' 
tary  pursuits,  and  the  former  in  polifics,*  and  to  excel 

"  The  MS.  gives  '  enacting  that  they  must  live.' 

*  The  S.  point  of  Euboea. 

"  The  S.E.  point  of  Argolis.  <*  See  ii.  .S  n. 

'  The  Greek  should  perhaps  be  altered  to  give  '  the  latter 
practising  military  pursuits,  and  the  former  esteemed  to  be 
skilful  in  politics.' 

71 


ARISTOTLE 

καθ"    eavTov   ^ιαφύρβιν    διό    καΙ   €χρωντο   τω   μ€ν 

4  στρατηγώ  τω  δε  συμβονλω.  την  μεν  ονν  των 
τ€ΐχών  άνοίκοΒόμησιν  κοίνη  Βιωκησαν,  καίττερ  δια- 
φζρόμενοι  προς  αλλήλους•  cttl  he  την  άπόστασίν 
την  των  "Ιώνων  άττο  της  των  Λακεδαιμονίων  συμ- 
μαχίας^ "Αριστείδης  ην  6  ττροτρεφας,  τηρησας  τους 

5  Αάκωνας  Βιαβεβλημενους  δια  ΙΙαυσανίαν.  διό  και 
τους  φόρους  ούτος  ην  6  τάζας  ταΐς  ττόλεσιν  τους 
πρώτους  eVei  τρίτω  μετά  την  εν  Σαλα/χΓνι  ναυ- 
/χαχι'αν  €771  Ύιμοσθενους  άρχοντος,  καΐ  τους  όρκους 
ώμοσε  τοις  "Ιωσι  ώστε  τον  αυτόν  εχθρον  eivai  και 
φίλον,  εφ"  οίς  και  τους  μύΒρους  εν  τω  πελάγει 
καθεΐσαν. 

1  XXIV.  Μβτα.  Se  ταύτα  θαρροΰσης  η8η  της 
πόλεως  και  χρημάτων  ηθροισμενων  πολλών,  συν- 
εβουλευεν  άντιλαμβάνεσθαι  της  ηγεμονίας  και  κατα- 
jSavTas•  εκ  τών  αγρών  οικεΐν  εν  τω  άστει•  τροφην 
γάρ  έ'σεσ^αι  πάσι,  τοις  μεν  στρατευομενοις  τοις  δε 
φρουροϋσι  τοις  δε  τα  κοινά  πράττουσι,  εϊθ"  οϋτω 

2  κατασχησειν  την  ηγεμονιαν.  πεισθεντες  δε  ταύτα 
και  λαβόντες  την  άρχην  τοΐς^  συμμάχοις  δε- 
σποτικωτερως  εχρώντο  πλην  Χιών  και  Αεσβίων 
και  Σιαμίων  τούτους  δε  φύλακας  εΐχον  της  άρχης, 
εώντες   τάς   τε   πολιτείας   παρ"    αύτοΐς   και   άρχειν 

3  ων  ετνχον  άρχοντες.  κατέστησαν  δε  και  τοις 
πολλοίς     εύπορίαν     τροφής,     ώσπερ     "Αριστείδης 

^  καιτηντωνΧακεδαιμονιωνσνμμαχιαν  cod.,  corr.  Blass. 
^  Tots  Blass :  roisre  cod. 

"  The  city  fortifications  were  rebuilt,  the  harbour  of  Peiraeus 
completed  and  the  Long  Walls  built  to  link  Peiraeus  and 
Phaierum  with  the  city. 

*  The  parties  swore  to  keep  the  covenant  until  the  iron 

72 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  xxiii.  3— xxiv.  3 

his  contemporaries  in  justice  ;  hence  the  Athenians 
employed  the  one  as  general  and  the  other  as 
counsellor.  So  the  rebuilding  of  the  walls  "•  was  directed  4 
by  both  these  statesmen  joirftTy,  although  they  were 
at  variance  with  one  anotTier  ;('but  the  secession  of 
the  Ionian  states  from  the  Lacedaemonian  alliance 
was  promoted  by  Aristeidesy  who  seized  the  oppor- 
tunity when  the  Lacedaemonians  were  discredited 
because  of  Pausanias.  Hence  it  was  Aristeides  who  5 
assessed  the  tributes  of  the  allied  states  on  the  first 
occasion,  two  years  after  the  naval  battle  of  Salamis,  478  b.u. 
in  the  archonship  of  Timosthenes,  and  who  adminis- 
tered the  oaths  to  the  lonians  when  they  swore  to 
have  the  same  enemies  and  friends,  ratifying  their 
oaths  by  letting  the  lumps  of  iron  sink  to  the  bottom 
out  at  sea.''  ^ 

XXIV.  Afterjvards,  (now  that  the  state  was  em-  1     ^,^ 
boldened^nd  ^uch  money  had  been  collected,") he 
began  to  advise  them  to  aim  at  the  leadership,  and 
to  come  down  from  their  farms  and  live  in  the  city, 
telling  them  that  there  would  be  food__^f!it~aJl,  some 
serving  in  the  army  and  others  as   frontier-guards 
and  others  conducting  the  business  of  the  community, 
and  then  by  this  method  they  would  kee^  the  leader- 
ship.  [  Having  taken  this  advice  and  won  the  empire,  2 
they  treated  the  allies  too  masterfully,  except  Chios, 
Lesbos  and  Samos,  which  they  kept  as  outposts  of 
empire,  and  allowed  to  have  their  own  governments 
and  to  rule  the  subjects  that  they  had  at  the  time.^ 
They  also  established  a  plentiful  food-sjipply  for  the  3 
multitude,  as  Aristeides  had  proposed ;  for  the  corn- 
appeared   again  on  the  surface,   wplv  fj  τον  μύδρον   τούτον 
άναφηναι  Hdt.  i.  165,  and  Hor.  Epodes  16.  25 — 

sed  iuremus  in  haec  :  '  simul  imis  saxa  renarint 
vadis  leuata,  ne  redire  sit  nefas.' 


ARISTOTLE 

€ΐσηγ'ησατο'   σννββαινξν  γαρ   άπο   των   φόρων   καΐ 
των  τ€Αών  καΙ  των  συμμάχων  πλβίονς  τ)  ΒισμυρΙονς 
^     dvSpag   τ ρΐφβσθ at.     δικασται   μ^ν   γαρ   ήσαν   ίζα- 
jN       κίσχίλιοί,    τοξόται    δ'     ίζακόσιοι    καΐ    χίλιοι    και 
/     y     προς   τούτοις    ιππείς   χίλιοι    και   διακόσιοι^   βουλή 
/        δε  -πεντακόσιοι,  και  φρουροί  νεωρίων  πεντακόσιοι 
και  προς  τούτοις  εν  Trj  πόλει  φρουροί  ν' ,  άρχοι  δ' 
ενΒημοι   μεν   εις   επτακοσίους   άνΒρας   νπερόριοι   δ' 
εις  επτακόσιους^•  προς   δε  τούτοις,   επει  συνεστή- 
σαντο^  τον  πολεμον  ύστερον,  όπλΐται  μεν  Βισχίλιοι 
και  πεντακόσιοι,  νηες  δε   φρουρίΒες  ε'ίκοσι,   άλλαι 
δε  νηες   αϊ  τους  φρουρούς^   άγουσαι  τους   άπο  του 
κυαμου   ^ισχιλίους   άνΒρας•   ετι   δε   πρυτανεΐον  και 
ορφανοί   και  Βεσμωτών  φύλακες'   απασι  γαρ  τού- 
τοις απο  των  κοινών  η  Βιοικησις  rjv. 

1  XXV.  Η  μεν  ουν  τροφή  τω  8ημω  δ6ά  τούτων 
εγινετο.  ετη  δε  επτακαιΒεκα  μάλιστα  μετά  τα 
Μτ^δικά    8ιεμεινεν    η    πολιτεία    προεστώτων    των 

Αρεοπαγιτών,  καίπερ  ύποφερομενη  κατά  μικρόν, 
αύζανομενου  δε  του  πλήθους  γενόμενος  τοΰ  ^ημου 
προστάτης  ^Εφιάλτης  ό  ΈωφωνίΒου  και  8οκών* 
ά8ωρο8όκητος    είναι    και    δίκαιο?   προς   την   πολι- 

2  τείαν,  επεθετο  τη  βουλή,  και  πρώτον  μεν  άνεΐλεν 
πολλούς  τών  ^Αρεοπαγιτών  αγώνας  επιφερων  περί 
τών  8ιωκη μένων  έπειτα  της  βουλής  επι  Κόνωνος 
άρχοντος  ατταΐ'τα  ττεριεΓλε*  τα  επίθετα  δι'  ων  ην  η 
της    πολιτείας    φυλακή,    και    τά    μεν    τοις    πεντα- 

^  numerum  e  priore  versu  male  repetitum  notant  Wila- 
mowitz-Kaibel. 

^  συνέστησαν  τά  <eis>  ?  ed.  :  συν€στήσαντο  τα  fis  Wilamowitz- 
Kaibel. 

*  Hlass,  cf.  Ixii.  1  :  ^opois  cod. 

*  δοκών  και  Kaibel.  ^  τηρκίλΐτο  Richards. 

74 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  xxiv.  3— xxv.  2 

bined  proceeds  of  the  tributes  and  the  taxes  and  the 
allies  served  to  feed  more  than  twenty  thousand  men. 
For  there  were  six  thousand  jurymen,  one  thousand 
six  hundred  archers  and  also  one  thousand  two 
hundred  cavalry,  five  hundred  members  of  the 
Council,  five  hundred  guardians  of  the  docks,  and 
also  fifty  watchmen  in  the  city,  as  many  as  seven 
hundred  officials  at  home  and  as  many  as  seven 
hundred  "  abroad  ;  and  in  addition  to  these,  when  later 
they  settled  into  the  war,  two  thousand  five  hundred 
hoplites,  twenty  guai-d-ships  and  other  ships  con- 
veying the  guards  to  the  number  of  two  hundred 
elected  by  lot  ;  and  furthermore  the  prytaneum,* 
orphans,  and  warders  of  prisoners — for  all  of  these 
had  their  maintenance  from  public  funds. 

XXV.  By  these  means  the  people  were  provided  1 
with  their  food-supply.     The  constitution  remained 
under  the  leadership  of  the  Areopagites  for  about 
seventeen  years  after  the  Persian  War,  although  it 
was  being  gradually  modified.     But  as  the  popula- 
tion increased,  Ephialtes  son  of  Sophonides,  having 
become  head  of  the  People  ^  and  having  the  reputation 
of  being  incorruptible  and  j  ust  in  re«ard  to  the  constitu- 
tion, attacked  the  Council.     Firswie  made  away  with  2 
many  of  the  Areopagites  by  bringing  legal  proceed- 
ings against  them  about  their  acts  of  administration  ; 
--s^then  in  the  archonship   of  Conon  he  stripped  the  462  u.c 
(^2^ouncil  of  all  its  added  powers  which  made  it  the 
safeguard  of  the  constitution,  and  assigned  some  of 

"  The  number  is  probably  repeated  frem  the  previous  line 
by  mistake  ;  other\vise  '  also  '  would  be  added. 

''  The  town-hall,  probably  in  the  old  Agora,  south  of  the 
Acropolis;  in  it  a  fire  was  kept  continually  burning,  and 
the  Prytaneis  dined. 

"  See  ii.  3  n. 


ARISTOTLE 

κοσίοις    τα    he    τω    Βημω    καΐ    τοις    Βίκαστηρίας 

3  άπβΒωκβν.  errpa^e  he  ταΰτα  σνναιτίου  yevoμevoυ 
θeμLστoκλeoυς,  δς  ην  μέν  των  'ApeoTraytrcui' 
eμeλλe  he  Kpiveadai  μηhισμoΰ.  βουλόμ€νος  he 
καταλυθηναι,  την  βονλην  6  θ€μιστοκλης  προς  μ€ν 
τον  ^Έιφίάλτην  eXeyev  οτι  σvvapπάζeLV  αυτόν  η 
βονλη  μeλλeL,  προς  he  τους  ^ Kpeoπaγίτaς  δτί 
hei^ei  τινάς  συνισταμένους  ΙπΙ  κaτaλύσeι  της 
πo\ιτeίaς.  άγαγών  he  τους  αΙρ€θ€ντας^  της  βουλής 
οΰ   hteτpLβ€v   6    ^Έιφίάλτης   ίνα    h€Lξη   τους    άθροι- 

4  ζομένους,  hieXeyeTO  μ€τά  σπoυhης  αύτοΐς.  ό  δ' 
^Έιφίάλτης  ώς  elhev  κaτaπλaγelς  κάθιζα  μονο- 
χίτων  €πΙ  τον  βωμόν.  θαυμασάντων  he  πάντων 
το  γ€γον6ς  καΐ  μeτά  ταΰτα  συvaθpoLσθeίσης  της 
βουλής  των  π€ντακοσίων  κατηγορούν  των  ^Apeo- 
παγιτών  6  τ  ^Κφίάλτης  καΐ  ό"  Θεμιστοκλής, 
καΐ  πάλιν  ev  τω  hημω  τον  αύτον  τρόπον,  ea»? 
περιείλοντο  αυτών  την  hύvaμιv.  /cat'  άνηρεθη  he 
και  6  ^Έιφιάλτης  hoλoφovηθ€ις  /χετ'  ου  πολύν 
χρόνον  δι'  ^Apιστohίκoυ  του  Ύαναγραίου. 

ι  XXVI.  Ή  μεν  οΰν  των  ^Αρεοπαγιτών  βουλή  τού- 
τον τον  τρόπον  άπεστερηθη  της  επιμελείας,  μετά 
hε  ταύτα  συνεβαινεν  άνιεσθαι  μάλλον  την  πολιτείαν 
δια  τους  προθύμως  hημaγωγoΰvτaς.  κατά  γάρ 
τους  καιρούς  τούτους  συνέπεσε  μηh^  ηγεμόνα  εχειν 
τους  επιεικέστερους ,  αλλ'  αυτών  προεστάναι 
Κίμωνα  τον   M.ιλτιάhoυ   νεώτερον*   οντά   και   προς 

^  Kenyon  :  αφαιρΐθβνταί  cod. 

*  ό  suppletum  a  Wilamowitz-Kaibel. 

^  [και]    Mayor :  καΐ  <ό  μέν  Θεμιστοκλής  .  .  .>  Wilamowitz- 
Kaibel. 

*  νωθρυν  Blass :  νωθρώτερον  Wilamowitz-Kaibel. 

76 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  xxv.  2— xxvi.  l 

them  to  the  Five  Hundred  and  others  to  the  People 
and  to  the  jury-courts.  For  these  acts  of  Ephialtes,  ^ 
Themistocjes  °  was  partly  responsible  ;  he  was  a 
/member  of  the  Areopagus,  but  was  destined  to  be 
>  put  on  trial  for  treasonable  dealings  with  Persia. 
Themistocles  desirmg  the  Council  to  be  jiestroyed 
used  to  tell  Ephialtes  that  the  Council  was  going  to  " 
arrest  him,  while  he'^told  the  Areopagites  that  he 
would  give  information  about  certain  persons  who 
were  conspiring  to  destroy  the  constitution.  And  he 
used  to  take  selected  members  of  the  Council  to 
the  place  where  Ephialtes  resided  to  show  them  the 
people  collecting  there,  and  conversed  with  them 
seriously.  Ephialtes  was  dismayed  when  he  saw  4 
this,  and  took  his  seat  at  the  altar  in  only  his  shirt. 
Everybody  was  amazed  at  what  had  happened, 
and  afterwards  when  the  Council  of  Five  Hundred 
assembled  Ephialtes  and  Themistocles  kept  on 
denouncing  the  Areopagites,  and  again  similarly  at 
the  meetings~of  the  people,  until  they  deprived 
them  of  their  power.  And  also  Ephialtes  was  actually 
made  away  with  not  long  after,  being  craftily 
murdered  by  A'ristodicus  of  Tanagra. 
I  XXVI.  IrT  this  way  the  Council  of  the  Areopagites  1 
fwas  deprived  of  the  superintendence  of  affairs.  After 
this  there  came  about  an  increased^elaxation  of  the 
constitution,  due  to  the  eagerness  of  those  who  were 
the  leaders  of  the  People.  For  it  so  happened  that 
during  these  periods  the  better  classes  ''  hadno  leadeT 

at  all,  but  the  fh^ιpf^J^ιpr^nη    ^p^nnfT  thpm  ,  Γ||γ|Γ>Γΐ  gon 

of  Miltiades,  was  a  rather  young  man  who  had  only 

"In  Politics  ii.  xii.  the  place  assigned  here  to  Themisto- 
cles is  taken  by  Pericles. 

*  Or  '  more  respectable ' :  it  is  a  vague  term  of  social 
approval,  cf.  §  1  fin,  xxvii.  4,  xxviii.  1,  xxxvi.  9. 

77 


ARISTOTLE 

την  ττόλιν  οφέ  ττροσζλθόντα,  ττρός  8e  τούτοις 
βφθάρθαι  τους  ττολλονς  κατά  7τόλ€μον•  της  γαρ 
στρατζίας  γινομένης  ev  τοΐς  τότ€  χρόνοις  €Κ  κατα- 
λόγου καΐ  στρατηγών  υφισταμένων  άττ^ίρων  μ€ν 
τον  ττοΧζμζΙν  τιμωμένων  δε  δια  τα?  ττατρικάς 
δό^α?,  alel  συνέβαινεν  των  έζιόντων  ανά  8ισχιλίονς 
η  τρισχιλίους  άπόλλνσθαι,  ώστ€  άναλίσκ€σΘαι 
τους   €πΐ€ΐκ€Ϊς   και   τον   Βημου   καΐ  των   βύπόρων, 

2  τά  μ€ν  ονν  άλλα  πάντα  διώκουν  ονχ  ομοίως  και, 
7τρότ€ρον  τοΐς  νόμοις  ττροσέγ^οντβς,  την  he.  των 
ivvea  αρχόντων  αΐρ€σιν  ουκ  έκίνουν  αλλ  η^ 
€κτω   eVet   μ€τά   τον   ^Εφιάλτου    θάνατον   έγνωσαν 

(και  €κ  ζβνγιτών  προκρίνζσθαι  τονς  κληρωσο- 
μένους  των  εννέα  αρχόντων  και  ττρώτος  ηρζ^ν 
έζ  αυτών  Ήίνησιθβί^ης.  οι  δε  ττρό  τούτου  ττάντ^ς 
€ζ  Ιππέων  και  π€ντακοσιομ€8ίμνων  ήσαν,  οί  δε* 
ζζυγΐται    τάς    εγκυκλίους    ηρχον,    ει    μη    τι    παρ- 

3  €ωράτο  των  έν  τοΐς  νόμοις.  έ'τει  δε  πέμπτω  μβτα 
/(  ταΰτα  έπι  Αυσικράτους  άρχοντος  οί  τριάκοντα 
ι'    8ικασταΙ    κατέστησαν    πάλιν    οί    καλούμ€νοι    κατά 

Βημους'  καΐ  τρίτω  μ€τά  τούτον  έπι  Άντώότου 
δια  το  πλήθος  των  πολιτών   Περικλεου?   €ΐποντος 

Λ    έγνωσαν   μη    μ€τέχ€ΐν   της   ττόλεω?    ος    αν   μη    έζ 

ι    άμφοΐν  άστοΐν  η  γεγονώς. 

1      XXVII.    Μετά    δε    ταΰτα    προς    το    ^ημαγωγεΐν 

έλθόντος   Περικλέους•  και  πρώτον^  ίύ^οκιμησαντος 

6τ€    κατηγόρησε    τάς    εύθύνας    Κίμωνος    στρατη- 

γοΰντος     νέος     ων,     Βημοτικωτέραν     έτι     συνέβη 

^  ij  supplevit  Blass.  *  5k  supplevit  Kenyon. 

'  πρώτον  Blass :  ττωτου  cod. :  πρό  τον  Jackson. 

•    '  '    !l    '       ' 

«  C/.  xvi.  5. 
78 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  xxvi.  1— xxvii.  1 

lately  entered  public  life  ;    and  in  addition,  that  the 
multitude  had  suffered  seriously  in  war,  for  in  those 
days  fEe  expeditionary  torce  wasraised  from  a  muster- 
roll,  and  was  commanded  by  generals  with  no  experi- 
ence of  war  but  promoted  on  account  of  their  family 
reputations,  so  that  it  was  always  happening  that  the 
troops  on  an  expedition  suffered  as  many  as  two  or 
three  thousand  casualties,  making  a  drain  on  the 
numbers   of  the  respectable  members   both  of  the 
[people    and   of  the   wealthy.     Thus   in   general   all  2 
I  the  administration  was  conducted  without  the  same 
[attention   to   the   laws   as   had   been   given   before, 
although  no  innovation  was  made  in  the  election  of 
the  Nine  Archons,  except  that  five  years  after  the 
death  of  Ephialtes  they  decided  to  extend  to  the 
Teamster   class    eligibility    to    the   preliminary    roll 
from  which  the  Nine  Archons  were  to  be  selected 
by  lot  ;    and  the  first  of  the  Teamsier  class  to  hold 
the  archonship  was  Mnesitheides.  (All  the  Archons  457  b.c. 
hitherto  had  been  from  the  Knights  and  Five-hundred- 
measure-menj  while  the  Teamsters  held  the  ordinary 
offices,  unlesssome  provision  of  the  laws  was  ignored. 
Four  years  afterwards,  in  the  archonship  of  Lysicrates,  3 
the  thirty  judges  called  the  Local  Justices  were  in-  453  b.c. 
stituted  again  "  ;  and  two  years  after  Lysicrates,  in  451  b.c 
the  year  of  Antidotus,  o^ving  to  the  large  number  of 
the  citizens  an  enactment  was  passed  on  the  proposal 
of  Pericles  confining  citizenship  to  persons  of  citizen  "^ 
birth  on  both  sides. 

XXVII.  After  this  when  Pericles  advanced  to  the  1 
leadership  of  the  people,  having  first  distinguished  463  b.c. 
himself  when  while  still  a  young  man  he  challenged 
the  audits  of  Cimon  who  was  a  general,  it  came  about 
that  the  constitution  became  still  more  democratic. 

79 


ARISTOTLE 

γ€ν€σθαι  την  ττολίτζίαν.  καΐ  γαρ  των  'A/aeo- 
τταγιτών  eVta  TrapetXeTO,  καΐ  μάλιστα  προντρβφεν 
την  πόλιν  inl  την  ναυτίκην  Βύναμιν,  i^  ης  συνέβη 
θαρρήσαντας  τους  πολλούς  αττασαν  την  ττολίτβίαν 

2  μόίλλον  άγ€ΐν  et?  αύτοΰς.  μετά  he  την  iv  Σαλα/χΓνι 
ναυ/χαχιαν'  ύνος  Set  ττεντηκοστω  eVet  ΙττΙ  ΥΙυθο- 
8ίόρου  άρχοντος  ό  ττρός  ΥΙελοποννησίονς  ενίστη 
ττόλεμος,  iv  ω  κατακλεισθείς  6  8ημος  iv  τω  άστ€ΐ 
καΐ  συνεθισθείς  iv  ταΓ?  στρατβίαις  μισθοφορ€Ϊν,  τά 
μεν  εκών  τά  he  άκων  προηρεΐτο^  την  ττολιτείαν 
hiOLKelv  αυτός,  iπoίησe  he  καΐ  μισθοφόρα  τά 
hiKaoTTipia      ΥΙ,ερικλης     πρώτος,     άντώημαγωγών 

3  προς  την  Κίμωνος  ενπορίαν.  6  γάρ  Κίμων  are 
τυραννικην  έχων  ούσίαν  πρώτον  μεν  τάς  κοινάς 
λητουργίας  iλrjτoυpγει  λαμπρώς,  έπειτα  τών 
hημoτώv  έτρεφε  πολλούς'  i^rjv  γάρ  τω  βονλομενω 
AaκLahώv  καθ^  εκάστην  την  ημεραν  iλθόvτί  παρ' 
αύτον  εχειν  τά  μέτρια,  ετι  hi  τά  χωρία  πάντα 
άφρακτα  ην,  όπως  i^rf  τω  βονλομενω  της  όπώρας 

4  άπολανειν.  προς  δτ)  ταύτην  την  χορηγίαν  επι- 
λειπόμενος  ο  ΙΙερικλης  τη  ουσία,  συμβουλενσαντος 
αύτώ  Aaμωvίhoυ  του  Οίηθεν  {ος  ihόκει  τών  πολλών 
εισηγητής  etv-at  τω  ΥΙερικλει,  διό  και  ώστράκισαν 
αυτόν  ύστερον)  iπει  τοις  ιhίoις  ηττάτο  διδόΐ'αι  τοις 
πολλοίς  τά  αυτών,  κατεσκευασε  μισθοφοράν  τοις 
hικaστηpίoις^•  αφ'  ων  αίτιώνταί  rtve?  χείρω* 
γενέσθαι,   κληρουμενων   iπιμελώς   άει  μάλλον   τών 

5  τυχόντων  η   τών  iπιεικώv  ανθρώπων,     ηρξατο   hi 

'  προή-γΐτο  Richards. 

*  (ξτ)  Kenyon  :  εξηι>  cod. 

'   Blass:   δικασται?  cod. 

*  χΐίρονί  Wilamowitz-Kaibel  (servato  δικασταΐί). 

80 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  xxvii.  1-5 

For  he  took  away  some  of  the  functions  of  the  Areo- 
pagus, and  he  urged  the  state  very  strongly  in  the  i. 
direction  of  naval  power,  which  resulted  in  embolden- 
ing the  multitude,"  who  brought  all  the  government 
more  into  their  own  hands.     Forty-eight  years  after  2 
the  naval  battle   of  Salamis,  in  the   archonship   of432B.c. 
Pythodorus,  the  war  against  the  Peloponnesians  broke 
out,  during  which  the  people  being  locked  up  in  the 
city,  and  becoming  accustomed  to  earning  pay  on 
their  military  campaigns,  came  partly  of  their  own 
will  and  partly  against  their  will  to  the  decision  to 
administer  the  government  themselves.    Also  Pericles  / 
first  made  service  in  the  jury-courts  a  paid  office,  as'" 
a  popular  counter-measure  against  Cimon's  wealth. 
For   as    Cimon  had   an    estate    large    enough   for  a  3 
tyrant,  in  the  first  place  he  discharged  the  general 
public  services  in  a  brilliant  manner,  and  moreover  he 
supplied  maintenance  to  a  number  of  the  members 
of  his  deme  ;  for  anyone  of  the  Laciadae  who  liked 
could  come  to  his  house  every  day  and  have  a  moder- 
ate supply,  and  also  all  his  farms  were  unfenced,  to 
enable   anyone  who  liked  to   avail  himself  of  the 
harvest.     So  as  Pericles'  means  were  insufficient  for  4 
this  lavishness,  he  took  the  advice  of  Damonides  of  ■ 
Oea  (who  was  believed  to  suggest  to  Pericles  most  of 
his  measures,  owing  to  which  they  afterwards  ostra- 
cized him),  since  he  was  getting  the  worst  of  it  with 
his  private  resources,  to  give  the  multitude  what  was 
their  own,  and  he  instituted  payment  for  the  jury- 
courts  ;   the  result  of  which  according  to  some  critics 
was    their    deterioration,   because   ordinary  persons 
always  took  more  care  than  the  respectable  to  cast  lots 
for  the  duty.     Also  it  was  after  this  that  the  organized  5 

<•  Cf.  xxii.  7.  xxiv.  1. 

ο  81 


ARISTOTLE 

μ€τα  ταΰτα  /cat  το  Se/«x^etv,  πρώτου  καταΒΐΐ- 
ζαντος  ^Ανύτου  μετά  την  iv  Πυλω  στρατηγίαν 
κρινόμενος  γαρ  υττό  τίνων  δια  το  άποβαλεΐν  ΐΐύλον, 
Βεκάσας  το  δικαστή ριον  άπεφυγεν. 

1  XXVIII,  "Κως  μβν  οΰν  ΐίερίκλης  προαστηκει 
τον  Βήμου  βελτίω  τα  κατά  την  πολιτείαν  ην, 
τελεντησαντος  he  ΙΙερίκλεονς  πολύ  χείρω.  πρώτον 
γαρ  τότ€  προστάτην  ελαββν  ο  Βημος  ουκ  evSoKi- 
μοΰντα  παρά  τοις  επιεικάσιν,  iv  8e  τοις  πρότερον 
χρόνοίς  aei  Βίετβλονν  οΐ^  επιεικείς  Βημαγωγονντες . 

2  εζ  αρχής  μεν  γαρ  και  πρώτος  εγενετο  προστάτης 
του  Βημου  Σόλων,  δεύτερος  8e  ΐίεισίστρατος, 
των  ευγενών  και  γνωρίμων  καταλυθείσης  8e 
της  τυραννικός  Ιίλεισθενης  του  γένους  ων  τών 
Άλκμεονώών,  και  τούτω  μεν  ούΒεις  ην  άντι- 
στασιώτης  ώς  εζεπεσον  οι  περί  τον  Ισαγόραν 
μετά  8ε  ταΰτα  του  μεν  Βήμου  προειστήκει  Έάνθ- 
ιππος,  τών  8ε  γνωρίμων  Μιλτιάδη? "  έ'ττ^ιτα 
Θεμιστοκλής  και  'Αριστείδης-  μετά  δε  τούτους 
'Έιφιάλτης  μεν  του  Βήμου,  Κ,ίμων  δ'  ό  Μιλτιάδου 
τών  ευπόρων  είτα  ΐίερικλης  μεν  του  Βήμου, 
θουκυΒίΒης  δε  τών  έτερων,  κηΒεστης  ών  Κίμωνος. 

3  Τίερικλεους  8ε  τελευτήσαντος  τών  μεν  επιφανών 
προειστήκει  Νικίας  6  εν  Έικελία  τελευτησας,  του 
δε  8ημου  Κλέων  ό  Κλεαινε'του,  δς  8οκεΐ  μάλιστα 
Βιαφθεΐραι    τον    8ημον    ταΐς    ορμαΐς,^  και    πρώτος 

ϊ  ετΓΐ  τοΰ  βήματος  άνεκραγε  και  ελοιΒορησατο  και 
περιζωσάμενος  εΒημηγόρησε,  τών  άλλων  εν  κόσμω 

1  [οΊ]  Richards. 
'  διανο/χαΐϊ  Sandys :  νομαΐί  Thalheim. 

"  Pylos  (Navarino)  on  the  W.  coast  of  Peloponnesus,  had  . 
been  taken  by  Atheas  425  b.c,  but  was  retaken  by  Sparta 

82 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  xxvii.  5— xxviii.  3 

bribery  of  juries  began,  Anytus  having  first  shown  the        <»^ 
way  to  it  after  his  command  at  Pylos**  ;    for  when  ^, - 
he  was  brought  to  trial  by  certain  persons  for  having 
lost  Pylos  he  bribed  the  court  and  got  off. 

XXVIII.  So  long,  then,  as  Pericles  held  the  head-  1 — -— 
ship  ^  of  the  People,  the  affairs  of  the  state  went 
better,  but  when  Pericles  was  dead  they  became 
much  worse.  For  the  People  now  for  the  first  time 
adopted  a  head  who  was  not  in  good  repute  with  the 
respectable  classes,  whereas  in  former  periods  those 
always  continued  to  lead  the  people.  For  Solon  2 
was  the  first  and  original  head  of  the  People,  and  the 
second  was  Peisistratus,  who  was  one  of  the  men  of 
nobility  and  note.  After  the  tyranny  had  been  put 
down,  Cleisthenes,  a  member  of  the  family  of  the 
Alcmaeonidae,  was  head  of  the  People,  and  he  had 
no  opponent,  since  the  party  of  Isagoraswas  banished ; 
but  after  this  Xanthippus  held  the  headship  of  the 
People,  and  Miltiades  of  the  notables  ;  and  then 
Themistocles  and  Aristeides ;  and  after  them  Ephialtes 
held  the  headship  of  the  People,  and  Cimon  son  of 
Miltiades  of  the  wealthy  ;  and  then  Pericles  of  the 
People  and  Thucydides  of  the  others,  he  being  a 
relation  of  Cimon.  When  Pericles  died,  Nicias,  who  3 
died  in  Sicily,  held  the  headship  of  the  men  of  dis- 
tinction, and  the  head  of  the  People  was  Cleon  son 
of  Cleaenetus,  who  is  thought  to  have  done  the  most 
to  corrupt  the  people  by  his  impetuous  outbursts, 
and  was  the  first  person  to  use  bawling  and  abuse  on 
the  platform,  and  to  gird  up  his  cloak  before  making 
a  public  speech,  all  other  persons  speaking  in  orderly 

409  B.C.     Anytus  (see  also  xxxiv.  3,  one  of  the  prosecutors  of 
Socrates)  was  sent  with  30  triremes  to  its  relief,  but  owing 
to  weather  never  got  round  Cape  Malea. 
See  note  on  ii.  3. 

83 


ARISTOTLE 

AeyovTOJi'.  etra  μ€τά  τούτους  των  μβν  €Τ€ρων 
Θηραμβνης  6  "Αγνωνος,  του  δε  δτ^/χου  ΥΛ^οφών  ο 
λυροποίός,  ος  καΐ  την  ^ιωβολίαν^  βπορισβ  πρώτος• 
και  χρόνον  μεν  τίνα  διεδίδου/  /χβτά  he  ταΰτα 
κατέλυσε  Ιίαλλίκράτης  ΥΙαιανίΐύς  πρώτος  υπο- 
σχόμενος βπίθήσβιν  προς  τοΐν  8υοΐν  όβολοΐν  άλλον 
όβολόν.  τούτων  μεν  οΰν  αμφοτέρων  θάνατον  κατ- 
εγνωσαν  ύστερον  εΐωθεν  γαρ  καν  ί^^αττατη^^  το 
πλήθος  ύστερον  μισεΖν  τους  τι  προαγαγόντας  ποιείν 

4  αυτού?  τών  μη  καλώς  εχόντων,  από  δε  Κλεο- 
φώντος  η8η  8ίε8εχοντο  συνεχώς  την  ^ημαγωγιαν 
οΐ  μάλιστα  βουλόμενοι  θρασύνεσθαι  καΐ  χαρι- 
ζεσθαί  τοις  πολλοίς  προς  το  παραυτίκα  βλέποντες . 

5  ^οκοΰσι  δε^  βέλτιστοι  γεγονεναι  τών  Αθηνησι 
ιπολιτευσαμενων  μετά  τους  αρχαίους  Νικίας  και 
^θουκυ^ίΒης  και  Θηραμένης,     και  περί  μεν  Νικίου 

και  ΘουκυΒί8ου  πάντες  σχεΒόν  όμολογοΰσιν  άνδρας 
γεγονεναι  ου  μόνον  καλούς  κάγαθούς  άλλα  και 
πολιτικούς  και  τη  πόλει  πάση  πατρικώς  χρω- 
μενους,  περί  δε  Θηραμένους  δια  το  συμβηναι  κατ 
αυτόν  ταραχώδεις  τάς  πολιτείας  είΐ'αι*  άμφισ- 
βητησις  της  κρίσεως  εστί.  Βοκεΐ  μεντοι^  τοις 
μη  παρεργως  αποφαινομενοις  ουχ  ωσπερ  αυτόν 
Βιαβάλλουσι  πάσας  τάς  πολιτείας  καταλύειν,  αλλά 
πάσας  προάγειν  εως  μη^έν  παρανομοΐεν,  ως  δυνά- 
μενος πολιτεύεσθαι  κατά  πάσας,  όπερ  εστίν  αγαθού 
πολίτου  έργον,  παρανομούσαις  οέ  ου  συγχωρών 
αλλ'  άπεχθανόμενος . 

1  διωββλίαν  edd.  *  δίΐδίδοτο  Wyse. 

3  δέ :  δοι  (-δ'  οί)  cod.,  f  superscripto. 
*  €Ϊναι  supplevit  Richards.  '  μέντοι  Kenyon :  μ(ν  cod. 

"  By  instituting  the '  theatre-fund '  (τό  θεωρικό»),  which  was 
84 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  xxviii.  3-5 

fashion.  Then  after  these  Theramenes  son  of 
Hagnon  was  chief  of  the  others  and  Cleophon  the 
lyre-maker  of  the  People,  who  first  introduced  the 
two-obol  dole  ** ;  he  went  on  distributing  this  for  a 
time,  but  afterwards  Callicrates  of  the  Paeanian  deme 
abolished  it,  being  the  first  person  to  promise  to  add 
to  the  two  obols  another  obol.  Both  of  these  two 
leaders  were  afterwards  condemned  to  death  ;  for 
even  though  the  multitude  may  be  utterly  deceived, 
subsequently  it  usually  hates  those  who  have  led  it 
to  do  anything  improper.  From  Cleon  onward  the  4 
leadership  of  the  People  was  handed  on  in  an  unbroken 
line  by  the  men  most  willing  to  play  a  bold  part 
and  to  gratify  the  many  with  an  eye  to  immediate 
popularity.  And  it  is  thought  that  the  best  of  the  5 
politicians  at  Athens  after  those  of  early  times  were 
Nicias,  Thucydides  and  Theramenes.  As  to  Nicias 
and  Thucydides,  almost  everybody  agrees  that  they 
were  not  only  honourable  gentlemen  but  also  states- 
manlike and  patriotic  servants  of  the  whole  state,  but 
about  Theramenes,  owing  to  the  confused  nature  of 
the  constitutional  changes  that  took  place  in  his  time, 
the  verdict  is  a  matter  of  dispute.  However,  the 
view  of  wTiters  not  making  mere  incidental  references 
is  that  he  was  not  a  destroyer  of  all  governments,  as 
critics  charge  him  with  being,  but  guided  them  all 
forward  into  a  fully  law-abiding  course,  since  he  was 
capable  of  serving  the  state  under  all  of  them,  which 
is  the  duty  of  a  good  citizen,  but  did  not  give  in 
to  them  when  they  acted  illegally,  but  faced  their 
enmity.,^ 

a  state  fund  for  defraying  the  cost  of  an  ordinary  seat  at 
the  theatre,  2  obols.  Plutarch  attributes  its  institution  to 
Pericles.     An  obol  was  about  l^d.,  6  to  a  drachma. 

85 


ARISTOTLE 

1  XXIX.  'Έα>9  /Aev  οΰν  Ισόρροπα  τα.  πράγματα 
κατά  τον  πόΧεμον  ην  8ί€φνλαττον  την  Βημοκρατίαν. 
€7Γ6ΐ  Se  μβτά  την  iv  Σικτβλια  γ€νομ€νην  συμφοράν^ 
Ισχυρότατα'^  τα  των  Αακ€^αιμονίων  ΙγΙνετο  δια 
την  προς  βασιλέα  συμμαχίαν,  ηναγκάσθησαν  κινη- 
σαντ€ς  την  Βημοκρατίαν  καταστησαι  την  εττι  των 

•    τ€τρακοσίων  ποΧιτβίαν,  ΐΐπόντος  τον  μ^ν  προ^  τοΰ 

\    φηφίσματος  λόγον  ^Ιηλοβίου,  την  δε  γνώμην  γρά- 

φαντος  ΐΐυθο^ώρου  τοΰ  ^ Αναφλυστίον  *  μάλιστα  δέ 

συμπ€ΐσθβντων  των  πολλών  δια  το  νομίζζΐν  βασιλέα 

μάλλον     ίαυτοΐς     συμπολ^μησ^ιν     eav     δι     ολίγων 

2  ποιησωνται  την  πολιτβίαν.  ην  δε  το  φηφισμα  τοΰ 
Πυ^οδωρου  τοιόΐ'δε•  τον  Βημον  ελβσθαι  μβτα  των 
προϋπαρχόντων  δέκα  προβονλων  άλλους  είκοσι  εκ 
των  ύπερ  τβτταράκοντα  €τη  γεγονότων,  οιτιν^ς 
όμόσαντ€ς  η  μην  συγγράφειν  ά  αν  ηγώνται  βέλ- 
τιστα    είναι     τη     ττόλει     συγγράφουσι     ττερι     της 

3  σωτηρίας•  e^elvai  δε  και  των  άλλων  τω  βουλομύνω 
γράφειν,  ιν  ε|•  απάντων  αιρώνται  το  άριστον. 
Κλειτο^ών  δε  τα  /αέν  άλλα  καθάπβρ  Πυ^οδωρο? 
ειττεν,  προσαναζητησαι  δε  του?  αιρ^θβντας  ^γραφβν 
και  του?  πατρίους  νόμους  ους  Κλεισ^ε'νη?  ΐθηκ^ν 
δτ€  καθιστή  την  8ημοκρατίαν,  δπως^  άκούσαντες 
και  τούτων  βουλ^ύσωνται  το  άριστον,  ως  ου 
Βημοτικην    άλλα    παραπλησιαν    οΰσαν    την    Κλει- 

4  σθένους  ττολιτειαν  ττ^  Σόλωνο?.  οί  δ  αιρε^ε'ντε? 
πρώτον   /χεν   έγραφαν   επάναγκ^ς   ε?ναι   του?   ττρυ- 

^  Richards :  διαφοραν  cod, 

*  ίσχυρύτΐρα  Mayor,  *  ττρό]  7re/)i  Wyse, 

*  Blass:  .  .  .  v. τιον  cod. 

5  όττω?  <&;'>  Wilamowitz-Kaibel, 

"  Or  '  before  the  resolution.' 
86 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  xxix.  1-4 

XXIX.  In  the  period  of  the  war  therefore,  so  long  1 
as  fortunes  were  evenly  balanced,  they  continued  to 
preserve  the  democracy.  But  when  after  the  occur- 
rence of  the  disaster  in  Sicily  the  Lacedaemonian  side  4i3  b.c. 
became  very  strong  owing  to  the  alliance  with  the 
king  of  Persia,  they  were  compelled  to  overthrow  the 
democracy  and  set  up  the  government  of  the  Four 
Hundred,  Melobius  making  the  speech  on  behalf  of  the 
resolution  "  but  Pythodorus  of  the  deme  Anaphlystus 
having  drafted  the  motion,  and  the  acquiescence  of 
the  mass  of  the  citizens  being  chiefly  due  to  the  belief 
that  the  king  would  help  them  more  in  the  war  if  they 
limited  their  constitution.  The  resolution  of  Pytho-  2 
dorus  was  as  follows  :  '  That  in  addition  to  the  ten 
Preliminary  Councillors  *  already  existing  the  people 
choose  twenty  others  from  those  over  forty  years  of 
age,  and  that  these,  after  taking  a  solemn  oath  to 
draft  whatever  measures  they  think  best  for  the  state, 
shall  draft  measures  for  the  public  safety  ;  and  that  3 
it  be  open  to  any  other  person  also  that  wishes,  to 
frame  proposals,  in  order  that  they  may  choose  the 
one  that  is  best  out  of  them  all.'  Cleitophon  moved 
an  amendment  to  the  resolution  of  Pythodorus,  that 
the  commissioners  elected  should  also  investigate  the 
ancestral  laws  laid  do\vn  by  Cleisthenes  when  he  was 
establishing  the  democracy,  in  order  that  they  might 
decide  on  the  best  course  to  advise  after  hearing 
these  laws  also,  on  the  ground  that  the  constitution 
of  Cleisthenes  was  not  democratic  but  similar  to  that 
of  Solon.    The  commissioners  when  elected  first  pro-  4 

*  The  ten  commissioners  appointed  at  Athens  after  the 
Sicilian  disaster  to  deal  with  the  emergency  (Thuc.  viii.  1), 
and  later  instructed  to  reform  the  constitution  {ib.  Ixvii.). 

87 


ARISTOTLE 

τανβις  άπαντα  τα  Χ^γόμζνα  rrepl  της  σωτηρίας 
€πίφηφίζβιν,  €7Γ€ΐτα  τάς  των  παρανόμων  γραφάς 
καΐ  τάς  είσαγγβλίας  καΐ  τάς  προσκλησ€ΐς^  avetXov, 
όπως  άν  οι  €θβλοντ€ς  ^Αθηναίοι  συμβουλενωσι 
π€ρί  των  προκ€(,μ€νων•  iav  Se  τις  τινα^  τούτων 
χάριν  η  ζημιοΐ  η  προσκαληται  η  ^Ισάγη  ei? 
8ίκαστηρίον,  evhei^iv  αύτον  elvai  και  άπαγωγην 
προς  τους  στρατηγούς ,  τους  δε  στρατηγούς  παρα- 

5  Sovvai  τοις  eV8e/ca  θανάτω  ζτ^^υ,ιώσαι.  μ€τά  8e 
ταύτα  την  ποΧιτ^ίαν  SieTa^av  TovBe  τρόπον  τά 
μεν  προσιοντα^  μη  εζεΐναι  αλλοσε  δατταιη^σαι 
η  €ΐς  τον  πόλεμον,  τάς  δ'  αρχάς  αμίσθους 
άρχ€ΐν  άπάσας  €ως  αν  6  πόλεμος  η,  πλην 
των  ivvea  αρχόντων  και  των  πρυτάνεων  οι  άν 
ώσιν,  τούτους  δε  φερειν  τρεις  όβολούς  εκαστον 
της  ημέρας•  την  δ'  άλλην  πολιτείαν  επιτρεφαι 
πασαν*  'Αθηναίων  τοις  Βυνατωτάτοις  και  τοις 
σώ/χασιν  και  τοις  χρήμασιν  λητουργεΐν  μη  ελαττον 
η  πεντακισχιλίοις^  εως  άν  ο  πόλεμος  ν•  κυρίους  δ' 
etvat  τούτους  και  συνθηκας  συντίθεσθαι  προς  ους 
άν  εθελωσιν  ελεσθαι  δ'  e/c*  της  φυλής  εκάστης  δέκα 
άνδρας  ύπερ  τετταράκοντα  ετη  γεγονότας  οΐτινες 
καταλεξουσι  τους  πεντακισχιλίους  όμόσαντες  καθ* 
ιερών  τελείων. 

1  XXX.  Ot  μεν  ούν  αίρεθεντες  ταύτα  σννεγραφαν 
κυρωθέντων    δε    τούτων    εΐλοντο    σφών    αυτών    οΐ 

^  Blass :  προκΚ-ησΐΐ^  Cod. 
^  Tij  Tiva  Richards:  tls  cod. 

^  Ίτροσίοντα,  Richards  (cf.  xxxix.  2)  :  χρηματαπροσιοντα  cod. : 
Xp.  <τά>  ττρ.  Kenyon. 

*  πάσαν  Mayor:  ττασιν  cod. 

*  -ων  (i.e.  ίλαττον  νεντακισχιΧίων)  v.l.  adscr.  cod. 

*  δ'  έκ  edd. :  5ΐκαι  cod. 

88 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  xxix.  4— xxx.  1 

posed  that  it  should  be  compulsory  for  the  Presidents" 
to  put  to  the  vote  all  proposals  made  for  the  public 
safety,  and  then  repealed  the  procedures  of  impeach- 
ment for  illegal  proposals,  information  and  summons, 
in  order  that  those  Athenian  citizens  who  wished 
might  give  advice  about  the  matters  before  them  ; 
and  enacted  that,  if  anybody  attempted  to  punish  or 
summon  or  bring  them  into  court  for  so  doing,  he  be 
liable  to  information  and  summary  arrest  before  the 
Generals,  and  that  the  Generals  should  hand  him 
over  to  the  Eleven  to  be  punished  with  death.  After  < 
this  they  framed  the  constitution  in  the  following 
way  :  that  it  should  not  be  permissible  to  spend  the 
revenues  on  any  other  object  than  the  war  ;  that  all 
the  officers  of  state  should  be  unpaid  for  the  duration 
of  the  war,  excepting  those  who  held  the  posts  of  the 
Nine  Archons  and  the  Presidents,  and  these  should 
draw  three  obols ''  per  man  per  day  ;  and  that  all  the 
rest  of  the  functions  of  government  should  be  en- 
trusted to  those  Athenians  who  in  person  and  property 
were  most  capable  of  serving  the  state,  not  less  than 
five  thousand,  for  the  duration  of  the  war  ;  and  that 
the  powers  of  this  body  should  include  competence  to 
contract  treaties  with  whatever  people  they  wished  : 
and  that  they  should  elect  ten  men  over  forty 
years  of  age  from  each  tribe,  who  should  enroll  the 
Five  Thousand  after  taking  oath  over  unblemished 
victims. 

XXX.  So  the  Commissioners  drafted  these  pro- 
posals ;  and  these  being  ratified,  the  Five  Thousand 

"  The  Presidents  of  the  Council,  see  xliii.  2. 
^  Half  a  drachma,  see  iv.  3  n. 

89 


ARISTOTLE 

ΤΓ^ντακίσγ^ίΧιοι,   τους   αναγράφοντας   την   ττοΧιτ^ίαν 
βκατόν    dvSpas.     οΐ    δ'    alpedevTes    ανέγραφαν    καΐ 

2  έζηνεγκαν  τάδε*  βουλ€ν€ΐν  μβν  κατ'  Ινιαυτον  τονς^ 
υπέρ  τριάκοντα  €τη  γΐγονότας  avev  μισθοφορας• 
τούτων  δ'  elvat,  τους  στρατηγούς  καΐ  τους  ivvea 
άρχοντας  καΐ  τον  Ιβρομνημονα  και  τους  ταξιάρχους 
και  ιππάρχους  και  φυλάρχους  και  άρχοντας  et?  τα 
φρούρια  και  ταμίας  των  ΐ€ρων  χρημάτων  τη  θ€ω 
και  τοις  άλλοις  θ€θΐς  δεκτά  και  ίΧληνοταμίας^  και 
των  άλλων  οσίων^  χρημάτων  απάντων  βίκοσιν  οι 
8ιαχ€ΐριοΰσιν,*  και  Ίζροποιούς  και  έπιμελητάς  δέκα 
ίκατέρους•  αιρ€Ϊσθαι  δβ  πάντας  τούτους  e/c  προκρί- 
των, €Κ  των  det  βουλβυόντων  πλ€ΐους  προκρίνοντας, 
τάς  δ'  αλλάς•  αρχάς  άπάσας  κληρωτάς  elvat  και 
μη    €Κ    της   βουλής•    τους    δε    ίλληνοταμίας    οι    αν 

3  8ιαχ€ΐρίζωσι  τα  χρήματα  μη  συμβουλ^ΰ^ιν .  βούλας 
δε  ποιησαι  τέτταρας  e/c  της  ηλικίας  της  ίίρημβνης 
βίς  τον  λοιπόν  χρόνον,  και  τούτων  το  λαχον  μέρος 
βουλίύ^ιν ,  t'etjLtac  he  και  τους  άλλους  προς  την 
ληξιν  ίκάστην.  τους  δ'  εκατόν  άνδρα?  διανεΓ^ίΐαι 
σφάς  Τ€  αυτούς  και  τους  άλλους  τ4τταρα  μέρη 
ως    ίσαίτατα    και    Βιακληρώσαι,   και    €ΐς    ένιαυτόν 

4:  βουλζύβιν  τους   λαχόντας^•   βουλ^ύζσθαι^    he    fj   αν 

^  Tovs]  τ€τρα.κοσίονί  Niemeyer. 

*  [και  έΧληΐΌταμίαί]  Sandys. 

'  [όσίωΐ']  ?  ed. 

*  [-V  οΐ  διαχΐίριοΐσιν]  Thompson. 

^  τούί  λαχόνταί  siippletum  a  Wilamowjtz-Kaibel. 

'  βονλβύεσθαι  suppletum  a  Sandys. 


"  The  secretary  or  registrar  who  with  the  actual  repre- 
sentative, the  Pylagoras,  was  sent  by  Athens,  as  by  the 
other  members,  to  the  Amphictyonic  Council. 

90 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  xxx.  1-4 

elected  a  hundred  of  their  members  as  a  committee 
to  draw  up  the  constitution.  This  committee  drew 
up  and  pubhshed  the  following  resolutions  :  '  The  2 
Council  to  consist  of  members  over  thirty  years  of 
age  holding  office  for  a  year  and  drawing  no  pay  ; 
these  members  to  include  the  Generals,  the  Nine 
Archons,  the  Sacred  Remembrancer,'*  the  Company- 
commanders, **  Officers  of  the  Horse,''  Officers  of  Tribes  ^ 
and  officers  in  command  of  the  Guards,^  the  Trea- 
surers of  the  Sacred  Funds  of  the  Goddess^  and  the  ten 
Treasurers  of  the  other  gods,  the  Greek  Treasurers,^ 
and  tΛventy  Treasurers  of  all  the  secular  funds  as 
well,  who  shall  manage  them,'*  and  Sacrificial  Officers 
and  Superintendents,  ten  of  each ;  and  the  Council 
to  elect  all  of  these  from  a  larger  preliminary  list  of 
candidates  proposed  by  it  from  its  members  at  the  time, 
but  all  other  offices  to  be  elected  by  lot  and  not  from 
the  Council ;  and  the  Greek  Treasurers  *  that  are  to 
manage  the  funds  not  to  be  members  of  the  Council. 
And  four  Councils  to  be  formed  for  the  future  from  3 
persons  of  the  stated  age,  and  a  division  of  these 
selected  by  lot  to  officiate,  but  the  others  also  to  be 
included  in  each  such  selection.  And  the  Hundred 
Men  to  divide  themselves  and  the  others '  into  four 
divisions  as  nearly  equal  as  possible,  and  to  cast  lots 
among  them,  and  those  on  whom  the  lot  falls  to  form 
the  Council  for  a  year.    And  the  Council  to  frame  4 

^  See  1x1.  3.  '  See  ib,  4.  "*  See  ib.  5. 

*  See  xxiv.  3.  f  Athena. 

»  This  contradicts  the  end  of  the  section,  and  the  text  seems 
to  be  corrupt. 

*  This  clause  seems  to  be  interpolated  from  below. 

»■  The  managers  of  the  funds  paid  as  tribute  by  the  Con- 
federacy of  Delos. 

^  i.e.  the  rest  of  the  Five  Thousand. 

91 


ARISTOTLE 

hoKT)  αντοΐς  άριστα  e^ecv  ττ€ρί  re  των  χρημάτων 
οττως  άν  σώα  fj  καΐ  els  το  δέον  άναλίσκηται,  καΐ 
ΤΓβρΙ  των  άΧλων  ως  άν  Βννωνται  άριστα-  eav  8e^ 
τι  θβλωσιν  βονλζνσασθαι  μετά  ττΧζΐόνων,  €7Γ€ΐσ- 
KaXeiv  ζκαστον  επείσκλητον  ον  άν  iOeXr]  των  €Κ 
της  αντης  ηλικίας.  τάς  δ  έδρα?  ττοΐ€ΐν  της 
βουλής  κατά  7Τ€νθημ€ρον,  eav  μη  δεωνται  πλειόνων. 

5  κληροΰν  δε  την  βονλην  τους  ivvea  άρχοντας,  τάς 
δε  χειροτονίας  κρίνβιν  πέντε  τους  λαχόντας  εκ 
της  βουλής,  και  εκ  τούτων  ενα  κληροΰσθαι  καθ* 
εκάστην  ημεραν  τον  επιφηφιοΰντα.  κληροΰν  δε 
τους  λαχόντα?  πέντε  τους  εθελοντας  προσελθεΐν 
εναντίον  της  βουλής,  πρώτον  μεν  Ιερών,  Βεχττερον 
δε  κήρυξ IV,  τρίτον  πρεσβείαις,  τέταρτον  τών  άλλων 
τά  δε  τοΰ  πολέμου  όταν  8εη  άκληρωτι  προσαγα- 

6  γόντας  τους  στρατηγούς  χρηματίζεσθ αι. ^  τον  δε 
μη  ιόντα  εις  το  βουλευτήριον  τών  βουλευόντων 
την  ώραν  την  προρρηθεΐσαν  όφείλειν  Βραχμήν  τής 
ημέρας  εκάστης,  εάν  μη  ευρισκόμενος^  άφεσιν  τής 
βουλής  άπή. 

1  XXXI.  Ύαύτην  μεν  οΰν  εις  τον  μέλλοντα  χρόνον 
ανέγραφαν  την  πολιτείαν,  εν  δε  τω  παροντι  καιρώ 
τήν8ε'  βουλεύειν  μεν  τετρακοσίους  κατά  τά 
πάτρια,  τετταράκοντα  εξ  εκάστης  φυλής  εκ  προ- 
κρίτων ους  άν  ελωνται  οι  φυλεται  τών  υπέρ 
τριάκοντα  ετη  γεγονότων.  τούτους  δε  τας  τε 
αρχάς  καταστήσαι,  και  περί  τοΰ  όρκου  οντινα 
χρή  ομόσαι  γράφαι,  και*  περί  τών  νομών  και 
τών     ευθυνών     και    τών     άλλων     πράττειν    fj     αν 

2  ήγώνται  σνμφερειν.    τοις  δε  νόμοις  οΐ  άν  τεθώσιν 

1  δέ  suppletum  a  Mayor.  *  χρημάτιζαν  Blass. 

3  ΐΰρόμΐνο%  Tyrrell.  *  και  supplevit  Kenyon. 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  xxx.  4-xxxi.  2 

such  resolutions  as  may  seem  to  them  likely  to  be 
best  to  secure  the  safe  preservation  of  the  funds  and 
their  expenditure  upon  necessary  objects,  and  about 
the  other  affairs  to  the  best  of  their  abihty  ;  and  in 
case  of  their  desiring  to  consider  some  matter  with 
added  numbers,  each  member  to  summon  as  a  co- 
opted  member  anybody  of  the  same  age  as  himself 
that  he  may  wish.  To  hold  the  sittings  of  the 
Council  every  five  days,  unless  more  sittings  are  re- 
quired.  The  Council  to  elect  the  Nine  Archons  by  5  ^ 
lot.  The  tellers  to  be  five  persons  elected  by  lot 
from  the  Council,  and  one  of  these  to  be  chosen  by 
lot  to  serve  daily  as  putter  of  the  question.  And  the 
five  tellers  elected  to  cast  lots  among  those  who 
desire  an  audience  of  the  Council,  first  about  matters 
of  religion,  second  for  Heralds,  third  for  embassies, 
fourth  about  other  business  ;  but  whenever  questions 
relating  to  war  need  consideration  they  are  to  intro- 
duce the  Generals  without  casting  lots  and  take  their 
business.  A  member  of  the  Council  not  coming  to  the  6 
Council-chamber  at  the  time  previously  announced 
to  be  liable  to  a  fine  of  a  drachma  for  each  day,  unless 
he  obtain  leave  of  absence  from  the  Council.' 

XXXI.  This  constitution,  therefore,  they  drcAV  up  1 
for  the  future,  but  the  following  to  be  in  force  in 
the  present  crisis  :   '  The  Council  to  consist  of  four    ! 
hundred  members  according  to  the  ancestral  regula-    1 1 
tions,  forty  from  each  tribe  taken  from  a  preliminary     '  ' 
list  of  any  persons  over  thirty  years  of  age  that  the 
members  of  the  tribe  may  elect.     These  to  appoint 
the  officials,  and  to  draft  a  proposal  about  the  form  of 
oath  to  be  taken,  and  to  take  action  about  the  laws 
and  the  audits  and  other  matters  as  they  may  think 
good.     And  to  follow  any  laws  that  may  be  enacted  2 

93 


ARISTOTLE 

Trepl  των  ττοΧηικών  χρησθαι,  καΐ  μη  i^etvai  μ€τα- 
KiveTv  μη^^  €Τ€ρους  θ€σθαί.  των  Se  στρατηγών  το 
νυν  elvai  την  alpeaiv  Ιζ  απάντων  ττοιβΐσθαι  των 
πεντακίσχίλίων,  την  Be  βονλην  eVetSav  καταστη^ 
ττοιήσασαν  £^ετασιν  iv^  οπλοις  iXeauai  δεκτά 
άνΒρας  καΐ  γραμματέα  τούτοις,  τους  8e  αίρ^θίντας 
αρχ€ΐν  τον  βίσιόντα  βνιαυτον  αυτοκράτορας,  και 
αν  τι  Βεωνταί  συμβουλβύβσθαί  μετά  της  βουλής. 
3  eXeoOai  8e  καΐ  ΐττπαρχον  eva^  καΐ  φυλάρχους  δέκα- 
το δε  λοίπον  την  alpeaiv  ποΐ€Ϊσθαι  τούτων  την 
βουλην  κατά  τα  γβγραμμβνα.  των  δ  άλλων"  αρχών 
πλην  της  βουλής  καΐ  τών  στρατηγών  μη  e^elvai 
μητ€  τούτοις  μητ€  αλλω  μηΒ€νΙ  πλβΐον  η  άπαξ 
άρξαι  την  αύτην  αρχήν,  ει?  δε  τον  άλλον  χρόνον. 
Ινα  ν€μηθώσιν  οΐ  τετρακόσιοι  ει?  τας  τετταρα? 
λήζεις,  όταν  έκάστοις*  γίγνηται  /χετά  τών  άλλων 
βουλεύειν,  διανει/χ.άν'των  αυτού?  οι  εκατόν  άνδρε?, 

1  XXXII,  Οι  /χέν  ουν  εκατόν  οι  υπό  τών  ττεντα- 
κισχιλίων  αιρεθέντ^ς  ταύτην  ανέγραφαν  την  πολι- 
τειαν.  ΙπικυρωθΙντων  δε  τούτων  ύπο  του  πλήθους 
βπιφηφίσαντος  ^ Κριστομάχου ,  ή  μβν  βουλή  η^  εττι 
Καλλίου  πριν  Βιαβουλεϋσαι  κατελύθη  μηνός  Θαρ- 
γηλιώνος  τετράδι  εττι  δε'κα,  οι  δε  τετρακόσιοι 
ειστ^σαν  ενάτη  φθίνοντος  θαργηλιώνος•  έδει  δε 
την   είληχυΐαν   τω    κυάμω   βουλην   εισιε'ναι   δ     επι 

2  δε'κα  Σικιροφοριώνος .  ή  μεν  ουν  ολιγαρχία  τούτον 
κατέστη  τον  τρόπον  επί  Καλλιου  μεν  άρχοντος 
ετεσιν    δ'     ύστερον    της    τών    τυράννων    εκβολής 

1  Wyse :  καταστησψ  cod.  *  fV  supplevit  Wyse. 

*  ^va  <καΙ  ταξιάρχους  δέκα^  Wilamowitz. 

*  'έκαστοι!  (vel  Toh  avTois,  αύτοΐς)  edd.  :  τοισαστοΐί  Cod. 

^  ή  supplevit  Rutherford. 

94 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  xxxi.  2— xxxii.  2 

about  the  affairs  of  state,  and  not  to  have  powers 
to  alter  them  nor  to  enact  others.  The  election  of 
the  Generals  for  the  time  being  to  be  made  from 
among  all  the  Five  Thousand,  and  the  Council  as  soon 
as  it  is  appointed  to  hold  a  review  under  arms  and 
elect  ten  men  to  the  post,  and  a  secretary  for  them,  and 
those  elected  to  hold  office  for  the  ensuing  year  with 
autocratic  powers,  and  to  consult  with  the  Council 
about  any  matter  if  they  require.  And  also  to  elect  3 
one  Master  of  the  Horse  and  ten  Tribe-commanders  ; 
and  for  the  future  the  Council  to  conduct  the  election 
of  these  according  to  the  procedure  enacted.  And 
none  of  the  other  officials  except  the  Council  and  the 
Generals,  nor  anybody  else,  to  be  allowed  to  hold  the 
same  office  more  than  once.  And  for  the  future,  in 
order  that  the  Four  Hundred  may  be  divided  into  the 
four  lists,**  when  each  division  takes  its  turn  to  form 
the  Council  with  the  rest,  let  the  Hundred  Men 
divide  them  into  sections.' 

XXXII.  This  then  was  the  constitution  drawn  up  by  1 
the  Hundred  elected  by  the  Five  Thousand.     These 
proposals  were  carried  by  the  multitude,  being  put 
to  the  vote  by  Aristomachus,  and  the  Council  in 
Callias's  year  was  dissolved  on  the  14<th  day  of  the  4i2  b.(;. 
month   of  Thargelion   before   it   had  completed  its 
term  of  office  ;    while  the  Four  Hundred  came  into 
office  on  Thargelion  the  21  st  ;  and  the  Council  elected      "X-  '^ ' 
by  lot  was  due  to  enter  office  on  Scirophorion  the 
14th. ^     In  this  way  therefore  the  oligarchy  was  set  2 
up,  in  the  archonship  of  Callias,  about  a  hundred 
years  after  the  expulsion  of  the  tyrants,  the  chief 

«  Cf.  XXX.  3. 
*"  The  three  dates  are  about  May  31,  June  7,  and  June  30. 


ARISTOTLE 

jLtaAiara  Ικατόν,  αίτιων  /μάλιστα  γ€νομ4νων  lleia- 
auhpov  καΐ  Αντιφώντος  και  Θηραμένους,  άνΒρών 
καΐ  γ€γ€νημ€νων  ev  και  avveaei  και  γνώμη  hoKovv- 
3  των  ^ιαφΙρ€ΐν.  γενομένης  hk  ταύτης  της  πολιτείας 
οΐ  μεν  πεντακισχίλιοι  λόγω  μόνον  ηρεθησαν,  οι  οε 
τετρακόσιοι  μετά  των  8εκα  τών  αυτοκρατόρων 
είσελθόντες  εις  το  βουλευτήριον  ηρχον  τε^  της 
ττόλ^ως  και  προς  ΑακεΒαιμονίους  πρεσβευσάμενοι 
κατελύοντο  τον  πόλεμον  εφ'  οΐς  εκάτεροι  τυγ- 
χάνουσιν  εχ^οντες,  ούχ  υπακουόντων  δ  εκείνων 
εΐ  μη  και  την  άρχην  της  θαλάττης  άφησουσιν, 
οϋτως  άπεστησαν. 

1  XXXIII,  Μτ^ν'α?  μεν  οΰν  ΐσως  τετταρας  8ι- 
εμεινεν  η  τών  τετρακοσίων  πολιτεία,  και  ηρζεν  εζ 
αυτών  Μ,νασίλοχος  ^ίμηνον  επι  θεοπόμπου  άρχον- 
τος, δς^  VP^^  τους  επιλοίπους  8εκα  μήνας, 
ήττηθεντες  δε  τη  περί  Ύψετρίαν  ναυ/χ^αχια  και 
της  Έίύβοίας  απόστασης  δλης  πλην  Ω,ρεοΰ, 
χαλεπώς  ενεγκόντες  επι  τη  συμφορά  μάλιστα  τών 
προγεγενημενων  {πλείω  γαρ  εκ  της  Έιύβοιας  η 
της  'Αττικής  ετύγχανον  ωφελούμενοι)  κατελυσαν 
τους  τετρακοσίους  καΐ  τα  πράγματα  παρε8ωκαν 
τοις  πεντακισχιλίοις  τοις   εκ  τών  οπλών,  φηφισα- 

2  μενοι  μηΒεμίαν  άρχην  efvai  μισθοφόρον.  αιτιω- 
τατοι  δ'  εγενοντο  της  καταλχ)σεως  Αριστοκράτης 
και  Θηραμένης,  ου  συναρεσκό μενοι  τοις  υπο  τών 
τετρακοσίων  γιγνομενοις'  άπαντα  γαρ  δι  αυτών 
επραττον,  ούΒεν  επαναφεροντες  τοις  πεντακι- 
σχιλίοις.  Βοκοΰσι  Βε  καλώς  πολιτευθηναι  κατά 
τούτους  τους  καιρούς,  πολέμου  τε  καθεστώτος 
και  εκ  τών  οπλών  της  πολιτείας  ούσης. 

1  τ£  supplevit  Hude.  *  5s  supplevit  Kenyon. 

96 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  xxxii.  2— xxxiii.  2 

movers  having  been  Peisander,  Antiphon  and  Thera- 
menes,  men  of  good  birth  and  of  distinguished  reputa- 
tion for  wisdom  and  judgement.  But  when  this  con-  3 
stitution  had  been  set  up,  the  Five  Thousand  were 
only  nominally  chosen,  but  the  Four  Hundred  with 
the  aid  of  the  Ten  with  autocratic  powers  "  entered 
the  Council-chamber  and  governed  the  state.  They 
also  sent  envoys  to  the  Lacedaemonians  and  proposed 
to  conclude  peace  on  terms  of  uti  possidetis ;  but  the 
Lacedaemonians  would  not  consent  unless  Athens 
would  also  relinquish  the  empire  of  the  sea,  so  that 
they  finally  abandoned  the  project. 

XXXIII.  The  constitution  of  the  Four  Hundred  1 
lasted  perhaps  four  months,  for  two  of  which  Mnesi- 
lochus  was  archon,  in  the  year  of  the  archonship  of  411b.c. 
Theopompus,  who  received  the  office  for  the  remain- 
ing ten  months.  But  when  they  had  been  worsted 
in  the  naval  battle  ofFEretria  and  the  whole  of  Euboea 
except  Oreum  had  revolted,  they  were  more  dis- 
tressed at  the  misfortune  than  by  any  previous  dis- 
aster (for  they  were  actually  getting  more  support 
from  Euboea  than  from  Attica),  and  they  dissolved 
the  Four  Hundred  and  handed  over  affairs  to  the  Five 
Thousand  that  were  on  the  armed  roll,^  having  passed 
by  vote  a  resolution  that  no  office  should  receive  pay. 
The  persons  chiefly  responsible  for  the  dissolution  2 
were  Aristocrates  and  Theramenes,  who  disapproved 
of  the  proceedings  of  the  Four  Hundred  ;  for  they 
did  everything  on  their  own  responsibility  and  re- 
ferred nothing  to  the  Five  Thousand.  But  Athens 
seems  to  have  been  well  governed  during  this 
critical  period,  although  a  war  was  going  on  and  the 
government  was  confined  to  the  armed  roll. 

"  The  Ten  Generals,  see  xxxi.  2.         **  Cf.  iv.  2,  xxix.  5. 
Η  .  97 


ARISTOTLE 

1  XXXIV.  Τούτου?  μ^ν  οΰν  αφείλ^το  την  ττολι- 
Teiav  6  8ημος  δια  τάχους'  eret  δ'  ^β^όμω^  /χετα 
TTjv  των  τετρακοσίων  κατάλνσιν ,  errl  Καλλιου  τον 
^Αγγζληθεν  άρχοντος,  γενομένης  της  εν  Άργι- 
νούσαίς  ναυμαχία?,  ττρώτον  μεν  τους  8εκα  στρατη- 
γούς τους  τη  ναυ/χαγια  νικώντας  συνέβη  κριθηναι 
/χια  χειροτονία  πάντας,  τους  μεν  ούΒε  συνναυμαχη- 
σαντας,  τους  δ'  εττ'  αλλότριας  νεως  σωθεντας, 
εζαττατηθ εντός  του  ^ημου  δια.  του?  τταροργίσαντας• 
eVeiTa  βουλομενων  Αακε^αιμονίων  εκ  Αεκελειας 
αττιεναι^  εφ*  οΐς  εχουσιν  εκάτεροι  καΐ  είρηνην 
άγειν^  ενιοι  μεν  εσπούΒαζον,  το  δε  ττληθος  ούχ 
ύττηκουσεν ,  εζαπατηθεντες  ύττο  Κ^λεοφώντος,  ος 
εκώλυσε  γενέσθαι  την  εΙρηνην  ελθών  εις  την 
εκκλησίαν  μεθύων  και  θώρακα  εν8ε8υκώς,  ου 
φάσκων  επιτρεφειν  εάν  μη  ττάσας  άφιώσι  Αακε^αι- 

2  μόνιοι  τάς  πόλεις,  ου  χρησάμενοι  δε  καλώς  τότε 
τοις  πράγμασι  /χετ'  ου  πολύν  χρόνον  έγνωσαν  την 
άμαρτίαν.  τω  γάρ  ύστερον  ετει  επ*  ^Αλεζίου 
άρχοντος  ητύχησαν  την  εν  Atyo?  ποταμοΐς  ι^αυ/χα- 
χίαν,  εζ  ης  συνέβη  κύριον  γενόμενον  της  πόλεως 
Αύσαν^ρον     καταστησαι     τους     τριάκοντα     τρόπω 

3  τοιώδε•  της  ειρήνης  γενομένης  αύτοΐς  εφ*  ω  τε 
πολιτεύσονται  την  πάτριον  πολιτείαν,  οι  μεν 
δημοτικοί  διασωζεΐΓ  επειρώντο  τον  ^ήμον,  τών  δε 

^  'έ κτ φ  edd,  *  Mayor:  avievai  cod. 

■  ^φ'  oh  .  .  .  a7etc  cum  schol.  Wilamowitz-Kaibel :  xau- 
φοΐίΐχονσιΐΊρηνην(κατεροια,'γ(ΐν  Cod. 

"  '  wSixth '  (in  Greek  arithmetic  '  seventh  ')  is  a  mistake  for 
'  fifth '  (Greek  '  sixth ') :  the  Four  Hundred  fell  in  41 1 ,  Callias 
was  archon  406  b.c. 

*  i.e.  with  his  courage  artificially  stimulated  and  with 
armour  to  protect  him  against  assassination  (unless  we  adopt 

98 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  xxxiv.  1-3 

XXXIV.  So  the  people  speedily  took  the  govern-  1 
jnent  out  of  these  men's  hands  ;  and  in  the  sixth  " 
year  after  the  dissolution  of  the  Four  Hundred,  in  the 
archonship  of  Callias  of  the  deme  of  Angele,  after  the 
occurrence  of  the  naval  battle  at  Arginusae,  it  came 
about  first  that  the  ten  Generals  to  whom  victory 
in  the  naval  battle  was  due  were  all  condemned  by  a 
single  vote,  some  of  them  not  even  having  been  in  the 
engagement  at  all  and  the  others  having  escaped  on 
board  a  ship  not  their  own,  the  people  being  com- 
pletely deceived  through  the  persons  who  provoked 
their  anger ;  and  then,  when  the  Lacedaemonians 
were  willing  to  evacuate  Decelea  on  terms  of  both 
parties  retaining  what  they  held,  and  to  make  peace, 
though  some  persons  were  eager  to  accept,  yet  the 
mass  of  the  people  refused  to  consent,  being  com- 
pletely deceived  by  Cleophon,  who  prevented  the 
conclusion  of  peace  by  coming  into  the  assembly,  drunk 
and  wearing  a  corslet,^  and  protesting  that  he  would 
not  allow  it  unless  the  Lacedaemonians  surrendered 
all  the  cities."  But  though  on  this  occasion  they  had  2 
managed  their  affairs  ill,  they  realized  their  mistake 
not  long  afterwards.  For  in  the  next  year,  when  405  b.c. 
Alexius  was  Archon,  they  met  with  the  disaster  in 
the  naval  battle  of  Aegospotami  which  resulted  in 
the  city's  falling  into  the  hands  of  Lysander,  who 
set  up  the  Thirty  in  the  following  way.  The  peace  3 
having  been  concluded  on  terms  of  their  carrying  on 
the  government  according  to  the  ancestral  constitu- 
tion, the  popular  party  endeavoured  to  preserve  the 

the  conjecture  that  μεθύωι>  και  θώρακα  evdedvKws  is  a  mistaken 
paraphrase  of  some  original  record  giving  θώρακα  ΐχων  in 
the  slang  sense  of  '  well  primed  with  liquor,'  cf,  Aristoph. 
Ran.  1504). 

*  i.e.  those  that  they  had  taken  in  the  war. 

99 


ARISTOTLE 

γνωρίμων  ol  μ^ν  iv  ταΐς  eraipeiai?  οντ€ς,  και  των 
φυγάδων  οΐ  μ€τά  την  ζίρηνην  ι<ατ€λθόντ€ς ,  ολιγ- 
αρχίας βττ^θύμουν,  οι  8'  iv  iratpeia  μβν  ouSe/Mta 
συγκαθ€στώτ€ς  άλλως  δε  8οκοΰντ€ς  ούΒβνος  ετη- 
λείπβσθαι  των  πολιτών  την  ττάτριον  πολιτ€ΐαν 
εζητουν  ων  ην  μεν  και  ^Αρχΐνος  καΙ  "Ανυτος 
καΐ  Ιίλεηοφών  καΐ  Φορμίσιος  και  έτεροι  πολλοί, 
προειστηκει  8ε  μάλιστα  Θηραμένης.  ΑυσάνΒρον 
8ε  προσθεμένου  τοις  όλιγαρχικοΐς  καταπλαγείς  ο 
8ημος  ηναγκάσθη  χειροτονεΐν  την  όλιγαρχιαν. 
έγραφε  8ε  το  φηφισμα  ΑρακοντίΒης    Αφι8ναΐος. 

1  XXXV.  Ot  μεν  οΰν  τριάκοντα  τούτον  τον 
τρόπον  κατέστησαν  επι  ΐΙυθο8ώρου  άρχοντος, 
γενόμενοι  8ε  κύριοι  της  πόλεως  τα  μεν  άλλα  τα 
8όζαντα  περί  της  πολιτείας  παρεώρων,  πεντα- 
κόσιους 8ε  βουλευτάς  και  τάς  άλλα?  αρχάς  κατα- 
στησαντες  εκ  προκρίτων  εκ  των  χιλιωΐ'/  και 
προσελόμενοι  σφίσιν  αύτοΐς  του  ΙΙειραιεως  άρ- 
χοντας 8εκα  και  του  8εσμωτηρίου  φύλακας  εν8εκα 
και  μαστιγοφόρους  τριακόσιους  ύπηρετας  κατεΐχον 

2  την  πόλιν  δι'  εαυτών,  το  μεν  οΰν  πρώτον  μέτριοι 
τοις  πολίταις  ήσαν  και  προσεποιοΰντο  8ιοικεΐν^  την 
πάτριον    πολιτείαν ,    και    τους    τ'     'Έφιάλτου    και 

{/  * Αρχεστράτου  νόμους  τους  περί  τών  ^Αρεοπαγιτών 
καθεΐλον  εζ  'Αρείου  πάγου  καί  τών  Έόλωνος 
θεσμών  όσοι  8ιαμφισβητησεις  εΐχον,  και  το  κΰρος 
ο    ην    εν    τοις    8ικασταΐς    κατελυσαν,    ως    επανορ- 

1  {(Κ  των]  χιλίων  Herwerden :  [έκ  των  χιλίων]  Rutherford : 
φνλων  pro  χιλίων  Hude. 
^  διώκ€ΐν  edd. 

100 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  xxxiv.  3— xxxv.  2 

democracy,  but  the  notables  who  belonged  to  the 
Comradeships  and  those  exiles  who  had  returned 
after  the  peace  were  eager  for  oligarchy,  while  those 
notables  who  were  not  members  of  any  Comradeship 
but  who  otherwise  were  inferior  in  reputation  to  none 
of  the  citizens  were  aiming  at  the  ancestral  constitu- 
tion ;  members  of  this  party  were  Archinus,  Anytus, 
Cleitophon  and  Phormisius,  while  its  chief  leader  was 
Theramenes.  And  Λvhen  Lysander  sided  with  the 
oligarchical  party,  the  people  were  cowed  and  were 
forced  to  vote  for  the  oligarchy.  The  motion  was 
proposed  by  Dracontides  of  Aphidna. 

XXXV.  So  in  this  manner  the  Thirty  were  estab-  i 
lished,  in  the  archonship  of  Pythodorus.  Having  be-  404  b.c. 
come  masters  of  the  state  they  neglected  most  of  the 
measures  that  had  been  resolved  on  in  regard  to  the 
constitution,  but  appointed  five  hundred  Councillors 
and  the  other  offices  from  among  persons  previously 
selected  from  the  Thousand,"  and  also  chose  for  them- 
selves ten  governors  of  Peiraeus,  eleven  guardians 
of  the  prison,  and  three  hundred  retainers  carrying 
whips,  and  so  kept  the  state  in  their  own  hands.  At  2 
first,  then,  they  were  moderate  towards  the  citizens 
and  pretended  to  be  administering  the  ancestral  form 
of  constitution,  and  they  removed  from  the  Areopagus 
the  laws  of  Ephialtes  and  Archestratus  ^  about  the 
Areopagites,  and  also  such  of  the  ordinances  of  Solon 
as  were  of  doubtful  purport,  and  abolished  the 
sovereignty  vested  in  the  jurymen,  claiming  to  be 
rectifying    the    constitution    and    removing    its    un- 

"  i.e.  from  the  knights ;  but  the  text  can  hardly  be  correct, 
and  may  be  emended  to  give  'from  among  a  thousand 
persons  previously  selected.' 

*  Probably  a  supporter  of  Ephialtes,  for  whose  legislation 
see  ch.  xxv. 

101 


ARISTOTLE 

θοΰι^τ€ς  και  ποίονντ€ς  άναμφισβητητον  την  ττολι- 
reiav,  οίον  Trepl  του  δούναι  τα  εαυτού  ω  άν  ideXrj 
κύριον  7τοίήσαντ€ς  καθάπαζ,  τάς  Se  προσονσας 
δυσκολία?  "  iav  μη  /χανιών  η  γηρως  (eveKaY  η 
γυναίκΐ  ττιθόμ^νος ' '  άφβΐλον  όπως  μη  η  τοις 
συκοφάνταις   ^φο^ος•   ομοίως   δε   τοΰτ'    έ'δρων   και 

3  ετΓΐ  των  άλλων,  κατ'  αρχάς  /xev  ονν  ταυτ'  Ιττοίονν 
και  τους  συκοφάντας  και  τους  τω  Βημω  ττρος 
χάριν  όμιλοΰντας  παρά  το  βελτιστον  και  κακοπραγ- 
μονας  οντάς  και  πονηρούς  άνηρουν,  εφ  οΐς  έχαιρεν^ 
η     πόλις    γιγνομίνοις,    ηγούμενοι    του    βέλτιστου 

4  χάριν  ποιεΐν  αυτούς,  επει  δε  την  πάλιν  εγκρατε- 
στερον  εσχον,  ούΒενός  άπείχοντο  των  πολιτών, 
αλλ'  άπεκτειναν  τους  και  ταΐς  ούσίαις  και  τω 
γένει  και  τοις  ά^ιώ/χασιν  προέχοντας,  ύπεξαιρού- 
μενοί  τε  τον  φόβον  και  βουλόμενοι  τας  ουσίας 
Βιαρπάζειν  και  χρόνου  Βιαπεσόντος  βραχεος  ουκ 
ελάττους  άνηρήκεσαν  η  χίλιους  πεντακόσιους. 

1  ΧΧΧνί.  Ού'τω?  δε  της  πόλεως  ύποφερομενης 
Θηραμένης  άγανακτών  επΙ  τοις  γινομενοις  της 
μεν  ασέλγεια?  αύτοΐς  παρηνει  τταυσασ^αι  μετα- 
δουναι  δε  των  πραγμάτων  τοις  βελτίστοις.  οι  δε 
πρώτον^  εναντιωθεντες,  επει  Βιεσπάρησαν  οι  λόγοι 
προς  το  πλήθος  και  προς  τον  θηραμενην  οίκείως 
είχον  οΐ  πολλοί,  φοβηθεντες  μη  προστάτης  γενό- 
μενος τοΰ  Βημου  κατάλυση  την  Βυναστειαν  κατα- 
λε'γουσιν     των     πολιτών     τρισχιλιους*     ώς     μετα- 

2  δώσοντε?    της    πολιτείας.       Θηραμένης    δε    ττάλιν 

^  ^€κα  Ύ7ΐρω$  Wyse  :  •^/ηρων  cod. 

*  SidgWJck  (cf.  xxxiv.  1  το  δέ  πληθοί  ούχ  νπ-ήκονσεν,  ίξαττατη- 
eivres) :  exaipov  cod. 

^  edd. :  ττρωτοί  cod.  *  edd. :  δισχιλιου;  cod. 

102 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  xxxv.  2— xxxvi.  2 

certainties  :  for  example,  in  regard  to  the  bestowal 
of  one's  property  on  whomsoever  one  wishes,  making 
the  single  act  of  donation  valid  absolutely,  while 
they  removed  the  tiresome  qualifications '  save  when 
in  consequence  of  insanity  or  of  old  age,  or  under  the 
influence  of  a  woman,'  in  order  that  there  might  be 
no  opening  for  blackmailers  ;  and  similarly  they  did 
this  in  the  other  matters  as  well.  At  the  outset,  there-  3 
fore,  they  were  engaged  in  these  matters,  and  in 
removing  the  blackmailers  and  the  persons  who  con- 
sorted undesirably  with  the  people  to  curry  favour 
and  were  evil-doers  and  scoundrels ;  and  the  state 
was  delighted  at  these  measures,  thinking  that  they 
were  acting  with  the  best  intentions.  But  when  4 
they  got  a  firmer  hold  on  the  state,  they  kept  their 
hands  off  none  of  the  citizens,  but  put  to  death  those 
of  outstanding  wealth  or  birth  or  reputation,  in- 
tending to  put  that  source  of  danger  out  of  the  way, 
and  also  desiring  to  plunder  their  estates  ;  and  by 
the  end  of  a  brief  interval  of  time  they  had  made 
away  with  not  less  than  fifteen  hundred. 

XXXVI.  While  the  state  was  thus  being  under-  1 
mined,  Theramenes,  resenting  what  was  taking  place, 
kept  exhorting  them  to  cease  from  their  wantonness 
and  to  admit  the  best  classes  to  a  share  in  affairs. 
At  first  they  opposed  him,  but  since  these  proposals 
became  disseminated  among  the  multitude,  and  the 
general  public  were  well  disposed  towards  Thera- 
menes, they  grew  afraid  that  he  might  become  head 
of  the  People  and  put  down  the  oligarchy,  and  so 
they  enrolled  three  thousand  of  the  citizens  with  the 
intention  of  giving  them  a  share  in  the  government. 
But  Theramenes  again  criticized  this  procedure  also,  2 


103 


I 


ARISTOTLE 

βττιτιμα  και  τούτοις,  ττρώτον  μ^ν  δτι  βουλομβνοί 
μ€ταΒοΰναι  τοις  επιεικεσι  τρίσχιλίοις  μόνοις  μβτα- 
διδοασι,  ώς  iv  τοντω  τω  πλήθ^ι  της  αρετής 
ώρισμ€νης,  βπ€ΐθ'  οτι  δυο  τα  εναντιώτατα  ττοιοΰσιν, 
βίαων  τ€  την  αρχήν  καΐ  των  αρχομένων  ηττω 
κατασκβυάζοντβς .  οι  δε  τούτων  μβν  ώλιγωρησαν, 
τον  δε  κατάλογον  των  τρισχιλίων  ττολνν  μεν 
χρόνον  νττερεβάλλοντο^  και  τταρ'  αύτοΐς  Ιφύλαττον 
τους  εγνωσμένους,  ore  δε  και  ho^eiev  αύτοΐς 
€κφ4ρ€ΐν  τους  μεν  εξηλβιφον  των  εγγεγραμ- 
μένων'^ τους  δ'  άντενεγραφον  των  έζωθεν. 
1  XXXVII.  "Ηδ-)7  δε  του  χειμώνος  ενεστώτας, 
καταλαβόντος  Θρασυβούλου  μετά  των  φυγάδων 
Φυλην  και  κατά  την  στρατιάν  ην  έξηγαγον  οι 
τριάκοντα  κακώς  αποχωρήσαντες ,  έγνωσαν  τών 
μεν  άλλων  τα  οττλα  παρελέσθαι  Θηραμένην  δε 
8ιαφθεΐραι  τόνδε  τρόπον,  νόμους  είσήνεγκαν  εις 
την  βουλην  δυο  κελεύοντες  έπιχειροτονεΐν,  ων  ο 
μεν  εις  αυτοκράτορας  έττοίει  τους  τριάκοντα  τών 
πολιτών  άποκτεΐναι  τους  μη  του  καταλόγου  μετ- 
έχοντας τών  τρισχιλιων,  6  δ'  έτερος  εκωλυε 
κοινωνεΐν  της  παρούσης  πολιτείας  όσοι  τυγχα- 
νουσιν  το  εν  Ήετιωΐ'εια,  τείχος  κατασκάφαντες  η 
τοις  τετρακοσίοις  εναντίον  τι  πράζαντες  τοΐς^ 
κατασκεύασασι  την  προτέραν  όλιγαρχιαν  ων  ετυγ- 
χανεν  αμφοτέρων  κεκοινωνηκώς  ό  Θηραμένης, 
ώστε    συνέβαινεν   έπικυρωθέντων   τών   νόμων   εξω 

^  ΰτΓΐρ€βάλ\οντο  <,ίκφέρΐΐν'ρ  Gertz. 

2  ίγ^ί'^ραμμένων  Herwerden :  -^("γραμμ^νων  cod. 

^  τ6ΐ%  Herwerden :  T/rots  cod. 

104 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  xxxvi.  2— xxxvii.  1 

first  on  the  ground  that  although  willing  to  share  the 
government  with  the  respectable  they  were  only 
giving  a  share  to  three  thousand,  as  though  moral 
worth  were  limited  to  that  number,  and  next  because 
they  were  doing  two  absolutely  incompatible  things, 
making  their  rule  one  of  force  and  at  the  same  time 
weaker  than  those  they  ruled.  But  they  despised 
these  remonstrances,  and  for  a  long  time  went  on 
postponing  the  roll  of  the  Three  Thousand  and  keep- 
ing to  themselves  those  on  whom  they  had  decided, 
and  even  on  occasions  when  they  thought  fit  to 
publish  it  they  made  a  practice  of  erasing  some  of  the 
names  enrolled  and  writing  in  others  instead  from 
among  those  outside  the  γοΙΙ.** 

XXXVII.  Winter  had  already  set  in,  when  Thrasy-  1 
bulus  with  the  exiles  occupied  Phyle,  and  things  went 
badly  with  the  Thirty  on  the  expedition  that  they 
led  out  against  them  ;  so  they  decided  to  disarm  the 
others  and  to  destroy  Theramenes  in  the  following 
way.  They  introduced  two  laws  into  the  Council, 
with  orders  to  pass  them  ;  one  was  to  give  the  Thirty 
absolute  powers  to  execute  any  citizens  not  members 
of  the  roll  of  Three  Thousand,  and  the  other  pro- 
hibited admission  to  citizenship  under  the  present 
constitution  for  all  who  had  actually  taken  part  in  the 
demolition  of  the  fort  ^  on  Eetionea,  or  in  any  act  of 
opposition  to  the  Four  Hundred  who  had  instituted 
the  former  oligarchy ;  in  both  of  these  proceedings 
Theramenes  had  in  fact  participated,  so  that  the 
result  was  that  when  the  laws  had  been  ratified  he 

"  So  that  no  one  would  be  sure  of  being  on  it. 

'  A  projecting  mole  on  the  northern  side  of  Peiraeus 
harbour,  commanding  the  entrance.  It  had  been  begun, 
but  was  then  demolished  at  the  instigation  of  Theramenes 
(Thuc.  viii.  90-92). 

105 


ARISTOTLE 

τ€  γίγνεσθαι  της  ττοΧιτβίας  αύτον  και  του?  τριά- 
2  κοντά  κυρίους  elvai  θανατοΰντας .  άναιρ^θίντος  δε 
Θηραμένους  τά  τ€  όπλα  τταρβίλοντο  πάντων  πλην 
των  τρισχίλίων  καΐ  iv  τοΐς  άλλοι?  ττολυ  προς 
ωμότητα  και  πονηρίαν  βπ^Βοσαν.  πρβσβζΐς  δε^ 
πέμφαντες  eiV  Λακεδαί/χονα  του  τε  Θηραμένους 
κατηγορούν  και  βοηθ^ΐν  αύτοΐς  ηζίουν  ων  άκού- 
σαντ€ς  οΐ  Λακεδαι/χόνιοι  Ιίαλλίβίον  άττε'στειλαι^ 
άρμοστην  και  στρατιώτας  ως  επτακόσιους ,  at  την 
άκρόπολιν   ελθόντβς   ^φρουρούν. 

1  XXXVIII.  Μετά  δε  ταύτα  καταλαβόντων  των 
άπο  Φυλής  την  Μ,ουνιχίαν  και  νικησάντων  μάχη 
τους  μ€τά  των  τριάκοντα  βοηθησαντας,  εττανα- 
■χωρησαντες  μετά  τον  κίν^υνον  οι  εκ  τοΰ  άστεως 
και  συναθροισθεντες  ει?  την  άγοράν  τη  ύστεραία, 
τους  μεν  τριάκοντα  κατελυσαν  αίροΰνται  δε  δέκα 
των  πολιτών  αυτοκράτορας  επι  την  τοΰ  πολέμου 
κατάλυσιν.  οι  δε  παραλαβόντες  την  άρχην  εφ*^ 
οΐς  μεν  ηρεθησαν  ουκ  επραττον,  επεμπον  δ  ει? 
Λακεδαί)αονα    βοηθειαν   μεταπεμπόμενοι    και   χρη- 

2  ματα  δανειζόμενοι,  χαλεπώς  δε  φερόντων  επι 
τούτοις  των  εν  τη  πολιτεία,  φοβούμενοι  μη  κατα- 
λυθώσιν  της  άρχης  και  βουλόμενοι  καταπληζαι 
τους  άλλους  {δπερ  εγενετο) ,  συλλαβόντες  Αημ- 
άρετον  ούΒενος  οντά  δεύτερον  των  πολιτών  άπ- 
εκτειναν,  και  τά  πράγματα  βεβαίως^  ^ι^χον,  συναγω- 
νιζόμενου Καλλι^ιου  τε  και  τών  ΪΙελοποννησιων 
των  παρόντων  και  προς  τούτοις  ενιων  τών  €V 
τοΐς  ίππεΰσι•  τούτων  γάρ  τινε?  μάλιστα  τών 
πολιτών     εσπούΒαζον     μη     κατελθεΐν     τους     απο 

^  δ^  supplevit  Mayor. 
^  έφ'  edd. :  ev  cod.  '^  βιαίως  Mayor. 

106 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  xxxvii.  1— xxxvni.  2 

became  outside  the  constitution  and  the  Thirty  had 
authority  to  put  him  to  death.  Theramenes  having  2 
been  put  out  of  the  way,  they  disarmed  everybody 
except  the  Three  Thousand,  and  in  the  rest  of  their 
proceedings  went  much  further  in  the  direction  of 
cruelty  and  rascality.  And  they  sent  ambassadors 
to  Sparta  to  denounce  Theramenes  and  call  upon 
the  Spartans  to  assist  them  ;  and  when  the  Spartans 
heard  this  message  they  dispatched  Callibius  as 
governor  and  about  seven  hundred  troops,  who  came 
and  garrisoned  the  Acropolis. 

XXXVIII.  After  this  the  refugees  in  Phyle  took  1 
Munichia,  and  defeated  in  action  the  force  that  came 
with  the  Thirty  to  the  defence ;  and  the  force  from 
the  city,  on  their  return  after  this  dangerous  ex- 
pedition, held  a  meeting  in  the  market-place  the  day 
after,  deposed  the  Thirty,  and  elected  ten  of  the 
citizens  as  plenipotentiaries  to  bring  the  war  to  a 
conclusion.  These,  however,  having  obtained  this 
office  did  not  proceed  to  do  the  things  for  the  purpose 
of  which  they  had  been  elected,  but  sent  to  Sparta 
to  procure  help  and  to  borrow  funds.  But  this  was  2 
resented  by  those  within  the  constitution,  and  the 
Ten,  in  their  fear  of  being  deposed  from  office  and 
their  desire  to  terrify  the  others  (which  they  suc- 
ceeded in  doing),  arrested  one  of  the  most  leading 
citizens,  Demaretus,  and  put  him  to  death,  and  kept 
a  firm  hold  upon  affairs,  while  Callibius  and  the 
Peloponnesians  at  Athens  actively  supported  them, 
and  so  did  some  members  of  the  corps  of  Knights  as 
well  ;  for  some  of  the  Knights  were  the  most  eager 
of  all  the  citizens  that  the  men  at  Phyle  should  not 

107 


ARISTOTLE 

3  Φυλ-^?.  o)5  δ'  ol  τον  Retpatea  και  την  Μοννυχίαν 
€χοντ€ς  άποστάντος  άπαντος  του  Βημου  ττρος 
αυτούς^  €π€κράτουν  τω  ττολβμω,  τότε  καταλυσαν- 
Tes•  τους  δέκα  τους  ττρώτους  αίρζθίντας ,  άλλους 
βΐλοντο  SeKa  τους  βέλτιστους  etvai  ^οκοΰντας,  €φ 
ων  συνέβ-η  καΐ  τάς  διαλύσει?  yeveadai  και  κατ- 
ελθεΐν  τον  δη/χον,  συναγωνιζόμενων  και  προθυμου- 
μενων  τούτων,  προει,στηκβσαν  δ'  αύτων  μάλιστα 
'Ρίνων  τ€  6  Παιαι^ιεύ?  και  Φάυλλος  6  ^ΑχερΒονσιος' 
οΰτοί  γαρ  ττρίν  τε  Παυσαι^ιαν^  άφικεσθαι  δι- 
επβμποντο  προς  τους  iv   Heipaiei   και   άφικομενου 

4  συνβσπού^ασαν  την  κάθο^ον.  €πι  πέρας  γαρ  ηγαγε 
την  είρηνην  και  τα?  διαλύσει?  Παυσανία?  ό  των 
ΑακεΒαιμονίων  ^ασιλεύ?  μετά  των  δέκα  διαλ- 
λακτών  των  ύστερον  άφικομενων  εκ  Λακεδαι- 
μονος  ους  αυτό?  εσττουδασεν  ελθεΐν.  οι  δε  77ερι 
τον  'ΡΙνωνα  διά  τε  την  εΰνοιαν  την  ει?  τον  Βημον 
επηνεθησαν,  καΐ  λαβόντες  την  επιμελείας  εν  ολιγ- 
αρχία τάς  εύθύνας  εδοσαν  εν  δημοκρατία,  και 
ούδει?  ουδει^  ενεκαλεσεν  αυτοί?  ούτε  των  εν  αστει 
μεινάντων  ούτε  των  εκ  Υϊειραιεως  κατελθ όντων, 
άλλα  διά  ταΰτα  καΐ  στρατηγός  ευθύς  ηρεθη  'Ρίνων. 

ι  XXXIX.  ^Έιγενοντο  δ'  αί  διαλύσει?  εττ'  Ευ- 
κλει'δοι»  άρχοντος  κατά  τάς  συνθήκας  τάσδε.  τους 
βουλομενους  ^Αθηναίων  των  εν  αστει  μεινάντων 
εζοικεΐν  εχειν  Ελευσίνα  επίτιμους  οντάς  και 
κυρίους   και   αυτοκράτορας   εαυτών   και  τα   αυτών 

2  καρπουμενους .     το    δ'     ίερον    είναι    κοινον    αμφο- 

^  Blass  :  αντην  cod. 
2  re  II αυσαί-ίο)/ Richards:  7?7rai'<ra»'ta»'re  cod. 

108 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  xxxviii.  3— xxxix.  2 

return.  But  the  party  holding  Peiraeus  and  Munichia,  3 
ποΛν  that  the  whole  of  the  people  had  come  over  to 
their  side,  began  to  get  the  upper  hand  in  the  war, 
and  so  finally  they  deposed  the  ten  who  had  been 
elected  first,  and  chose  ten  others  whom  they  thought 
to  be  the  best  men,  and  while  these  were  in  power 
there  took  place  the  reconciliation  and  the  return  of 
the  people,  with  the  active  and  eager  support  of  the 
ten.  The  most  prominent  among  them  were  Rhinon 
of  the  Paeanian  deme  and  Phayllus  of  the  Acherdusian ; 
for  these  men  had  repeatedly  gone  on  missions  to 
the  men  at  Peiraeus  before  Pausanias's  arrival,  and 
after  his  arrival  they  zealously  supported  the  return. 
For  it  was  Pausanias  the  king  of  the  Lacedaemonians  4 
who  brought  the  peace  and  reconciliation  to  fulfilment, 
with  the  aid  of  the  ten  mediators  who  later  an-ived 
from  Sparta,  and  whose  coming  was  due  to  the  efforts 
of  the  king  himself.  Rhinon  and  his  companions 
were  commended  for  their  goodwill  towards  the 
people,  and  having  been  appointed  to  superintend 
these  negotiations  under  an  oligarchy  they  gave 
in  their  accounts  under  a  democracy,  and  no  one 
made  any  charge  against  them  whatever,  whether  of 
those  who  had  remained  in  the  city  or  of  those  who 
had  returned  from  Peiraeus  ;  indeed,  on  the  contrary 
Rhinon  was  immediately  elected  general  because  of 
his  conduct  in  this  office. 

XXXIX.  The  reconciliation  took  place  in  the  1 
archonship  of  Eucleides  on  the  following  terms  :  403  b.c. 
'  That  those  of  the  Athenians  who  have  remained 
in  the  city  that  desire  to  emigrate  do  have  Eleusis, 
retaining  their  full  rights,  and  having  sovereignty  and 
self-government,  and  enjoying  their  own  revenues. 
And  that  the  temple  be  the  common  property  of  both  2 

109 


ARISTOTLE 

τίρων,  €πιμ€λ€Ϊσθαυ  Be  Κήρυκας  καΐ  ΈνμολπίΒας 
κατά,  τα  ττάτρια.  μτ]  i^etvai  he  /χτ^τε  τοΙς  Ελευ- 
aivoOev  els  ro  άστυ  ju^re  rot?  e/c  τοΰ  άστεω? 
Έλευσίναδ'  elaievai  πλην  μυστηρίοις  ίκατίρους. 
συvτeλeΐv    he    άττο    των    ττροσίόντων    els    το    συμ- 

3  μαχικον  καθάπερ  τους  άλλους  'Αθηναίους,  eav  δε 
τιν€ς  των  άτηόντων  οΐκίαν  λαμβάνωσι,ν  Έλβυσΐνι, 
συμπe^θeιv  τον  κeκτημevov^  eav  he  μη  συμ- 
^αινωσιν  άλλήλοις  τιμητάς  eXeadai  τpeΐς  €κάτ€ρον,^ 
καΐ  ηντιν'  αν  οΰτοι  τάζωσι  τιμήν  λαμβάν€ίν. 
*Έιλ€υσίνίων  he  auvoLKelv  ους  αν  ουτοι^  βούλωνται. 

4  τήν  δ'  άττογραφήν  elvat  τοις  βουλομ4νοις  e^oiKetv, 
τοις  μ€ν  €πώημοΰσίν  αφ'  ης  αν  ομόσωσιν  τους 
όρκους  heKa  ήμepώv,  την  δ'  έζοίκησιν  eiKoai,  τοις 
δ'  ά■πohημoΰσιv  εττειδάν  €πώημήσωσιν  κατά  ταύτα. 

δ  μή  e^eZvai  he  άρχειν  μηheμίav  αρχήν  των  ev  τω 
αστει  τον  Έλευσΐνι  κατοικοΰντα  πρΙν  άττογράφηται 
πάλιν  ev  τω  άστει  κατοικ€Ϊν.  τάς  he  hίκaς  τοΰ 
φόνου  etvat   κατά  τα  πάτρια,  el  τις  τίνα  auro^etp 

6  άπeκτeιvev  ή  eτpωσev.^  των  he  παρ€ληλυθότων 
μηhevL  προς  μηΒ^να  μνησικακ€Ϊν  e^eZvai  πλην  προς 
τους  τριάκοντα  και  τους  heKa  και  τους  evheKa 
καΐ  τους  τοΰ  Ileιpaιeως  άρζαντας,  μηhe  προς 
τούτους  eav  hιhώσιv  eύθύvaς.  eύθύvaς  he  hoΰvaι 
τους  μεν  ev  Heipatet  άρζαντας  ev  τοις  ev  Ueipaiel, 
τους  δ'   ev    τω   άστ€ΐ  ev  τοις*   τά  τιμήματα   παρ- 

^  ίκάτβρον  Bury  :  (κατ€ρωρ  cod. 
*  αύτοί  Richards. 
*  et  τΐί  .  .  .  ίτρωσ(ν  Blass,  partim  ex  aliis :  valde  confusa  cod. 
*  iv  Totj  <ev  τφ  άστ€ΐ>  ?  Kenyon. 


"  See  Ivii.  1. 
*  Perhaps  '  in  the  city  '  should  be  inserted  after  '  property, 

110 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  xxxix.  2-6 

sections,  and  be  under  the  superintendence  of  thie 
Heralds  and  the  Eumolpidae "  according  to  the  an- 
cestral practice.  But  that  it  be  not  lawful  for  those 
at  Eleusis  to  go  into  the  city,  nor  for  those  in  the  city 
to  go  to  Eleusis,  except  in  either  case  at  a  celebration 
of  the  Mysteries.  And  that  they  contribute  from 
their  revenues  like  the  other  Athenians  to  the  fund 
for  the  common  defence.  And  that  any  of  those  who  3 
go  away  that  take  a  house  at  Eleusis  be  helped  to 
obtain  the  consent  of  the  owner  ;  and  if  they  can- 
not come  to  terms  with  one  another,  each  party  to 
choose  three  valuers,  and  to  accept  whatever  price 
these  valuers  assess.  And  that  of  the  people  of 
Eleusis  those  whom  the  settlers  may  be  willing  to 
allow  do  dwell  in  the  place  with  them.  And  that  the  4 
registration  of  those  that  Avish  to  migrate  be,  for  those 
who  are  in  the  country,  within  ten  days  of  the  date 
of  their  swearing  the  oaths  of  peace,  and  their 
migration  within  twenty  days,  and  for  those  abroad 
similarly  from  the  date  when  they  return.  And  that  5 
it  be  not  permitted  for  anyone  residing  at  Eleusis 
to  hold  any  of  the  offices  in  the  city  until  he  removes 
himself  from  the  roll  in  order  to  reside  again  in  the 
city.  And  that  trials  for  homicide  be  in  accordance 
with  the  ancestral  ordinances,  if  a  man  has  killed  or 
wounded  another  with  his  own  hand.  And  that  there  6 
be  a  universal  amnesty  for  past  events,  covering 
everybody  except  the  Thirty,  the  Ten,  the  Eleven, 
and  those  that  have  been  governors  of  Peiraeus,  and 
that  these  also  be  covered  by  the  amnesty  if  they 
render  account.  And  that  those  who  had  been 
governors  in  Peiraeus  render  account  before  the 
courts  held  in  Peiraeus,  but  those  in  the  city  before  a 
court  of  persons  that  can  produce  ratable  property  ^ ; 

111 


ARISTOTLE 

€χομ€νοίς•  eW*  οϋτως  i^oiKciv  τους  μη^  εθίλοντας. 
τα  δε  χρήματα  α  iSaveiaavTO  els  τον  ττόλβμον 
€κατ€ρονς  απο^οΰναι  χωρίς. 

1  XL,  Τενομενων  8e  τοιούτων  των  διαλύσεων, 
καΐ  φοβούμενων  όσοι  μετά.  των  τριάκοντα  συνεττολε- 
μησαν,  και  πολλών  μεν  επινοονντων  εζοικεΖν  ανα- 
βαλλόμενων δε  ΤΎ)ν  άπογραφην'^  εΙς  τάς  εσχάτα? 
ημέρας,  όπερ  εΐώθασιν  ποιείν  άπαντες,  ^Αρχΐνος 
συνώών  το  πλήθος  καΐ  βουλόμενος  κατασχεΐν  αυ- 
τούς ύφεΐλε  τάς  υπολοίπους  ημέρας  της  απογραφής, 
ώστε    συναναγκασθηναι    μενειν    πολλούς    άκοντας 

2  εως  εθάρρησαν.  /cat  δοκεί  τοΰτό  τε  πολιτεύσασθαι 
καλώς  Άρχΐνος,  καΐ  μετά  ταΰτα  γραφάμενος  το 
φηφισμα  το  Θρασυβούλου  παρανόμων,  εν  ω  μετ- 
εδιδου  της  πολιτείας  πάσι  τοις  εκ  ΧΥειραιεως  συγ- 
κατελθοΰσι,  ων  ενιοι  φανερώς  ήσαν  δούλοι,  και 
τρίτον,  επεί  τι?  ηρζατο  τών  κατεληλυθότων  μνησι- 
κακεΐν,  (XTTayaycut'  τούτον  επι  την  βουλην  και 
πείσας  άκριτον  άποκτεΐναι,  λέγων  οτι  νυν  Βειζουσιν 
εΐ  βούλονται  την  Βημοκρατίαν  σωζειν  και  τοις 
ορκοις  εμμενειν  άφεντας  μεν  γαρ  τούτον  προτρε- 
φειν  και  τους  άλλους,  εάν  δ'  άνελωσιν  παράδειγμα 
ποιησειν  απασιν.  όπερ  και  συνεπεσεν  αποθανόν- 
τος γάρ  ού^εις  πώποτε  ύστερον  εμνησικάκησεν, 
άλλα  Βοκοΰσιν  κάλλιστα  8η  και  πολιτικώτατα 
απάντων  και  ΙΒία  και  κοινή  χρησασθαι  ταΓ?  προ- 

3  γεγενημεναις   συμφοραΐς•   ου   γάρ   μόνον   τα?   ττερι 


^  TOVS  μη  Blass :  tovs  δ  cod.  (δ  supra  lineam), 
*  Jackson  :  ανα-^ραψην  cod. 


112 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  xxxix.  6— xl.  3 

or  that  those  who  will  not  render  account  on  these 
terms  do  migrate.'*  And  that  each  party  separately 
repay  their  loans  contracted  for  the  war.' 

•  XL.  The  reconciliation  having  been  made  on  these  1 
terms,  all  those  who  had  fought  on  the  side  of  the 
Thirty  were  alarmed,  and  many  intended  to  migrate, 
but  put  off  their  registration  to  the  latest  days, 
as  everybody  usually  does ;  so  Archinus  perceiving 
their  numbers  and  wishing  to  retain  them,  cancelled 
the  remainder  of  the  days  allowed  for  registration, 
so  that  many  should  be  jointly  compelled  to  stay 
against  their  will  until  they  recovered  courage.  This  2 
seems  to  have  been  a  statesmanlike  act  of  Archinus  ; 
as  was  also  later  his  indicting  as  unconstitutional 
the  decree  of  Thrasybulus  admitting  to  citizenship 
all  those  who  had  come  back  together  from  Peiraeus, 
some  of  whom  were  clearly  slaves  ;  and  his  third  act 
of  statesmanship  was  that  when  somebody  began 
to  stir  up  grudges  against  the  returned  citizens,  he 
arraigned  him  before  the  Council  and  persuaded  it 
to  execute  him  without  trial,  saying  that  this  was 
the  moment  for  them  to  show  if  they  wished  to  save 
the  democracy  and  keep  their  oaths ;  for  by  letting 
this  man  off  they  would  incite  the  others  too,  but  if 
they  put  him  out  of  the  way  they  would  make  him 
an  example  to  everybody.  And  this  is  what  actually 
occurred  ;  for  never  since  he  was  put  to  death  has 
anybody  broken  the  amnesty,   but   the    Athenians 

I  appear  both  in  private  and  public  to  have  behaved 
towards  the  past  disasters  in  the  most  completely 
honourable  and  statesmanlike  manner  of  any  people 
in  history ;  for  they  not  only  blotted  out  recrimina-  3 

"  A  variant  reading  («^'  οϋτω^  έ^οικείν  rovs  (e^Xovras)  gives 
'  then  those  who  wish  are  to  emigrate  on  these  terms.' 

I  113 


ARISTOTLE 

των  ττροτίρων  αίτιας  e^rjXeiipav  άλλα  και  τα 
χρήματα  Λακεδαι/χονίοι?  ο.  οΐ  τριάκοντα  προς  τον 
πόλεμον  ζλαβον  άττί^οσαν  Koivrj,  KeXevovaojv  των 
συνθηκών  ίκατίρονς  άττο^ώόναι  χωρίς,  τους  τ  εκ 
τοΰ  άστεως  καΐ  τους  Ικ  του  Iletpateajs,  ηγούμενοι 
τοντο  πρώτον  αρχειν  heiv  της  ομονοίας'  iv  δε 
ταΐς  άλλαυς  πόλεσιν  ονχ  οΐον  eVc  προστιθέασιν 
τών  οίκβίων  οΐ  8ημοκρατησαντ€ς^  άλλα  /cat  την 
4  χώραν  άνά8αστον  ποίοϋσιν.  ^ιελύθησαν  oe  και 
προς  τους  iv  'Έιλβυσΐνι  κατοικήσαντας  eret  τρίτω 
μ€τά  την  εζοίκησιν  €πΙ  Ξεναινετου   άρχοντος. 

1  XLI.  Ταϋτα  μ€ν  οΰν  iv  τοις  ύστερον  συνέβη 
γενέσθαι  καιροΐς,  τότε  δε  κύριος  6  Βημος  γενό- 
μενος τών  πραγμάτων  ενεστήσατο  την  νυν  ούσαν 
πολιτείαν  iπι  ΥΙυθοΒώρου  μεν  άρχοντος  .Βοκοΰντος 
δε  δικαίως''  τοΰ  8ημου  λαβείν  την  πολιτείαν  δια 
το  ποιησασθαι  την  κάθο8ον   δι'    αύτοΰ  τον  8ημον. 

2  ην  δε  τών  μεταβολών  ενδέκατη  τον  αριθμόν  αύτη . 
πρώτη  μεν  γαρ  εγενετο  η  κατάστασις'  τών  εξ 
άρχης  "Ιωνος  και  τών  /χετ'  αύτοΰ  συνοικισαντων 
τότε  γαρ  πρώτον  εις  τάς  τετταρας  συνενεμηθησαν 
φυλάς  και  τους  φυλοβασιλεας  κατέστησαν .  δευτέρα 
8ε,  καΐ  πρώτη  μετά  ταύτην  εχουσά  τι  πολιτείας 
τάξις*  ή  iπl  Θησέως  γενομένη,  μικρόν  παρεγ- 
κλίνουσα  της  βασιλικής,  μετά  δε  ταύτην  η  επι 
Αράκοντος,  εν  fj  και  νόμους  ανέγραφαν  πρώτον, 
τρίτη  δ'   η  μετά  την  στάσιν  η   επι  Έόλωνος,  αφ 

^  οι  δήμοι  κρατήσαντΐ'ϊ  edd. 

*  δίκα/ου  Richards.  '  μετάστασίί  alii  legunt. 

*  Wilamowitz :  (χουσαιιτοΚιταανταξίν  cod. 

»  The  Greek  text  is  very  doubtful,  but  apparently  tin 
114 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  xl.  3— xli.  2 

tions  with  regard  to  the  past,  but  also  pubUcly 
restored  to  the  Spartans  the  funds  that  the  Thirty 
had  taken  for  the  war,  although  the  treaty  ordered 
that  the  parties  in  the  city  and  in  Peiraeus  were 
each  to  make  restitution  separately.  The  Athenians 
thought  that  they  must  take  this  as  a  first  step  to 
concord,  whereas  in  the  other  states  those  who  have 
set  up  democracy  not  only  do  not  pay  any  more  out 
of  their  own  property  but  even  make  a  redistribution 
of  the  land.  They  also  made  a  reconciliation  with  4 
those  that  had  settled  at  Eleusis  two  years  after  the 
migration,  in  the  archonship  of  Xenaenetus.  40i  b.c. 

XLI.  These  events  then  came  about  in  the  follow-  1 
ing  periods  ;  but  at  the  date  mentioned  the  people 
having  become  sovereign  over  affairs  established 
the  now  existing  constitution,  in  the  archonship  of 
Pythodorus,  when  the  People's  having  accomplished 
its  return  by  its  own  efforts  made  it  appear  just  for  402  b.o. 
it  to  assume  the  government.  In  the  list  of  reforms  2 
this  was  the  eleventh  in  number.  There  first  occurred 
the  organization  of  the  original  constitution  after  the 
settlement  at  Athens  of  Ion  and  his  companions, 
for  it  was  then  that  the  people  were  first  divided  into 
the  four  Tribes  and  appointed  the  Tribal  Kings.  The 
second  constitution,  and  the  first  subsequent  one 
that  involved  a  constitutional  point,"  was  the  reform 
that  took  place  in  the  time  of  Theseus,  which  was  a 
sUght  divergence  from  the  royal  constitution.  After 
that  one  came  the  reform  in  the  time  of  Draco,  in 
which  a  code  of  laws  was  first  published.  Third  was 
the  one  that  followed  the  civil  disturbance  in  the  time 
of  Solon,  from  which  democracy  took  its  beginning. 

constitution  in  the  time  of  Ion  is  taken  as  the  starting-point, 
and  the  eleven  revolutions  follow. 

115 


ARISTOTLE 

'^S  αρχή  δημοκρατίας  iyeveTO.  τετάρτη  δ'  η  eirl 
Πεισιστράτου  τνραννίς.  πβμπτη  δ'  η  μ€τά  την 
τών^  τυράννων  κατάλυσιν  η  ¥>.λβίσθ€νονς,  ^-ημοτι- 
κωτ€ρα  της  Σ^όλωνος.  €κτη  δ'  η  μ€τά  τα.  Μηδικά, 
της  εζ  'Apeiou  πάγου  βουλής  βπιστατούσης. 
ββΒόμη  δε  /cai^  μ€τά  ταυτην  ην  Άριστειδτ^?  μ^ν 
ύττε^αζβν  ^Εφιάλτης  δ'  eneTeXeaev  καταλυσας  την 
Αρ€θ7ταγΐτι.ν  βουλην,  iv  fj  ττλβιστα  συνίβη  την 
ι  /  ττόΧιν  δια  του?  δημαγωγούς  άμαρτάνβιν  δια'  την 
της  θαλάττης  άρχην.  ογΒόη  δ'  η  των  τετρακοσίων 
κατάστασις ,  καΐ  μετά  ταυτην  ενάτη  δε  η  δημοκρατία 
τταλιν.  Βεκάτη  δ'  η  των  τριάκοντα  και  η  των 
8eKa  τυραννίς.  ενδέκατη  δ'  η  μετά  την  άπο 
Φυλής  και  εκ  ΐίεψαιεως  κάθοΒον  άφ^  ης  δια- 
γεγενηται  μέχρι  της  νΰν,  άει  προσεπιλαμβάνουσα 
τω  πληθει  την  εζουσίαν.  απάντων  γαρ  αύτος 
αυτόν  πεποίηκεν  6  ^ημος  κύριον  καΐ  πάντα  δι- 
οικείται φηφίσμασιν  και  8ικαστηρίοις  εν  οΐς  ό  ^ημος 
εστίν  6  κρατών,  και  γαρ  αϊ  της  βουλής  κρίσεις 
εΙς  τον  Βημον  εληλύθασιν.  και  τοΰτο  δοκουσι 
ποιεΐν  ορθώς•  εύΒιαφθορώτεροι  γαρ  oAtyoi  τών 
3  πολλών  εισιν  και  κε'ρδει  και  χάρισιν.  μισθοφόρον 
δ'  εκκλησίαν  το  μεν  πρώτον  άπεγνωσαν  ποιεΐν 
ου  συλλεγομένων  δ'  εις  την  εκκλησίαν ,  άλλα  ττολλα 
σοφιζομενων  τών  πρυτάνεων  όπως  προσιστηται  το 
πλήθος  προς  την  επικύρωσιν  της  χειροτονίας, 
πρώτον  μεν   Άγύρριος   όβολον   επόρισεν,   μετά   δε 

^  Τ7)ν  τΰν  Kenyon:  τωρ  cod. 

"  και  seel.  Blass :  ή  coni.  Mayor. 

'  <καΙ>  διά,  κΛτά,  δια  .   .  .   άρχην  <θαρρήσασαρ>  coni.  edd. 

116 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  xli.  2-3 

Fourth  was  the  tyranny  in  the  time  of  Peisistratus. 
Fifth  the  constitution  of  Cleisthenes,  following  the 
deposition  of  the  tyrants,  which  was  more  democratic 
than   the  constitution  of  Solon.     Sixth   the  reform 
after  the  Persian  War,  under  the  superintendence  of 
the   Council  of  Areopagus.     Seventh  followed  the 
reform    outlined   by   Aristeides    but    completed    by 
Ephialtes  when  he  put  down  the  Areopagite  Council, 
during  which  it  came   about  because  of  the  dem- 
agogues that  the  state  made  many  mistakes,  because 
of  the  empire  of  the  sea."    Eighth  was  the  establish- 
ment of  the  Four  Hundred,  and  after  that,  ninth, 
democracy  again.     Tenth  was  the  tyranny  of  the 
Thirty  and  that  of  the  Ten.     Eleventh  was  the  con- 
stitution established  after  the  return  from  Phyle  and 
from  Peiraeus,  from  which  date  the  constitution  has 
continued  down  to  its  present  form,  constantly  taking 
on  additions  to  the  power  of  the  multitude.    For  the 
people  has  made  itself  master  of  everything,  and 
administers    everything    by    decrees    and    by   jury- 
courts  in  which  the  people  is  the  ruling  power,  for 
even  the  cases  tried  by  the  Council  have  come  to  the 
people.    And  they  seem  to  act  rightly  in  doing  this, 
for  a  few  are  more  easily  corrupted  by  gain  and  by 
influence  than  the  many.    The  proposal  to  introduce  3 
payment  for  attendance  at  the  Assembly  was  on  the  -' 
first  occasion  rej  ected  ;  but  as  people  were  not  attend- 
ing the  Assembly  but  the  presidents  kept  contriving 
a  number  of  devices  to  get  the  multitude  to  attend 
for  the  passing  of  the  resolution  by  show  of  hands, 
first  Agyrrhius  introduced  a  fee  of  an  obol,  and  after 

"  Here  again  the  exact  text  is  doubtful. 

117 


ARISTOTLE 

τούτον  'ΥίρακλζίΒηζ  6  KAa^o/xevio?  6  Βασιλεύς 
€τηκαλούμ€νος  Βιώβολον,  πάλιν  δ'  ^Αγνρριος 
τριώβολον. 

1  XLII.  "Έιχ€ΐ  δ'  η  νυν  κατάστασις  της  ττολιτεια? 
TovSe  τον  τρόπον.  μ€Τ€χονσίν  μβν  της  πολιτβίας 
οΐ  Ιζ  αμφοτέρων  γβγονότβς  αστών,  εγγράφονται 
δ'  ets"  τους  Βημότας  οκτωκαί^βκα  €τη  γ€γονότ€ς. 
όταν  δ'  €γγράφωνται  8ιαφηφίζονται  π€ρΙ  αυτών 
όμόσαντ€ς  οι  ^ημόται,  πρώτον  μ€ν  el  8οκοΰσι 
γβγονέναι  την  ηλικίαν  την  €Κ  του  νόμου,  καν  μη 
Βό^ωσι  άπ€ρχονται  πάλιν  €ΐς  τταΓδας",  SeijTepov  δ' 
ei  ελ^ύθ^ρός  βστι  και  γβγονβ  κατά  τους  νόμους• 
67Γ6ΐτ'  άν^  άποφηφίσωνται^  μη  etvat  έλζύθβρον, 
6  μέν  έφίησιν  βις  το  Βικαστηριον,  οι  δε  δτ^^όται 
κατηγόρους  αίροΰνται  vreWe  άνδρα?  e^  αυτών, 
καν  μ€ν  μη  8όζη  δικαίως  ίγγράφ^σθαι,  πωλξΐ 
τούτον    η    πόλις'    iav    δε    νικηση,    τοις    ^ημόταις 

2  €πάναγκ€ς  ^γγράφζίν.  μετά  δε  ταΰτα  Βοκιμάζβι 
τους  έγγραφίντας  η  βουλή,  καν  τι?  ^όζη  νεώτερος 
οκτωκαίΒεκα  ετών  είναι,  ζημιοΐ  τους  8ημότας 
τους  εγγράφαντας.  επάν  δε  Βοκιμασθώσιν  οι 
έφηβοι,  συλλεγεντες  οι  πατέρες  αυτών  κατά  φυλάς 
όμόσαντες  αίροΰνται  τρεις  εκ  τών  φυλετών  τών 
ύπερ  τετταράκοντα  ετη  γεγονότων  ους  αν  ηγώνται 
βέλτιστους  ειΐ'αι  και  επιτη^ειοτάτους  επιμελεΐσθαι 
τών  εφήβων,  €Κ  δε  τούτων  6  Βήμος  ενα  της  φυλής 
εκάστ7)ς  χειροτονεί  σωφρονιστήν,  και  κοσμητήν  εκ 

3  τών  άλλων  Αθηναίων  επι  πάντας.  συλλαβόντες 
δ'  οΰτοι  τους  εφήβους,  πρώτον  μεν  τά  Ιερά  περι- 
ήλθαν, εΓτ'  εις   ΥΙειραιεα  πορεύονται  και  φρουροΰ- 

^  iLf  Papageorgios :  ανμεν  cod.  ^  Wyse ;  €πιψ.  cod. 

118 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  xu.  3— xlii.  3 

him  Heracleides  of  Clazomenae,  surnamed  ^  King,  two 
obols,  and  Agyrrhius  again  three  obols. 

XLII.  The  present  form  of  the  constitution  is  as  1 
follows.  Citizenship  belongs  to  persons  of  citizen 
parentage  on  both  sides,  and  they  are  registered  on 
the  rolls  of  their  demes  at  the  age  of  eighteen.  At 
the  time  of  their  registration  the  members  of  the 
deme  make  decision  about  them  by  vote  on  oath,  first 
whether  they  are  shown  to  have  reached  the  lawful 
age,  and  if  they  are  held  not  to  be  of  age  they  go  back 
again  to  the  boys,  and  secondly  whether  the  candi- 
date is  a  freeman  and  of  legitimate  birth  ;  after  this, 
if  the  vote  as  to  free  status  goes  against  him,  he 
appeals  to  the  jury-court,  and  the  demesmen  elect 
five  men  from  among  themselves  to  plead  against 
him,  and  if  it  is  decided  that  he  has  no  claim  to  be 
registered,  the  state  sells  him,  but  if  he  wins,  it  is 
compulsory  for  the  demesmen  to  register  him.  After  2 
this  the  Council  revises  the  list  of  persons  that  have 
been  registered,  and  if  anyone  is  found  to  be  under 
eighteen  years  of  age,  it  fines  the  demesmen  that 
registered  him.  And  when  the  cadets  have  been 
passed  by  this  revision,  their  fathers  hold  meetings 
by  tribes  and  after  taking  oath  elect  three  members 
of  the  tribe  of  more  than  forty  years  of  age,  whom 
they  think  to  be  the  best  and  most  suitable  to  super- 
vise the  cadets,  and  from  them  the  people  elects  by 
show  of  hands  one  of  each  tribe  as  disciplinary  officer, 
and  elects  from  the  other  citizens  a  marshal  over 
them  all.  These  take  the  cadets  in  a  body,  and  3 
after  first  making  a  circuit  of  the  temples  then  go  to 

°  Or  '  nicknamed '  (as  was  Peisistratus  in  Eupolis's 
comedy  Demos) :  but  perhaps  his  family  claimed  royal 
descent  in  Asia  Minor. 

119 


ARISTOTLE 

σιν  οι  /xev  την  Μοννιχίαν  οι  δε  την  Άκτην. 
XeipoTovel  δε  και  τταώοτρίβας  αντοΐς  8υο  και 
διδασκάλου?  oirive?  6πλομαχ€Ϊν  και  To^evevv  και 
άκοντίζ^ίν  και  καταττάλτην  αφι^ναι  διδάσκουσιν/ 
διδα>σι  δε  και  ei?  τροφην  tols  μ-ev  σωφρονισταΐς 
^ραχμην  α  ίκάστω,  toZs  δ'  ξφηβοις  τετταρα? 
όβολούς  ίκάστω•  τα  δε  των  φνλίτών  των  αντοΰ 
λαμβάνων  6  σωφρονιστής  έκαστος  άγοράζβι  τα 
ε'τΓίτιίδεια  ττασιν  ει?  το  κοινόν  (συσσιτοΰσι  γαρ 
κατά  φυλάς),  και  των  άλλων  εττι/χελειται  πάντων. 

4  και  τον  μ€ν  πρώτον  iviavTOv  όντως  Βιαγουσι• 
τον  δ'  νστβρον,  ίκκλησίας  iv  τω  θβατρω  γενομένης 
άτΓοδει^ά/χε^οι  τω  8ημω  τά  πβρί  τάς  τά^ει?  και 
λαβόντες  ασπίδα  και  δόρυ  παρά  της  πόλεως,  περι- 
πολοϋσι     την     χώραν     και     Βιατρίβονσιν     εν     τοις 

5  φυλακτηρίοις .  φρουρονσι  δε  τά  δυο  ετη'  χλα/χυδα? 
έχοντες'  και  ατελει?  εισι  πάντων  και  Βίκην  ούτε 
διδόασιν  οντε  λαμβάνονσιν,  ίνα  μη  πρόφασις  η  του 
άτΓίε'ναι/  πλην  περί  κλήρου  και  επικλήρον  καν 
TLVL  κατά*  γένος  Ιερωσννη  γεντ^ται.  Βιεξελθόντων 
δε  των»  δυειν'  ετών  ήΒη  μετά  τών  άλλων  είσιν. 

1  XLIII.  Τά  μεν  οΰν  περί  την  τών  πολιτών 
εγγραφήν  και  τους  εφήβους  τούτον  έχει  τον 
τρόπον.  τάς  δ'  αρχάς  τάς  περί  την  εγκυκλιον 
Βιοίκησιν  άπάσας  ποιοϋσι  κληρωτάς,  πλην  ταμιου 
στρατιωτικών  και  τών  επι  τών  θεωρικών  και  του 
τών  κρηνών  επιμελητού•  ταύτας  δε  χειροτονοΰσιν, 
και  οι  χειροτονηθεντες  άρχουσιν  εκ   Πανα^τ^ι^αιων 

1  ζιδάξονσίν  Rutherford. 

^  πρόφασίί  .  .  .  άπι^ναι  legit  Blass,  sed  incertus  cod. 

*  κατά  Wilamowitz-Kaibel :  κατατο  cod. 

120 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  xlii.  3— xliii.  1 

Peiraeus,and  some  of  them  garrison  Munichia,"  others 
the  Point. ^  And  the  people  also  elects  two  athletic 
trainers  and  instructors  for  them,  to  teach  them  their 
drill  as  heavy- armed  soldiers,  and  the  use  of  the 
bow,  the  javelin  and  the  sling.  It  also  grants  the 
disciplinary  officers  one  drachma  a  head  for  rations,  and 
the  cadets  four  obols  a  head  ;  and  each  disciplinary 
officer  takes  the  pay  of  those  of  his  own  tribe  and  buys 
provisions  for  all  in  common  (for  they  mess  together 
by  tribes),  and  looks  after  everything  else.  They  go  4 
on  with  this  mode  of  life  for  the  first  year  ;  in  the 
following  year  an  assembly  is  held  in  the  theatre,  and 
the  cadets  give  a  display  of  drill  before  the  people, 
and  receive  a  shield  and  spear  from  the  state  ;  and 
they  then  serve  on  patrols  in  the  country  and  are 
quartered  at  the  guard-posts.  Their  service  on  5 
patrol  goes  on  for  two  years  ;  the  uniform  is  a  mantle  ; 
they  are  exempt  from  all  taxes  ;  and  they  are  not 
allowed  to  be  sued  nor  to  sue  at  law,  in  order  that 
they  may  have  no  pretext  for  absenting  themselves, 
except  in  cases  concerning  estate,  marriage  of  an 
heiress,  and  any  priesthood  that  one  of  them  nnay 
have  inherited.  When  the  two  years  are  up,  they 
now  are  members  of  the  general  body  of  citizens. 

XLIII.  Such,  then,  are  the  regulations  about  the  i 
registration  of  the  citizens  and  about  the  cadets.  All 
the  officials  concerned  with  the  regular  administration 
are  appointed  by  lot,  except  a  Treasurer  of  Military 
Funds,  the  Controllers  of  the  Spectacle  Fund,  and  the 
Superintendent  of  Wells ;  these  officers  are  elected 
by  show  of  hands,  and  their  term  of  office  runs  from 


"  See  xix.  2  n. 
*  The  southern  promontory  of  Peiraeus. 


121 


ARISTOTLE 

elg    ΐΐαναθηναια.      χ€ψοτονοΰσί   he   καΐ   τάς   ττρος 
τον  ττόλβμον  άττάσας. 

2  Βουλτ^  δε  κληροΰται  φ',  ν'  άττο  φνλης  έκαστης. 
πρυταν€ν€ί  δ'  iu  jaepet  των  φυλών  έκαστη  καθ*  δ 
τι  άΐ'  λάγ^ωσιν,  αί  μέν  ττρώται  τβτταρβς  ζ'  καΐ  λ' 
ημέρας  έκαστη,  αί  δε  ?■'  αί  νστ^ραι  πέντ€  και 
λ'  ημέρας  έκαστη'  κατά  σελήνην  γαρ  αγουσιν  τον 

3  ένιαυτόν.  οι  he  πρυτανεύοντας  αυτών  πρώτον  μέν 
συσσιτοϋσιν  έν  τη  θόλω,  λαμβάνοντες  άργυριον 
παρά  της  πόλεως,  έπειτα  συνάγουσιν  καΐ  την 
βουλην  καΐ  τον  8ημον,  την  μεν  οΰν^  βουλην 
δσαι  ημέραι,^  πλην  εάν  τις  άφέσιμος  η,  τον  δε 
Βημον  τετράκις  της  πρυτανείας  εκάστης,  και  όσα 
8εΐ  χρηματίζειν  την  βουλην,  και  δ  τι  έν  εκάστη 
τη  ήμερα,  και  δπου  καθίζειν,^  ούτοι  προγράφουσι. 

4  προγράφουσι  δε  και  τάς  εκκλησίας  ούτοι•  jutav 
μεν  κυρίαν,  έν  fj  δει  τάς  αρχάς  έπιχειροτονεΐν  ει 
Βοκοΰσι  καλώς  άρχειν,  και  περί  σίτου  και  περί 
φυλακής  της  χώρας  χρηματίζειν,  και  τάς  εισ- 
αγγελίας έν  ταύτη  τη  ήμερα  τους  βουλομενους 
ποιεΐσθαι,  και  τάς  άπογραφάς  τών  8ημευομένων 
άναγινώσκειν,  και  τάς  λήξεις  τών  κλήρων  και  τών 
έπικλήρων  άναγινώσκειν,'^  δπως  μηΒένα  λάθη  μη^έν 

Γ)  έρήμον  γενόμενον  έπι  δε  της  έκτης  πρυτανείας 
προς  τοις  είρημένοις  και  περί  της  όστρακοφορίας 
έπιχειροτονίαν  διδόασιν  ει  δοκεΓ  ποιεΐν  ή  μή,  και 
συκοφαντών  προβολάς  τών  Ά^ηΐ'αιων  και  τών  με- 

^  [ore]  edd.  *  όσημέραι  Kenyon. 

^  Wilamowitz-Kaibel ;  οπονκαθι^ίΐ  cod. 

*  [avayivwcKeiv]  Gennadios. 

"  i.e.  in  every  four  years ;  the  Great  Panathenaic  Festival, 
as  also  the  Pythian,  was  held  in  the  third  Olympic  year. 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  xliii.  1-5 

one  Panathenaic  Festival  to  the  next."     All  military 
officers  also  are  elected  by  show  of  hands. 

The  Council  is  elected  by  lot,  and  has  five  hundred  2 
members,  fifty  from  each  tribe.  The  Presidency  is 
filled  by  each  tribe  in  turn,  in  an  order  settled  by  lot, 
each  of  the  first  four  selected  holding  the  office  for 
thirty-six  days  and  each  of  the  latter  six  for  thirty- 
five  days  ;  for  their  year  is  divided  into  lunar  months.'' 
Those  of  them  serving  as  Presidents  first  dine  to-  3 
gether  in  the  Round-house,"  receiving  a  sum  of  money 
from  the  state,  and  then  convene  meetings  of  the 
Council  and  the  People,  the  Council  indeed  meeting 
on  every  day  excepting  holidays,  but  the  People  four 
times  in  each  presidency.  And  the  Presidents  put  up 
written  notice  of  the  business  to  be  dealt  with  by  the 
Council,  and  of  each  day's  agenda,  and  of  the  place  of 
meeting.  They  also  put  up  written  notice  of  the  4 
meetings  of  the  Assembly  :  one  ^  sovereign  meeting, 
at  which  the  business  is  to  vote  the  confirmation  of 
the  magistrates  in  office  if  'they  are  thought  to 
govern  Avell,  and  to  deal  with  matters  of  food  supply 
and  the  defence  of  the  country  ;  and  on  this  day 
informations  have  to  be  laid  by  those  who  wish,  and 
the  inventories  of  estates  being  confiscated  read, 
and  the  lists  of  suits  about  inheritance  and  heiresses, 
so  that  all  may  have  cognizance  of  any  vacancy  in 
an  estate  that  occurs.  In  the  sixth  presidency  in  5 
addition  to  the  business  specified  they  take  a  vote 
on  the  desirability  of  holding  an  ostracism,  and  on 
preliminary  informations  against  persons  charged  as 
malicious  informers,  citizens  and  resident  aliens,  up 

''  Alternate  months  of  29  and  30  days  make  a  year  of 
354  days,  as  does  36  χ  4+35  χ  6. 

"  At  the  N.E.  of  the  Areopagus,  near  the  Council-chamber. 
'^  One  in  each  presidential  term  of  office. 

123 


ARISTOTLE 

τοίκων  fiexpL  τριών  ίκατίρων ,  καν  τις  ύττοσχ6μ€νός 
β  τι  μη  ποιηστ)  τω  8ημω.  €Τ€ραν  δε  ταΐ?  ικ€τηρίαις, 
€V  η  deig  6  βουλόμβνος  [κ€τηρίαν  virep  ων  αν 
βούληται  και  ι6ίων  και  δημοσίων  διαλέγεται  προς 
τον  8ημον.  αι  δε  δυο  ττερι  των  άλλων  elaiv,  iv 
αίς  κβλβύουσιν  οι  νόμοι  τρία  μ^ν  ι^ρών  χρηματίζ€ΐν, 
τρία  δε  κήρυξιν  και  πρβσββίαις,  τρία  δ'  οσίων, 
χρηματίζουσιν  δ'  ενίοτε  και  άνευ  προχειροτονίας. 
προσέρχονται  δε  και  οι  κήρυκες  και  οι  πρέσβεις 
τοις  πρυτανεσιν  πρώτον,  και  οι  τάς  επιστολάς 
φέροντες  τούτοις  αποδιδόασι. 
ι  XLIV.  "Εστί  δ'  επιστάτης  τών  πρυτάνεων  εις  6 
λαχών  οΰτος  δ'  επιστατεΐ  νύκτα  και  ήμεραν,  και 
ουκ  έ'στιν  οϋτε  πλειω  χρόνον  οντε  δι?  τον  αυτόν 
γενέσθαι,  τηρεί  δ'  ούτος  τάς  τε  κλεΐς  τάς  τών 
Ιερών  εν  οΐς  τα  χρΎ}ματ^  εστίν  καΐ  τά^  γράμματα 
τη  πόλει,  και  την  Βημοσίαν  σφραγίδα,  και  μενειν 
άναγκαΐον   εν   τη    θόλω   τοΰτόν   εστίν   και   τριττύν 

2  τών  πρυτάνεων  ην  άν  οΰτος  κελεύη.  και  επεώάν 
συναγάγωσιν  οί  πρυτάνεις  την  βουλήν  η  τον  ^ημον 
οΰτος  κλήροι  προέδρους  εννέα,  ενα  εκ  της  φυλής 
εκάστης  πλην  της  πρυτανευούσης,  και  πάλιν  εκ 
τούτων   επιστατην   ενα,    και   τταραδιδωσι   το    πρό- 

3  γράμμα  αύτοις•  οί  δε  παραλαβόντες  της  τ'  εύ- 
κοσμίας  επιμελούνται  και  ύπερ  ών  δει  χρηματίζειν 
προτιθεασιν  και  τας  χειροτονίας  κρινουσιν  και  τά 
άλλα  πάντα  ^ιοικοΰσιν  και  τοΰ^  άφεΐναι  κύριοι  εισιν. 


^  τά  suppletum  ab  edd. 
*  του  Richards :  τοντ  cod. :  τοΰ  δ'  Hude. 


124 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  xliii.  δ— xi.iv.  3 

to  the  number  of  not  more  than  three  crimes  of 
either  class,  and  cliarges  of  failure  to  perform  a 
.Jservice  promised  to  the  People.  Another  meeting  q 
.'js  given  to  petitions,  at  Avhicli  anyone  Avho  wishes, 
after  placing  a  suppliant-bi-anch,"  may  speak  to 
-  the  People  al)out  any  matter  he  may  wish  whether 
■^public  or  private.  The  tAvo  other  meetings  deal  Aviih 
l-aW  other  business,  at  wliich  the  laws  enact  that  three 
iipases  of  sacred  matters  are  to  be  dealt  A\'ith,  three 
ijlAudiences  for  heralds  and  embassies,  and  three  cases 
'^of  secular  matters.  And  sometimes  they  do  business 
r.V'ithout  a  preliminary  vote  being  taken.  Also  tlie 
'^Presidents  give  a  first  audience  to  lieralds  and  to  am- 
■^bassadors,  and  to  the  Presidents  dispatches  are  de- 
^■Jivered  by  their  bearers. 

??i  XLIV.  I'he  Presidents  have  a  single  Head  elected  1 
φγ  Jot  ;  he  holds  office  for  a  day  and  a  night,  and  may 
■  not  hold  office  longer,  nor  serve  a  second  time.  Pie 
:  keeper  of  the  keys  of  the  temples  in  which  tlie 
i.iuuey  and  documents  of  the  state  are  lodged,  and 
-'.of  the  state  seal,  and  he  is  required  to  stay  in  the 
'  iiound  -  house,  and  so  is  Avhichever  Thiid  *  of  the 
".Presidential  Boards  he  orders.  And  Avhenever  the  2 
;;jPresidents  call  a  meeting  of  the  Council  or  of  the 
/People,  this  official  selects  by  lot  nine  Chairmen,  one 
:.:from  each  tribe  except  the  tribe  presiding,  and  ag  in 
^"from  these  a  single  Plead,  and  he  hands  over  the  hst 
■^of  agenda  to  them  ;  and  after  receiviiig  it  they  super-  3 
I;intend  procedure,  bring  forward  the  business  to  be 
i dealt  Avith,  act  as  tellers,  direct  all  the  other  busi- 
^mess  and  have  power  to  dismiss  the  meeting.     A  man 

,,    "  -^"  olive-branch  wreathed  with  wool  was  carried  by  the 
j   suppliant '  and  placed  on  the  altar  in  the  assembly. 
^      *  See  viii.  30  n. 

125 


ARISTOTLE 

/cat  hr LOT arrja at  ftev  ουκ  ζζ^στιν  ττλζΐον  η  ατταζ  iv 
τω  ii'iavrw,  TrpoeSpeuGLV  δ'   c^cartu  ατταζ  iirl  τη; 
Trpuraveias  €κάστϊ]ς. 
4       ΐίοιονσι    Be     καΐ    αρχαιρεσίας^    στρατηγών     καΐ 
ιππάρχων   και,  των  άλλαη'  των  ττρος  rov  πόΧεμον 
άρχων  iv  rfj  εκκλησία,  καθ^  ο  τι  αν  τω  Βημω  BoKfj 
ποιοΰσι  δ     ol  μετά   την   ζ'    πρυτανεύοντες  εφ*   ων 
αν  εύσημία  γενηται.     Βεΐ  Be  προβονλενμα  γενεσθα 
και  περί  τούτων.  ■'• 

1  XLV.  Η  Βε  βουλή  πρότερον  μεν  ην  κυρία  κα\ 
χρήμασιν  ζημί,ώσαι  και  Βησαι  και  άποκτεΐναί. 
και  Αυσίμαχον  Β''  αί^τ-ί]?  άγαγούσης  ώς  τον  Βημιον, 
καθημενον  ηΒη  μέλλοντα  άποΟνησκειν  Έιύμηλί- 
Βης  ό  ^ΑλωπεκηΟεν  άφείλετο,  ου  φάσκων  Βεΐν  άνεν 
Βικαστηριου  γνώσεως  ούΒενα  των  -πολιτών  άπο~ 
θνήσκειν  και  κρίσεο)ς  εν  Βικαστηρίω  γενομένης 
6  μεν  Αυσίμαχος  άτίεφυγεν,  και  επωνυμίαν  εσχεν  6 
άπο  του  τνπάνου•  6  Βε  Βημος  άφείλετο  της  βουλη^^ 
το  θανατοΰν  και  Βεΐν  και  χρημασι  ζημιοΰν,  καΐ 
νόμον  εθετο,  αν  τίνος  άΒικεΐν  η  βουλή  καταγνώ  η 
ζημιώση,  τάς  καταγνώσεις  καΐ  τάς  επιζημιώσεις 
είσάγειν  τους  θεσμοθετας  εις  το  Βικαστηριον, 
και  ο  τι  αν  οΐ  Βικασταΐ  φηφίσοηηαι  τοΰτο  κύριον 
είναι. 

2  KptVet  δε  τάς  αρχάς  η  βουλή  τάς  πλείστας,  καΐ 
μάλισθ*  οσαι  χρήματα  Βιαχειρίζουσιν  ου  κυρία,  δ' 
η  κρίσις  αλλ'  εφεσιμος  εις  το  Βικαστηριον.  εζεστι 
Βε  και  τοις  ΙΒιώταις  εΙσαγγέλΧειν  ην  άν  βούλωνται 

^  edd. :  δ€καίδ€καρχαΐ[>(σια$  (dittographia)  cod. 
^  Αυσίμαχον  δ'  Papageorgios  :  και\νσψαχον  codex.  - 

126 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  xliv.  3— xlv.  2 

r.m'ot  become  Head  more  than  once  a  year,  but  he 
ii  be  Chairman  once  in  each  presidency. 
They    also   conduct    elections    of   Generals,    and  4 
Lvalry  Commanders  and  the  other  military  officers 
Lhe  Assembl}',  in  Avhatever  manner  seems  good  to 
People  ;  and  these  elections  arc  held  by  the  first 
i.-d  of  Presidents,  after   the  sixth  Presidency,"  in 
.  term  of  office  favourable  Mcatl)er-omens  may  . 
r.     These   matters    also   require   a  preliminary 
vuutiou  of  the  Council. 

XLV.  The  Council  formerly  had  sovereign  power  1 
!">ftss  sentences  of  fine,  imprisonment  and  death. 
. , .-,  it -once  it  had  brought  L3'simachus  to  the  public 
'••'ieriuirAUtioner,  Mhen,  as  he  already  sat  awaiting  death, 
.  i;lic:jii^lides  of  the  dcme  Alopece  rescued  him,  saying 
\  ^that^io  citizen  ought  to  die  without  sentence  by  a 
t't  •*3 UE}•' i    and  when  a  trial  Avas  held  in  a  jury-court 
'r  ;  iJTsijjiachus  s:ot  off,  and  he  "fot  the  nickna)ne  of  '  the 
ί'  ,nr~afrom  the  drum-stick  '  ^  ;  and  the  People  deprived 
•- 'tli/'.  Council  of  the  power  to  sentence  to  death  and 
-onment  and  to  impose  fines,  and  made  «i  law 
ill  verdicts  of  guilty  and  penalties  passed  by  the— 
ruicil  must  be  brought  before  the  jury-court  by  the  κ 
"'  lators,  and  that  any  vote  of  the  jurjanen  should 
.  ereign. 

Is  of  officials  are  held  in  most  cases  by  the  2 
•il,  particularly  those  of  the  officials  who  handle 
;  but  the  verdict  of  the  Council  is  not  sovereign,  : 
iibject  to    apjjeal    to    the  jurj^-cciurt.    Private 
^s  also  liave  the  right  to  lay  an  information 

.  the  Prosidcnts  holding  tlie  seventh  or  a  later  term 

c,  see  xliii.  2.     Rain,  thunder,  etc.,  were  bad  omens, 

■e  regulation  liad  a  practical  value  for- the  ojien-air 

ί  iii^-s  in  the  Pnyx. 

'  V.-'.the  man  who  escaped  the  bastinado. 


I 


ARISTOILE 

των  άρχώΐ'  μη  χρησθαι  τοις  νόμοις•  €φεσις  ?,έ  ι  , 
τούτοι,ς    εστίν    etV    το    Βίκαστηριον    εάν    αντοη•  \  V 
βουλί]  καταγνω. 

3  Αοκιμάζζΐ  δε  καΐ  τονς  βονλεντάς  τονς  τον  νσΐίη 
evLai'Tov   βονλευσοντας    και    τονς    -eiWa    αργό:-  •. 
καί  τιροτερον  μεν  -ην  αττοοοκιμασαι   κνρια,   νν. 
τούτοις^   εφεσις   εστίν   εις  το   Βικαστ-ήριηΐ'  _      :, 

4  Τουτωΐ'    μεν    ονν    ακυρός    εστίν    -η    βονΧη,    ττρο- 
βονΧεύει  δ'  εΙς  τον  S-ημον,  καΐ  ουκ  £^€στί.ν  ovuh- 
απροβουλευτον   ούΒ*   6  τι   αν   μ-η   ττρογράφωσίν'  Όί 
πρυτάνεις    φηφισασθαί   τω    S-ημcρ'    κατ^ .  αυτά   '. 
ταΰτα  ένοχος  εστίν  6  νίκησας  γραφτ)  ηαραΐ'όμ    ~•. 

1  XLVI.  Έιπιμελεΐται  he  καΐ  τών  ττειτοιημεΜύν 
τριηρών  και  των  σκευών  καΐ  των  νεωσοίκων,::•καί 
ποιείται  καινάς^  τριήρεις  η  τετρηρεις,  όποτζρ'Χς 
αν  ο  8ημος  χειροτόνηση,  και  σκευή  ταύτα.ις-  ;κό} 
νεϋίσοικονς'  χειροτονεί  δ  αρχιτέκτονας  ο  8ήι.  Ος 
εττι  τας  ναΰς.  αν  δε  μη  τταρα^ώσιν  εζειργασμίι'α 
ταΰτα  τη  νεα  βουλή,  την  8ωρεάν  ουκ  εστίν  ά,ντοΐς 
λαβείν  εττι  γαρ  της  ύστερον  βουλής  λαμβανήνσίν'., 
ττοιεΐται    δε    τάς   τριήρεις,    δέκα    άνΒρας    εζ    QxrcY}< 

2  ελομενη  τριηροποιοΰς.  εζετάζει  δε  και  τα  ηίικσ- 
Βομηματα,  τά  δϊ^/Μοσια  ττάντα,  καν  τις  ά^ικεΐν'.αντ'^ί 
^όζη  τω  τε  8ημω  τούτον  άττοφαινει  και  καταγνρ^ου, 
τταραδιδωσί   δικαστήριο).  -.. 

1      XLVII.  ΣιυνΒιοικεΐ    δε    καΐ    ταΐς    άλλαι?    ά/0Τ(.ιί 

τά    πλείστα.       πρώτον     μεν     γαρ    οι    ταμιαό,'τη 

Αθηνάς   εισι   μεν   Βεκα,   κληροϋται   δ     εις   εκ-,-ττ.- 

φυλης,  εκ  πεντακοσιομεΒίμνων  κατά  τον  Σόλωίτ 

\  <καί>  Toi'rots  Wilamowitz-Kaibcl.  ":; 

^  Kaifas  Kenyon  :  K-atvasSe  cod.-  ;: 

*-καταγί'0!'τοϊ  Wilamowitz-Kaibel-  ■"- 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  xr.v.  2-χιλ'π.  1 

Γ  illegal  piOccdure  against  any  official  they  may  wish; 
oat  in  these  cases  also  there  is  an  appeal  to  the  reo])le 
/  if  the  Council  passes  a  verdict  of  guilty. 
ί        The  Council  also  checks  the  qualifications  of  the  3 
I     Councillors  v.ho  are  to  hold  office  for  the  folhnving 

Lyear,  and  of  the  Nine  Archons.    And  formerly  it  iiad 
sovereign  power  to  reject  them  as  disqualified,  but 
"how  they  have  an  appeal  to  the  jury-court. 
ί         In   these   matters   therefore   the    Council   is    not  4 
k  ■  sovereign,  but  it  prepares  resolutions  for  the  People, 
:^     and  the  People  cannot  pass  any  measures  that  have 
I  _not  been  prepared  by  the  Council  and  published  in 
';_     writing  in  advance  by  the  Presidents  ;   for  the  pro- 
ί     poser  Λνΐιο  carries  such  a  measure  is  ipso  facto  liable 
%     to  penalty  by  indictment  for  illegal  procedure. 
i         XL\  I.  The   Council   also   inspects   triremes   after  1 
^     construction,  and  their  rigging,  and  the  naval  sheds, 
.•     and  has  new  triremes  or  quadriremes,  Avhichever  the 
'^'"Peojilc"  votes  for,  built  and  rigged,  and  naval  sheds 
built  ;  but  navaljirqhitccts  are  clected.by  the  People. 
«,    If  the  outgoing  Council  does  not  hand  over  these 
works  completed  to  the  new  Couiicil,  the  members 
cannot  draw  their  lionorarium,  Mhich  is  payable  Λvhen 
the  next  Council  is  in  office.     For  the  building  of 
\   triremes  it  elects  ten  of  its  own  members  as  Naval 
Constructors.     It  also  inspects  all  public  buildings,  ο 
and  if  it  finds  any  commissioner  in  default  it  rej)orts 
Jiim  to  tlie  People,  and  if  it  gets  a  verdict  of  guilty 
liands  hira  over  to  a  jury-court. 

XLVII.  The  Council  also  shares  in  the  administra- 
tion of  the  other  offices  in  most  affairs.  First  there 
are  the  ten  Treasurers  of  Athena,  elected  one  from 
a  tribe  by  lot,  from  the  Five-hundred-bushel  class, 
according  to  tlie  law  of  Solon  (>vhich  is  still  in  force), 


i 


ARISTOTLIi 

νόμον  (ert  γαρ  6  νόμος  KvpLos  cotlv),  αρχζί  δ'  ό 
λαχων  καν  ττάνυ  Tievr^s  fj.  τταραλαμβάνουσί  δε  τό 
re  αγαλ/χα  rijs  *  Αθηνάς  καΐ  τάς  Νίκας  καΐ  τον 
άλλον  κόσμον  καΐ  τά  χρήματα  εναντίον  της 
βουλής. 

2  "ΈιπίΐΘ*  οί  ττωλι^ταΐ  ι  μίν  elai,  κληροΰται  δ'  €Ϊς 
e/c  της  φυλής,  μισθονσι  Se  τά  μισθώματα  ττάντο 
καΐ  τά  μέταλλα  τίίϋλ,ονσι  καΐ  τά  τέλη  μ€τά  τον 
ταμίου  των  στρατιωτικών  καΐ  τών  Ιττι  το  θβωρικον 
γιρημάνων  ivainriw  της  βουλής,  και  κυροΰσιν  οτω 
αν  η  βονλη  χειροτόνηση ,  και  τά  irpaOevra  μέταλλα 
τά  τ*  εργάσιμα^  τά  εις  τρία  ετη  ττεπρο^μενα  και  τά 
συγκεχοίρημενα  το.  ζΐς  .  .  .'  ετη  ττεττραμενα.  και  τας 
ουσίας  τών  εζ  *  Αρείου  ττάγου  φευγόντων  και  τών 
άλλων  εναντίον  της  βουλής  ττωλοΰσιν,  κατακυρονσι 
δ'  οΐ  Ο'  άρχοντες,  καΐ  τά  τέλη  τά  εις  ενιαντον 
πεπραμενα  άναγράφαντες  εις  λελευκωμενα  γραμ_- 
ματεΐα  τόν  τε  ηριάμενον  και  οσου^  αν  ττρϊηται  τη 

3  βουλή  7ταραΒι8όασιν.  άναγράφουσιν  Βε  χωρίς  μεν 
ους  Bel  κατά  ττρυτανείαν  εκάστην  καταβαλλειν  εις 
Βεκα  γραμματεία,  χο)ρ\ς  Β  ους  τρις  του  ενιαντον, 
γραμματεΐον  κατά  την  καταβολην  εκάστην  τγοιύ^- 
σαντες,  χωρίς  Β'  ους  εττι  της  ενάτης  ττρντανείας. 
άναγράφουσι  Βε  και  τά  χωρία  καΐ  τάς  οικίας 
τάττογραφίέντα  καΐ  ττραθεντα  εν  τω  Βικαστηρίω- 
και  γάρ  τανθ^  οΰτοι  ττωλοΰσιν.  εστί  Be  τών  μςν 
οικιών  εν  ε'  ετεσιν  ανάγκη   την  τι^τ^'''  άποΒονναι, 

'  τά  τ'  <apya,  και  τά>  ΐρ-γάσιμα  Sandys. 

*  numcrum  rasum  alii  ι',  alii  y  legunt. 

^  erasum  supplevit  Wilamowitz. 

"  Golden  figures,  tept  in  the  Parthenon;  probably  there 
130 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  xlvii.  1-3 

and  the  one  on  whom  the  lot  falls  holds  office  even 
though  he  is  quite  a  poor  man.  They  take  over  the 
custody  of  the  statue  of  Athena  and  the  Victories" 
and  the  other  monuments  and  the  funds  in  the 
presence  of  the  Council. 

Then  there  are  the  ten  Vendors,  elected  by  lot  2 

one  from  a  tribe.    They  farm  out  all  public  contracts 

and  sell  the  mines  and  the  taxes,  with  the  co-operation 

of  the  Treasurer  of  Military  Funds  and  those  elected  to 

superintend  the  Spectacle  Fund,  in  the  presence  of 

.  the  Council,  and  ratify  the  purchase  for  the  person 

I  for  whom  the  Council  votes,  and  the  mines  sold  and 

the  workings  that  have  been  sold  for  three  years  and 

the  concessions  sold  for  .  .  .^  years.    And  the  estates 

of  persons  banished  by  the  Areopagus  and  of  the 

ί  others  they  sell  at  a  meeting  of  the  Council,  but  the 

;  sale  is  ratified  by  the  Nine  Archons.    And  they  draw 

.  up    and   furnish   to   the   Council   a   list   written   on 

whitened  tablets  "  of  the  taxes  sold  for  a  year,  showing 

ί  the  purchaser  and  the  price  that  he  is  paying.     And  3 

;  they  draw  up  ten  separate  lists  of  those  who  have  to 

]  pay  in  each  presidency,  and  separate  lists  of  those 

j  who  have  to  pay  three  times  in  the  year,  making  a 

I  list  for  each  date  of  payment,  and  a  separate  list  of 

i  those  who  have  to  pay  in  the  ninth  presidency.    They 

I  also  draw  up  a  list  of  the  farms  and  houses  written 

'  off  **  and  sold  in  the  jury-court ;  for  these  sales  are  also 

:  conducted  by  these  officials.    Payment  must  be  made 

for  purchases  of  houses  within  five  years,  and  for 

had   been   ten,   but  eight  were   melted  down   for  coinage 
towards  the  end  of  the  Peloponnesian  War. 
J       "  The  ilumber  half  erased  may  be  10  or  3. 

•^  Wooden  boards  coated  with  chalk,  on  which  notices  were 
i  scratched;  they  could  be  easily  rubbed  oiF,  c/.  xlviii.  1. 
•*  i.e.  registered  as  confiscated. 

131 


ARISTOTLE 

των  δε  χωρίων  iv  8e/ca•   καταβάλλουσιν  8e  ταύτα 

4  €πΙ  της  ενάτης  πρυτανείας.  εΙσφερει  δε  και  ο 
βασιλεύς•  τα?  μισθώσεις  των  τέμνων  αναγραφας 
iv  γραμματείοις  λελενκωμενοις.  εστί  8ε  και  τού- 
των ή  μεν  μίσθωσις  εις  ετη  δέκα,  καταβάλλεται 
δ'    επί   της    θ'    πρυτανείας•   διό    καΐ    πλείστα    χρη- 

5  ματα  επί  ταύτης  συλλεγεταί  της  πρυτανείας,  εισ- 
φέρεται μεν  οΰν  εις  την  βουλην  τά  γραμματεία 
κατά  τάς  καταβολάς  άναγεγ ραμμένα,  τηρεί  δ  ό 
δημόσιος'  όταν  δ'  fj  χρημάτων  καταβολή,  παρα- 
δι'δωσι  τοις  άπο^εκταις  αυτά  ταύτα  καθελών  απο 
των  επιστυλίων  ων  εν  ταυττ7  τη  ημέρα  hεΐ  τα 
χρήματα  καταβληθηναι  καΐ  άπαλειφθηναι,  τά  δ 
άλλα  απόκειται  χωρίς  Ινα  μη  προεξαλειφθη. 

1  XLVIII.  Εισι  δ'  άπο^έκται  8έκα  κεκληρωμένοι 
κατά  φυλάς'  ούτοι  δε  παραλαβόντες  τα  γραμματεία 
άπαλείφουσι  τά  καταβαλλόμενα  χρήματα  εναντίον 
της  βουλής  εν  τω  βουλευτήρια)  και  πάλιν  απο- 
διδόασιι^  τά  γραμματεία  τω  8ημοσίω  •  καν  τι?  ελλίπη 
καταβολην,  ενταΰθ^  εγγέγραπται,  και  διττλασιαν  , 
ανάγκη  το  ελλειφθεν  καταβάλλειν  η  ^εΒεσθαΐ'  Ι 
και  ταΰτα   είσπράττειν  η   βουλή   και   δησαι   κυρία 

2  κατά  τους  νόμους  εστίν,  τη  μεν  ούν  προτεραία 
δέχονται  τάς  καταβολάς^  και  μερίζουσι  ταΓ?  αρχαΐς, 
τ^δ'  ύστεραία  τόν  τε  μερισμόν  είσφέρουσι  γράφαντες 
εν  σανίδι  και  καταλεγουσιν  εν  τω  βουλευτήρια), 
και  προτιθέασιν  εν  τη  βουλή  ει  τις  τίνα  οώεν 
άΒικοΰντα  περί  τόν  μερισμόν  η  άρχοντα  η  ώιώτην, 
και  γνώμας  επιφηφίζουσιν  εάν  τις  τι  ^οκη  α^ικεΐν. 

1  τάί  καταβολάί  (vel  ras  waaas)  Kaibel:  τα s  cod. 

182 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  xlvii.  3— xlviii.  2 

farms  within  ten  ;  and  they  make  these  payments  in 
the  ninth  presidency.  Also  the  King-archon  intro-  4 
duces  the  letting  of  domains,  having  made  a  list  of 
them  on  whitened  tablets.  These  also  are  let  for  ten 
years,  and  the  rent  is  paid  in  the  ninth  presidency ; 
hence  in  that  presidency  a  very  large  revenue  comes 
in.  The  tablets  written  up  with  the  list  of  pay-  δ 
ments  are  brought  before  the  Council,  but  are  in  the 
keeping  of  the  official  clerk  ;  and  whenever  a  payment 
of  money  is  made,  he  takes  down  from  the  pillars 
and  hands  over  to  the  receivers  just  these  tablets 
showing  the  persons  Λvhose  money  is  to  be  paid  on 
that  day  and  wiped  oif  the  record,  but  the  other 
tablets  are  stored  away  separately  in  order  that  they 
may  not  be  wiped  off  before  payment  is  made. 

XLVIII.  There  are  ten  Receivers  elected  by  lot,  1 
one  from  each  tribe  ;  these  take  over  the  tablets  and 
wipe  off"  the  sums  paid  in  the  presence  of  the  Council 
in  the  Council-chamber,  and  give  the  tablets  back 
again  to  the  official  clerk  ;  and  anybody  that  has 
defaulted  in  a  payment  is  entered  on  them,  and  has 
to  pay  double  the  amount  of  his  arrears  or  go  to 
prison  ;  and  the  legal  authority  to  impose  this  fine 
and  imprisonment  is  the  Council.  On  the  first  day,  2 
therefore,  they  receive  the  payments  and  apportion 
them  among  the  magistrates,  and  on  the  second  day 
they  introduce  the  apportionment,  written  on  a  wooden 
tablet,  and  recount  it  in  the  Council-chamber,  and 
bring  forward  in  the  Council  any  case  in  which  some- 
body knows  of  anyone,  either  an  official  or  a  private 
person,  having  committed  a  wrong  in  relation  to  the 
apportionment,  and  put  resolutions  to  the  vote  in  case 
anyone  is  found  to  have  committed  any  wrong. 

"  See  xlvii.  2  n. 

133 


ARISTOTLE 

3  Κληροΰσί  he  καΐ  λογιστας  i^  αυτών  οι  βονλζυταΐ 
θ€κα    τους    ΧογιουμΙνους    τοις    άρχαΐς    κατά    την 

4  ττρντανβιαν  βκάστην.  κληροΰσί  he  καΐ  (ύθύνους, 
eva  της  φυλής  ίκάστης,  και  irapehpovg  β'  €κάστω 
των  ζύθύνων,  οΐς  άναγκαΐόν  εστί  ταΓ?  άγοραΐς^ 
κατά  τον  e^τώvυμov  τον  της  φυλής  έκαστης 
καθησθαι,  καν  τι?  βουληταί  τινι  των  τάς  €ύθυνας 
ev  τω  hικaστηpίω  hehωκότωv  €ντ6ς  y'  ημερών 
αφ  ης  ehωκe  τάς  εύθύνας  εϋθυναν  αν  τ'  ιδίαν  αν  re 
hημoσίav  e/xj3aAeCT^ai,  γράφας  ei?  ττινάκιον  λελευκω- 
μενον  τούνομα  το  θ  αύτοΰ  και  το  του  φει'γοντος 
και  το  α8ικημ  6  τι  αν  Ιγκαλη,  και  τίμημα  έπιγρα- 
φαμενος  δ  τι  άν  αύτώ  hoKrj,  hίhωσιv  τω  εύθυνω• 

5  ο  he  λαβών  τοϋτο  και  άναγνούς,  eav^  καταγνώ 
τταραδιδωσιν  τα  μέν  ί'δια  τοις  hικaστaΐς  τοις  κατά 
hημoυς  τοις  την  φυλην  ταύτην  €ΐσάγονσιν,^  τά 
he  hημόσιa  τοις  θεσμοθ4ταις  επιγράφει.  οι  he 
θεσμοθεται  eav  παραλάβωσιν  πάλιν  εισάγουσιν 
ταυτην  την*  εΰθυναν  εις  το  8ικαστηριον,  και  ο  τι 
αν  γνώσιν  οι  hικaστaι  τοϋτο  κύριόν  εστίν. 

1  XLIX.  Αοκιμάζει  he  και  τους  ίππους  η  βουλή, 
καν  μεν  τις  καλόν  ΐππον  έχων  κακώς  hoKrj 
τρεφειν,  ζημιοΐ  τω  σίτω,  τοις  hε  μη  hυvaμevoις 
ακολουθεΐν  η  μη  θελουσι  μενειν  αλλ'  άνάγουσι^^ 
τροχον  επι  την  γνάθον  επιβάλλει,  και  ο  τοϋτο* 
παθών    άhόκιμός    εστί.       hoκιμάζ€l    he    και    τους 

^  Kenyon,  sed  γ  incertuin,  op  desunt. 

^  eav  Herwerden :  eav^tv  cod. 

^  δίκάζονσιν  Richards. 

*  ταύτην  ante  την  supplet  Blass. 

^  άλ,ν  άνά-γουσί  Blass,  sed  incertum :  άλλ'  avay<.wyoisy  oDol 
('  unbroken ')  Wyse. 

'  -γνάθον  .  .  .  TovTo  Blass  (et  partim  alii) :  -γναθ  .  .  .  ουτο  cod. 
134. 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  xlviii.  3— xlix.  1 

The  Council  also  elect  by  lot  ten  of  their  own  body  3 
as  Accountants,  to  keep  the  accounts  of  the  officials 
for  each  presidency.  Also  they  elect  by  lot  Auditors,  4 
one  for  each  tribe,  and  two  Assessors  for  each  Auditor, 
who  are  required  to  sit  at  the  tribal  meetings  accord- 
ing to  the  hero  after  Avhom  each  tribe  is  named," 
and  if  anyone  wishes  to  prefer  a  charge,  of  either  a 
private  or  a  public  nature,  against  any  magistrate 
who  has  rendered  his  accounts  before  the  jury- 
court,  within  three  days  from  the  day  on  which  he 
rendered  his  accounts,  he  writes  on  a  tablet  his 
own  name  and  that  of  the  defendant,  and  the 
offence  of  which  he  accuses  him,  adding  whatever 
fine  he  thinks  suitable,  and  gives  it  to  the  Auditor  ; 
and  the  Auditor  takes  it  and  reads  it,  and  if  he  con-  5 
siders  the  charge  proved,  he  hands  it  over,  if  a  private 
case,  to  those  jurymen  in  the  villages  who  introduced 
this  tribe,  and  if  a  public  suit,  he  marks  it  to  the 
Legislators.  And  the  Legislators,  if  they  receive  it, 
introduce  this  audit  again  before  the  jury-court,  and 
the  verdict  of  the  jurymen  holds  good. 

XLIX.  The  Council  also  inspects  the  Knights'  1 
chargers,  and  if  anybody  having  a  good  horse  keeps  it 
in  bad  condition,  it  fines  him  the  cost  of  the  feed,  and 
horses  that  cannot  keep  up  with  the  squadron  or 
will  not  stay  in  line  but  jib  it  brands  on  the  jaw 
with  the  sign  of  a  wheel,  and  a  horse  so  treated 
has  failed  to  pass  the  inspection.    It  also  inspects 

"  i.e.  one  Auditor  and  two  Assessors  are  assigned  to  each 
tribe,  the  assignment  being  indicated  by  the  name  of  the 
hero  after  whom  the  tribe  was  named.     See  liii.  5  n. 

135 


ARISTOTLE 

προΒρόμονς  όσοι  αν  avrfj  ^οκώσιν  €7ητη8βιοι  προ- 
8ρομ€ύ€ίν  elvai,  καν  rtv*  άποχβίροτονηστ],  κατα- 
βββηκβν  ούτος.  8οκίμάζ€ί  δε  και  τους  άμιππους, 
καν    τίνα    άποχαροτονηστ] ,    ττάτταυται    μισθοφόρων 

2  οντος.  τους  δ'  ιππέα?  καταλζγουσιν  οι  καταλογβΐς , 
ους  αν  6  Βημος  χβιροτονηστ]  δέκα  άνδρα?*  ους  ο 
αν  καταλξζωσι  παραδιδοασι  τοις  ιππαρχοις  και 
φυλάρχοις,  ούτοι  δε  παραλαβόντ€ς  ^ισφ4ρονσι  τον 
κατάλογον  €ΐς  την  βονλην  και  τον  ττίνακα  αν- 
οίζαντ€ς  iv  ω  κτατασεστ^/χασ/χεί'α  τα  ονόματα  των 
ιππέων  εστί,  τους  μβν  €^ομνυμ€νους  των  ττροτ€ρον 
ζγγβγραμμβνων  μη  δυνατούς  είναι  τοι?  σώ/χασιν 
ίππευειν  ε'^αλειc^oυσt,  τους  δε  κατειλεγ/χε'νου? 
καλοΰσι,  καν  /χε'ν  τι?  βζομόσηται  μη  δυνασθαι  τω 
σώματι  ίππευειν  η  τη  ουσία  τούτον  αφιασιν,  τον 
δε  μη  βζομνυμβνον  Βιαχβιροτονοΰσιν  οΐ  βουΑ^υται 
ττότβρον  επιττ^δειό?  εστίν  ιππευειν  η  ου'  καν  μ€ν 
χ€ΐροτονησωσιν ,  βγγραφουσιν  ει?  τον  πίνακα,  ει 
δε  μή,  και  τούτον  ά</>ιασιν. 

3  "Εκρινεν  δε'  ποτέ  και  τα  τταρα^ζίγματα  και^  τον 
ττάττΧον  η  βουλή,  νυν  δε  το  Βικαστηριον  το  λαχόν 
€8όκουν  γαρ  ούτοι  καταχαρίζίσθαι  την  κρίσιν, 
και  της  ποιησ^ως  των  Νικών  και  των  άθλων  των 
€ΐς  τα  Πανα^τ^ναια  συνεπι/χελειται  /χετά  του  ταμίου 
των  στρατιωτικών. 

4  Αοκιμάζ€ΐ  δε  και  του?  άδι^νάτου?  η  βουλή• 
νόμος  γάρ  εστίν  ος  κελεύει  τους  εντό?  τριών  μνών 
Κ€κτημ€νους    και    το    σώμα    ττ€ττη  ρω  μένους    ωστ€ 

^  καΐ]  τα  it's  coniecit  Blass. 

"  Woven  for  Athena  at  every  Panathenaic  Festival  and 
carried  in  the  procession. 
136 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  xlix.  1-4 

the  mounted  skirmishers,  to  see  which  it  considers 
fit  for  skirmishing  duty,  and  any  that  it  votes  to 
reject  are  thereby  deposed  from  that  rank.  It 
also  inspects  the,  foot-soldiers  that  fight  in  the 
ranks  of  the  cavalry,  and  anyone  it  votes  against  is 
thereby  stopped  from  drawing  his  pay.  The  Knights'  2 
roll  is  made  by  the  ten  Roll-keepers  elected  by  the 
People  ;  and  they  pass  on  the  names  of  all  whom 
they  enroll  to  the  Cavalry  Commanders  and  Tribe 
Commanders,  and  these  take  over  the  roll  and  bring 
it  into  the  Council,  and  opening  the  tablet  on  which 
the  names  of  the  Knights  have  been  inscribed,  they 
delete  those  among  the  persons  previously  entered 
who  claim  on  oath  exemption  from  cavalry  service 
on  the  ground  of  bodily  incapacity,  and  summon 
those  enrolled,  and  grant  discharge  to  anyone  who 
claims  exemption  on  oath  on  the  ground  of  bodily 
incapacity  for  cavalry  service  or  lack  of  means, 
and  as  to  those  who  do  not  claim  exemption  the 
Councillors  decide  by  vote  whether  they  are  fit  for 
cavalry  service  or  not  ;  and  if  they  vote  for  them  as 
fit  they  enter  them  on  the  tablet,  but  if  not,  these 
also  they  dismiss. 

At  one  time  the  Council  used  also  to  judge  the  3 
patterns  for  the  Robe,"  but  now  this  is  done  by  the 
jury-court  selected  by  lot,  because  the  Council  was 
thought  to  show  favouritism  in  its  decision.  And  the 
Council  has  joint  supervision  with  the  Steward  of  the 
Army  Funds  over  the  construction  of  the  Victories 
and  over  the  prizes  for  the  Panathenaic  Games. 

The    Council    also   inspects    the    Incapables  ;     for  4 
there  is  a  law  enacting  that  persons  possessing  less 
than  3  minae  *  and  incapacitated  by  bodily  infirmity 

*  See  iv.  4  n. 

137 


ARISTOTLE 

μη  δυνασ^αι  μη^βι^  epyov  €ργάζ€σθαί  8οκίμάζ€ΐν 
jxev  TTjv  βουλην,  διδόναι  δε  Βημοσία  τροφην  δυο 
οβολονς  ίκάστω  της  ημέρας,  καΐ  τα/χια;?  iarlv 
αύτοΐς  κληρωτός. 

Συΐ'διοικεΓ  δε  /cat  ταΐς  άλλαις  άρχαΐς  τα  TrXeCaO* 
ως  έτΓΟ?   eLTTelv. 

1  L.  Τα  μ€ν  οΰν  υπό  της  βουλής  8ιοικουμ€να 
ταΰτ  €στίν.  κληροΰνται  δβ  /cat  Ιερών  βτησκευα- 
σται  δe/cα  άν8ρ€ς,  οΐ  λαμβάνοντες  τριάκοντα  μνας 
τταρα  των  airoheKTchv  Ιπισκενάζονσιν  τα  /χάλιστα 

2  ^εόμενα  των  Ιερών,  /cat  αστυνόμοι  δe/cα•  τούτων 
he  e  μεν  άρχουσιν  εν  Fletpatet  πέντε  δ'  εν  άστει, 
και  τάς  τε  αύλητρβας  /cat  τα?  φαλτρίας  /cat  τάς 
κιθαρίστριας  ούτοι  σκοποΰσιν  δπως  μη  πλείονος 
η  Βυεΐν  Βραχμαΐς  μισθωθησονται,  καν  πλείους  την 
αύτην  σπου^άσωσι  λαβείν  οΰτοι  8ιακληροΰσι  και 
τώ  λαχόντι  μισθοΰσιν .  και  δπως  τών  κοπρολόγων 
μηΒεις  εντός  ι'  σταδίων  του  τείχους  καταβαλεΐ 
κόπρον  επιμελούνται,  και  τάς  ό^ούς  κωλύουσι 
κατοικο8ομεΐν  και  Βρυφάκτους  ΰπερ  τών  οδών 
ύπερτείνειν  και  οχετούς  μετεώρους  εις  την  ό8ον 
εκρουν  έχοντας  ποιεΐν  και  τάς  θυρίδας  εις  την 
oSov  άνοίγειν  και  τους  εν  ταί?  όδοΓ?  άπογιγνο- 
μενους  άναιροΰσιν,  έχοντες  δημοσίους  ύπηρετας. 

1  LI.  Ιίληροΰνται  Βέ  και  άγορανόμοι  t'/  πέντε 
μεν  εΙς  Iletpatea,  e'  δ'  εις  άστυ.  τούτοις  δε  ύπό 
τών  νόμων  προστετακται  τών  ώνίων  €7Γΐ]υ.ελ€Γσσαι 
πάντων,  όπως  καθαρά  και  άκίβ^ηλα  πωληται. 

2  Υ^ληροΰνται  δε  και  μετρονόμοι  t'/  πέντε  μεν 
εις  άστυ,  ε'  δε  εις  ΥΙειραιεα•  και  οΰτοι  τών  μέτρων 

^  numerum  ι'  bis  supplevit  Papageorgios. 
138 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  xlix.  4— li.  2 

from  doing  any  work  are  to  be  inspected  by  the  Council, 
which  is  to  give  them  a  grant  for  food  at  the  pubUc 
expense  at  the  rate  of  2  obols*^  a  day  each.  And 
there  is  a  Treasurer  for  these  persons,  elected  by  lot. 

The  Council  also  shares  in  the  administration  of 
virtually  the  greatest  number  of  the  duties  of  the 
other  offices. 

L.  These  then  are  the  matters  administered  by  the  1 
Council.  Also  ten  men  are  elected  by  lot  as  Restorers 
of  Temples,  who  draw  30  minae  ^  from  the  Receivers 
and  repair  the  temples  that  most  require  it  ;  and  ten 
City  Controllers,  five  of  whom  hold  office  in  Peiraeus  2 
and  five  in  the  city  ;  it  is  they  who  supervise  the  flute- 
girls  and  harp-girls  and  lyre-girls  to  prevent  their  re- 
ceiving fees  of  more  than  two  drachmas,*  and  if  several 
persons  want  to  take  the  same  girl  these  officials  cast 
lots  between  them  and  hire  her  out  to  the  winner. 
And  they  keep  watch  to  prevent  any  scavenger  from 
depositing  ordure  within  a  mile  and  a  quarter  of  the 
wall  ;  and  they  prevent  the  construction  of  buildings 
encroaching  on  and  balconies  overhanging  the  roads, 
of  overhead  conduits  with  an  overflow  into  the  road, 
and  of  windows  opening  outΛvard  on  to  the  road  ; 
and  they  remove  for  burial  the  bodies  of  persons 
who  die  on  the  roads,  having  public  slaves  for  this 
service. 

LI.  Also  Market-controllers  are  elected  by  lot,  five  1 
for  Peiraeus  and  five  for  the  city.    To  these  the  laws 
assign  the  superintendence  of  all  merchandise,  to 
prevent  the  sale  of  adulterated  and  spurious  articles. 

Also  ten  Controllers  of  Measures  are  appointed  by  2 
lot,  five  for  the  city  and  five  for  Peiraeus,  who  super- 


Say  threepence. 
*  See  iv.  4  n. 


139 


ARISTOTLE 

/cat  των  σταθμών   €7ημ,βλοννταί  πάντων,   δττως  οι 
ττωλονντ^ς  χρησωνται^  δίκαιοι?. 

3  ^Ησαν  3e  και  σίτοφνλακες  κληρωτοί  ι  /  π€ντ€ 
μβν  els  rieipaiea,  ττέντ€  δ'  els  άστυ,  νυν  δ  είκοσι 
μ^ν  els  άστυ,  ττεντεκαιδεκα  δ'  ei?  Ileipaiea. 
ούτοι  δ  eπtμeλoΰvτaL  ττρώτον  μev  οττω?  ο  ev 
άγορα  σίτο?  apyos"  ώνιο?  έ'σται  δικαιω?,  eTreiv 
oτΓωs  οΐ  Te  μνλωθροί  npos  tcls  τLμas  των  κριθών 
τα  αλφιτα  πωλήσονσιν  και  οί  άρτοττώλαι  προ?  τα? 
τίμάs  τών  πυρών  tovs  apTOVs,  καΐ  τον  σταθμον 
ayovTas  όσον  αν  ούτοι  τάζωσιν  ο  γαρ  νομο5 
toUtovs  KeXevei  ταττειν. 

4  ^Εμπορίου  δ'  eπιμeλητάs  δέκα  κληρονσιν  του'τοι? 
δε    προστέτακται   τών   τ'    εμπορίων    iπιμeλeΐσθaι, 
και   τον   σίτου   του   κaτaπλeovτos   ει?   το    σιτικον 
€.μπόριον  τα  δυο   μeprj  του?   ε/χττόρου?   άvaγκάζeιv 
els  το  άστυ  κoμLζeιv. 

1  LII.  Κα^ιστασι  δε  και  του?  ένδεκα  κληpωτoύs, 
επιμ€λησομ€νον5  τών  εν  τω  Β€σμωτηριω,  και  tovs 
άπaγoμevovs  κλε'τττα?  και  του?  άι^δραποδιστα?  και 
TOVS  λωπoSύτas  αν  μίν  όμολογώσι  θανάτω  ζημιω- 
σοντα?,  αν  δ'  άμφισβητώσιν  elσάζovτas  ει?  το 
Βικαστηριον,  καν  /χέν  άποφνγωσιν  άφήσovτas,  ει 
δε  μη  τότε  ^ανατώσοντα?,  και  τα  άπoγpaφόμeva 
χωρία  και  οικία?  εισά^οντα?  ει?  το  ^ικαστηριον 
και  τα  Βόζαντα  δτ^/χόσια  είναι  πapahώσovτas  τοΓ? 
πωλ•)7ταΓ?,  και  τα?  ε'νδει'^ει?  εισά^οντα? — και  ya/o 
ταύτα?  εtσάyoυσιv  οί  ένδεκα*  είσάyoυσι  δε  τών 
ενδείξεων  τίνα?  και  οι  θεσμοθΐται. 

1  χρή(Το;'ται  Rutherford. 

*  ι'  suppletum  ex  Harpocratione  a  Wilamowitz-Kaibel. 

*  ά.στικ6ν  vel  Άτταόι/  edd.  (v.ll.  ex  Harpocratione). 

140 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  li.  2— lii.  l 

intend  all  measures  and  weights,  in  order  that  sellers 
may  use  just  ones. 

Also  there  used  to  be  ten  Corn-wardens  elected  by  3 
lot,  five  for  Peiraeus  and  five  for  the  city,  but  now 
there  are  twenty  for  the  city  and  fifteen  for  Peiraeus. 
Their  duties  are  first  to  see  that  unground  corn  in 
the  market  is  on  sale  at  a  fair  price,  and  next  that 
millers  sell  barley-meal  at  a  price  corresponding  with 
that  of  barley,  and  baker-women  loaves  at  a  price 
corresponding  with  that  of  wheat,  and  weighing  the 
amount  fixed  by  the  officials — for  the  law  orders  that 
these  shall  fix  the  weights. 

They  elect  by  lot  ten  Port-superintendents,  whose  4 
duty  is  to  superintend  the  harbour-markets  and  to 
compel  the  traders  to  bring  to  the  city  tΛvo-thirds  of 
the  sea-borne  corn  that  reaches  the  corn-market. 

LII.  They  also  appoint  the  Eleven,  officers  chosen  1 
by  lot  to  superintend  the  persons  in  the  prison, 
and  to  punish  with  death  people  arrested  as  thieves 
and  kidnappers  and  footpads  that  confess  their  guilt, 
but  if  they  deny  the  charge  to  bring  them  before  the 
Jury-court,  and  if  they  are  acquitted  discharge  them, 
but  if  not  then  to  execute  them  ;  and  to  bring  before 
the  Jury-court  lists  of  farms  and  houses  declared  to 
be  public  property  and  to  hand  over  to  the  Vendors  " 
those  that  it  is  decided  to  confiscate  ;  and  to  bring 
in  informations — for  these  too  are  brought  in  by  the 
Eleven,  though  the  Legislators  also  bring  in  some 
informations. 

"  See  xlvii.  2. 

141 


ARISTOTLE 

2  Κληροΰσι  8e  και  ^ΙσαγωγΙας  e  dvSpag,  ot,  τα? 
€μμ'ήνους  ^Ισάγουσι  δικά?,  hvoiv  φνλαΐν  βκαστος. 
elai  δ'  έμμηνοι  προικός,  eav  τις  οφειλών  μη  άττοδω, 
καν  τις  inl  δραχμή  ^ανεισάμβνος  anoorepfj,  καν 
τι?  iv  αγορά  βονλόμενος  εργάζεσθαι  Βανεισηται 
τταρά  τίνος  άφορμην  έτι  δ  αΐκειας  και  ερανικας 
καΐ    κοίνωνι,κάς    και    άνδραττόδων    καΐ    υποζυγίων 

3  /cat  τριηραργίας  καΐ  τραπεζιτι,κάς}     ούτοι  μεν  ούν 
ταύτα?     οικαί,ουσιν     έμμηνους    εισαγοντες,     οι    ο 
άποΒεκται  τοις  τελώι^αις•   και  κατά  των  τελωνών, 
τα  μεν  μ^χρι   Βεκα   δραχμών   οντες   κύριοι,   τα   δ 
αλλ'  εΙς  το  8ικαστήριον  εισάγοντες  έμμηνα. 

1  LIII.  Κληροϋσι  δε  και^  τετταράκοντα,  τετταρας 
εκ  της  φνλης  εκάστης,  προς  ους  τάς  άλλα?  δικά? 
λαγχάνουσιν  οι  πρότερον  μεν  ήσαν  τριάκοντα  και 
κατά  δήμους  περιόντβς^  ε^ίκαζον,  μετά  Βε  την 
επι  των  τριάκοντα  όλιγαρχίαν  τετταράκοντα  γεγο- 

2  νασίΓ.  και  τά  μεν  μέχρι  Βεκα  8ραχμών  αυτοτελείς 
είσι  Βικάζειν,  τά  δ'  ύπερ  τοΰτο  το  τίμημα  τοις 
Βιαιτηταΐς  παρα^ώόασιν.  οΐ  Βέ  παραλαβοντες  εαν 
μη  δυι^ωνται  Βιαλΰσαι^^γιγνώσκουσι,  καν  μεν  αμ- 
φοτεροις  άρεσκη  τά  γνωσθεντα  και  εμμενωσιν, 
έχει  τέλος  η  Βίκη.  αν  δ'  6  έτερος  εφη  των  αντι- 
δίκων εΙς  το  Βικαστήριον,  εμβαλόντες  τα?  μαρ- 
τυρίας και  τάς  προκλήσεις  και  τους  νόμους  εις 
εχίνους,  χωρίς  μεν  τάς  του  Βιώκοντος  χωρίς  be 
τάς  του  φεύγοντας,  και  τούτους  κατασημηνάμενοι 

*  έρανικαι  .  .  .  κοινωνικαΐ  .  .  .  τραπε^ιτικαΐ  Bury. 

*  καΐ  <τοι>ϊ>  Wilamowitz-Kaibel. 

*  irepuovTes  Kenyon. 


ο  A  drachma  a  mina  a  month  =  12  per  cent  per  annum. 
"  i.e.  particularly  an  action  to  recover  expenses, brought 

142 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  lii.  2— liii.  2 

They  also  elect  by  lot  five  men  as  Introducers,  who  2 
introduce  the  cases  to  be  tried  within  a  month,  each 
official  those  of  two  tribes.  These  cases  include  prose- 
cutions for  non-payment  of  dowry  due,  actions  for  the 
recovery  of  loans  borrowed  at  a  drachma  interest,"* 
and  of  capital  borrowed  from  one  party  by  another 
wishing  to  do  business  in  the  market ;  and  also  actions 
about  outrage,  friendly-society  business,  partnerships, 
slaves,  draft  animals,  naval  command,*  and  bank  cases. 
These  officials,  therefore,  bring  into  court  and  decide  3 
these  suits  within  a  month  ;  but  the  Receivers  '^  decide 
suits  brought  by  tax-farmers  or  against  them,  having 
power  to  deal  summarily  with  suits  up  to  ten  francs 
but  bringing  the  others  into  the  Jury-court  within  a 
month. 

LIII.  They  also  elect  by  lot  forty  persons,'*  four  1 
from  each  tribe,  who  are  the  court  before  which  the 
other  suits  are  brought ;  formerly  they  were  thirty 
and  went  on  circuit  trying  cases  in  each  parish,  but 
since  the  oligarchy  of  the  Thirty  their  number  has 
been  raised  to  forty.  They  have  summary  jurisdiction  2 
in  claims  not  exceeding  ten  drachmas,  but  suits  above 
that  value  they  pass  on  to  the  Arbitrators.  These 
take  over  the  cases,  and  if  they  are  unable  to  effect  a 
compromise,  they  give  judgement,  and  if  both  parties 
are  satisfied  with  their  judgement  and  abide  by  it, 
that  ends  the  suit.  But  if  one  of  the  two  parties 
appeals  to  the  Jury-court,  they  put  the  witnesses' 
evidence  and  the  challenges  and  the  laws  concerned 
into  deed-boxes,  those  of  the  prosecutor  and  those 
of  the  defendant  separately,  and  seal  them  up,  and 
by  the  captain  of  a  trireme  against  his  successor  who  had 
failed  to  relieve  him  when  his  year  of  office  was  over. 

"^  See  xlviii.  1. 

<*  Perhaps  the  Greek  should  be  altered  to  give  '  the  Forty.' 

143 


ARISTOTLE 

/cat    την    γνώσιν    του    διαιττ^του    γζγραμμβνην    iv 
γραμματεία)  ττροσαρτ'ησαντζς ,  ττα/οαδιδόασι  τοις  8' 

3  τοις  την  φνλην  τον  φεύγοντας  δικάζουσιν.  οι  Se 
παραλαβόντες  είσάγουσιν  εις  το  ^ικαστηριον,  τα 
μεν  εντός  χιλίων  εις  ενα  και  Βιακοσίους,  τα  δ' 
ύπερ  χίλίας  εις  ενα  καΐ  τετρακόσιους,  ουκ  εζεστι 
δ'  οντε  νόμοίς  ούτε  ττροκλησεσι  ούτε  μαρτυρίαις 
αλλ'  η  ταΐς  παρά  του  Βίαιτητον  χρησθαι  ταΐς  εις 

4  τους  εχίνους  εμβεβλημεναις .  διαιττ^ται  δ'  είσΐν  οΐς 
αν  εζηκοστον  έτος  fj•  τοΰτο  δε  hijXov  εκ  των 
αρχόντων  και  των  επωνύμων  εισι  γαρ  επώνυμοι 
8εκα  μεν  οι  τών  φυλών,  δυο  δε  καΐ  τετταράκοντα 
οΐ  τών  ηλικιών  οι  δ'  έφηβοι  εγγραφόμενοι  πρό- 
τερον  μεν  εις  λελευκωμενα  γραμματεία  ενεγρά- 
φοντο,  και  επεγράφοντο  αύτοΐς  ο  τ'  άρχων  εφ'  ου 
ενεγράφησαν  και  6  επώνυμος  6  τω  προτερω^  ετει 
8ε^ιαιτηκώς,  νυν  δ'  εΙς  στηλην  χαλκην  αναγρά- 
φονται, και  ϊσταται  η  στήλη  προ  του  βουλευτήριου 

5  παρά  τους  επωνύμους.  τον  δε  τελευταΐον  τών 
επωνύμων  λαβόντες  οι  τετταράκοντα  Βιανεμουσιν 
αύτοΐς  τάς  δίαιτα?  και  επικληροΰσιν  άς  έκαστος 
διαιττ^σει•  και  άναγκαΐον  άς  αν  έκαστος  λάχη 
δίαιτα?  εκδιαιταν,  6  γαρ  νομός  άν  τις  μη  γενηται 
διαιτητής  της  ηλικίας  αύτώ  καθηκούσης  άτιμον 
είναι  κελεύει,  πλην  εάν  τύχη  άρχην  άρχων  τινά  εν 
εκείνω  τω  ενιαυτώ  η  αποΒημών  ούτοι  δ    ατελείς 

^  irpbrepov  edd.  hiatus  causa. 

»  Of  the  100  Attic  heroes  10  gave  their  names  to  the 
Tribes  (see  xxi.  (i),  and  of  the  remaining  90,  42  names  were 
affixed  to  the  successive  years  of  active  citizenship,  military 
service  being  from  the  age  of  18  to  59,  and  those  in  their 
60th  year  serving  as  diaetetae.  As  each  year  expired,  the 
144 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  liii.  2-5 

attach  to  them  a  copy  of  the  Arbitrator's  verdict 
written  on  a  tablet,  and  hand  them  over  to  the  four 
judges  taking  the  cases  of  the  defendant's  tribe. 
When  these  have  received  them  they  bring  them  before  3 
the  Jury-court,  claims  within  1000  drachmas  before 
a  court  of  two  hundred  and  one  jurymen,  and  claims 
above  that  before  one  of  four  hundred  and  one.  The 
litigants  are  not  permitted  to  put  in  laws  or  chal- 
lenges or  evidence  other  than  those  passed  on  by  the 
Arbitrator,  that  have  been  put  into  the  deed-boxes. 
Persons  fifty-nine  years  of  age  may  serve  as  Arbi-  4 
trators,  as  appears  from  the  regulations  for  the 
Archons  and  Name-heroes  ;  for  the  Heroes  giving 
their  names  to  the  Tribes  are  ten  in  number  and  those 
of  the  years  of  military  age  forty-two,"  and  the  cadets 
used  formerly  when  being  enrolled  to  be  inscribed 
on  whitened  tablets,  and  above  them  the  Archon  ^  in 
whose  term  of  office  they  were  enrolled  and  the 
Name-hero  of  those  that  had  been  Arbitrators  the 
year  before,  but  now  they  are  inscribed  on  a  copper 
pillar  and  this  is  set  up  in  front  of  the  Council-chamber 
at  the  side  of  the  list  of  Name-heroes.  The  Forty  5 
take  the  last  one  of  the  Name-heroes  and  distribute 
the  arbitration-cases  among  those  of  his  year  and 
assign  by  lot  the  cases  that  each  is  to  arbitrate  upon  ; 
and  it  is  compulsory  for  each  of  them  to  complete 
the  arbitration  of  the  cases  allotted  to  him,  for  the 
law  enacts  the  disfranchisement  of  anybody  who  does 
not  become  Arbitrator  when  of  the  proper  age,  unless 
he  happens  to  hold  some  office  in  that  year  or  to  be 
abroad,  these  being  the  only  grounds  of  exemption. 

Name-hero  of  the  men  now  passing  the  age  of  60  was  trans- 
ferred to  those  now  just  18. 

'>  i.e.  the  senior  of  the  Nine  Archons,  called   'Επώΐ'νμο$ 
because  his  name  dated  the  year. 

L  145 


ARISTOTLE 

6  €ΐσΙ  μόνοι,  εστίν  δε  καΙ  etVayyeAAetv  els  τους 
Βιαιτητάς^  εάν  τις  ά^ικηθΎ]  νττο  του  Βιαιτητοΰ,  καν 
τίνος  καταγνώσιν  άτιμοΰσθαι  κελεύουσιν  οι  νομοί' 

7  εφεσις  δ'  εστί  και  τούτοις.  χρώνται  δε  τοις 
βπωνυμοις  και  προς  τάς  στρατειας,  και  όταν 
ηλικίαν  εκπεμπωσι  προγράφουσιν  άττο  τίνος  άρχον- 
τος και  επωνύμου  μ^χρι  τίνων  δει  στρατεύεσθαι. 

1  LIV.  Κ.ληροΰσι  δε  και  τάσδε  τάς  αρχάς•  όδο- 
ττοιούς  ττεντε,  οΐς  ττροστετακται  δημοσίους  εργατας 

2  εχουσι  τάς  οδού?  εττισκευάζειν  και  λογιστάς  δε'κα 
και  συνηγόρους  τούτοις  δε'κα,  ττρος  ους  απαντάς 
ανάγκη  τους  τάς  αρχάς  άρζαντας  λόγον  άπενεγκεΐν. 
ούτοι  γάρ  είσιν  οί^  μόνοι  τοις  ύπευθύνοις  λογι- 
ζόμενοι και  τάς  εύθύνας  εις  το  Βικαστήριον  εισ- 
άγοντες.  καν  μεν  τίνα  κλεπτοντ  εζεΧεγζωσι, 
κλοπην  οι  οικασται  καταγινωσκουσι,  και  το 
γνωσθεν  άποτίνεται  8εκαπλοΰν•  εάν  8ε  τίνα  οώρα 
λαβόντα  επώειζωσιν  και  καταγνώσιν  οι  δικασται, 
Βώρων  τι/χώσιν,  άποτίνεται  δε  και  τοΰτο  οεκα- 
πλοΰν  αν  δ'  ά^ικεΐν  καταγνώσιν,  άΒικιου  τι/χώσιν, 
άποτίνεται  δε  τοϋθ*  άπλοΰν  εάν  προ  της  θ  πρυ- 
τανείας εκτείση  τι?,  ει  δε  μη,  Βιπλοΰται-  το  δε' 
Βεκαπλοΰν  ου  Βιπλοϋται. 

3  Κληροΰσι  δε  και  γραμματέα  τον  κατά  πρυτα- 
νείαν  καλούμενον,  δς  τών  γραμμάτων*  εστί  κύριος 
και  τά  ψηφίσματα  τά  γιγνόμενα  φυλάττει  και 
τάλλα  πάντα  αντιγράφεται  και  παρακάθηται  τη 
βουλή,    πρότερον  μεν  ουν  ούτος  ην  χειροτονητός, 

^  δικαστάί  Kenyon. 

»  €ΐσιν  οί  Jos.  Mayor :  eiai  cod.  ^  δέ  supplevit  Kenyon. 

*  ex  Harpocratione  edd. :  -γραμματίων  cod. 

"  Perhaps  διa^τητάs  is  a  mistake  for  δικαστάί,  'jurymen.' 
146 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  liii.  6— liv.  3 

Anybody  unjustly  dealt  with  by  the  Arbitrator  may  6 
indict  him  before  the  Arbitrators,*  and  the  laws 
prescribe  the  penalty  of  disfranchisement  for  an 
Arbitrator  found  guilty  ;  but  the  Arbitrators  also 
have  an  appeal.  The  Name-heroes  also  are  employed  7 
to  regulate  military  service  ;  when  soldiers  of  a 
certain  age  are  being  sent  on  an  expedition,  a  notice 
is  posted  stating  the  years  that  they  are  to  serve, 
indicated  by  the  Archon  and  Name-hero  of  the 
earliest  and  latest. 

LIV.  They  also  elect  by  lot  the  following  officials  :  1 
five  Highway-constructors,  whose  duty  is  to  repair 
the  roads,  with  workmen  who  are  public  slaves  ;  and  2 
ten  Auditors  and  ten  Assessors  with  them,  to  whom 
all  retiring  officials  have  to  render  account.  For  these 
are  the  only  magistrates  who  audit  the  returns  of 
officials  liable  to  account  and  bring  the  audits  before 
the  Jury-court.  And  if  an  official  is  proved  by  them 
to  have  committed  peculation,  the  Jury  convict  him 
of  peculation,  and  the  fine  is  ten  times  the  amount  of 
which  he  is  found  guilty  ;  and  if  they  show  that  a  man 
has  taken  bribes  and  the  Jury  convict,  they  assess  the 
value  of  the  bribes  and  in  this  case  also  the  fine  is  ten 
times  the  amount  ;  but  if  they  find  him  guilty  of 
maladministration,  they  assess  the  damage,  and  the 
fine  paid  is  that  amount  only,  provided  that  it  is  paid 
before  the  ninth  presidency  ;  otherwise  it  is  doubled. 
But  a  fine  of  ten  times  the  amount  is  not  doubled. 

They  also  appoint  by  lot  the  officer  called  Clerk  for  3 
the  Presidency,  who  is  responsible  for  documents,  is 
keeper  of  the  decrees  that  are  passed  and  supervises 
the  transcription  of  all  other  documents,  and  who 
attends  the  sittings  of  the  Council.  Formerly  this 
officer  was  elected  by  show  of  hands,  and  the  most 

147 


ARISTOTLE 

και  Tovs  €νΒοζοτάτους  καΐ  πιστότατους  €χ€ΐρο- 
τόνουν,  καΐ  γαρ  iv  ται?  στηλαίς  προς  ται?  σνμ- 
μ,αχίαις  καΐ  προζζνίαις  και  πολιτβίαις  ούτος  άναγρά- 

4  φ^ταί•  νυν  δε  yeyove  κληρωτός,  κληροΰσι  δε  καΐ 
ετΓΐ  τους  νόμους^  €Τ€ρον  ος  παρακάθηται  ttj  βουλτΙ, 

5  και  άντιγράφβται  καΐ  ούτος  ττάντα?.  χ€ίροτον€Ϊ 
δε  /cat  ο  δήμος  γραμματέα  τον  άναγνωσόμ^νον 
αύτω  καΐ  ttj  βουλή,  καΐ  ούτος  ουδενό?  εστί  κύριος 
αλλά  του  avayt'cut'at. 

6  Ιίληροΐ  δε  καΐ  Ι^ροποιούς  δε'κτα  τους  εττί  τα 
βκθύματα  καλουμένους,  οι  τά  τε  μαντευτά  ιερά 
θυουσιν,  καν  τι  καλλιερησαι  δε'τ^  καλΧιεροΰσι  μετά 

7  των  μάντεων,  κλήροι  δε  και  έτερους  δε'/ca  τού? 
κατ'  ενιαυτόν  καλουμένους,  οι  θυσίας  τε  τινας 
θύουσι  και  τάς  πεντετηρίδας  άπάσας  διοικοΰσιν 
πλην  ΐΐαναθηναίων .  είσι  δε  πεντετηρίδες  μία  μεν 
η  εις  Αηλον  (εστί  δε  και  επτετηρις  ενταύθα), 
δευτέρα  δε  Βραυρώνια,  τρίτη  δε  'Ηράκλεια, 
τετάρτη  δε  Ελευσίνια•  ε'  δε  Πανα^τ^ναια,  και 
τούτων  ούΒεμια'^  εν  τω  αύτω  εγγίνεται.  νυν  δε 
πρόσκειται  και  'Υίφαίστια  εττι'  Ιίηφισοφώντος 
άρχοντος. 

^      Ιίληροΰσι  δε  και  εις  Σαλαju,t^'α  άρχοντα  και  εις 

ΐίειραιεα   Βήμαρχον,    οι    τά   τε    Διονυσία    ποιοΰσι 

εκατερωθι  και  χορηγούς  καθισταοιν   εν  Σιαλαμΐνι 

δε  και  τοϋνομα  του  άρχοντος  αναγράφεται. 

^  e  Polluce  Kenyon :  €πιτοντοίίΐΌμοΐ'  cod. 

^  Wilamowitz-Kaibel :  ονδΐμια  cod. 

'  άπό  Blass. 

"  An  honourable  office  assigned  to  a  citizen  of  another 
state  who  represented  Athenian  interests  there. 

*  i.e.  taking  place  once  in  every  four  or  six  years :  in  Greek 
this  is  called  "  five-yearly,"  "  seven-yearly." 
148 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  liv.  3-8 

distinguished  and  trustworthy  men  used  to  be  elected, 
for  this  officer's  name  is  inscribed  on  the  monumental 
slabs  above  records  of  alliances  and  appointments  to 
consulships  "  and  grants  of  citizenship  ;  but  now  it  has 
been  made  an  office  elected  by  lot.  They  also  elect  4 
by  lot  another  officer  to  superintend  the  laws,  who 
attends  the  sittings  of  the  Council,  and  he  also  has 
copies  made  of  all  the  laws.  The  People  also  elect  5 
by  show  of  hands  a  clerk  to  read  documents  to  the 
Assembly  and  to  the  Council ;  he  has  no  duties  except 
as  reader. 

The  People  also  elects  by  lot  the  ten  sacrificial  6 
officers  entitled  Superintendents  of  Expiations,  who 
offer  the  sacrifices  prescribed  by  oracle,  and  for  busi- 
ness requiring  omens  to  be  taken  watch  for  good 
omens  in  co-operation  with  the  soothsayers.  It  also  7 
elects  by  lot  ten  others  called  the  Yearly  Sacrificial 
Officers,  who  perform  certain  sacrifices  and  administer 
all  the  four-yearly  ^  festivals  except  the  Panathenaic 
Festival.  One  of  the  four-yearly  festivals  is  the 
Mission  to  Delos  (and  there  is  also  a  six-yearly  "^ 
festival  there),  a  second  is  the  Brauronia,  a  third  the 
Heraclea,  and  a  fourth  the  Eleusinia  ;  a  fifth  is  the 
Panathenaic,  which  is  not  held  in  the  same  year  as 
any  of  the  others  mentioned.  There  has  now  been 
added  the  Festival  of  Hephaestus,  instituted  in  the 
archonship  of  Cephisophon.  329  b.c. 

They  also  elect  by  lot  an  archon  for  Salamis  and  8 
a  demarch  for  Peiraeus,  who  hold  the  Festivals  of 
Dionysus  ^  in  each  of  those  places  and  appoint  Choir- 
leaders  ;  at  Salamis  the  name  of  the  archon  is  re- 
corded in  an  inscription. 

"  Both  the  text  and  the  facts  are  most  uncertain. 
'^  τά  Αιοννσια  τά  κατ'  aypous. 

149 


ARISTOTLE 

1  LV.  Αύται  μ€ν  οΰν  αϊ  άρχαΐ  κληρωταί  re 
και  κύριαι  των  ειρημβνων  πάντων^  elaLv.  οι  8e 
καλούμενοι  ivvea  άρχοντες  το  μεν  εζ  ο,ρχης  ον 
τρόπον  καθίσταντο  εΐρηταΐ'  νυν  δε  κληροΰσιν  θεσμο- 
θετας  μεν  εζ  καΐ  γραμματέα  τούτοις,  ετι  δ' 
άρχοντα  και  βασιλέα  και  πολεμαρχον,  κατά  μέρος 

2  εζ  εκάστης  φυλής.  Βοκιμάζονται  δ'  ούτοι  πρώτον 
μεν  εν  ttj  βουλτ^  τοις  φ' ,  πλην  του  γραμματέως , 
οΰτος  δ'  εν  8ικαστηρίω  μόνον,  ωσττερ  οι  άλλοι 
άρχοντες  {πάντες  γαρ  και  οι  κληρωτοί  και  οΐ 
χειροτονητοι  8οκιμασθεντες  άρχουσιν),  οι  δ'  εννέα 
άρχοντες  εν  τε  τη  βουλή  και  πάλιν  εν  8ικαστηρίω. 
και  πρότερον  μεν  ουκ  ηρχεν  οντιν"  άποΒοκιμάσειεν 
ή  βουλή,  νυν  δ'   εφεσίς  eWiv*  εις  το  ^ικαστηριον, 

3  και  τοΰτο  κύριόν  εστί  της  δοκιμασίας,  επερωτώσιν 
δ'  οταΓ  Βοκιμάζωσιν  πρώτον  μεν  "  τις  σοι  πατήρ 
και  πόθεν  τών  Βήμων,  και  τις  πατρός  πατήρ,  και 
τις  μητηρ,  και  τις  μητρός  πατήρ  και  πόθεν  τών 
Βημων;"  μετά  δε  ταύτα  ei  εστίν  αύτω  Άπόλλωΐ' 
Πατρώο?  και  Zeu?  'Έιρκεΐος,  και  που  ταΰτα  τα 
ιερά  εστίν  είτα  ηρία  ει  εστίν  και  που  ταύτα* 
επεηα  γονέας  ει  ευ  ποιεί,  κεί^  τά  τέλη  τελεΐ,  και 
τάς  στρατείας  ει  έστράτευται.  ταΰτα  δ'  άν- 
ερωτησας    "  κάλει"     φησιν    "τούτων    τους    μάρ- 

4  τυράς."  επειΒάν  Βέ  παράσχηται  τους  μάρτυρας, 
επερωτά  "τούτου  βούλεταί  τι?  κατηγορεΐν;" 
καν   μεν   ^    τις    κατήγορος,    δού?    κατηγορίαν   και 

^  Ίτάντων  Kenyon :  νράξβων  alii :  ...  ων  cod. 
*  Thalheim  :  και  cod.  {καΐ  τά  τέλη  <ei>  Wilamowitz-Kaibel). 


"  Chaps,  iii.,  viii.,  xxii.,  xxvi. 
150 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  lv.  1-4 

LV.  These  offices,  then,  are  elected  by  lot  and  have  1 
authority  over  all  the  matters  stated.  As  to  the 
officials  designated  the  Nine  Archons,  the  mode  of 
their  appointment  that  was  originally  in  force  has 
been  stated  before  *  ;  but  now  the  six  Lawgivers  and 
their  clerk  are  elected  by  lot,  and  also  the  Archon,** 
King  and  War-lord,  from  each  tribe  in  turn.  The  2 
qualifications  of  these  are  first  checked  in  the  Council 
of  Five  Hundred,  except  the  Clerk,  but  he  is  checked 
only  in  a  Jury-court,  as  are  the  other  officials  (for  all 
of  them,  both  those  elected  by  lot  and  those  elected 
by  show  of  hands,  have  their  qualifications  checked 
before  they  hold  office),  while  the  Nine  Archons  are 
checked  in  the  Council  and  also  again  in  a  Jury- 
court,  Formerly  any  official  not  passed  by  the 
Council  did  not  hold  office,  but  now  there  is  an 
appeal  to  the  Jury-court,  and  with  this  rests  the  final 
decision  as  to  qualification.  The  questions  put  in  3 
examining  qualifications  are,  first,  '  Who  is  your 
father  and  to  what  deme  does  he  belong,  and  who  is 
your  father's  father,  and  who  your  mother,  and  who 
her  father  and  what  his  deme  ? '  then  whether  he  has 
a  Family  Apollo  and  Homestead  Zeus,"  and  where 
these  shrines  are  ;  then  whether  he  has  family  tombs 
and  where  they  are  ;  then  whether  he  treats  his 
parents  well,  and  whether  he  pays  his  taxes,  and 
whether  he  has  done  his  military  service.  And  after 
putting  these  questions  the  officer  says,  '  Call  your 
witnesses  to  these  statements.'  And  when  he  has  4 
produced  his  witnesses,  the  officer  further  asks,  *  Does 
anybody  wish  to  bring  a  charge  against  this  man  ? '  And 
if  any  accuser  is  forthcoming,  he  is  given  a  hearing  and 

*  i.e.  the  Archon  Eponymus,  see  liv.  4  n. 
«  The  gods  of  the  Athenian's  home. 

151 


ARISTOTLE 

άττολογίαν,  ούτω  8ί8ωσιν  iv  μεν  rfj  βουΧγι  την 
επιχβίροτονίαν  iv  δε  τω  Βικαστηρίω  την  φηφον 
iav  δε  μηΒβΙς  βονληται  κατηγορβΐν,  €νθνς  διδωσι 
την  φηφον  και  ττρότζρον  μ€ν  €Ϊς  ενββαλλζ  την 
φηφον,  νυν  δ'  ανάγκη  ττάντας  έ'στι  ^ίαφηφίζζσθαι, 
πβρί  αυτών.  Ινα  αν  τις  πονηρός  ών  άπαλλάζη  τους 
κατηγόρους  €πι  τοις  Βικασταΐς  yevT^rac  τούτον 
5  άπο8οκιμάσαι.  8οκιμασθ€ν^  δε  τούτον  τον  τρόπον, 
βα^ίζουσι  προς  τον  λίθον  βφ*  ου  τα  τόμι  eartf 
(ε0  ου  και  οι  8ιαιτηται  όμόσαντβς  αποφαίνονται 
τα?  δίαιτα?  και  οι  μάρτυρες  έζόμνυνται  τάς  μαρ- 
τυρίας), άναβαντ€ς  δ'  εττι  τούτον  ομνυουσιν  δικαίως 
άρξειν  και  κατά  τους  νόμους,  και  δώρα  μη 
ληφεσθαι  της  άρχης  eveKa,  καν  τι  λάβωσιν  αν- 
δριάντα άναθησειν  χρυσοΰν.  εντεύθεν  δ'  όμόσαντες 
εις  άκρόπολιν  βα8ίζουσιν  και  πάλιν  εκεί  ταυτά 
ομνυουσι,  και  /χετα  ταϋτα  εις  την  άρχην  είσ- 
ερχονται. 

1  LVI.  Ααμβάνουσι  δε  και  πάρεδρους  δ  τε  άρχων 
και  6  ^ασιλεί)?  και  6  πολέμαρχος  δυο  έκαστος 
ους  αν  βούληται,  και  ούτοι  δοκιμάζονται  εν  τώ 
Βικαστηρίω  πριν  παρεΒρεύειν,  και  εύθύνας  διδοασιι/ 
επάν  παρεΒρεύσωσιν . 

2  Και  ό  μεν  άρχων  ευθύς  εισελθών  πρώτον  μεν 
κηρύττει  δσα  τις  εΐχεν  πριν  αυτόν  είσελθεΐν  εις 
την   άρχην  ταΰτ     εχειν   και   κρατεΐν  μέχρι   άρχης 

3  τέλους.  έπειτα  χορηγούς  τραγωΒοΐς  καθίστησι 
τρεις,  εξ  απάντων  ^Αθηναίων  τους  πλουσιωτάτους' 
πρότερον  δε  και  κωμωΒοΐς  καθιστή  πέντε,  νυν  δε 

^  δοκιμασθέν<τΐί'>  Rutherford. 
152 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  lv.  4— lvi.  3 

the  man  on  trial  an  opportunity  of  defence,  and  then 
the  official  puts  the  question  to  a  shoAV  of  hands  in  the 
Council  or  to  a  vote  by  ballot  in  the  Jury-court  ;  but 
if  nobody  wishes  to  bring  a  charge  against  him,  he 
puts  the  vote  at  once  ;  formerly  one  person  used  to 
throw  in  his  ballot-pebble,  but  now  all  are  compelled  to 
vote  one  way  or  the  other  about  them,  in  order  that 
if  anyone  being  a  rascal  has  got  rid  of  his  accusers," 
it  may  rest  with  the  jurymen  to  disqualify  him.  And  5 
when  the  matter  has  been  checked  in  this  way,  they 
go  to  the  stone  on  which  are  the  victims  cut  up  for 
sacrifice  (the  one  on  which  Arbitrators  also  take  oath 
before  they  issue  their  decisions,  and  persons  sum- 
moned as  witnesses  swear  that  they  have  no  evidence 
to  give),  and  mounting  on  this  stone  they  swear 
that  they  will  govern  justly  and  according  to  the  laws, 
and  will  not  take  presents  on  account  of  their  office, 
and  that  if  they  should  take  anything  they  will  set 
up  a  golden  statue.  After  taking  oath  they  go  from 
the  stone  to  the  Acropolis  and  take  the  same  oath 
again  there,  and  after  that  they  enter  on  their  office. 

LVI.  The  Archon,  the  King  and  the  War-lord  also  1 
take  two  assessors  each,  chosen  by  themselves,  and 
the  qualifications  of  these  are  checked  in  the  Jury- 
court  before  they  hold  office,  and  they  are  called  to 
account  when  they  retire  from  office. 

Immediately  on  coming  into  office  the  Archon  first  2 
makes  proclamation  that  all  men  shall  hold  until 
the  end  of  his  office  those  possessions  and  powers 
that  they  held  before  his  entry  into  office.  Then  he  3 
appoints  three  Chorus-leaders  for  the  tragedies,  the 
wealthiest  men  among  all  the  Athenians  ;  and  for- 
merly he  used  also  to  appoint  five  for  the  comedies, 

"  i.e.  has  bribed  them  to  let  him  oiF. 

153 


ARISTOTLE 

τούτους^  αϊ  φυλαΐ  φέρουσιν.  erreiTa  παραλαβών 
τονς  χορηγούς  τους  Ινηνβγμένους  νττο  τών  φυλών 
els  /Διονύσια  avSpdaiv  καΐ  τταίσΐν  καΐ  κωμωΒοΐς 
καΐ  εΙς  Θαργήλια  άνΒράσιν  καΐ  παισίν  (etat  δ'  οι 
μ,εν  elg  Αίονύσια  κατά  φυλάς,  els  Θαργήλια  8e^ 
8υ€Ϊν  φυλαΐν  εις,  παρέχει  δ'  iv  μ€ρα  ίκατέρα 
τών  φυλών)  τούτοις  τάς  αντιφάσεις  ποιεί  και 
τάς  σκήφεις  εΙσάγει  Ιάν  τι?  η  λελητουργκη- 
κεναι  φ-η  πρότερον  ταντην  τ-ην  λητουργιαν  η 
ατελής  ett'at  λελητουργηκως  ετεραν  λτ^τουργιαν  και 
τών  -χρόνων  αύτώ  της  ατέλειας  μή  εζεληλυθοτων 
ή  τα  ετη  μή  γεγονεναι  (δει  γαρ  τον  τοις  τταισιν 
■χορηγοΰντα  ύπερ  τετταράκοντα  ετη  γεγονεναι). 
καθίστησι  he  και  εις  Αήλον  χορηγούς  και  αρχι- 
θεωρον  τώ  τριακοντορίω  τώ  τους  ήιθεους  αγοντι. 

4  πομπών  δ'  επεμελεΐται  της  τε  τω  Ασκληπιώ 
γινομένης  όταν  οικουρώσι  μύσται,  και  της  Αιο- 
ννσίων  τών  μεγάλων  μετά  τών  επιμελητών,  ους 
πρότερον  μεν  6  Βήμος  εχειροτόνει  8εκα  οντάς, 
και  τά  εις  τήν  πομπήν  άναλώματα  παρ  αυτών 
άνήλισκον,  νυν  δ'   ενα  της  φυλής  εκάστης  κλήροι 

5  και  διδωσιν  εις  τήν  κατασκευήν  εκατόν  μνάς'  επι- 
μελείται δε  και  της  εις  0apyr;Aia  και  της  τώ  Διι 
τώ  Ίίωτήρι.  Βιοικεΐ  δε  και  τον  αγώνα  τών  Αιονυ- 
σίων  ούτος  και  τών  Θαργηλίων,     εορτών  μεν  ούν 

6  €πιμελεΐται  τούτων,    γραφαι  δε  και  8ίκαι  λαγχά- 

^  Wyse :  Toirrois  cod.  *  δέ  supplent  edd. 


"  A  festival  in  May,  at  which  there  were  competitions  of 
cyclic  choruses  and  a  procession  (§  5). 

*  A  citizen  appointed  to  one  of  these  expensive  public 
offices  could  challenge  another  as  better  able  to  afford  it, 

154 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  lvi.  3-6 

but  these  are  now  returned  by  the  Tribes.  After- 
wards he  receives  the  Chorus-leaders  nominated  by 
the  Tribes  for  the  men's  and  boys'  competitions  and 
the  comedies  at  the  Dionysia  and  for  men  and  boys 
at  the  Thargeha  <*  (for  the  Dionysia  one  for  each  tribe, 
for  the  Thargelia  one  for  two  tribes,  which  take 
turns  to  supply  them),  and  deals  with  their  claims  for 
substitution  by  exchange  of  property,''  and  brings 
forward  their  claims  to  exemption  on  the  ground 
of  having  performed  that  public  service  before,  or  of 
being  exempt  because  of  having  performed  another 
service  and  the  period  of  exemption  not  having 
expired,  or  of  not  being  of  the  right  age  (for  a  man 
serving  as  Chorus-leader  for  the  boys  must  be  over 
forty).  He  also  appoints  Chorus-leaders  for  Delos  and 
a  Procession-leader  for  the  thirty-oared  vessel  that 
carries  the  youths.''  He  supervises  processions,  the  4 
one  celebrated  in  honour  of  Asclepius  when  initiates 
keep  a  watch  -  night,  and  the  one  at  the  Great 
Dionysia,  in  which  he  acts  jointly  with  the  Super- 
visors ;  these  w^ere  formerly  ten  men  elected  by 
show  of  hands  by  the  People,  and  they  found  the 
expenses  of  the  procession  out  of  their  own  pockets, 
but  now  they  are  elected  by  lot,  one  from  each  tribe, 
and  given  100  minae  for  equipment ;  and  he  also  5 
supervises  the  procession  of  Thargelia,  and  the  one 
in  honour  of  Zeus  the  Saviour.  This  official  also 
administers  the  competition  of  the  Dionysia  and  of 
the  Thargelia.  These,  then,  are  the  festivals  that  he 
supervises.     Criminal  and  civil  law-suits  are  instituted  6 

and  the  man  challenged   could  only  escape  undertaking 
the  office  by  exchanging  estates  with  the  challenger. 

"  For  the  festival  at  Delos  see  liv,  7  ;  boys'  choruses  went 
from  Athens. 

155 


ARISTOTLE 

νονται  προς  αυτόν,  άς  άνακρίνας  els  το  Βικαστήριον 
ζΐσάγζί,  γονέων  κακώσ^ως  {αύται  8e  eloiv  άζήμίοι 
τω  βουλομβνω  διώκαν),  ορφανών  κακωσεως  (αύται 
δ  etat  Λτατά  των  βττίτρόττων) ,  βτηκληρον  κακώσ€ως 
(αύται  Se  eiai  κατά  των  επιτρόπων  και  των  συν- 
οικούντων),  οΐκου  όρφανικον  κακωσβως  [elai  δε 
και  αύται  κατά  των  επιτρόπων),  παράνοιας,  idv 
τις  αιτιάται  τίνα  παρανοοΰντα  τά  υπάρχοντα^ 
άπολλυναι,  et?  8ατητών  aipeaiv,  idv  τι?  μη  deXr] 
κοινά  τα  οντά  νεμβσθαι,  βίς  επιτροπής  κατάστασιν , 
€ΐς  βπιτροπης  διαδικασία^,  €ΐς  εμφανών  κατά- 
στασιν,   επιτροπον    αυτόν    εγγράφαι,    κλήρων    και 

7  επικληρων  επιδικασιαι.  επιμελείται  δε  και  τών 
ορφανών  και  τών  επικλήρων  και  τών  γυναικών 
όσαι  αν  τελευτησαντος  του  ανδρός  σκηπτωνται 
κύειν,  και  κύριος  εστί  τοις  άΒικοΰσιν  επιβάλλειν 
η  είσάγειν  εις  το  Βικαστηριον.  μισθοί  δε  και  τους 
οίκους  τών  ορφανών  και  τών  επικλήρων  εως  αν  τι? 
τετταρακαώεκετις^  γενηται  και  τά  άποτιμήματα 
λαμβάνει,  και  τους  επιτρόπους^  εαν  μη  διδώσι  τοις 
παισίν  τον  σΐτον  ούτος  εισπράττει. 

1  LVII.  Και  ο  μεν  άρχων  επι/χελειται*  τούτων,  ό 
δε  ^ασιλεύ?  πρώτον  μεν  μυστηρίων  επιμελείται 
μετά  τών  επιμελητών  ους  ό  8ημος  εχειροτονεΐ,  δυο 
μεν  εζ  *  Αθηναίων  απάντων,  ενα  δ'  εζ  ΈιύμολπιΒών , 
ενα  δε  εκ  Κηρύκων,     έπειτα  Αιονυσίων  τών  Έττι- 

^  Blass  (alii  alia) :  τα  .  .  .  .  απολλιψ  .  .  cod. 

*  Blass :  εττικλ ακαιδΐ  .  .  ris  cod. 

*  Brooks :  /cat  ....  oij  cod. 
*  Blass :  καιο  ...  at  cod. 

156 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  lvi.  6— lvii.  1 

before  him,  and  after  a  preliminary  trial  he  brings 
them  in  before  the  Jury-court  :  actions  for  ill-usage 
of  parents  (in  which  anybody  who  wishes  may  act  as 
prosecutor  without  liability  to  penalty)  ;  for  ill-usage 
of  orphans  (which  lie  against  their  guardians)  ;  for 
ill-usage  of  an  heiress  (which  lie  against  the  guardians 
or  the  relations  that  they  live  with)  ;  for  injury  to  an 
orphan's  estate  (these  also  lie  against  the  guardians)  ; 
prosecutions  for  insanity,  when  one  man  accuses 
another  of  wasting  his  property  when  insane  ;  actions 
for  the  appointment  of  liquidators,  when  a  man  is  un- 
willing for  property  to  be  administered  in  partner- 
ship ;  actions  for  the  institution  of  guardianship  ; 
actions  for  deciding  rival  claims  to  guardianship  ; 
actions  for  the  production  of  goods  or  documents  ; 
actions  for  enrolment  as  trustee  ;  claims  to  estates 
and  to  heiresses.  He  also  supervises  orphans  and  7 
heiresses  and  women  professing  to  be  with  child 
after  the  husband's  death,  and  he  has  absolute 
power  to  fine  offenders  against  them  or  to  bring  them 
before  the  Jury-court.  He  grants  leases  of  houses 
belonging  to  orphans  and  heiresses  until  they  are 
fourteen  years  of  age,  and  receives  the  rents,  and  he 
exacts  maintenance  for  children  from  guardians  who 
fail  to  supply  it. 

LVII.  These  are  the  matters  superintended  by  the  1 
Archon.  But  the  King  superintends,  first,  the  mys- 
teries, in  co-operation  with  Superintendents  elected 
by  show  of  hands  by  the  People,  two  from  the  whole 
body  of  the  citizens,  one  from  the  Eumolpidae 
and  one  from  the  Heralds."     Next  the  Dionysia  in 

"  The  Eumolpidae  and  Kerykes  were  two  ancient  priestly 
families  at  Athens. 

157 


ARISTOTLE 

ληναίων^'  ταντα  δ'  earl  πομττη  re  και  αγων.^ 
την  μ€ν  ονν  πομπην  KOivfj  ττέμττουσιν  ο  re  βασιλεύς 
/cat  οι  ετημβληταί,  τον  δε  aycova  ^ιατίθησιν  ο 
βασιλζύζ.  τίθησί  δε  και  τους  των  λαμπάδων 
αγώνα?     απαντάς,    ώς    δ'     €πος    elrreiv    και    τα? 

2  πατρίους  θυσίας  διοικεί  οΰτος  πάσας,  γραφαι  δε 
λαγχάνονταί  προς  αυτόν  άσβββίας,  καν  τις  ΐ€ρω- 
σύνης  άμφισβητη  προς  τίνα.  διαδικάζει  δε  κ:αι  τοις 
γ4ν€σι  και  τοις  ίερεΰσι  τα?  αμφισβητήσεις  τα? 
ύπ€ρ  των  γερών  άπάσας  οΰτος.  λαγχάνονται  δε 
και  αι  τοΰ  φόνου  δίκαι  ττασαι  προς  τούτον,  και  ο 
προαγορβύων  εϊργβσθαι  των  νομίμων  ούτος  εστίν. 

3  ει'σι  δε  φόνου  Βίκαι  και  τραύματος ,  αν  μεν  εκ 
προνοίας  άποκτείνη^  η  τρώση,  εν  Άρειω  πάγω, 
και  φαρμάκων,  εάν  άποκτείνη  8ούς,  και  πυρκαας- 
ταύτα  γαρ  ή  βουλή  μόνα  δικάζει,  τών  δ'  ακουσίων 
και  βουλευσεως  καν  οίκετην  άποκτείνη  τι?  η 
μέτοικον  ή  ζενον,  οι  επι  Παλλαδιω•  εάν  δ  απο- 
κτεΐναι  μεν  τι?  ομόλογη,  φή  δε  κατά  του?  νόμους, 
οίον  μοιχόν  λαβών  ή  εν  πολεμώ  αγνοησας  ή  εν 
άθλω  αγωνιζόμενος,  τούτω  επι  Αελφινίω  δικά- 
ζουσιν  εάν  δε  φεύγων  φυγήν  ων  άρεσις  εστίν 
αιτιαν  εχη  άποκτεΐναι  ή  τρώσαί  τίνα,  τούτω  δ  εν 
Φρεάτου     δικάζουσιν,     ό     δ'     άττολογειται     προσ- 

4  ορμισάμενος  εν  πλοίω.  δικάζουσι  δ'  οί  λαχόντε? 
ταΰτ'   εφεται  πλην*   τών   εν   Άρείω  πάγω  γιγνο- 

^  ένΐ  ληναίω  Bywater. 

*  Van  Leeuwen :  εστί  .  .  .  η  .  .  .  cod. 

8  ίττοκτύντι  <jisy  Papageorgios. 

*  Kenyon :  τα  .  .  .  ττ\•ην  cod. 

"  Held  at  the  Limnae,  S.E.  of  the  Acropohs,  at  the  end 
of  January.  The  7th  Attic  month,  Gamelion  (January- 
February),  was  in  old  Ionic  called  Lenaeon. 

158 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  lvii.  1-4 

Lenaeon  '^ ;  this  festival  consists  of  a  procession  and 
a  competition,  the  former  conducted  by  the  King  and 
the  Superintendents  jointly,  the  latter  organized  by 
the  King.  He  also  holds  all  the  Torch-race  Com- 
petitions ;  also  he  is  the  director  of  practically  all 
the  ancestral  sacrifices.  He  holds  the  court  that  2 
tries  charges  of  impiety  and  disputed  claims  to 
hereditary  priesthoods.  He  adjudicates  between 
clans  and  between  priests  in  all  disputed  claims  to 
privileges.  Before  him  are  also  brought  all  murder 
cases,  and  proclamations  of  exclusion  from  customary 
rites  are  made  by  him.  Trials  for  deliberate  murder  3 
and  wounding  are  held  in  the  Areopagus,  and  for 
causing  death  by  poison,  and  for  arson  ;  for  these  only 
are  tried  by  the  Council,  whereas  involuntary  homicide 
and  plotting  to  murder,  and  murder  of  a  slave  or 
resident  alien  or  foreigner,  come  before  the  court  at 
the  Palladium  ^  ;  and  one  who  admits  homicide  but 
declares  it  to  have  been  legal  (for  instance  when  he 
has  killed  a  man  taken  in  adultery),  or  who  in  war  has 
killed  a  fellow-citizen  in  ignorance,  or  in  an  athletic 
contest,  is  tried  at  the  Delphinium  ;  but  if,  when  a 
man  has  taken  refuge  in  exile  after  an  offence  that 
admits  of  satisfaction,  he  is  charged  with  homicide 
or  wounding,  he  is  tried  at  the  Precinct  of  Phreatus,<' 
and  delivers  his  defence  from  a  ship  anchored 
near  the  shore.  Commissioners  appointed  by  lot  4 
try  these  cases,  except  those  that  are  held  on  the 
Areopagus  ;   the  cases  are  introduced  by  the  King, 

''  This  shrine  and  the  Delphinium  were  probably  S.E.  of 
the  Acropolis. 

''  Near  the  harbour  of  Zea;  doubtless  the  eponymous 
hero  was  fictitious,  the  place  being  really  named  from  a 
well,  φρέαρ.  If  the  defendant  had  landed  he  would  have 
been  arrested  for  his  former  offence. 

159 


ARISTOTLE 

μβνων  elaayei  δ'  ο  βασιλβύς,  καΐ  Βικάζουσιν  ev 
ίβρω  καΐ  ύτταίθριοί,  και  ό  ^ασιλ^ύ?  δταν  Βικάζτ) 
nepiaipeirai  τον  στίφανον.  6  he  την  αιτιαν  έχων 
τον  μ€ν  άλλον  χρόνον  βΐργβται  των  Upcov  καΐ  ούδ 
et?  την  άγοράν  νόμος  ^μβαλβΐν  αυτω,  τότβ  δ  ets' 
το  lepov  €ΐσ£λθών  άπολογ€Ϊται.  όταν  Se  μη  etSfj 
τον  ΤΓΟιησαντα,  τω  Βράσαντι  λαγχάν€ί,  Βι,κάζβι  δ 
ο  βασίλβύζ  καΐ  οΐ  φυλοβασίλζΐς ,  καΐ  τα?  των 
άφνχων  καΐ  των  άλλων  ζώων. 

1  LVIII.  Ό  δε  πολέμαρχος  θυβι  μ^ν  θυσίας  την 
re  τη  ^Αρτ€μώ(,  τη  Άγροτβρα  καΐ  τω  Έι^υαλιω, 
^ιατίθησι  δ'  aycoi'a  τον  €πιτάφίον  [και]^  τοις  τ€Τ€- 
λευτηκόσιν    iv    τω    πολεμώ,    καΐ    Άρ/χοδιω     και 

2  'AptCTToyeiTOVt  et'ttyta/xara  ttoicl.  ^ίκαι  Se  λαγ- 
χάνονται  προς  αυτόν  ΐ'διαι  μόνον,^  αι  re  τοις 
μ,βτοίκοις  καΐ  τοις  ΙσοτζλΙσι  καΐ  (αίΥ  τοις  προ- 
ζ4νοις  γίγνόμ€ναι•  καΐ  δει  τούτον  λα^όι^τα  /cat 
8ίαν€ίμαντα  δέκα  μ^ρη  τό  λα;;^όν  €κάστη  τη  φυλή 
μ€ρος  προσθ^ίναι,  τους   δε   την  φυλην  δικάζοντας 

3  τοις  Βιαίτηταΐς  άπο8οΰναί.     αυτός  δ'  εισάνει  Οίκας 
τα?    τ€    του    αποστασιου     και     απροστασιου     και 
κλήρων   καΐ   ζ,πικληρων   τοΙς  μετοίκοις,    /cat   ταλλ 
όσα  τοις  πολίταις  ο  άρχων  ταύτα  τοις  μ€τοίκοίς  ο 
πολέμαρχος . 

1  LIX.  01  δε  θβσμοθέται  πρώτον  μ^ν  του  προ- 
γράφαι  τά  δικαστήρια  είσι  κύριοι  τίσιν  ημβραις 
δει  δικτάζειν,*  εττειτα  του  8οΰναι  ταΓ?  αρχαΐς- 
καθότι  γαρ  αν  ούτοι   'όώσιν,  κατά  τοϋτο  χρώνται. 

^  Kenyon  secundum  Pollucem. 

'  μόνον  Wilamowitz-Kaibel:  με»»  cod. 

»  Kaibel.  *  καθίί^ίΐν  Richards. 

<•  A  form  of  Ares. 
160 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  lvii.  4— lix.  1 

and  the  court  sits  within  the  sacred  precinct  in  the 
open  air,  and  Avhen  the  King  is  acting  in  a  case  he 
takes  oiF  his  crown.  The  accused  man  all  the  rest  of 
the  time  is  debarred  from  sacred  places  and  is  even 
forbidden  by  law  from  setting  foot  in  the  market- 
place, but  at  the  trial  he  enters  the  precinct  and 
makes  his  defence.  When  the  King  does  not  know 
who  committed  the  act,  he  institutes  proceedings 
against  '  the  guilty  man,'  and  the  King  and  Tribal 
Kings  try  the  case,  as  also  prosecutions  of  inanimate 
objects  and  animals  for  homicide. 

LVIII.  The  War-lord  offers  sacrifices  to  Artemis  the  1 
Huntress  and  to  Eny alius,"  and  arranges  the  funeral 
games  in  honour  of  those  who  have  fallen  in  war,  and 
makes  memorial  offerings  to  Harmodius  and  Aristo- 
geiton.  Only  private  law-suits  are  brought  before  2 
him  in  which  resident  aliens,  ordinary  and  privileged, 
and  foreign  consuls  are  concerned  ;  he  has  to  take 
the  list  of  cases  and  divide  it  into  ten  portions 
and  assign  one  portion  by  lot  to  each  tribe,  and  to 
assign  the  jurymen  for  each  tribe  to  the  Arbitrators. 
He  himself  brings  forward  cases  in  which  resident  aliens  3 
are  concerned,  on  charges  of  acting  without  their  pro- 
tectors ^  or  of  lacking  a  protector,  and  as  to  estates 
and  heiresses  ;  and  all  other  actions  that  in  the  case 
of  citizens  are  brought  in  by  the  Archon,  in  the  case 
of  resident  aliens  are  introduced  by  the  War-lord. 

LIX.  The    Lawgivers    are    responsible,   first,   for  1 
preparing  lists  of  the  days  on  which  the  jury-courts 
are  to  sit,  and  then  for  giving  them  to  the  officers,  for 
these  follow  the  arrangements  that  the  Lawgivers 

*  A  metoikos  (other  than  the  isoteleis,  who  for  taxation 
and  military  service  ranked  with  citizens)  had  to  be  enrolled 
under  a  citizen,  whose  sanction  was  necessary  for  his  actions 
if  important. 

Μ  l6l 


ARISTOTLE 

2  €Τ6  δε  τάς  ^Ισαγγελίας  ^ΙσαγγέΧλουσιν^  €ΐς  τον 
Βημον,  καΐ  τάς  καταχαροτονίας  /cat  τά^  προβολάς 
αττασα?  ^ισαγουσιν  ούτοι,  και  γραφας  τταρανομων, 
και    νόμον   μη    Ιτητη^€ΐον    deivai,    καΐ    ττροε^ρικην 

3  και  €τηστατικΎ]ν  καΙ  στρατηγοΐς  evOvvas.  βίσΐ  Se 
και  γραφαΐ  προς  αυτούς  ών  τταράστασις  τίθεται, 
ξενίας  καΐ  Βωροξενίας  {αν  τις  δώρα  8ούς  αποφυγή 
την  ζβνίαν)  και  συκοφαντίας  και  δώρων  και 
φευ^βγγραφης  και  φβυΒοκλητείας  και  βουλευσεως 

4  και  αγραφιου  και  μοιχείας.  εισάγουσιν  δε  και 
τα?  δοκιμασίας  ταΓ?  άρχαΐς  άττάσαι?,  και  τους 
απεφηφισμενους  υπό  των  δημοτών,  και  τάς  κατα- 

6  γνώσεις  τάς  εκ  της  βουλής.  εισάγουσι  δε  και 
8ίκας  ιΒίας,  εμπορικάς  και  μεταλλικάς,  και  Βουλών, 
αν  τις  τον  ελεύθερον  κακώς  λεγη.  και  επι- 
κληροΰσι  ται?  άρχαΐς  ούτοι  τά  δικαστήρια  τά  τ^  ιδία 

6  και  τα  δτ^/χοσια.  και  τά  σύμβολα  τά  προς  τάς 
πόλεις  ούτοι  κυροϋσι,  και  τάς  8ίκας  τάς  από  τών 
συμβόλων  εισάγουσι,  και  τά  φευ^ομαρτύρια  τά' 
εζ  'Αρείου  πάγου. 

7  Ύούς  δε  8ικαστάς  κληροΰσι  πάντες*  οι  εννέα  άρ- 
χοντες Βεκατος  δ'  ο  γραμματεύς  6  τών  θεσμοθετών, 
τους  της  αύτοϋ  φυλής  έκαστος. 

1  LX.  Τα  μεν  ούν  περί  τους  θ'  άρχοντας  τούτον 
έχει  τόν  τρόπον,  κληροΰσι  δε  και  άθλοθετας  8εκα 
άνΒρας,  ενα  τής  φυλής  εκάστης,  ούτοι  δε  δοκτι- 
μασθεντες  άρχουσι  τετταρα  ετη,  και  Βιοικοΰσι 
την  τε  πομπήν  τών   ΥΙαναθηναίων  και  τόν  aycDva 

^  <&s   άν   Tivfsy  (ίσαγγέλλωσι   Blass:    eic.  .  .  .  δημοί'    seel. 
Wilamowitz-Kaibel.  *  τ  suppletum  a  Kaibel. 

*  τά  suppletum  a  Bernadakis. 

*  πάντΐί  coni.  Kenyon  :  iruvras  cod. 
162 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  lix.  2— lx.  1 

assign.     Moreover  it  is  they  who  bring  before  the  2 
People  indictments,  and  bring  in   all   votes   of  re- 
moval from  office,  preliminary  informations  sent  on 
by  the  Assembly,  impeachments  for  illegal  procedure, 
proceedings   against  inexpedient  legislation,   a  suit 
against  a  President  or  a  Superintendent,  and  audits 
imposed  on  Generals.     Also  they  hear  indictments  for  3 
which  a  fee  is  paid,  on  charges  of  alien  birth,  alien 
corruption  (that  is,  if  a  person  charged  with  alien 
birth    secures   his    acquittal   by   bribery),   malicious 
information,   bribery,    false   entry    of  public   debts, 
personation  of  a  witness,  conspiracy,  non-registration, 
adultery.    They  also  introduce  "  the  tests  of  qualifica-  4 
tion  for  all  offices,  and  claims  to  citizenship  rejected 
by  vote  of  the  deme,  and  verdicts  of  guilty  passed 
on  from  the  Council.^     They  also  introduce  private  5 
actions  in  commercial  and  mining  cases,  and  actions 
against  slaves  for  slandering  a  freeman.     And  they 
assign  the  public  and  the  private  jury-courts  by  lot 
among  the  magistrates.     They  ratify  contracts  with  6 
other  states,  and  bring  into  court  suits  arising  under 
those  contracts,  and  prosecutions  for  false  witness 
instituted  by  the  Areopagus. 

All  the  Nine  Archons  with  the  Lawgivers'  Clerk,  7 
making  ten,  elect  by  lot  the  jurymen,  each  electing 
those  of  his  own  tribe. 

LX.  These  are  the  functions  of  the  Nine  Archons.  1 
They  also  elect  by  lot  ten  men  as  Stewards  of  the 
Games,  one  from  each  tribe,  who  when  passed  as 
qualified  hold  office  for  four  years,  and  administer  the 
procession  of  the  Panathenaic  Festival,  and  the  con- 

"  i.e.  before  the  bodies  that  checked  these  qualifications, 
see  Iv.  2-4.  *  See  xliv.  2  fin. 

163 


ARISTOTLE 

της  μουσικής  /cat  τον  γυμνικον  ά^ώι^α  και  την 
ιππο8ρομίαν,  καΐ  τον  π€ττλον  ποιούνται,  και  τους 
αμφορ€Ϊς  ποιούνται  μετά  της  βουλής,  και  το  eXaiov 

2  τοις  άθληταΐς  άπο8ι8όασι.  συλλέγεται  δε  τό^ 
ελαιον  άπο  των  μορίων  εισπράττει  8έ  τους  τά 
χωρία  κεκτημένους  εν  οΐς  αϊ  μορίαι  είσιν  6  άρχων, 
τρι  ημικοτύλια  απο  του  στελέχους  εκάστου,  πρό- 
τερον  δ  επώλει  τον  καρπόν  η  πόλις,  και  ει  τις 
εξορύζειεν  ελαιαΐ'  μορίαν  η  κατάζειεν,  εκρινεν  η 
εξ  Αρείου  πάγου  βουλή,  και  ει  του  καταγνοίη, 
θανάτω  τούτον  εζημίουν.  εζ  ου  δβ  το  ελαιον  6 
το  χωρίον  κεκτημένος  άποτίνει,  6  μεν  νόμος  εστίν, 
η  δε  κρίσις  καταλελυταΐ'  το  δ'^  ελαιον  εκ  του 
κτήματος,  ουκ  άπο  των  στελεχών,  εστί  τη  πόλει. 

3  συλλεζας  ουν  6  άρχων  το  εφ^  εαυτού  γιγνόμενον 
τοις  τα/χιαι?  παρα8ίΒωσιν  εις  άκρόπολιν,  και  ουκ 
εστίν  άι^α^δτ^ι^αι  πρότερον  εις  "Αρειον  πάγον  πριν 
αν  άπαν  τταραδώ  τοις  τα/χιαι?.  οι  8ε  ταμίαι  τον 
μεν  άλλον  χρόνον  τηροΰσιν  εν  άκροπόλει,  τοΖς  δε 
ΙΙαναθηναίοις  άπομετροΰσι  τοις  άθλοθεταις,  οι  δ' 
αθλοθεται  τοις  νικώσι  των  αγωνιστών,  εστί  γάρ 
άθλα  τοις  μεν  την  μουσικήν  νικώσιν  άργύριον^  και 
χρυσά,  τοις  δε  την  εύανΒρίαν  άσπίΒες,  τοις  δε  τον 
γυμνικον  αγώνα  και  την  ιπποΒρομιαν  ελαιον. 

1  LXI.  ^ειροτονοΰσι  δε  και  τάς  προς  τον  πόλεμον 
αρχάς  άπάσας,  στρατηγούς  8εκα,  πρότερον  μεν 
άφ'  εκάστης*  φυλής  ενα,  νυν  δ'  εζ  απάντων,  και 
τούτους   8ιατάττουσι   τη   χειροτονία,    ενα   μεν   επί 

^  5k  τό  Richards :  τοδ  cod.  *  δ' :  yap  coni.  Blass. 

*  Wilamowitz-Kaibel :  apyvpia  cod. 

*  έκάστηί  supplevit  Kenyon  :  αφφυ\η$  cod. 

"  See  xlix.  3  n. 
164 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  lx.  1— lxi.  l 

test  in  music,  the  gymnastic  contest  and  the  horse- 
race, and  have  the  Robe**  made,  and  in  conjunction 
with  the  Council  have  the  vases  ^  made,  and  assign  the 
olive-oil  to  the  competitors.  The  oil  is  procured  from  2 
the  sacred  trees  ;  and  the  Archon  levies  it  from  the 
owners  of  the  farms  in  which  the  trees  are,  three 
quarters  of  a  pint  from  each  trunk.  Formerly  the  state 
used  to  sell  the  fruit,  and  anybody  who  dug  up  or  cut 
down  a  sacred  olive-tree  was  tried  by  the  Council  of 
Areopagus,  and  if  found  guilty  punished  vnth  death  ; 
but  ever  since  the  olive-oil  has  been  provided  as  rent  by 
the  owner  of  the  farm,  though  the  law  still  stands,  the 
trial  has  gone  out  ;  and  the  state's  claim  to  the  oil 
is  calculated  on  the  estate  and  not  on  the  number 
of  trees.''  So  the  Archon  collects  the  tribute  of  oil  3 
accruing  in  his  year,  and  passes  it  on  to  the  Treasurers 
at  the  Acropolis,  and  he  is  not  allowed  to  go  up  to 
the  Areopagus  before  he  has  handed  the  full  quantity 
over  to  the  Treasurers.  These  have  it  in  their  keeping 
in  the  Acropolis  always,  except  that  at  the  Pan- 
athenaic  Festival  they  dole  it  out  to  the  Directors 
of  the  Games  and  these  to  the  victorious  competitors. 
For  the  prizes  are  for  the  victors  in  music  silver  money 
and  gold  vessels,  for  those  in  manly  beauty  shields, 
and  for  those  in  the  gymnastic  contest  and  the  horse- 
race olive-oil. 

LXI.  They  also  elect  by  show  of  hands  all  the  1 
military  officers — ten  Generals,  formerly  one  from 
each  tribe,  but  now  from  all  the  citizens  together,  and 
the  vote  decides  the  assignment  of  duties  to  these 

*  In  athletic  contests  the  prize  was  a  vase  of  oil  and  a 
garland  of  foliage  from  the  sacred  olive-trees. 

■^  i.e.  the  amount  per  tree  stated  above  is  only  approxi- 
mately calculated. 

165 


ARISTOTLE 

Tovs  όπλίτας,  os  ηγείται  των  οπλιτών  αν  εξίωσι, 
€va  δ  €πΙ  την  χωράν,  os  φνλάττ€ΐ,  καν  πόλεμος 
ev  Trj  χωρά  γίγνηται  πολεμεί  ούτος•  8νο  δ'  επΙ  τον 
Ueipaiea,  τον  μεν  εις  την  Μουνυχίαν  τον  δ'  εις 
την  Άκτην,  οΐ  της  φυλακής^  επιμελούνται  τών^ 
εν  ΙΙειραιεΐ'  ενα  δ'  επι  τάς  συμμορίας,  δς  τους 
τε  τριήραρχους  καταλέγει  και  τάς  άντώόσεις  αύτοΐς 
ποιεί  και  τα?  διαδικασία?  αύτοΐς  εΙσάγει•  τους  δ' 
άλλους  προς  τα  παρόντα  πράγματα   εκπεμπουσιν. 

2  επιχειροτονία  δ'  αυτών  εστί  κατά  την  πρυτανείαν 
εκάστην,  ει  8οκοΰσιν  καλώς  άρχειν  καν  τίνα  άπο- 
χειροτονησωσιν ,  κρίνουσιν  εν  τω  8ικαστηρίω,  καν 
μεν  άλω  τιμώσιν  δ  τι  χρη  παθεΐν  η  άποτεΐσαι,  αν 
δ  αποφυγή  πάλιν  άρχει,  κύριοι  8ε  εισιν  οται/ 
ηγώνται  και  8ησαί  τόν^  άτακτοΰντα  και  εκ- 
κηρΰζαι*  και  επιβολην  επιβάλλειν  ουκ  ειώθασι  8ε 
επιβάλλειν. 

3  ^ειροτονοΰσι  8έ  και  ταζιάρχους  8εκα,  ενα  της 
φυλής  εκάστης•  ούτος  δ'  ηγείται  τών  φυλετών  και 
λοχαγούς  καθίστησιν. 

4  Ύ^ειροτονοϋσι  8ε  και  ιππάρχους  8ύο  εζ  απάντων 
ούτοι  δ'  ηγούνται  τών  ιππέων,  8ιελόμενοι  τάς 
φυλάς  ε'  εκάτερος•  κύριοι  8έ  τών  αύτώΐ'  είσιν  ώνπερ^ 
οι  στρατηγοί  κατά  τών  οπλιτών,  επιχειροτονία  8ε 
γίνεται  και^  τούτων. 

5  ^ειροτονοΰσι    8έ     και    φυλάρχους    ι','    ενα    της 

^  φνλακηί  coni.  Kenyon,  φνλης  secundum  codicem  dedit. 

*  των  Wilamowitz-Kaibel :  καίτων  cod. 

•''  Tiv  cod. :  corr.  Wilamowitz-Kaibel. 

*  κ-ηρνξαι  cod. :  corr.  Blass. 

'  (ΙσΙ»  ώντΓΐρ  Wilamowitz-Kaibel :  wvirepeiaiv  cod. 

•  και  suppleuit  Gertz. 

'  nnmerum  i'  suppleuit  Richards. 

166 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  lxi.  1-5 

— one  being  appointed  to  the  heavy  infantry,  who 
commands  them  on  foreign  expeditions ;  one  to  the 
country,  who  guards  it  and  commands  in  any  war 
that  takes  place  in  it  ;  two  to  Peiraeus,  one  of  them 
to  Munychia  and  the  other  to  the  Point,  who  super- 
intend the  protection  of  the  population  of  Peiraeus  ; 
one  to  the  Symmories,'*  who  enrols  the  Captains  of 
triremes  and  carries  out  their  exchanges  and  intro- 
duces their  claims  for  exemption  ;  and  the  others  they 
dispatch  on  expeditions  as  occasion  arises.  A  con-  2 
firmatory  vote  is  taken  in  each  presidency  upon  the 
satisfactoriness  of  their  administration  ;  and  if  this 
vote  goes  against  any  officer  he  is  tried  in  the  jury- 
court,  and  if  convicted,  the  penalty  or  fine  to  be 
imposed  on  him  is  assessed,  but  if  he  is  acquitted  he 
resumes  office.  When  in  command  of  a  force  they 
have  power  to  punish  breach  of  discipline  with  im- 
prisonment, exile,  or  the  infliction  of  a  fine  ;  but  a 
fine  is  not  usual. 

They  also  elect  by  show  of  hands  ten  Regimental  3 
Commanders,  one  of  each  tribe  ;    these  lead  their 
fellow-tribesmen  and  appoint  company-commanders. 

They  also  elect  by  show  of  hands  two  Cavalry  4 
Commanders  from  the  whole  body  of  citizens  ;  these 
lead  the  Knights,  each  commanding  a  division  con- 
sisting of  five  tribes,  and  their  powers  are  the  same  as 
those  of  the  Generals  over  the  heavy  infantry.  The 
Cavalry  Commanders'  election  also  is  submitted  to  a 
confirmatory  vote. 

They  also  elect  by  show  of  hands  ten  Tribal  Com-  5 

"  The  20  companies  in  which  the  1200  richest  citizens 
were  enrolled  for  payment  of  the  ΐίσφορά  or  property-tax 
levied  to  meet  emergency  expenses  of  war. 

167 


ARISTOTLE 

φνλης,    τον    ηγησόμ€νον    των    Ιππβων^    ωσττβρ    οι 

ταζίαρχοί  τών  οπλιτών. 
6      ^eipoTOVouat   8e    καΐ   εΙς   Αημνον   ΐππαρχον,   δς 

e77t/xeAetTai  τών  ίττττβων  τών  iv  Αημνω. 
1      ^(ΐροτονοΰσι   Se   καΐ   ταμίαν   της    Παράλου    καΐ 

νϋν^  της  του  "Αμμωνος. 

1  LXII.  At  δε  κληρωτοί  άρχαΐ  ττρότβρον  μ€ν  ήσαν 
at  μβν  μ€τ  evvia  αρχόντων  €Κ  της  φυλής  δλης 
κληρουμ€ναι,  at  δ'  ei^  Θησβίω  κληρούμ^ναι  δι- 
ηροΰντο  ets"  τους  8ημους•  €π€ώη  δ'  €πώλουν  οΐ 
8ημοι,  καΐ  ταύτας  €κ  της  φυλής  δλης  κληροΰσι, 
πλην  βουλευτών  καΐ  φρουρών  τούτους  δ'  etj  τους 
8ημους  άποΒώοασι. 

2  Μισθοφοροΰσι  δβ  πρώτον  ο  8ημος  ται?  μ€ν 
άλλαί?  €κκλησίαις  Βραχμην,  τη  δε  κυρία  ivvea 
οβόλους^'  €π€ίτα  τα  δικαστήρια  τρεις  όβολούς•  €ΪΘ' 
η  βουλή  π€ντ€  οβολούς.  τοις  Se  πρυτανεύουσιν  €ΐς 
σίτησιν  όβολός  προστίθεται  [δέκα  προστίθενται].* 
έ'ττειτ'  εις  σίτησιν  λαμβάνουσιν  εννέα  άρχοντες 
τετταρας  όβολούς  έκαστος,  και  παρατρεφουσι 
κήρυκα  και  αύλητην  επειτ'  άρχων  εις  Σ^αλαμΐνα 
Βραχμην  της  ημέρας,  άθλοθεται  δ  εν  πρυτανείω 
^ειπνοΰσι  τον  'Έικατομβαιώνα  μήνα  orar  η  τά 
Eiat'a^Tyvaia,  αρζαμενοι  από  της  τετρα8ος  ιστά- 
μενου, άμφικτύονες  εις  Αηλον  ^ραχμην  της  ημέρας 
εκάστης   εκ    Αηλου   λαμβάνουσι.^     λαμβάνουσι    δε 

^  τών  ί-πττέων  suppleuit  Kenyon. 

*  νυν  Blass:  erasuni,  δίχα  legit  Kenyon. 

'  6β6\ουί  suppletum  a  Wilamowitz-Kaibel. 

«  Blass, 
'  λαμβάνουσι  suppleuit  Kenyon  (cf.  Ivii.  2). 
168 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  lxi.  5— lxii.  2 

manders,  one  for  each  tribe,  to  lead  the  cavalry  as  the 
Regimental  Commanders  lead  the  heavy  infantry. 

They  also  elect  by  show  of  hands  a  Cavalry  Com-  6 
mander  for  Lemnos,  to  take  control  of  the  cavalry  in 
that  island. 

They  also  elect  by  show  of  hands  a  Treasurer  of  7 
the  Paralus,"  and  at  the  present  day  a  Treasurer  of 
the  ship  of  Ammon. 

LXII.  The  officials  elected  by  lot  were  formerly  1 
those  elected  from  the  whole  tribe  together  with  the 
Nine  Archons  and  those  now  elected  in  the  temple  of 
Theseus  who  used  to  be  divided  among  the  demes  ; 
but  since  the  demes  began  to  sell  their  offices,  the 
latter  also  are  elected  by  lot  from  the  whole  tribe, 
excepting  members  of  the  Council  and  Guards  ^ ; 
these  they  entrust  to  the  demes. 

Payment  for  public  duties  is  as  follows  :  first,  the  2 
People  draw  a  drachma  for  ordinary  meetings  of  the 
Assembly,  and  a  drachma  and  a  half  for  a  sovereign 
meeting  <= ;  second,  the  Jury-courts  half  a  drachma  ; 
third,  the  Council  five  obols  ;  and  those  acting  as 
president  have  an  additional  obol  for  food.  Also  the 
Nine  Archons  get  four  obols  each  for  food,  and  have 
to  keep  a  herald  and  a  flute-player  as  well ;  and  the 
archon  for  Salamis  gets  a  drachma  a  day.  Games- 
directors  dine  in  the  Prytaneum  in  the  month  of 
Hecatombaeon,  during  the  Panathenaic  Festival, 
from  the  fourth  of  the  month  onward.  Amphictyons 
for  Delos  get  a  drachma  a  day  from  Delos.     All  the 

"  One  of  the  state  triremes  used  for  embassies,  etc.  The 
other,  the  Salaminia,  was  superseded  by  the  one  named 
after  Zeus  Ammon,  specially  used  to  convey  missions  to 
Cyrene  on  the  way  to  the  shrine  of  Zeus  Ammon. 

*  Possibly  the  guards  of  the  docks,  mentioned  at  xxiv.  3. 

"  See  xliii.  4. 

169 


ARISTOTLE 

/cat  οσαι  αποστέλλονται  άρχαΐ  ei?  Σιάμον  η  Υικΰρον 
η  Αημνον  η  "Ιμβρον  els  σίτησιν  άργύρι,ον. 
3       ApxeLv  δε  τα?  μβν  κατά  πόλβμον  αρχάς  ε^εστι 
ττλβονάκίς,    των    δ'    άλλων    ονΒβμίαν,    πλην    βου- 
λευσαι  δι?. 

1  LXIII.  Τα  δε  Βικαστήρια  κληροΰσιν  οι  θ'  άρ- 
χοντες κατά  φυλάς,  6  δε  γραμματεύς  των  θεσμό - 

2  θετών  της  Βεκάτης  φυλής. ^  εϊσο8οί  δε  elatv  εΙς 
τα  δικαστήρια  δε'κτα,  μία  τη  φυλή  εκάστη,  και 
κληρωτήρια  είκοσι,  δυο  τη  φυλή  εκάστη,  καΐ 
κιβώτια  εκατόν,  8εκα  τη  φυλή  εκάστη,  και  έτερα 
κιβώτια  εις  ά^  εμβάλλεται  τών  λα;!^οντων  δικαστών 
τα  ττινακια,  και  ύ8ρίαι  δυο  και  βακτηρίαι  παρα- 
τίθενται κατά  την  εί'σοδον'  εκάστην  δσοιπερ  οι 
δικασται,  και  βάλανοι  εις  την  υδριαν  εμβάλλονται 
ισαι  ται$•  βακτηρίαις,  γεγραπται  δε  ε'ν  ταΓ?  βαλάνοις 
τά  στοιχεία  άπο  του  ενδεκάτου,  του  λ,*  οσαπερ  αν 

3  μελλη  τά  δικαστήρια  πληρωθήσεσθαι.  Βικάζειν  δ' 
εζεστιν  τοις  υπέρ  λ'  ετΐ7  γεγονόσιν,  όσοι  αυτών  μη 
οφειλουσιν  τω  8ημοσίω  η  άτιμοι  είσιν  εάν  8ε  τι? 
8ικάζη  οίς^  μη  εζεστιν,  ενδείκνυται  και  εις  το 
8ικαστηριον  εισάγεται,  εάν  δ'  άλω  προστιμώσιν 
αύτώ  οι  δικασται  ο  τι  άν  8οκη  άζιος  είναι  παθεϊν 
η  άποτισαι•  εάν  δε  αργυρίου  τιμηθη  δει  αύτον  δε- 

^  Tjj  δΐκάτΎ}  φν'ΚΎΐ  ?  Richards. 

^  κιβώτια  δέκα  ei's  ά  (uel  ors)alii:  κιβω Cod. 

^  Kenyon :  Ιζοδοί'  Hommel  •.  e  .  .  .  cod. 
*  Kenyon:  post  λ  inserit  τριακοστού  (inter pretans)  cod. 
^  ψ  Richards. 

°  'The  dicasts  in  each  tribe  are  distributed  over  all  the 
10  divisions  into  which  all  the  dicasts  are  divided.  In  each 
tribe  all  the  tickets  {πινάκια)  bearing  the  names  of  the  dicasts 
in  the  division  A  are  placed  in  the  first  κιβωτών,  those  of 
170 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  lxii.  2— lxiii.  3 

officials  sent  to  Samos,  Scyros,  Lemnos  or  Imbros  also 
get  money  for  food. 

The  military  offices  may  be  held  repeatedly,  but  3 
none  of  the  others,  except  that  a  man  may  become  a 
member  of  the  Council  twice. 

LXIII.  The  Jury-courts  are  elected  by  lot  by  the  1 
Nine  Archons  by  tribes,  and  the  Clerk  of  the  Law- 
givers from  the  tenth  tribe.  The  courts  have  ten  2 
entrances,  one  for  each  tribe,  twenty  rooms,  two  for 
each  tribe,  in  which  courts  are  allotted  to  jurors,  a 
hundred  small  boxes,  ten  for  each  tribe,"  and  other 
boxes  into  which  the  tickets  of  the  jurymen  drawn  by 
lot  are  thrown,  and  two  urns.  Staves  are  placed  at 
each  entrance,  as  many  as  there  are  jurymen,  and 
acorns  to  the  same  number  as  the  staves  are  thrown 
into  the  urn,  and  on  the  acorns  are  written  the  letters 
of  the  alphabet,  starting  with  the  eleventh,  lambda,  as 
many  as  the  courts  that  are  going  to  be  filled.  Right  3 
to  sit  on  juries  belongs  to  all  those  over  thirty  years 
old  who  are  not  in  debt  to  the  Treasury  or  dis- 
franchised. If  any  unqualified  person  sits  on  a  jury, 
information  is  laid  against  him  and  he  is  brought 
before  the  jury-court,  and  if  convicted  the  jurymen 
assess  against  him  whatever  punishment  or  fine  he  is 
thought  to  deserve  ;  and  if  given  a  money  fine,  he  has 

division  Β  in  the  second,  and  so  on  for  all  the  10  divisions. 
According  to  the  number  of  dicasts  required,  an  equal 
number  of  tickets  is  draΛvn  by  lot  from  each  of  the  100 
κφώτια.  Each  ticket  so  drawn  has  a  court  assigned  to  it 
by  lot ;  and  the  tickets  are  now  all  placed  in  the  second  set 
of  10  κίβώτια,  all  tickets  assigned  to  dicasts  of  any  special 
court  being  placed  in  the  κιβωτών  which  bears  the  letter 
corresponding  to  that  court.  The  names  of  all  the  dicasts 
selected  to  serve  are  thus  distributed  over  the  several  courts 
that  are  to  sit  on  the  day  in  question  '  (Sandys).  See  further 
ch.  Ixiv. 

171 


ARISTOTLE 

SeaOaL  €ως  αν  εκτίσΊ]  τό  re  πρότερον  οφλημα  €φ' 
ώ    βνβΒζίχθη    και    δ   τι    αν    αύτω    προστιμ-ήσ-η    τό 

4  ^ικαστιηριον .  €χ€ΐ  δ'  ζκαστος  δικαστή?  ev  πινάκιον 
ττύζινον,  Ιπιγεγραμμένον  τό  όνομα  τό  iavrov  πα- 
τρόθβν  και  τοΰ  8'ημου  και  γράμμα  ev  των  στοι- 
χ€ΐων  μ^χρι  τοΰ  κ•  νβνβμηνται  γαρ  κατά  φυλάς 
δεκτά  μ€ρη  οι  δι/cασταt,  παραπλησίως  Ισοι  iv 
€Κάστω  τω  γράμματι. 

5  Εττειδάν  δε  ό  θεσμοθίτιις  €πικληρώ(Γη  τά  γράμ- 
ματα α  δει  ττροσπαρατίθεσθαι  τοις  Βικαστηρίοις, 
€π€θηκ€  φβρων  6  υπηρέτης  €φ'  €καστον  τό  Βικα- 
στηριον  το  γράμμα  το  λαχόν. 

Only  fragments  of  the  remaining  pages  of  the  ms. 
survive,  much  defaced.  The  most  legible  passages  are 
here  appended,  gaps  having  been  filled  in  without  note 
where  the  restoration  is  generally  accepted  or  is  very 
probable. 

1  LXIV.  Τά  δε  κιβώτια  τά  δέκα  κείται  ev  τω 
€μ7Γροσθ€ν  της  εισόδου  κα^'  €κάστην  την  φυλην. 
βπιγβγραπται  δ  εττ  αϋτώι^  τά  στοι^^εΐα  μ^χρι  τοΰ 
κ.  εττειδάν  δ'  €μβάλωσιν  οι  δικασται  τά  πινάκια 
€ΐς  το  κιβώτιον  ε0'  ου  αν  η  βττιγεγραμμένον  το 
γράμμα  το  αύτο  owep  im  τω  πινακίω  €στιν  αύτω 
των  στοιχείων,  Βιασείσαντος  τοΰ  ύττηρ4του  έλκει  6 
θεσμοθέτης  εζ  εκάστου  τοΰ  κιβωτίου  ττινάκιον  εν 

2  ούτος  δε  καλείται  εμπήκτης,  και  εμττηγνυσι  τά 
πινάκια  τά  εκ  τοΰ  κιβωτίου  εις  την  κανονίΒα 
εφ  'ής  τό  αυτό  γράμμα  επεστιν  όπερ  επι  τοΰ 
κιβωτίου,  κληροΰται  δε  ούτος  ϊνα  μη  άει  6  αυτός 
εμπηγνύων    κακουργη.     εισι    δε    κανονίΒες    πεντε^ 

172 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  lxiii.  3— lxiv.  2 

to  go  to  prison  until  he  has  paid  both  the  former  debt, 
for  which  the  information  was  laid,  and  whatever 
additional  sum  has  been  imposed  on  him  as  a  fine  by 
the  court.  Each  juryman  has  one  box-wood  ticket,  4 
with  his  own  name  and  that  of  his  father  and  deme 
written  on  it,  and  one  letter  of  the  alphabet  as  far  as 
kappa  ;  for  the  jurymen  of  each  tribe  are  divided 
into  ten  sections,  approximately  an  equal  number 
under  each  letter. 

As   soon  as  the  Lawgiver  has  drawn  by  lot   the  5 
letters  to  be  assigned  to  the  courts,  the  attendant 
immediately  takes  them  and  affixes  to  each  court  its 
allotted  letter. 


LXIV.  The  ten  boxes  lie  in  front  of  the  entrance  for  1 
each  tribe.  They  have  inscribed  on  them  the  letters 
as  far  as  kappa.  When  the  jurymen  have  thrown 
their  tickets  into  the  box  on  which  is  inscribed  the 
same  letter  of  the  alphabet  as  is  on  the  ticket  itself, 
the  attendant  shakes  them  thoroughly  and  the  Law- 
giver draws  one  ticket  from  each  box.  This  attendant  2 
is  called  the  Affixer,  and  he  affixes  the  tickets  taken 
from  the  box  to  the  ledged  frame  on  which  is  the 
same  letter  that  is  on  the  box.  This  attendant  is 
chosen  by  lot,  in  order  that  the  same  person  may  not 
always  affix  the  tickets  and  cheat.     There  are  five 

^  πέντ€  Blass,  5έκα  alii :  lacunam  cod. 

173 


ARISTOTLE 

3  iv  €κάστω  των  κληρωτηρίων.  όταν  Se  ζμβάλτ} 
τους  κύβους,  6  άρχων  την  φυλην  κλ-ηροΐ  κατά 
κληρωτηριον.  elal  8e  κύβοι  χαλκοΐ  μελανές  καΙ 
Χζυκοί•  όσους  δ'  αν  hlrj  λαχ^ΐν  Βίκαστάς,  τοσούτοι 
€μβάλλοντα(,  λευκοί,  κατά  ττάντ€  πινάκια  €Ϊς,  οι 
δε  μΙΧανβς  τον  αύτον  τρόπον,  επεώάν  δ'  i^aiprj^ 
τους     κύβους,     καλβΐ    τους     ξίληχότας     6     κηρυζ' 

4  υπάρχει  he  και  6  €μπ'ήκτης  βίς  τον  αριθμόν.  6  Sc 
κληθ€ΐς  και  ύπακούσας  e'A/cet  βάλανον  e/c  της 
ύΒρίας,  και  όρεξας  αύτην  άνβχων  το  γράμμα,  Bei- 
κνυσιν  πρώτον  μεν  τω  άρχοντι  τω  εφζστηκότι•  6 
Be  άρχων  βττειδάν  ιΒη,  εμβάλλει  το  πινάκιον  αύτοΰ 
€ΐς  το  κιβώτιον  οπού  αν  η  επιγεγραμμενον  το 
αύτο  στοιχεΐον  όπερ  εν  τη  βαλάνω,  ΐν^  εις  οίον 
άν  λάχη  εισίη  και  μη  εΙς  οίον  άν  βούληται,  μηΒε 
η  συναγαγεΐν  εις  Βικαστηριον  ους  άν  βούληται  τι?. 

6  παράκειται  Be  τω  άρχοντι  κιβώτια  δσαπερ  άν 
με?<λη  τά  Βικαστηρια  πληρωθησεσθαι,  έχοντα  στοι- 
χεΐον  εκαστον  όπερ  άν  fj  επι  του  Βικαστηριου 
εκάστου  είληχός. 

1  LXV.  Αυτός  Βε  Βείζας  πάλιν  τω  υπηρέτη  €?τ' 
εντός  εισέρχεται  της  κιγχλίΒος.^  6  Βε  υπηρέτης 
ΒίΒωσιν  αύτω  βακτηρίαν  ομόχρων  τω  Βικαστηρίω 
εφ*  ου  τό  αυτό  γράμμα  εστίν  όπερ  εν  τη  βαλάνω, 
ίνα  α.ναγκαΐον  η  αύτω  εισελθεΐν  εις  δ  εϊληχε  Βικα- 
στηριον εάν  γάρ  εις  έτερον  εισίη  εξελέγχεται  υπό 

2  του  χρώματος  της  βακτηρίας•  τοις  γάρ  Βικα- 
στηρίοις  χρώματα^  επιγεγραπται  εκάστω  επι  τω 
σφηκίσκω  της  είσόΒου.     ό  Βε  λαβών  την  βακτηρίαν 

^  ^ξΐλ-τϊ  alii :  e  .  .  .  cod. 

'  primae  sententiae  supersunt  tantum  paucae  literae  incertae. 

*  χρώμα  edd.  e  schol.  Aristoph.  Plut.  277. 

174 


.  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  lxiv.  3— lxv.  2 

ledged  frames  in  each  of  the  balloting-rooms.  When  3 
he  has  thrown  in  the  dice,  the  Archon  casts  lots  for 
the  tribe  for  each  balloting-room ;  they  are  dice  of 
copper,  black  and  white.  As  many  white  ones  are 
thrown  in  as  jurymen  are  required  to  be  selected,  one 
white  die  for  each  five  tickets,  and  the  black  dice 
correspondingly.  As  he  draws  out  the  dice  the  herald 
calls  those  on  whom  the  lot  has  fallen.  Also  the 
Affixer  is  there  corresponding  to  the  number.  The  4 
man  called  obeys  and  draws  an  acorn  from  the  urn 
and,  holding  it  out  with  the  inscription  upward,  shows 
it  first  to  the  superintending  Archon ;  when  the 
Archon  has  seen  it,  he  throws  the  man's  ticket  into 
the  box  that  has  the  same  letter  written  on  it  as  the 
one  on  the  acorn,  in  order  that  he  may  go  into  what- 
ever court  he  is  allotted  to  and  not  into  whatever 
court  he  chooses  and  in  order  that  it  may  not  be 
possible  to  collect  into  a  court  whatever  jurymen  a 
person  wishes.  The  Archon  has  by  him  as  many  5 
boxes  as  courts  are  going  to  be  filled,  each  lettered 
with  whichever  is  the  letter  assigned  by  lot  to  each 
court. 

LXV.  And  the  man  himself  having  again  shown  it  1 
to  the  attendant  then  goes  inside  the  barrier,  and  the 
attendant  gives  him  a  staff  of  the  same  colour  as  the 
court  bearing  the  same  letter  as  the  one  on  the  acorn, 
in  order  that  it  may  be  necessary  for  him  to  go  into 
the  court  to  which  he  has  been  assigned  by  lot ;  for  if 
he  goes  into  another,  he  is  detected  by  the  colour  of 
his  staff,  for  each  of  the  courts  has  a  colour  painted  2 
on  the  lintel  of  its  entrance.    He  takes  the  staff  and 


175 


ARISTOTLE 

jSaSt^ei  et?  το  Si/caarr^piov  το  όμόχρων  μ€ΐ'  τύ] 
βακτηρία  €χον  Be  το  αυτό  γράμμα  όπερ  iv  τω 
βαλάνω.  €7Τ€ΐ8άν  δ'  είσ^λθτ],  τταραλαμβάνεί  σνμ- 
βολον    8ημοσία    πάρα    του    βίληχότος    ταντην    την 

3  αρχήν.  €ΐτα  την  τ€  βάλανον  /cat  την  βακτηρίαν^ 
iv  τώ  Βίκαστηρίο)  τούτον  τρόπον  εΙσεΧηΧυθότες. 
τοις  δ'   άπολαγχάνουσιν  άττοδιδόασιν  οΐ  εμπηκται 

4  τα  πινάκια,  οΐ  he  ύπηρ4ται  οι  δημόσιοι  από  της 
φνλης  4κάστης  τταραδιδόασι  τα  κιβώτια,  ev  €πι  το 
8ικαστήριον  εκαστον,  ev  ω  eveuTi  τα  ονόματα  της 
φυλής  τα  όντα  ev  Ικάστω  των  δικαστηρίων, 
παραόιόόασι  he  τοις  είληχόσι  ταύτα  άττοδιδοι^αι 
τοΓ?  δικασται?  iv  έκάστω  [τώ]^  Βικαστηριω  αριθμώ 
τά  πινάκια  όπως  iK  τούτων  σκοποϋντες  απο• 
Βώώσι  τον  μισθόν. 

1  LXVI.  Έπβιδάν  Se  πάντα  πλήρη  η  τά  δικα- 
στήρια, τίθεται  iv  τω  πρώτω  των  δικαστηρίων 
β'  κληρωτήρια  και  κύβοι  χαλκοί  ev  οίς  επι- 
γεγραπται  τά  χρώματα  των  δικαστηρίων,  και 
€Tepoi  κύβοι  iv  οΐς  ioTiv  των  αρχών  τά  ονόματα 
iπιγeγpaμμeva.  λαχόντες  be  τών  θεσμοθετών  δυο 
χωρίς  εκατερων  τους  κύβους  iμβάλλoυσιv ,  ο  μεν 
τά  χρώματα  εις  το  εν  κληρωτήριον,  6  δε  τών 
αρχών  τά  ονόματα  εις  το  έτερον,  η  8  αν  πρώτη 
λάχη  τών  αρχών,  αύτη  αναγορεύεται  ύπο  τοΰ 
κήρυκος  οτι  χρήσεται  τω  πρώτω  λαχόντι  δικα- 
στή ρ  ίω.   .   .   . 

Ofcc.  Ixvi.  2-lxviii.  2  (ms.  pp.  S3,  34)  only  fragments 
remain,  variously  put  together  and  supplemented  by 
editors. 


176 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  lxv.  2— lxviii.  1 

goes  to  the  court  of  the  same  colour  as  his  staff  and 
having  the  same  letter  as  is  on  the  acorn.  And  when 
he  has  come  into  it  he  receives  a  token  publicly  from 
the  person  appointed  by  lot  to  this  office.  Then  3 
with  the  acorn  and  the  staff  they  take  their  seats 
in  the  court,  when  they  have  thus  entered.  And  to 
those  to  whom  the  lot  does  not  fall  the  Affixers  give 
back  their  tickets.  And  the  public  attendants  from  4 
each  tribe  hand  over  the  boxes,  one  to  each  court, 
in  which  are  those  names  of  the  tribe  that  are  in 
each  of  the  courts.  And  they  hand  them  over  to  the 
persons  appointed  by  lot  to  restore  the  tickets  to 
the  jurymen  in  each  court  by  number,  in  order  that 
according  to  these  when  they  examine  them  they 
may  assign  the  pay. 

LXVI.  When  all  the  courts  are  full,  two  ballot-  ] 
boxes  are  placed  in  the  first  of  the  courts,  and  copper 
dice  with  the  colours  of  the  courts  painted  on  them, 
and  other  dice  with  the  names  of  the  offices  written 
on  them.  And  two  of  the  Lawgivers  are  chosen  by 
lot,  and  throw  the  two  sets  of  dice  in  separately,  one 
throwing  in  the  coloured  dice  into  one  ballot-box  and 
the  other  the  names  of  the  offices  into  the  other.  And 
to  whichever  of  the  offices  the  lot  falls  first,  it  is 
proclaimed  by  the  herald  that  this  will  use  the  first 
court  allotted.  ... 

^  βακτ-ηρίαν     <,^χοΐ'τε$     Kaei^'ovffii'y     Kenyon :     <άποηθέασιν> 
Thalheim. 

^  si  recte  legitur,  dittographiam  seel.  ed. 


177 


ARISTOTLE 

2  LXVIII.  .  .  .  μζτα  τον  γ'  (άττοδιδού?  γαρ  γ' 
λαμβάνει)    ίνα    φηφίζωνται    ττΟΛ>τ€ς'    ου    γαρ    βστί 

3  λαβ(ΐν  σνμβολον  ovSevi  eav  μη  φηφίζηται.  elal  δε 
αμφορείς  δυο  Κ€ίμ€νοι  iv  τω  8ικαστηρίω,  6  μ^ν 
χαλκούς  ό  δε  ξύλινος,  διαιρετοί  όπως  μη  λάθτ] 
υποβάλλων  τις  φηφους,  ει?  ους  φηφίζονται  οΐ 
δικτασται,  ό  μ€ν  χαλκούς  κύριος  ό  δε  ζυλινός  άκυρος, 
€χων  6  χαλκούς  επίθημα  ^ιβρρινημένον  ωστ  αυτήν 
μόνην    χωρ€Ϊν    την    φηφον,    ίνα    μη    δυο    ο    αυτός 

4  ζμβάλλη.  ε'ττειδάν  δε  8ιαφηφίζ€σθαι  μβλλωσιν  οι 
οικασταί,  6  κηρυζ  αγορεύει  πρώτον  αν  βπισκη- 
πτωνται  οι  αντιΒικοι  ταΐς  μαρτυρίαις'  ου  γαρ 
€στιν  €πισκήφασθαι  όταν  άρζωνται  Βιαφηφίζβσθαι. 
εττειτα  πάλιν  ανακηρύττει  "  η  τ€τροπημ4νη  του 
προτ€ρον  λέγοντος  η  δε  πλήρης  του  ύστερον 
λέγοντος."  6  δε  Βικαστης  λαβών  άμα^  εκ  του 
λυχνείου  τάς  φηφους,  πιεζων  τον  αύλίσκον  της 
φηφου  και  ου  δεικνύων  τοις  άγωνιζομενοις  ούτε 
το  τετροπημενον  ούτε  το  πλήρες,  εμβάλλει  την 
μεν  κυριαν  εις  τον  χαλκοΰν  αμφορέα  την  δε  άκυρον 
εις  τον  ζύλινον. 

1  LXIX.  ΐΐάντες  δ'  επειδά»^  ωσι  8ιεφηφισμενοι, 
λαβόντες  οι  ύπηρεται  τον  αμφορέα  τον  κύριον 
εξερώσι  επι  αβακα  τρυπήματα  έχοντα  δσαιπερ 
εισιν  αι  φηφοι,  Ιν^  αύται  φανεραΐ  προκειμεναι 
εύαριθμητοι  ώσιν,  και  τα  τρυπητά  και  τα  πλήρη 
8ηλα  τοις  άντώίκοις.  οι  δε  επι  τάς  φηφους  είλη- 
χοτες  8ιαριθμοΰσιν  αυτά?  ε'ττι  τοΰ  άβακος,  χωρίς 
μεν    τας    πλήρεις    χωρίς    δε    τάς    τετρυπημενας. 

'  και  αναγορεύει  ο   κηρυζ  τον  αριθμόν  τών  φήφων, 

^  \aβ6μevos  alii :  λα  |  .  .  .  cod. 
178 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  lxviii.  2— lxix.  1 

LXVIII.  .  .  .  <a  copper  token  marked  with  a>  2 
3  (for  on  giving  this  up  he  gets  three  obols),  so  that 
they  all  may  vote  ;  for  nobody  can  get  a  token  if 
he  does  not  vote.  And  there  are  two  jars  placed  in  3 
the  court,  one  of  copper  and  one  of  wood,  separate 
so  that  a  man  may  not  secretly  throw  in  pebbles 
undetected,  into  which  the  jurymen  put  their  votes, 
the  copper  jar  to  count  and  the  wooden  jar  for 
pebbles  not  used,  the  copper  jar  having  a  lid  with 
a  hole  in  it  only  large  enough  to  take  just  the 
pebble  alone,  so  that  the  same  man  may  not  throw  in 
two.  And  when  the  jury  are  about  to  give  their  4 
verdict,  the  herald  first  asks  whether  the  litigants 
wish  to  challenge  the  evidence  of  the  witnesses  ;  for 
they  are  not  allowed  to  challenge  it  after  the  voting 
has  begun.  Then  he  proclaims  again,  '  The  pebble 
with  the  hole  through  it  is  a  vote  for  the  first  speaker, 
and  the  whole  pebble  one  for  the  second  speaker.' 
And  the  juryman  when  taking  the  pebbles  out  of  the 
lamp-stand  presses  the  pebble  against  the  lamp-stand 
and  does  not  let  the  parties  to  the  action  see  either  the 
perforated  pebble  or  the  whole  one,  and  throws  the 
one  that  he  wishes  to  count  into  the  copper  vessel  and 
the  one  that  he  discards  into  the  wooden  one. 

LXIX.  And  when  all  have  voted,  the  attendants  1 
take  the  vessel  that  is  to  count  and  empty  it  out  on  to 
a  reckoning-board  with  as  many  holes  in  it  as  there 
are  pebbles,  in  order  that  they  may  be  set  out  visibly 
and  be  easy  to  count,  and  that  the  perforated  and 
the  whole  ones  may  be  clearly  seen  by  the  litigants. 
And  those  assigned  by  lot  to  count  the  voting-pebbles 
count  them  out  on  to  the  reckoning-board,  in  two 
sets,  one  the  whole  ones  and  the  other  those  per- 
forated.    And  the  herald  proclaims  the  number  of 

179 


ARISTOTLE 

τοΰ  μεν  Βιώκοντος  τάς  τ€τρυπημ€νας  του  8e 
φζνγοντος  τα?  πλήρεις•  οττοτίρω  δ'  αν  πλείων 
γενηται,  οντος  νικά,  άν  8e  ΐσαι,  6  φεύγων. 
2  €π€ΐτα  πάλιν  τιμώσι,  άν  Scrj  τιμησαι,  τον  αντον 
τρόπον  φηφιζόμενοι,  το  μεν  σύμβολον  απο- 
δίδοντες βακτηρίαν  8ε  πάλιν  παραλαμβάνοντες'  ή 
δε  τίμησίς  εστίν  προς  ημίχονν  ν8ατος  εκατερω. 
επεώάν  δε  αντοΐς  fj  δεδικασμένα  τα  εκ  των  νόμων, 
απολαμβάνουσιν  τον  μισθον  εν  τω  μέρει  ου  ελαχον 


180 


ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  lxix.  1-2 

votes,  the  perforated  pebbles  being  for  the  prosecutor, 
and  the  whole  ones  for  the  defendant ;  and  whichever 
gets  the  larger  number  wins  the  suit,  but  if  the  votes 
are  equal,  the  defendant  wins.  Then  again  they 
assess  the  damages,  if  this  has  to  be  done,  voting  in 
the  same  way,  giving  up  their  ticket  and  receiving 
back  a  staff;  as  to  assessment  of  damages  each 
party  is  allowed  to  speak  during  three  pints  of  water. 
And  when  they  have  completed  their  legal  duties  as 
jurymen,  they  take  their  pay  in  the  division  to  which 
each  was  assigned  by  lot.   .   .  . 


181 


INDEX  L— PROPER  NAMES 


{References  are  to  chapters  except  that  'fr.'  denotes  one  of  the  fragments 
printed  before  c.  1.) 


Acastus,  3 
Acherdusian,  38 
Acte,  42,  61 
Aegeus,  fr.  2,  fr.  6 
Aegospotami,  34 
Agyrrhius,  41 
Alcmaeon,  13 

Alcmaeonidae,  1,  19,  20,  28 
Alexias,  34 
Alopece,  22,  45 
Ammon,  61 
Ambracia,  17 
Anacreon,  18 
Anaphlystius,  29 
Anchirnolus,  19 
Angele,  34 
Anthemion,  7 
Antidotus,  26 
Antiphon,  32 
Anytus,  27,  34 
Aphidnn,  34 
Apollo,  fr.  1,  55 
Archestratus,  35 
Archinus,  17,  34,  40 
Arginusae,  34 
Argos,  17,  19 
Ariphron,  22 
Aristaechmus,  4 
Aristeides,  22-24,  28,  41 
Aristion,  14 
Aristocrates,  33 
Aristodiciis,  25 
Aristogeiton,  18,  58 
Aristomachus,  32 
Artemis,  58 


Asclepius,  56 
Athena,  14,  47 

Brauron,  54 
Bucolium,  3 

Callias,  32,  34 
Callibius,  37,  38 
Callicrates,  28 
Cedon,  20 
Cephisophon,  54 
Charmos,  22 
Chios,  24 
Chronos,  12 
Cimon,  25-28 
Cineas,  19 
Clazoinenae,  41 
Cleisthenes,  20«•.,  28,  41 
Cleitophon,  29,  34        ^ 
Cleomenes,  19,  20 
Cleon,  28 
Cleophon,  28,  34 
Codridae,  fr.  7 
Codrus,  3 

CoUytus,  14,  22      , 
Corneas,  14 
Conon,  25 
Creusa,  fr.  1 
Cronos,  16 
Cylon,  fr.  8 
Cypselidae,  17 

Damasias,  18 
Damonides,  27 
Decelea,  34 


183 


ARISTOTLE 


Delos,  54,  56,  62 
Delphi,  19 
Delphinium,  57 
Demaretus,  38 
Dionysia,  54,  56,  57 
Dionysus,  3 
Diphilus,  4 
Draco,  3,  4,  7,  41 
Dracontides,  84 

Eetionea,  87 
Egypt,  11 
Eleusis,  39,  40,  54 
Bnyalius,  58 

Ephialtes,  25  f.,  28,  35,  41 
Epilycenm,  3 
Epimenides,  1 
Erechtheus,  fr.  2 
Bretria,  15,  33 
Euboea,  33 
Eucieides,  39 
Eumelides,  45 
Eumolpidae,  39,  57 

Geraestus,  22 
Gorgilus,  17 

Hagnon,  28 
Harmodias,  18,  58 
Harpactides,  19,  45 
Hegesias.  14 
Hegesistratus,  17 
Hellenes,  23 
Hephaestus,  54 
Heracleides,  41 
Hermocreon,  22 
Herodotus,  14 
Hipparchns,  17-19,  22 
Hippias,  17-19 
Hippomenes,  fr.  7 
Homer,  fr.  4 
Hymettus,  16 
Hypsechides,  22 

Imbros,  62  • 

Ion,  fr.  1,  3,  41 
Ionia,  5 
lonians,  fr.  1 
lophon,  17 
Isagoras,  20,  21,  28 

Laciadae,  27 
Leimone,  fr.  7 
Leipsydrion,  19 


Lemnos,  61  f. 
Lenaeum,  57 
Leocoreum,  18 
Lesbos,  24 
Lycomedes,  fr.  6 
Lycurgus,  13,  14 
Lycus,  fr.  2 
Lygdainis,  15 
Lysander,  34 
Lysicrates,  26 
Lysimacbus,  21,  23,  45 

Marathon,  22 
Maronea,  22 
Medon,  3 

Megacles, /r.  8,  13  f.,  22 
Megara,  fr.  2,  14,  17 
Melobius,  29 
Miltiades,  26,  28 
Mnesilochus,  83 
Mnesitheides,  26 
Mimycbia,  19,  38,  42,  61 
Myron,  1 

Naxos,  15 
Neocles,  23 
Nicias,  28 
Nicodemus,  22 
Nisus,  fr.  2 

Oea,  27 
Olympians,  12 

Paeanians,  14,  38 

Palladium,  57 

Pallas,  fr.  2 

Pallenis,  15,  17 

Panathenaea,  53,  60,  62 

Pandion,/r.  2 

Paiigaeus,  15 

Paralus,  61 

Parnes,  19 

Pausanias,  23,  38 

Peiraeus,  35,  38,  89,  40,  54,  61 

Peisander,  32,  61 

Peisistratus,  13-17,  22,  41 

Pelargicum,  19 

Pericles,  26  f. 

Phaenippus,  22 

Phayllns,  38 

Pheidon,  10 

Philoneos,  17 

Phormisius,  84 

Phreatto,  57 


184 


INDEX  I.  TO  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION 


Phye,  14 
Phyle,  37,  38,  41 
Point,  42,  61 
Poseidon,  67 
Pylos,  27 
Pythia,  19,  21 
Pythodorus,  27,  29,  35,  41 

Rhaicelos,  15 
Rhinon,  38 

Salamis,  17,  22,  23,  27,  54,  62  f. 

Samoa,  /r.  6,  24,  62 

Scyllaeum,  22 

Scyros,  fr.  6,  62 

Sicily,  28,  29 

Simonides,  18 

Solon,  2,  5-14,  17,  22,  28,  35,  41,  47 

Sophonides,  25 

Soter,  56 

Spartiates,  19 


Tanagra,  25 
Telesines,  22 
Thargelia,  56 
Thebes,  15 
Themistocles,  22-25 
Tbeopompus,  33 
Theramenes,  28,  33  f., 
Theseum,  15,  62 
Theseus,  Jr.  0,  41 
Thettalos,  17  f. 
Thrasybulus,  37,  40 
Thucydides,  28 
Timonassa,  17 
Timosthenes,  23 

Xanthippus,  22,  38 
Xenaenetus,  40 
Xerxes,  22 
Xuthus,  fr.  1 

Zeus,  55,  56 


185 


INDEX  II.— SUBJECTS 

(References  are  to  chapters  and  sections.    Notes  will  sometimes  le  Jound 
under  the  first  reference.) 


άβαξ,  69.  1 

αγορά,  38.  1,  51.  3,  51  2,  57.  4 

ayopai,  48.  4 

άγοράι/ομοι,  51.  1 

S.yoς,  1.  1,  20.  2 

άγραφίου  -γραφή,  59.  3 

aypoiKOi,  13.  2 

αδόκιμο;,  49.  1 

άδύι/ατοί,  49.  4 

ά^ίφνγία,  1.  1 

άθλοβί'ται,  (50.  1,  3,  62.  2 

a'lKtia,  52.  2 

άκον'σιοι  φόΐΌΐ,  57.  3 

αμιπτΓΟι,  49.  1 

αμφικτνον€ς  eU  Δήλον,  62.  2 

αμφορείς,  60.  1,  68.  3 

άΐ'αρχία,  13.  1 

άμδραττοδισταί,  52.  1 

άι/τίδοσίϊ,  56.  3,  61.  1 

άτΓοδβ'κται,  48.  1 

άίΓοκοτΓτ)  χρβών,   6.  1,  2,   10.  1,  11.  2, 

4,  13.  3 
άποστοσίου  δίκη,  58.  3 
άποτίμ-ημα,  56.  7 
άττροστασίου  δίκτ),  58.  3 
Άρίιοπαγΐται  (etc.),  3.  6,  4.  4,  8.  2, 

23.  1,  26.  1,  57.  4 
άρβσΐϊ,  57.  3 
αρμοστεί,  37.  2 
άρτοιτώλαι,  59.  3 
όρ;(»)γ6'ται,  21.  6 
άρχιθίιοροί,  56.  3 
opxireKTOi-es  ejrl  τάϊ  caCs,  46.  1 
άρχωΐ'  «ττώΐ'νμος,  3.  2,  .06 
άσίβ^ίας  ypaφaί,  57.  2 
άστννομόι,  .50.  2 
άτί'λίΐα,  56.  3 
άτίλίϊ  xupiof,  16.  6 

186 


ατιμία,  67.  5 
αϋτόχ6ΐρ,  39.  5 
άφε'σιμοϊ,  43.  3 
άψυχων  δίκαι,  57.  4 

βακτηρία,  63.  2,  64.  4 
βάΚανος,  63.  2,  64.  4 
βασίλειο;  στοά,  7.  1 
Βασιλειίϊ,  41.  3 
βασιλΕΪ»?  άρχωμ,  57.  1 
βου\€νσ(ως  γραφή,  57.  3,  59.  3 
βουλή,  43.  2  ff. 

γάμος  (Ιίρός),  3.  5 
γονίων  κάκωσις,  57.  6 
γραμματ€ΐα  λβλευκωμενα,  47.  3 
γραμματείς,  54.  3 
γυμνικός  άγων,  60.  1,  3 

&ΐκα,  οι,  38.  1,  3,  41.  2 

δίκά^ειμ,  27.  5 

Βημαγωγοί,  28,  41.  2 

δήμαρχος,  21.  5,  54.  8 

δ>)μ€υσΐϊ,  67.  5 

δημιοϊ,  45.  1 

δημιουργοί,  13.  2 

δήμοι,  21.  4 

δημόσιοι',  63.  3 

δημόσιος,  47.  5,  48.  1 

δημότης,  21.  4 

δημοτικοί,  16.  9 

διαδικασία,  56.  6,  61.  1,  67.  2 

διαιτηταί,  53.  1,  4,  5,  55.  5,  58.  2 

διάκριοι,  13.  4 

διαλλάκτης,  3S,  4 

διαμ(τρ«ω,  67.  3,  4 

διδάσκαλοι,  42.  3 

δίδραχμου,  10.  2 


INDEX  II.  TO  ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION 


δικαστήρια,  03.  1  ff. 
Διοΐ'υσια,  56.  4,  5 
διωβολία,  28.  3 
διώβολον,  41.  3 
δοκιμασία,  49.  1 
δούλων  δίκη,  63.  •5 
δρνφακτοι,  ϊ>0.  2 
δωροξίνία,  59.  3 
δώρων  -γραφή,  59.  4 

€νκύκλιοϊ,  26.  2,  43.  1 

εισαγγελία,  8.  5,  29.  4,  43.  4,  52.  2 

εισαγωγεΐϊ,  52.  2 

έκθύματα,  54.  6 

€κκλτ)σία,  43.  4 

έκττ)μοροι,  2.  2 

Ελαιοι/,  60.  2 

έλληΐΌταμίαι,  30.  2 

έμμηνοι  δίκαι,  52.  2  f. 

εμττηκττ)?,  64.  2  f. ,  65.  3 

εμτΓΟρικαί  δίκαι,  59.  4 

εμτΓορίου  εττιμεληταί,  51.  4 

ίνα-γίσματα,  58.  1 

Ιι/δει^ϊ,  29.  4,  52.  1 

ένδεκα,  52.  2 

ίνδημοι  αρχαί,  24.  3 

έ|ετασΐί,  31.  2 

έ^οττλασία,  15.  3 

έτΓίεικείϊ,  26.  1,  27.  4,  28.  1,  36.  2 

έττίκληροϊ,  9.  2,  42.  5,  56.  6 

έπιστατικτ)  γραφή,  59.  3 

επιτάφιος  άγώι/,  58.  1 

(πίτροπος,  56.  7 

έπώι/υμο?,  53.  4,  7 

ιρανικοί,  δίκαι,  52.  2 

έταιρεΐαι,  20.  1,  34.  3 

εΰβυνοι,  48.  4 

εύπατρίδαι,  13.  2 

εφ>)ί3οι,  42.  2  ff.,  53.  4 

ζ^νγίσιον  τε'λοϊ,  7.  4 
^υγίττ)?,  4.  3,  7.  3,  12,  26.  2 
^ωωι/  δίκαι,  57.  4 

Θαργήλια,  56,  5 
θεσμοθε'ται,  59.  1 
θίωρικόν,  43.  1,  47.  2 
βήτεϊ,  7.  3,  4 
θόλος,  43.  3,  44.  1 

ϊερομι/τ}μων,  30.  2 

ίεροτΓοιοί,  30.  2,  54.  6 

ΐκετηρίαι,  43.  6 

'ίτΓτταρχοϊ,  4.  2,  30.  2,  3.  3,  44.4,  61. 


ίττπεΐί,  Ι'η-τΓοι,  4.  3,  6.  2,  7.  3,  38.  2, 

49.  1,  68.  4 
Ιπποδρομία,  60.  1,  3 
ΐσοτελεΐϊ,  58.  2 

κανηφορ^ΐν,  18.  2 

Κήρυκες,  39.  2,  57.  1 

κλεψΰδραι,  67.  2 

κλήρος,  4.  1,  8.  1,  62.  1 

κλοττη,  54.  1 

κοιί'ωΐΊΚαΙ  δίκαι,  52.  2 

κοΉ-ρολόγοι,  50.  2 

κορυνηφόροι,  14.  1 

κοσμ-ητής,  41.  2 

κρηνών  έπιμεληταί,  43.  1 

κυαμοϊ,  8.  1,  22.  5,  24.  3,  32.  1 

κύρβεΐϊ,  7.  1 

κωλακρίται,  7.  3 

κωμωδοί,  56.  3 

λαμπάδω»»  αγώνες,  57.  1 
λτ)τουργία,  27.  3,  29.  5,  56.  3 
λί'βος,  7.  1,  55.  5 
λογισταί,  48.  3,  54.  2 
λοχαγοί,  61.  3 
λνχνεΐον,  68.  4 
λωτΓοδυ'της,  52.  1 

μάντεις,  54.  6 

μαστιγοφόροι,  35.  1 

μεσόγειος,  21.  4 

μέταλλα,  22.  7,  47.  2,  59.  5 

μέτοικοι,  43.  5,  57.  3,  58.  2 

μέτρα,  10.  1,  51.  2 

μετρονόμοι,  51.  2 

μηδισμός,  25.  3 

μισβός,  27.  2,  4,  30.  1,  33. 1,  41.  3,  49. 

1,  62.  2 
μνά,  4.  2,  10.  2,  49.  4,  56.  4 
μνησικακεΐν,  39.  6,  60.  2 
μοιχεία,  57.  3,  59.  3 
μορίαι,  60.  2 
μύδροι,  23.  5 
μυλωθροί,  51.  3 
μιίσται,  56.  4 
μυστήρια,  39.  2,  57.  1 

νανκραρία,  8.  3,  22.  5 

^ενία,  59.  3 

όδοτΓΟίοί,  54.  1 

οροί,  12.  4 

ορφανοί,  24.  3,  54.  1,  56.  6  f. 

187 


ARISTOTLE 


όστρακοφορία,  43.  5 
όχ€τοί,  50.  2 

παιδοτριβαί,  42.  3 

παλαιόττλουτοι,  6.  2 

παράλιοι,  13.  4,  21.  4 

παράνοια.,  54.  (3 

παραΐ'όμωμ  -γραφή,  25.  4,  40.  2,  46.  4, 

59.  2  ^ 
ττεδιακοι,  13.  4 
ττελάται,  2.  2 

π^ιτακισχιλιοι,  29.  5-32.  2 
ΤΓβΐ'τακόσιοι,  25.  2 
π€ντακοσίθμί&ιμνοι.,  4.  3,    7.  3,   8.  1, 

2(5.  2,  47.  1 
πβντίτηρίδίς,  54.  7 
πβττλοϊ,  49.  3,  (ίΟ.  2 
νινακίον,  48.  4,  ()3.  2,  66.  2 
πολΕμαρχο!,  08.  1 
πρόδρομοι,  49.  1 
προβδρικτ)  -γραφή,  59.  2 
πρόεδροι,  44.  2 
προικοϊ  St'ictj,  52.  2 
πρόξ(νοι,  54.  3,  58.  2 
προστάται  τοΰ  £^μου,  28.  1  ff. 
πρυταΐ'ίϊοΐ',  3.  5,  24.  3,  62.  2 
ιτυρκαϊά,  57.  3 
πιαληταί,  47.  2,  52.  1 

σ6ΐσα)(ίίία,  6.  1,  12.  4 

σίτησίϊ,  62.  2 

OΊτoφυλαίce?,  51.  3 

σταθμοί,  10.  1,  2,  51.  2 

στατ^ρ,  10.  2 

tTTeAe^os,  60.  2 

στοά  βασι'λβιος,  7,  1 

στρατηγοί,  61.  1 

στρατιωτικά,  43.  1,  47.  2,  49.  3 

συκοφανταί,  35.  2,  59.  3 

σύμβοΚον,  59.  7,  65.  2,  68.  2,  69.  2 

συμμ€ΐ^ΐϊ,  3.  5 

σνμμορίαι,  61.  1 


σφηκισκός,  65.  2 
σφραγίς,  44.  1 
σωφροι/ιστης,  42.  2 

Tei'xij,  18.  5,  23.  4,  37.  1,  50.  2 

τίλώι-αι,  52.  3 

Τίτρακόσιοι,  οι,  29.  1,  31.  3ff.,  32.  1, 

2,  37.  1,  41.  2 
τ€τταράκοΐ'τα,  οι,  53.  1,  5 
το^όται,  24.  3 
τρα•γω8οί,  56,  3 
τραπί^ιτικαΐ  δίκαι,  52.  3 
τραν'ματοϊ  δίκαι,  57.  3 
τριάκοντα,  οΊ,  34.  2-41.  3 
τρι-ηραρχικαϊ  δίκαι,  52.  2 
τριηροτΓοιοι,  46.  1 
τρισχι'λιοι,  οί,  36.  1-37.  1 
TpiTTves,  8.  3,  21.  3 
τριώβολοί',  41.  3 
-τύραννοι,  41.  2 

vSpia,  63.  2,  64.  4 
vStap,  66.  2,  67.  2,  4 

φαρμάκων  8ίκαι,  57.  3 

φόΐΌϊ,  7.  1,  16.  8,  39.  5,  57.  2,  3 

φρατριαι,  ρ.   1  §  5,  21.  6 

φυ-γή,  57.  3,  67.  5 

φυλαι,  8.  3,  21.  3 

φΰλαρχοι,  30.  2,  31.  2,  49.  2,  61.  5 

φι;λο|3ασιλ€Ϊϊ,  8.  3,  41.  2,  58.  4 

φυλοκριΐ'ίϊΐ',  31.  1 

χορηγία,  28.  4 

χορηγοί,  53.  3,  54.  8,  56.  3  ff. 
Xpeiyv  αποκοπή,  6.  1,  10.  1,  11.  2,  4, 
13.  3 

φαΚτρίαι,  50.  2 
ψ6υδ6γγροφη,  57.  3 
ψίυδοκλητβία,  59.  3 
φίυδομαρτνρία,  59.  6 


189 


THE  EUDEMIAN  ETHICS 


INTRODUCTION 

I.  Place  of  the  Evdemian  Ethics  in  the 
Aristotelian  Corpus 

All  the  extant  books  attributed  to  Aristotle  (in- 
cluding probably  the  recently  recovered  treatise 
on  the  Athenian  Constitution)  belong  to  the  group 
of  his  works  designated  by  ancient  authorities  άκρυα- 
τικυΐ  λόγοι,  '  lecture-courses.'  These  are  scientific 
treatises,  in  places  hardly  more  than  mere  outlines, 
though  for  the  larger  part  fully  written  out  argu- 
ments ;  presumably  they  are  records  of  Aristotle's 
doctrine  made  for  his  pupils,  and  preserved  in  the 
library  of  the  Peripatetic  School.  The  other  class  of 
his  writings,  now  lost,  were  more  popular  exposi- 
tions intended  for  the  general  reader  ;  some  of  them 
were  in  dialogue  form.  They  were  published,  and 
they  are  alluded  to  as  βκδ^δο/χά'οι  λόγοι. 

The  former  group  includes  three  works  on  the 
philosophy  of  conduct,  entitled  the  Eudemian  Ethics, 
the  Nicomachean  Ethics  and  Magna  Moralia.  The 
two  former  are  full  scientific  treatises,  in  eight  and 
ten  Books  respectively.  Magna  Moralia  is  a  smaller 
work,  more  discursive  in  style,  of  which  only  two 
Books  survive,  the  latter  part  being  lost  ;  its  contents 
correspond  partly  with  the  Eudemian  and  partly  with 
the  Nicomachean  Ethics  ;  it  was  probably  compiled 
190 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS 

by  a  Peripatetic  of  the  generation  after  Aristotle. 
Eudemus  was  the  pupil  of  Aristotle  who  followed 
his  doctrine  most  closely  ;  Nicomachus  was  Aristotle's 
son,  who  fell  in  battle  when  a  mere  lad.  Both  may 
have  been  the  compilers  of  the  treatises  that  bear 
their  names  :  Cicero  (De  Finibus  v.  12)  says  that 
the  Nicomachean  Ethics,  though  attributed  to  Aristotle 
himself,  can  well  have  been  by  his  son,  and  Diogenes 
of  Laerte  quotes  from  it  as  by  Nicomachus.  But  the 
early  commentator  Porphyry  speaks  of  both  works  as 
'  dedicated  to  '  the  persons  whose  names  they  bear. 
Whatever  the  truth  may  be,  the  Nicomachean  Ethics 
has  always  been  accepted  as  the  authoritative  ex- 
position of  Aristotle's  moral  science  ;  and  it  seems 
probable  that  the  Eudemian,  so  far  as  it  differs, 
represents  an  earlier  stage  of  its  development." 
This  view  is  not  necessarily  precluded  by  the  fact 
that  in  some  places  the  Eudemian  Ethics  is  fuller  in 
expression  or  more  discursive  than  the  Nicomachean. 

II.  The  Eudemian-Nicomachean  Books 

For  about  one  third  of  the  whole  the  two  works 
overlap,  the  Eudemian  Books  IV.,  V.,  VL  being 
identical  with  the  Nicomachean  V.,  VI.,  VII. ;  these 
are  given  in  the  mss.  and  editions  of  the  latter  work 
only.  Scholars  have  debated  to  which  they  really 
belong,  some  holding  that  they  fit  the  argument  of 

"  This  is  the  view  of  Jaeger,  followed  by  Burnet  in  his 
Essays  and  Addresses  and  by  Mansion  ;  but  the  Eudemian 
Ethics  is  regarded  as  later  than  the  Nicomachean  by  Spengel, 
Susemihl  1900,  and  Stocks  (in  the  Oxford  Aristotle  vol.  ix.), 
as  it  was  by  Burnet  in  his  earlier  work,  his  edition  of  N.E. 
Magna  Moralia  is  put  last  by  almost  all  scholars,  but  first 
of  the  three  treatises  by  Schleiermacher  and  Arnim. 

191 


ARISTOTLE 

the  Eudemian  and  that  the  corresponding  parts  of 
the  Nicomachean  have  been  lost,  others  the  opposite. 
But  all  Aristotle's  treatises  are  so  loosely  put  together 
that  the  arguments  for  neither  view  are  convincing. 
It  is  more  probable  •  that  the  three  common  Books 
represent  his  final  doctrine,  except  in  so  far  as  they 
are  modified  by  other  parts  of  his  works — thus  the 
excursus  on  the  ethical  value  of  pleasure  in  E.E.  VI. 
=  N.E.  VII.  was  doubtless  superseded  by  the  more 
accurate  treatment  of  the  topic  at  the  beginning  of 
N.E.  X. 


III.  The  Eudemian  Ethics  :  Outline  of  Contents 
AND  Comparison  with  the  Nicomachean 

Book  I.  introduces  the  subject — the  nature  of 
Happiness  or  Well-being,  the  supreme  End  or  Aim 
of  human  conduct.  This  is  a  practical  study  :  know- 
ledge of  the  good  is  an  aid  to  its  attainment.  The 
different  views  that  prevail  are  crystallized  in  thl^e 
typical  Lives,  the  philosopher's  life  of  thought,  tiie 
statesman's  life  of  action,  the  voluptuary's  life  of 
pleasure.  The  Platonic  theory  of  an  Absolute  Good 
is  of  questionable  philosophic  validity,  and  in  any 
case  has  no  bearing  on  practical  life. 

Book  II.  c.  i.  defines  Happiness  as  consisting  in 
the  right  exercise  of  the  functions  of  man's  nature, 
moral  and  intellectual.  The  contents  of  E.E.  so  far 
correspond  with  those  of  N.E.  Book  I. ;  the  remainder 
of  Book  II.  with  N.E.  II.  and  III.  i.-v.  It  examines 
the  nature  of  Moral  Goodness  or  \lrtue,  which  is 
defined  as  a  fixed  disposition  of  character  that  in 
action  or  emotion  steers  a  middle  course  between 
too  much  and  too  little.  The  various  virtues  are 
192 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS 

tabulated,  with  the  vices  of  excess  and  defect  that 
correspond  to  each.  The  problem  of  the  Freedom 
of  the  Will  is  studied  in  the  light  of  the  psychology 
of  Volition  and  Purpose. 

Book  III.  discusses  the  Virtues  and  some  minor 
Graces  of  Character  seriatim,  each  with  its  corre- 
sponding pair  of  Vices.  The  list  tallies  with  that  in 
N.E.  III.,  vi.  if.  and  IV.,  except  that  it  inserts  the 
virtue  of  Mildness  between  Temperance  and  Liber- 
ality, and  adds  to  the  minor  Graces  of  Character 
Nemesis  (righteous  indignation  at  another's  un- 
deserved good  or  bad  fortune),  Friendliness  and 
Dignity,  while  it  omits  Gentleness  and  Agreeable- 
ness  {N.E.  IV.,  v.,  vi.). 

(Books  IV.,  v.,  VI.  are  omitted  in  mss.  and  editions 
of  the  Eudemian  Ethics,  as  they  are  the  same  as 
Books  v.,  VI.,  VII.  of  the  Nicomachean  ;  the  first  of 
these  three  Books  deals  with  Justice,  thus  completing 
the  examination  of  the  Moral  Virtues  ;  the  second 
treats  the  Intellectual  Virtues  of  Prudence  or 
Practical  Wisdom  and  Theoria  or  Speculative  Wisdom  ; 
the  third  forms  an  appendix  to  the  section  on  Moral 
Virtue — it  examines  Weakness  of  Will  and  studies 
the  psychology  of  Pleasure — a  subject  again  treated 
differently  and  more  accurately  in  N.E.  X.  init.) 

The  subject  of  Book  VII.  is  Friendship.  The  term 
includes  all  forms  of  friendly  mutual  regard,  whether 
between  equals  or  superior  and  inferior,  relatives  or 
other  associates,  and  whether  based  on  the  motive  of 
utility  or  the  pleasure  of  society  or  respect  for  worth. 
The  psychology  of  friendship  is  analysed  in  relation 
to  that  of  self-love. 

In  N.E.  VIII.  and  IX.  Friendship  is  discussed  at 
greater  length  with  fuller  detail ;    the  arrangement 

ο  1.93 


ARISTOTLE 

of  the   topics  is   different  but  there  is  perhaps  no 
striking  discrepancy  of  view. 

E.E.  VIII.  notices  the  epistemological  aspect  of 
Virtue  (treated  in  N.E.  I.,  ix.,  but  differently)  ;  and 
discusses  the  ethical  bearing  of  Good  Luck  (more 
fully  dealt  with  in  a  different  connexion  in  c.  iii.  of 
N.E.  yiI.=E.E.  VI.),  and  there  follows  an  essay  on 
Kalokagathia,  Moral  Nobility  (a  virtue  merely  alluded 
to  without  analysis  in  N.E.,  as  a  necessary  quality  of 
the  Great-spirited  man,  1124  a  4  and  1179  b  10); 
it  is  treated  as  the  consummation  of  the  particular 
virtues.  In  conclusion  there  is  a  glance  at  Theoria, 
the  activity  of  Speculative  Wisdom,  as  the  highest 
life  of  man  ;  at  Book  II.  init.  this  was  coupled  with 
Moral  Conduct  as  constituting  happiness.  There  is 
nothing  corresponding  to  the  full  treatment  of 
Theoria  as  the  consummation  of  human  well-being 
that  is  given  in  N.E.  X.  vii.,  viii.,  or  to  the  transition 
from  ethics  to  politics  (glancing  at  the  importance  of 
public  education)  which  concludes  that  Avork. 

IV.  Text,  MSS.  and  Editions 

The  Eudemian  Ethics  is  not  contained  in  the  two 
best  MSS.  of  Aristotle,  the  10th  c.  Laurentianus 
(denoted  by  the  sign  K^)  and  the  12th  c.  Parisiensis 
(L^)  ;  we  derive  it  chiefly  from  Vaticanus  (P**),  a 
13th  c.  copy  of  K^,  and  the  early  15th  c.  Marcianus 
(Mb),  not  so  good  a  text  as  P''  but  an  indispensable 
adjunct  to  it — according  to  Jackson,  who  refers  to 
the  text  of  these  two  mrs.  as  '  the  Greek  tradition.' 
Other  later  copies  certainly  contain  more  errors,  and 
are  of  little  value  as  actual  traditions  of  a  sound  text 
— some  of  their  variants  may  be  mere  conjectural 
194 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS 

corrections  ;  their  readings  are  only  occasionally  given 
in  this  edition. 

The  13th  c.  Latin  translation  attributed  to  William 
of  Moerbeke  follows  the  Greek  very  closely,  and  is 
almost  equivalent  to  another  ms.  ranking  in  value 
next  to  Vaticanus  and  Marcianus  ;  it  is  occasionally 
adduced  in  this  edition  either  in  Latin  or  in  its  original 
Greek  Λvhen  this  can  be  inferred  with  certainty. 

There  is  an  old  Latin  version  of  Book  VIIL  c.  ii. 
with  Magna  Moralia  Book  IL  c.  viii.,  entitled  De 
Bona  Fortuna,  printed  in  a  Latin  Aristotle  of  1482, 
which  indicates  an  independent  Greek  text  of  that 
passage. 

The  earliest  printed  edition  of  Aristotle  is  the 
Aldine,  Venice  1498.  The  foundation  of  all  modern 
work  on  the  text  is  the  monumental  Berlin  edition, 
with  a  Latin  translation,  scholia  and  indices,  published 
by  the  Academia  Regia  Borussica  in  1831  and  the 
following  years.  The  text,  edited  by  Bekker,  forms 
Volumes  I.  and  Π.  which  are  paged  consecutively, 
the  Eudemian  Ethics  occupying  pp.  1214-1249  ;  the 
Berlin  pages,  the  columns  (indicated  by  a  and  b)  and 
the  numbering  of  the  lines  are  shown  in  the  margin 
of  the  present  text. 

Fritsche's  edition  of  the  Eudemian  Ethics  (Ratisbon 
1851)  has  an  introduction  on  the  authorship  and 
contents,  a  text  with  explanatory  notes,  illustrative 
quotations  and  critical  notes,  a  Latin  translation  and 
a  Greek  index. 

The  Teubner  text  of  Susemihl  (Leipzig  1884)  has 
useful  critical  notes,  collecting  the  corrections  of  other 
scholars  published  in  the  learned  journals. 

Henry  Jackson  contributed  a  valuable  study  of  the 
text  and  contents  of  Book  VH.  cc,  i.,ii.  to  The  Journal 

195 


ARISTOTLE 

of  Philology  xxxii.  pp.  170  ff.  ;  and  also  supplied  a 
number  of  printed  notes  to  the  Oxford  translator, 
J.  Solomon. 

Solomon's  translation,  in  Volume  IX.  of  the  Oxford 
Aristotle  19^5,  is  the  most  recent  work  on  the  book. 
Mr.  Solomon  in  his  footnotes  gives  full  references 
to  the  corresponding  passages  of  the  Nicomachean 
Ethics  and  Mag?ia  Moralia  ;  and  his  notes  on  the 
readings  of  the  Greek  that  he  has  adopted  make 
his  work  a  valuable  critical  edition  :  they  include 
conjectures  of  the  translator  himself,  of  Professor 
Ross  the  general  editor  of  the  series,  and  of  other 
scholars,  among  them  the  notes  of  Henry  Jackson 
referred  to  above. 

In  view  of  the  comparatively  scanty  amount  of 
work  on  the  text  hitherto  published,  the  present 
editor  has  thought  himself  justified  in  making  a 
considerable  number  of  conjectural  emendations  of 
his  own.  Some  freedom  has  been  used  in  incor- 
porating these  and  those  of  other  scholars  in  the 
text  ;  it  seems  in  keeping  with  the  purpose  of  this 
series  to  present  the  reader  directly  with  what 
Aristotle  probably  wrote,  leaving  him  to  glance  at 
the  critical  notes  to  discover  what  he  is  represented 
as  having  written  by  his  copyists.  At  the  same  time 
in  the  interests  of  scholarship  emended  passages  in 
the  text  are  marked  by  a  number  referring  to  the 
corresponding  note. 

Similarly,  the  style  of  the  translation  is  intended 
to  make  it  serve  as  an  aid  to  a  student  reading 
the  original.  It  is  as  interpretative  as  >vas  possible 
without  becoming  a  mere  paraphrase  ;  it  is  not 
intended  as  a  substitute  for  tlie  Greek,  which  miglit 
take  the  form  either  of  a  rigidly  literal  version  or 

196 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS 

of  a  rendering  into  idiomatic  English  conveying  the 
sense  but  ignoring  the  form  of  the  original. 

The  following  signs  are  used  in  the  critical  notes  : 

MSS. 

ph  =Vaticanus. 
M*^  =  Marcianus. 
cet.     =all  the  other  mss.  collated  by  editors  where 

their  readings  agree, 
v.l.     =  the  reading  of  one  or  some  of  these  other 

MSS. 

Guil.  =  the  Latin  version  of  William  of  Moerbeke. 
Γ        =the  conjectured  Greek  original  of  this. 
B^      =De  Bona  Fortuna. 

The  following  abbreviations  are  used  for  the  names 
of  some  editors  and  commentators  quoted  for  the 
text  : 

Aid.  =  editio  princeps  Aldina. 

Bek.  =Bekker. 

Bus.  =Busolt. 

Bz.    =Bonitz. 

Cas.  =Casaubon. 

Fr.     =  Fritsche. 

lac.    =  Henry  Jackson. 

Rac.  =the  present  editor. 

Ras.  =Rassow. 

Ric.  =  Richards. 

Sol.    =  Solomon. 

Sp.     ^Spengki'.  <^^  Η 

Sus.  =Susemihl. 

Syl.   =  Sylburg. 

Vict.  =  Victorius. 

H.  R. 
November  1934. 

197 


ΗΘΙΚί2Ν    ΕΤΔΗΜΙ$2Ν   Α 

1214  a 

Ι.    Ό    μβν    ev    Αήλω    παρά.    τω    θζώ    την   αντοΰ  1 
γνώμην    άποφηνάμ€νος    συνβγραφβν    €πΙ    το    προ- 
πύλαυον  του   Αητώου    SlcXouv  ώς^   ονχ   υπάρχοντα 
πάντα  τω  αύτώ  το  re  αγαθόν  καΐ  το  καλόν  και  το 
rjSij,  ποιησας 

5     κάλλίστον  το  Βικαίότατον,  λωστον  δ'   iyiaiveiv, 
πάντων  ηΒιστον  δ'^  ου  τίς  ipa  το  τυχ€Ϊν. 

ημβΐς  δ'  αύτω  μη  συγχωρώμβν  η  γαρ  ευδαι/χονια 
κάλλίστον     καΐ     άριστον    απάντων     ούσα    η^ιστόν 

ioTLV. 

Πολλών  δ'  όντων  θ βω ρημάτων  α  π€ρΙ  €καστον  2 
10  πράγμα  καΐ  πβρί  ίκάστην  φύσιν  άπορίαν  €χ€ΐ  καΐ 
δειται  σκ€φ€ως,  τά  μ€ν  αυτών  συντΐίν^ί  προς  το 
γνώναί  μόνον,  τά  he  καΙ  π^ρΐ  τάς  κτησ€ίς^  καΐ 
π€ρΙ  τάς  πράζεις  του  πράγματος,  όσα  μ^ν  οΰν  3 
€χ€ΐ  φιλοσοφίαν  μόνον  θεωρητικην,  ΧεκτΙον  κατά 
τόν  €π ψάλλοντα  καιρόν  6  τι  πβρ  αν  οίκ€Ϊον  η*  τη 

^  ώ?  add.  Sp. 

*  δ'  hie  Vr. :  ante  ήδιστον  aut  cm.  codd. 

'  χρ-ήσΐΐί  Sp.  *  Ric. :  6  τι  vep  οίκΰον  1]v. 

"  Theognis  (255  f.  with  sHght  variation,  quoted  also  in 
N.E.  i.,  1099  a  27). 

198 


THE    EUDEMIAN    ETHICS 

BOOK  I 

1  I.  The  man  "  who  at  Delos  se^  forth  in  the  precinct  Books  i.  ix. 
of  the  god  his  own  opinion  co^^iposed  an  inscription  ^ess. 

for  the  forecourt  of  the  temj,{j  of  Leto  in  which  he  ii>troduc- 
distinguished  goodness,  beauty  and  pleasantness  as  (cci.-vi.) : 
not   all  being   properties   of  the   same    thing.     His  Η^^^^^''^'"*' 
verses  are  : 

Justice  *  is  fairest,  and  Health  is  best, 
But  to  win  one's  desire  is  the  pleasantest. 

But  for  our  part  let  us  not  allow  that  he  is  right  ; 
for  Happiness  ^  is  at  once  the  pleasantest  and  the 
fairest  and  best  of  all  things  whatever. 

2  About  every  thing  and  every  natural  species  there  its  mode  of 
are  many  views  that  involve  difficulty  and  require  ^""ΐ"ΐ**''^'θ"> 
examination  ;  of  these  some  relate  only  to  our  ΙίηοΛν- 

ledge  of  the  thing,  others  deal  also  with  modes  of 

3  acquiring  it  and  of  acting  in  relation  to  it.  As  to 
all  those  views  therefore  that  involve  only  specula- 
tive philosophy,  we  must  say  whatever  may  be  proper 
to  the  inquiry  when   the  suitable   occasion  occurs. 

*  Or  '  Righteousness  ' ;  the  term  includes  more  than 
justice. 

"  Or  '  Well-being  '  ;  the  Greek  word  is  entirely  non- 
committal, and  does  not  necessarily  denote  a  state  of  feeling, 
consciousness  of  welfare. 

199 


ARISTOTLE 

1214  a 

15  μζθόΒω.  πρώτον  8e  σκ€τττ4ον  iv  tlvl  to  ev  ζην  4 
και  πώς  κτητόν,  πότβρον  φνσ€ί  γίνονται  πάντ€ς 
€ύοαιμον€ς  οι  τνγχάνοντ€ς  ταύτης  της  προσηγορίας, 
ωσπβρ  μεγάλοι  και  μικροί  και  την  χροιάν  δια- 
φεροντ€ς,  η  δια  μαθήσεως ,  ώς  οΰσης  επιστήμης 
τίνος    της     ευδαιμονίας,    η     δια     τίνος     ασκήσεως 

20  {πολλά  γαρ  οϋτε  κατά  φνσιν  οϋτε  μαθοΰσιν  αλλ' 
εθισθεΐσιν  υπάρχει  τοις  άνθρώποις,  φαΰλα  μεν 
τοις  φαύλως  εθισθεΐσι,  χρηστά  Βέ  τοις  χρηστώς) ; 
η  τούτων  μεν  κατ'  ο^δβ^α  τών  τρόπων,  ΒυοΙν  δέ  5 
θατερον,  ήτοι  καθά'^-'ρ  οι  νυμφόληπτοι  και  θεό- 
ληπτοι   τών    άνθρώπ(^ν,    επιπνοία    Βαιμονίον    τινός 

25  ωσπερ  ενθουσιάζοντες ,  η  δια  την  τύχην  (πολλοί 
γαρ  ταυτον  φασιν  eivai  την  εύ^αιμονίαν  και  την 
εύτυχίαν) , 

Ότι  μεν  οΰν  η  παρουσία^  δια  τούτων  απάντων  η  6 
τινών  η  τίνος  υπάρχει  τοις  άνθρώποις,  ουκ  ά^ηλον 
αττασαι    γαρ    αι    γενέσεις    σχεδόν    πίπτουσιν    εις 
ταιίτα?  τάς  αρχάς  {και  γάρ  τάς^  από  της  διανοίας 

30  αττασας•  προς  τα?  απ  επιστήμης  αν  τις  συναγάγοι 
πράξεις) .  τό  δ'  εύδαιμονεΐν  και  τό  ζην  μακαρίως  7 
και  καλώ?  εϊη  αν  εν  τρισι  μάλιστα  τοις  etvai 
!  οοκοΰσιν  αίρετωτάτοις•  οι  μεν  γάρ  την  φρόνησιν 
μεγιστον  είναι  φασιν  aya^ov,  οι  8ε  την  άρετήν,  οι 
8ε  την  η8ονην.  και  προς  την  εύ8αιμονίαν  ενιοι  8 
1214  b  Trepi  του  μεγέθους  αυτών  8ιαμφισβητοΰσι,  συμ- 
βάλλεσθαι  φάσκοντες  θάτερον  θατερου  μάλλον  εις 

^  ν.1.  παρουσία  rijs  €ύδαιμονίαί.  ^  τάϊ  add.  Cas. 

"  The  Greek  term  here  still  retains  the  general  sense  that  it 
has  in  Plato.     In  the  Nicomachean  Ethics  it  is   limited  to 

aoo 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  I.  i.  4-8 

4  But  we  must  consider  first  what  the  good  hfe  con- 
sists in  and  how  it  is  to  be  obtained — whether  all  of 
those  who  receive  the  designation  '  happy  '  acquire 
happiness  by  nature,  as  is  the  case  with  tallness  and 
shortness  of  stature  and  differences  of  complexion, 
or  by  study,  which  would  imply  that  there  is  a  science 
of  happiness,  or  by  some  form  of  training,  for  there  are 
many  human  attributes  that  are  not  bestowed  by 
nature  nor  acquired  by  study  but  gained  by  habitua- 
tion—bad  attributes  by  those  trained  in  bad  habits 
and  good  attributes  by  those  trained  in  good  ones. 

5  Or  does  happiness  come  in  none  of  these  ways,  but 
either  by  a  sort  of  elevation  of  mind  inspired  by 
some  divine  ροΛνβΓ,  as  in  the  case  of  persons  possessed 
by  a  nymph  or  a  god,  or,  alternatively,  by  fortune  ? 
for  many  people  identify  happiness  Avith  good  for- 
tune. 

6  Now  it  is  pretty  clear  that  the  presence  of  happi- 
ness is  bestowed  upon  men  by  all  of  these  things,  or 
by  some  or  one  of  them  ;  for  almost  all  the  modes  in 
which  it  is  produced  fall  under  these  principles,  in- 
asmuch as  all  the  acts  that  spring  from  thought  may 
be  included  with  those  that  spring  from  knowledge. 

7  But  to  be  happy  and  to  live  blissfully  and  finely  its  three 
may  consist  chiefly  in  three  things  deemed  to  be  "tftuents 
most   desirable  :     some   people   say   that   Wisdom  ° 

is  the  greatest  good,  others  Goodness  *  and  others 

8  Pleasure.  And  certain  persons  debate  about  their 
importance  in  relation  to  happiness,  declaring  that  one 
contributes  more  to  it  than  another — some  holding 

Practical  Wisdom,  prudentia,  '  prudence,'  as   distinct  from 
θεωρία,  sapientia,  '  speculative  wisdom.' 

*  It  must  always  be  remembered  that  the  Greek  term  is 
less  limited  in  meaning  than  '  virtue,'  and  may  denote 
excellence  in  any  department,  not  only  moral  goodness. 

201 


ARISTOTLE 

1214  b      ^     ^  ,  ,  ,  ^  •     ^ 

αντην,    OL     μβν     ώς    ονσαν     μΐΐζον     αγαθόν     την 

φρονησίν    της    aperrjg,    οΐ    δε    ταύτης    την    άρ€την, 

OL  δ    αμφοτέρων  τούτων  την  η^ονην  καΐ  τοις  μβν 

5  €Κ  ττάντων  δο/cer  τούτων,  τοις  δ'  e/c  hvolv,  τοις  δ 

ev  ivL  TLVi  τούτων  elvai  το  ζην  €ν^>αιμ6νως . 

II.    Yiepl    δτ)    τούτων   €πιστησαντας   άπαντα   τον  1 

Βυνάμενον   ζην  κατά  την  αντον  ττροαίρεσιν  ^βσ^αι 

TLva   σκοπόν  του   καλώς    ζην,   ήτοι   τιμήν   η   δο^αν 

η  πλοντον  η  τταώείαν,  ττρός  δν  άττοβλεττων  ττοιησεται 

10  πάσας  τάς  πράξεις  {ώς  τό  γ€  μη  συντ€τάχθαι  τον 
βίον  προς  τι  τέλος  αφροσύνης  πολλής  σημεΐον 
εστίν),  μάλιστα  δτ)  δέΐ  πρώτον  εν  αύτω  ^ιορίσασθαι  2 
μήτε  προπετώς  μήτε  ραθύμως  εν  τίνι  τών  ημέτερων 
το  ζην  εν  και  τίνων  άνευ  τοις  άνθρώποις  ουκ 
ενδέχεται  τοΰθ^   ύπάρχειν.      ου  γαρ  ταύτον   ών  τ 

15  άνευ  ούχ  οΐόν  τε  uyiatVeii'  και  το  i5yiatVetv,  ομοίως  3 
δ'   έχει  τοΰτο  και   εφ^  έτερων  πολλών   ώστ    ούΒέ 
τό  ζην  καλώς  και  ών  άνευ  ου  Βυνατον  ζην  καλώς. 
έ'στι  δε  τών  τοιούτων  τα  μεν  ουκ  ί'δια  της  uyteia?  4 
ούΒε  της  ζωής  άλλα  κοινά  πάντων  ώς  ειπείν,  και 

20  τών  εζεων  και  τών  πράξεων,  οΐον  άνευ  του  αναπνεΐν 
η  εγρηγορεναι  η  κινήσεως  μετεχειν  ούθεν  αν 
νπάρζειεν  ήμΐν  ούτ^  άγαθον  ούτε  κακόν,  τα  δ 
ίδια  μάλλον  περί  εκάστην  φύσιν,  ου  γάρ  ομοίως 
οίκεΐον  προς  εύεξίαν  τοις  είρημενοις  κρεωφαγια 
και  τών  περιπάτων   οι  μετά   ^εΐπνον.        α  8εΐ  μη 

»  C/.  Ν.Ε.  i.,  1094  a  22,  1095  a  22-26. 
202 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  I.  i.  8— ii.  4 

that  Wisdom  is  a  greater  good  than  Goodness, 
others  the  reverse,  and  others  that  Pleasure  is  a 
greater  good  than  either  of  them  ;  and  some  think 
that  the  happy  hfe  comes  from  them  all,  others  from 
two  of  them,  others  that  it  consists  in  some  one  of 
them. 

1  II.  Havingthen  inregard  to  this  subject  established  its  essential 
that  everybody  able  to  live  according  to  his  own  pur- 
posive choice  should  set  before  him  some  object  for 

noble  living  to  aim  at"— either  honour  or  else  glory 
or  wealth  or  culture^— on  which  he  Mdll  keep  his  eyes 
fixed  in  all  his  conduct  (since  clearly  it  is  a  mark 
of  much  folly  not  to  have  one's  life  regulated  with 

2  regard  to  some  End),  it  is  therefore  most  necessary 
first  to  decide  within  oneself,  neither  hastily  nor 
carelessly,  in  Avhich  of  the  things  that  belong  to  us 
the  good  life  consists,  and  what  are  the  indispensable 
conditions  for  men's  possessing  it.  For  there  is  a 
distinction  between  health  and  the  things  that  are 

3  indispensable  conditions  of  health,  and  this  is  simi- 
larly the  case  with  many  other  things  ;  consequently 
also  to  live  finely  is  not  the  same  as  the  things  with- 

4  out  which  living  finely  is  impossible.  And  in  the 
latter  class  of  things  some  that  are  indispensable 
conditions  of  health  and  life  are  not  peculiar  to 
special  people  but  common  to  practically  all  men — 
both  some  states  and  some  actions — for  instance, 
without  breathing  or  being  awake  or  participating 
in  movement  we  could  not  possess  any  good  or  any 
evil  at  all  ;  whereas  others  are  more  peculiar  to 
special  types  of  natural  constitution — for  instance, 
eating  meat  and  taking  walking  exercise  after 
dinner  are  not  closely  related  to  health  in  the  same 
way  as  the  conditions  mentioned.     And  these  facts 

203 


ARISTOTLE 

1214  b 

25  λάνθαναν^  έ'στι  γαρ  ταντ  αίτια  της  άμφισβητ'ησ€ως  5 
7T€pt  του  βύΒαιμονΐΐν  τι  εστί  καΐ  yiVerai  δια  τίνων 
ών   avev   γαρ   ούχ   οΐόν  re   €ύ8αιμον€Ϊν   eViot   ^eprj 
της  ΐύΒαιμονίας   eti^at  νομίζονσιν. 

III.    Πάσα?  μ^ν  ονν  τάς  δό^α?  Ιτησκοττ^Ιν  όσας  1 
€.χουσι    τινβς    ττβρί    αύτης    ττερίζργον .      ττολλά    γαρ 

30  φαίνεται  και  τοις  παώαρίοις  και  τοις  κάμνονσι 
και  τταραφρονοΰσι  nepl  ών  άν  ούθεις  νουν  €χων 
Βιαττορησειεν,  SdovTai  γαρ  ου  λόγων,  αλλ'  οι  μβν 
ηλικίας  iv  fj  μεταβαλοΰσιν^  οι  he  κολάσβως 
ιατρικής  η  πολιτικής  (κόλασις  γαρ  η  φαρμακεία 
των     πληγών     ουκ     Ιλάττων     εστίν)  •     ομοίως     he  2 

1215  a  ταυται?   oi)he   τας   των   πολΧών,   εική   γαρ   λεγουσι 

σχehov  περί  απάντων  και  μάλιστα  περί  ταύτης, 
τάς  hε  των  σοφών^  έπισκεπτεον  μόνας•  άτοπον 
γαρ  προσφερειν  λόγον  τοις  λόγου  μηhev  hεoμ€Voις 
αλλά  πάθους*     επει  δ'  είσιν  άπορίαι  περί  εκάστην  3 

5  πραγματείαν  οίκεΐαι,  hηλov  οτι  και  περί  βίου  του 
κρατίστου  και  ζωής  της  άριστης  είσίν  ταύτας  ουν 
καλώς  έχει  τάς  hόξaς  εζετάζειν,  οι  γάρ  τών 
αμφισβητούντων  έλεγχοι  τών  εναντιουμενων  αύταις^ 
λόγων  άπohείζεις  είσίν. 

Έιτι  hε  προ  έργου  το  τά  τοιαύτα  μη  λανθάνειν  4 
μάλιστα  προς   α   hei   συντείνειν  πάσαν   σκεφιν,   εκ 

10  τίνων  evhεγετaι  μετασχεΐν  του  ευ  και  καλώς   ζην 

^  &  ,  .  .  \ανθάνΐΐν  hie  Rac. :  supra  post  ψύσιν. 

"  Sp. :  μ€ταβά\\ονσιν. 

'  ταντη$  .  .  .  σοφών  add.  Ρ*•  marg.  (δέ  add.  Rac). 

*  vtidovs  lac.  *  Rac. :  αύτοΐί. 

°  In  the  Mss.  this  clause  comes  before  the  preceding  one, 
'  for  instance,  eating  meat  .  .  .  mentioned.' 

"  Cf.  N.E.  i.,  1095  a  28-30,  b  19  ff. 
204. 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  I.  ii.  5— iii.  4 

5  must  not  be  overlooked,"  for  these  are  the  causes  of 
the  disputes  about  the  real  nature  of  happiness  and 
about  the  means  of  procuring  it  ;  for  some  people 
regard  the  things  that  are  indispensable  conditions 
of  being  happy  as  actual  parts  of  happiness. 

1  III.  Now   to   examine   all  the   opinions   that   any  Considered 
people  hold  about  happiness  is  a  superfluous  task.'' "^the"*'''^ 
For  children  and  the  sick  and  insane  have  many  nature  of 
opinions  which  no   sensible   man  would  discuss,  for  '''^ρ^""^*" 
these  persons   need  not   argument  but  the   former 

time  in  which  to  grow  up  and  alter  and  the  latter 
medical  or  official  chastisement  (treatment  with 
3rugs  being  chastisement  just  as  much  as  flogging 

2  is).  And  similarly  it  is  also  superfluous  to  examine 
the  opinions  of  the  multitude  "  either  ;  for  they  talk 
at  random  about  almost  everything,  and  especially 
about  happiness.  We  ought  to  examine  only  the 
opinions  of  the  wise  '^ ;  for  it  is  out  of  place  to  apply 
reasoning  to  those  who  do  not  need  reasoning  at  all, 

3  but  experience.  But  since  every  subject  has  special 
difficulties  related  to  it,  it  is  clear  that  there  are  such 
in  regard  to  the  highest  life  and  the  best  mode  of 
existence  ;  it  is  then  well  to  examine  the  opinions 
putting  these  difficulties,  since  the  refutations  ad- 
vanced by  those  who  challenge  them  are  demon- 
strations of  the  theories  that  are  opposed  to  them. 

4  Moreover   to    notice   such   matters    is    especially  are  of  prac- 
advantageous  with  a  view  to  the  subjects  to  which  γΟγ'^η,Γ^"* 
all  inquiry  ought  to  be  xlireeted — the  question  what  attainment. 
are  the  ipeans  that  make  it  possible  to  participate 

>  in  living  Λν^Ι  and  finely  (if '  blissfully  '  is  too  invidious 

"  Cf.  N.E.  i.,  1095  b  19. 

**  The  words  translated  '  happiness  '  and  '  the  opinions  of 
the  wise '  are  conjectural  insertions  in  the  Greek. 

205 


ARISTOTLE 

121V 

{el  To^  μακαριως  επιφθονώτβρον  ΐίπβΐν),  καΐ  προς 
την    ελτΓίδα    την    irepl    €καστα    γβνομβνην    άν    των 
€τηακών.     el  μ€ν  γαρ  ev  τοις  δια  τνχην  γι,νομίνοις  5 
■ί)  Ύοΐς  δια  φνσι,ν  το  καλώς  ζην  eoTLV,  άν^λτηστον 
αν    €'ίη    πολλοίς,    ου    γάρ    εστί    δι'    eπLμeλeίaς    η 

15  κτησις  ovSe^  ctt'  αύτοΐς  ούδε'  της  αυτών  πραγ- 
ματείας• el  δ  ev  τω  αύτον  ποιόν  τίνα  elvat  καΐ  6 
τα?  κατ  αύτον  πράζεις,  κοινότερον  αν  εΐη  το 
αγαθόν  καΐ  deiOTepov,  κοινότερον  μεν  τω  πλείοσιν 
€νΒ4χεσθαι  μετασχεΐν,  deioTepov  he  τω  κεΐσθαι 
την  εύ^αιμονίαν  τοΐς^  αυτούς  παρασκευάζουσι 
ποίούς  τίνα?   καΐ  τας  πράξεις. 

20      IV.   "Εσται   δε    φανερά  τα   πλείστα   των   άμφισ-  1 
βητουμενων   καΐ   Βιαπορουμενων   άν   καλώς  όρισθη 
τι  χρη  νομίζειν  είναι  την  ενΒαιμονίαν,  πότερον  εν 
τω    ποιόν    τίνα   μόνον    efvat    την    φυχην,    καθάπερ 
Ttre?    ωηθησαν    τών    σοφών    και    πρεσβυτέρων,    η 

25  8εΐ  μεν  και  ποιόν  τίνα  ύπάρχειν  αυτόν,  μα?0(ον  8ε 
8εΐ  τάς  πράξεις  eii^at  ποιας  τινας. 

Αιηρημενων    δε    τών    βίων    και    τών    μεν    ουδ'*  2 
αμφισβητούντων     της     τοιαύτης     ευημερίας     αλλ' 
αλλω?'  τών  αναγκαίων  χάριν  σπουΒαζομενων ,  οΐον 
τών     περί     τάς     Τ€;)^να9     τα?     φορτικάς     και     τάς 
βάναυσους^   και  τών    περί   χρηματισμόν   {λέγω    δε 

30  φορτικάς    μεν    τάς    προς    8όξαν    π ραγματευομενας 
μόνον,  βάναυσους  δε  τα?  εδραία?  και  μισθαρνικάς, 

^  το  Vict.,  τφ  τό  Fr. :  τφ. 

*  ουδέ  om.  Sp.      ^  »  ουδέ  διά.  Ρ»>. 

*  ν.1.  έν  TOis :  if  τφ   .   .   .   ιταρασκΐυάζΐΐν  ?  Rac. 

*  ούδ'  add.  Βζ.  *  Sp.  ws. 

'  Sp. :   καΐ  ταί  βαναύσονί  post  χρηματισμόν. 

"  The  word  ψυχή,  usually  rendered  *  soul,'  has  no  term 
exactly  corresponding  to  it  in  English,  as  it  denotes  the  whole 

206 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  I.  in.  4— iv.  2 

an  expression) — and  with  a  view  to  the  hope  that  we 
may  have  of  the  things  that  are  good  in  the  various  ' 

5  departments.  For  if  hving  finely  depends  on  things 
that  come  by  fortune  or  by  nature,  it  would  be  be- 
yond the  hopes  of  many  men,  for  then  its  attainment 
is  not  to  be  secured  by  effort'^  and  does  not  rest  with 
men  themselves  and  is  not  a  matter  of  their  own 

6  conduct  ;  but  if  it  consists  in  oneself  and  one's  own 
actions  having  a  particular  quality,  the  good  would 
be  more  common  and  more  divine — more  common 
because  it  would  be  possible  for  more  people  to  share 
it,  and  more  divine  because  happiness  would  then  be 
in  store  for  those  who  made  themselves  and  their 
actions  of  a  particular  quality. 

1       IV.  Most  of  the  points  debated  and  the  difficulties  Character  or 
raised  ΛνΙΙΙ  be  clear  if  it  be  satisfactorily  determined  '='^"'^"'^*• 
what  the  proper,  conception  of  happiness  is — does 
it  consist  merely  in  a  person's  possessing  some  par- 
ticular quality  of  spirit,"  as  some  of  the  sages  and 
the   older   thinkers   held,   or   although   a  particular 
personal  character  is  indeed  an  indispensable  con- 
dition, is  a  particular  quality  of  conduct  even  more 
V;     necessary  ? 
'2      There  are  various  different  modes  of  life,  and  some  Three 
do  not  lay  any  claim  to  well-being  of  the  kind  under  ^>'Ρ"^''' •'^'^^• 
consideration,  but  are  pursued  merely  for  the  sake 
of  things  necessary — for  instance  the  lives  devoted 
to  the  vulgar  and  mechanic  arts  and  those  dealing 
with  business  (by  vulgar  arts  I  mean  those  pursued 
only  for  reputation,  by  mechanic  the  sedentary  and 
wage-earning  pursuits,  and  by  arts  of  business  those 

vitality  of  a  living  creature,  with  the  unconscious  factors  of 
nutrition  and  growth  as  well  as  conscious  feelings  or  emo- 
tions and  thoughts. 

207 


ARISTOTLE 

1216  8 

χρημαηστικας   8e   τάς    προς    ωνάς    αγοραίας^    και 

πράσ€ΐς  καττηλικάς),  των  δ'  ets"  άγωγην  εύδαι/ζ,ο- 
νίκην  ταττομενων  τριών  όντων  των  καΐ  πρότ€ρον 
ρηθζντων    αγαθών'    ώς    μβγίστων    τοις    άνθρώποίς, 

3δ  apcTTJs   και   φρονησίως   και   ηΒονης,   Tpeis   ορώμ^ν 

καΐ    βίους    οντάς    ους     οι     ζζουσίας^    τυγχάνοντ€ς 

i2i5h  προαιρούνται    ζην    ατταντ^ς,    πολιτικον    φιλοσοφον 

άπολαυστικόν .       τούτων     γαρ     6     μβν     φιλόσοφος  3 

βούλ^ται  TTcpi  φρόνησιν  et^at  και  την  θ^ωριαν  την 

TTepi  την  άληθβιαν,  ό  8e  πολιτικός  π€ρι  τάς  πράζ^ις 

τάς  καλάς  {αύται   δ'   eloiv   αΐ  άπο  της  άρβτης),  6 

ό  Ο    απολαυστικός  π€ρι  τάς  η^ονάς  τάς  σωματικάς . 

δίόττερ    eVepos"'    eTcpov*    ζύ^αίμονα    προσαγορβύβι,  4 

καθάπβρ   βλβχθη    και   πρότ€ρον,    και^    ^Αναξαγόρας 

μβν  6  ]ίλαζομ€νιος  βρωτηθβΐς  τις  ό  €ύ^αιμον€στατος , 

ούθβίς  "  €Ϊπ€ν  "  ών  συ  νομίζζΐς,  αλλ    άτοπος  αν 

τις  σοι  φανβίη."     τούτον  δ    άπβκρινατο  τον  τρόπον 

10  €Κ€Ϊνος  όρων  τον  €ρόμ€νον  αδύνατοι^  ύπολαμβάνοντα 
μη  μβγαν  οντά  και  καλόν  η  πλούσιον  ταύτης 
τνγχάν€ΐν  της  προσηγορίας,  αυτός  δ  ίσως  ώετο 
τον  ζώντα  άλύπως  και  καθαρώς  προς  το  Βικαιον 
η  τίνος  θεωρίας  κοινωνοΰντα  θ^ίας,  τούτον  ως 
άνθρωπον  βιπ€Ϊν^  μακάριον  eti^ai. 

15      V.    TLepi  πολλών   μ€ν  οΰν  και  έτερων  ου  paSiov  1 

^  Sol. :  irpbs  ayopat  μέν. 

^  Sp. :  έπ   έξονσίαί :  etr'  ίξουσίαΐ  <6»'Tes>  τυ-γχάνοντεί  ?  Rac, 

*  irepoi  add.  Ras.  *  irepov  Rac, :  ^repov  τόν. 

*  και  add.  ?  Sus.  '  eiireh  <5e(»'>  ?  Ric. 

«  See  1214  a  30-b  5. 

*  Perhaps  the  Greek  should   be   emended  to  give  '  those 
who  happen  to  be  in  power.' 

*  i.e.  active   citizenship  :    '  statesmanship  '  is   too   lofty  a 
term. 

208 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  I.  iv.  2— v.  1 

concerned  with  market  purchase  and  retail  selling)  ; 
but  on  the  other  hand,  the  things  related  to  the  happy 
conduct  of  life  being  three,  the  things  already  men- 
tioned'* as  the  greatest  possible  goods  for  men — 
gopdjiess,  .wisdom  and  pleasure,  we  see  that  there  are 
also  three  ways  of  life  in  which  those  to  whom:  for- 
,ΐίΐηε  gives  opportunity  *  invariably  choose  to  live,  the 
life  of  politics,''  the  life  of  philosophy,  and  the  life 

3  of  enjoyment.  Of  these  the  philosophic  life  denotes 
being  concerned  with  the  contemplation  of  truth,  the 
political  life  means  being  occupied  with  honourable 
activities  (and  these  are  the  activities  that  spring 
from  goodness),  and  the  life  of  enjoyment  is  con- 

4  cerned  with  the  pleasures  of  the  body.  Owing  to  this, 
different  people  give  the  name  of  happy  to  different 
persons,  as  was  said  before  too ;  and  Anaxagoras  ^ 
of  Clazomenae  when  asked  '  Who  is  the  happiest 
man  t  '  said  '  None  of  those  whom  you  think,  but 
he  would  seem  to  you  an  odd  sort  of  person.'  But 
Anaxagoras  answered  in  that  way  because  he  saw 
that  the  man  who  put  the  question  supposed  it  to 
be  impossible  to  receive  the  appellation  '  happy  ' 
without  being  great  and  beautiml  or  rich,  whereas 
he  himself  perhaps  thought  that  the  person  who 
humanly  speaking  enjoys  bliss  is  he  that  lives  by  the 
standard  of  justice  without  pain  and  in  purity,  or 
participates  in  some  form  of  divine  contemplation.* 

1      V.  While  there  are  many  different  things  as  to  Various 

opinions 
"  The  physical  philosopher,  500-428  b.c,  born  at  Clazo-  ^^*^,"*^'' 
menae  in  Ionia,  taught  at  Athens. 

«  i.e.  the  man  who  displays  the  virtues  of  Temperance, 
Justice  and  Wisdom  (the  fourth  cardinal  virtue,  Courage,  is 
omitted),  enhanced  by  pleasure  or  freedom  from  pain.  This 
passage  illustrates  how  Aristotle  prepared  the  way  for  the 
hedonism  of  Epicurus. 

Ρ  209 


ARISTOTLE 

1215  b      ,         ^  ^  ,  ^  X       r       -         «- 

TO  κρΐναι  καλώς,  μάλιστα  Be  TTcpi  o5  ττασι  ραστον 

€?ναι  δο/cet  καΐ  τταντος  ανθρώπου  το  ^νώναι,  τι 
των  iv  τώ  ζην  alperov,  καΐ  λαβών  αν  τι?  εχοι 
πλήρη  την  έπιθνμίαν.  πολλά  γάρ  εστί  τοιαύτα 
τών    άποβαινόντων    δι'    ά    προΐ^νται   το    ζην,    οίον 

20  νόσους    π^ριω^υνίας    χ€ΐμώνας•    ώστ€    Βηλον    οτι 
καν   εζ    άρχης    alpeTov   ην,    el  τις   αϊρεσιν   εδιδου, 
δια  γ€  ταΰτα  το  μη  γενέσθαι,     προς  δε  τούτοι?  ό^  2 
βίος  δν  ζώσιν  έτι  τταιδε?  οι^τε?'  καΐ  γάρ  €πΙ  τούτον 
άνακάμφαι  πάλιν  ούδει?  αν  υπομείνειβν  ευ  φρονών. 

20  ετι  δε  πολλά  τών  τε  μη^εμίαν  εχόντων  ή^ονην  η  3 
λυπην,    καΐ    τών    εχόντων    μεν    η^ονην    μη    καλην 
δε,   τοιαΰτ'  εστίν  ώστε  το  μη   είναι   κρεΐττον  είναι 
Toy    ζην.     όλως   δ'   ε'ί  τι?    άπαντα   συναγαγοι   όσα  4 
πράττουσι    μεν    και    πάσχουσιν    άπαντες,    εκόντες 
μεντοι  μηθεν  αυτών  δια  το  /χηδ'  αυτού  χάριν,  και 

30  προσθείη  χρόνου  πλήθος  άπεραντόν  τι,  ου  μάλλον 
ενεκ  αν  τι?  τούτων  ελοιτο  ζην  η  μη  ζην.  αλλά  5 
μην  ουδέ  δια  T17V  της  τροφής  μόνον  ηΒονην  η  την 
τών  αφροδισίων,  άφαιρεθεισών  τών  άλλων  η8ονών 
άς  το  γινώσκειν  η  βλεπειν  η  τών  άλλων  τις 
αισθήσεων    πορίζει    τοις    άνθρώποις,    οι)δ     αν    ει? 

35  προτιμήσειε  το  ζην  μη  παντελώς  ων  άνδράττοδον, 
Βήλον  γάρ  οτι  τω  ταύτην  ποιουμενω  την  αιρεσιν 
ούθεν   αν  Βιενεγκειε  ■)/ενε'σ^αι   θηρίον  ή   άνθρωπον 

1216  a  ο  γοΰν  εν  ΑΙγύπτω  βοΰς,  δν  ως  Άπιν  τιμώ)σιν,  εν  6 

πλείοσι  τών  τοιούτων  εξουσιάζει  πολλών  μοναρχών.^ 

^  <Tis>  ό  .   .   .  ;  Cas.  ^  Γ  :  μοναρχιών. 

"   C/.  Soph.  O.C.  1225  μη  ψυναι  τόν  άπαντα  viKqi  λ070ΐ'. 
210 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  I.  v.  1-7 

which  it  is  not  easy  to  make  a  right  judgement,  this 
is  especially  the  case  with  one  about  which  every- 
body thinks  that  it  is  very  easy  to  judge  and  that  any- 
body can  decide — the  question  which  of  the  things 
contained  in  being  alive  is  preferable,  and  which  when 
attained  would  fully  satisfy  a  man's  desire.  For 
many  of  life's  events  are  such  that  they  cause  men 
to  throw  life  away,  for  instance,  diseases,  excessive 
pains,  storms ;  so  that  it  is  clear  that  on  account  of 
these  things  any  way  it  would  actually  be  preferable, 
if  someone  offered  us  the  choice,  not  to  be  born  at 

2  all."  And  in  addition,  the  kind  of  life  that  people 
live  while  still  children  is  not  desirable — in  fact  no 
sensible  person  could  endure  to  go  back  to  it  again. 

3  And  further,  many  of  the  experiences  that  contain  no 
pleasure  nor  pain,  and  also  of  those  that  do  contain 
pleasure  but  pleasure  of  an  ignoble  kind,  are  such 
that  non-existence  would  be  better  than  being  alive. 

4  And  generally,  if  one  collected  together  the  whole 
of  the  things  that  the  whole  of  mankind  do  and  ex- 
perience yet  do  and  experience  unwillingly,  because 
not  for  the  sake  of  the  things  themselves,  and  if  one 
added  an  infinite  extent  of  time,  these  things  would 
not  cause  a  man  to  choose  to  be  alive  rather  than 

5  not  alive.  But  moreover,  also  the  pleasure  of  food! 
or  of  sex  alone,  with  the  other  pleasures  abstracted! 
that  knowledge  or  sight  or  any  other  of  the  senses ! 
provides  for  human  beings,  would  not  induce  any-  | 
body  to  value  life  higher  if  he  were  not  utterly  ■ 
slavish,  for  it  is  clear  that  to  one  making  this  choice 
there  would  be  no  difference  between  being  born  a 

6  beast  or  a  man  ;  at  all  events,  the  ox  in  Egypt,  which 
they  reverence  as  Apis,  has  a  greater  abundance  of 

7  such  indulgences  than  many  monarchs.     Nor  like- 

211 


ARISTOTLE 

1216  a 

ομοίως  8e  ovhk  δια  την  του  KadevSeiv  YjSovrjV'  τι  7 
γαρ  8ιαφβρ€ΐ  KaOevSeiv  aveyeprov  νττνον  άπο  τη? 
πρώτης  ημέρας  μ^χρι  της  τελευταία?  €τών  αριθμόν 
5  χιλίων  η  όποσωνονν ,^  η  ζην  οντά  φυτόν;  τά  γονν 
φυτά.  τοιαύτης  τινός  eoiKe  μζτ€χ€ΐν  ζωής,  ώσττ^ρ 
και  τά  τταιδία*  και  γό,ρ  ταύτα  κατά  την  πρώτην 
iv  τη  μητρί^  yiveaiv  πζφυκότα  μβν  διατελεί 
καθ^ύ^οντα  δε  τον  ττάντα  χρόνον.  ώστ€  φαν^ρόν  8 
εκ   των   τοιούτων   οτι    διαφεύγει    σκοπούμενους  τΊ 

10  τό  ευ  και  τι  τό  aya^oi'  τό  iv  τω  ζην. 

Ύόν   μ€ν   οΰν    ^Αναζαγόραν   φασίν    άποκρίνασθαι  9 
προς  τίνα  Βιαποροΰντα  τοιαΰτ*  άττα  και  Βΐΐρωτώντα 
τίνος   evcK     αν  τις   eXoiTo   ■}/εΐ'ε'σ^αι   μάλλον   η   μη 
yeveadai    "  του  "    φάναι    "  θβωρησαι    τόν    ούρανόν 
και  την  ττερι  τόν  δλον  κόσμον  τάζιν."     οΰτος  μ€ν 

15  οΰν  επιστήμης  τινός  €V€K€v  την  αιρεσιν  ω€το 
TtjLttW  είναι  τοΰ  ζην  οι  δε  ΈαρΒανάπαλλον  10 
μακαρίζοντ€ς  η  Ί1μιν8υρί8ην  τόν  Έυβαρίτην  η 
των  άλλων  Tim?  των  ζώντων  τόν  άπολαυστικον 
βίον,  ούτοι  δε  πάντες  iv  τω  γαίρ^ιν  φαίνονται 
τάττ€ΐν  την   €ύΒαιμονίαν•   έτεροι   δε'  τινε?   οΰτ     αν  11 

20  φρόνησιν    ούΒ€μίαν    οϋτ€    τάς    σωματικός    η^ονάς 
ζλοιντο    μάλλον    η    τά?    πράζβις    τα?    απ     αρετής• 
αιροϋνται  γοΰν  ου  μόνον  evioi  Βόζης  χάριν  αύτας 
αλλά    και    μη    μέλλοντας    βύΒοκιμησζίν.       αλλ'     οι  12 
ττολλοι    των    πολιτικών    ουκ    αληθώς    τυγχάνουσι 

^  ν. Ι.  ^TU)f  άρίθμων  χίλιον  αριθμόν  τ)  όττοσονονν  :  ΐτων  χιλίων 
il  όποσωνονν?  (exciso  αριθμόν  gloss,  ad  όττοσονονν  erratum) 
Rac.  *  μήτρφ  V. 

"  See  1215  b  6  η. 

*  A  mythical  king  of  Assyria,  proverbial  for  luxury,  cf. 
N.E.  i.,  1295  b  22. 
212 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  I.  v.  7-12 

wise  would  anyone  desire  life  for  the  pleasure  of 
sleep  either  ;  for  what  is  the  difference  between 
slumbering  without  being  awakened  from  the  first 
day  till  the  last  of  a  thousand  or  any  number  of  years, 
and  living  a  vegetable  existence  ?  any  way  plants  seem 
to  participate  in  life  of  that  kind  ;  and  so  do  children 
too,  inasmuch  as  at  their  first  procreation  in  the 
mother,  although  alive,  they  stay  asleep  all  the  time. 

8  So  that  it  is  clear  from  considerations  of  this  sort 
that  the  precise  nature  of  well-being  and  of  the  good 
in  life  escapes  our  investigation. 

9  Now  it  is  said  that  when  somebody  persisted  in 
putting  various  difficulties  of  this  sort  to  Anaxagoras  " 
and  went  on  asking  for  what  object  one  should  choose 
to  come  into  existence  rather  than  not,  he  replied 
by  saying,  '  For  the  sake  of  contemplating  the 
heavens  and  the  whole  order  of  the  universe.' 
Anaxagoras  therefore  thought  that  the  alternative 
of  being  alive  was  valuable  for  the  sake  of  some  kind 

10  of  knowledge  ;  but  those  who  ascribe  bliss  to  Sar- 
danapallus  ^  or  Smindyrides  of  Sybaris  "  or  some  of 
the  others  living  the  life  of  enjoyment,  all  appear  for 

11  their  part  to  place  happiness  iti  delight  ;  while  a 
different  set  would  not  choose  either  wisdom  of  any 
kind  or  the  bodily  pleasures  in  preference  to  the  actions 
that  spring  from  goodness  :  at  all  events,  some  people 

choose  those  actions  not  only  for  the  sake  of  reputa-<ii\)^Sf^0ff'^ 
tion  but    even  when   they    are    not   going   to   get 

12  any  credit.  But  the  majority  of  those  engaged  in 
politics  are  not  correctly  designated  *  politicians,'  for 

"  Greek  colony  in  S.  Italy.  For  SmindjTides,  who 
travelled  with  1000  slaves  in  attendance,  see  Herod  vi.  127, 
Athenaeus,  v.  p.  273. 

213 


35 


ARISTOTLE 

1216  a 

της  ττροσηγορι,ας'  ου  γάρ  elai  πολιτικοί  κατά  τον 
25  aXrjOeiav,  ο  μ€ν  γάρ  πολιτικός  των  καλών  €στι 
ττραξζων  προαιρετικός  αυτών  χάριν,  οι  8e  πολλοί 
χρημάτων  και  πλεονεξίας  ένεκεν  άπτονται  του 
ζην  οϋτως. 

E/C  μεν  οΰν  τών  ειρημενων  φανερον  δτι  πάντες  13 
επι  τρεις  βίους  φερουσι  την  εύ^αιμονίαν ,  πολιτικον 
φιλοσοφον  άπολαυστικόν .  τούτων  δ'  η  μεν  περί 
30  τα  σώματα  και  τάς  απολαύσεις  ηΒονη  και  τίς  και 
ποια  τις  γίνεται  και  δια.  τίνων  ουκ  ά^ηλον,  ώστ 
ου  τίνες  εισΧ  δει  ζητεΐν  ημάς^  αλλ'  ει  συντείνουσί 
τι  προς  εύΒαιμονίαν  η  μη,  και  πώς  συντείνουσί, 
και  ποτερον,  ει  8εΐ  προσάπτειν  τω  ζην  καλώς' 
η8ονάς  τινας,  ταύτας  8εΐ  προσάπτειν  η  τούτων 
μεν  άλλον  Tti^o,  τρόπον  ανάγκη  κοινωνεΐν,  ετεραι 
ο  εισίν  at'  rjSovai  δι'  ας  ευλόγως  οΐονται  τον 
εύΒαίμονα  ζην  ήΒεως  και  μη  μόνον  άλύπως. 

Αλλά  περί  μεν  τούτων  ύστερον  επισκεπτεον ,  ΐ4 
περί  ο  αρετής  και  φρονησεως  πρώτον  θεωρησωμεν 
την  τε  φύσιν  αυτών  εκατερου  τίς  εστί  και  πότερον 
40  μόρια  ταύτα  της  aya^Ty?  ζωής  εστίν*'  αυτά  η  αΐ 
1216  b  πράξεις  αϊ  άπ  αυτών,  επεώη  προσάπτουσιν  αυτά 
καν  ει  μη  πάντες  εις  την  εύ^αιμονίαν  αλλ'  ουν  οΐ 
λόγου  άξιοι  τών  ανθρώπων  πάντες. 

Χωκράτης  μεν  οΰν  ό  πρεσβύτης  ωετ    είναι  τέλος  15 
το  γινώσκειν  την  άρετην,  και  επεζητει  τί  εστίν  η 
5  hικaιoσύvη    και    τί    η    ανδρεία    και    εκαστον    τών 

^  Ft.  :  αύτά$.  *  Βζ. :  κα\ά$. 

'  αί  add.  Rac.  ■•  Rac. :  έστΙν  ή. 

"  The  Greek  word  is  specially  associated  with  sensual 
pleasures. 

"  The  promised  discussion  does  not  occur,  but  see  N.E. 
vii„  1153  b  7-25. 

314 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  I.  v.  12-15 

they  are  not  truly  political,  since  the  political  man  is 
one  who  purposely  chooses  noble  actions  for  their  own 
sake,  whereas  the  majority  embrace  that  mode  of  life 
for  the  sake  of  money  and  gain. 

13  What  has  been  said,  therefore,  demonstrates  that  f'^?°P^, 
all  men  ascribe  happiness  to  three  modes  of  life — the  threetypi- 
political,  the  philosophic,  and  the  life  of  enjoyment."  "*'  ^'^'^^• 
Among  these,  the  nature  and  quality  of  the  pleasure 
connected  with  the  body  and  Avith  enjoyment,  and 

the  means  that  procure  it,  are  not  hard  to  see  ; 
so  that  it  is  not  necessary  for  us  to  inquire  what  these 
pleasures  are,  but  whether  they  conduce  at  all  to 
happiness  or  not,  and  how  they  so  conduce,  and,  if  it 

^^  (be  the  case  that  the  noble  life  ought  to  have  some 
pleasures  attached  to  it,  whether  these  are  the  pleas- 
ures that  ought  to  be  attached,  or  whether  these 
must  be  enjoyed  in  some  other  way,  whereas  the 
pleasures  which  people  reasonably  believe  to  make 

^.     ithe  happy  man's  life  pleasant  and  not  merely  pain- 

■  "^  less  are  diiferent  ones. 

14  But  these  matters  must  be  examined  later. ^     Let  Eihicsa  i 
us    first    consider    Goodness    and    Wisdom  ^  —  what  subject  / 
the  nature  of  each  is,  and  also  whether  they  them- 
selves  or  the   actions    that   spring   from    them    are 

parts  of  the  good  life,  since  that  they  are  connected 
with  happiness  is  asserted,  if  not  by  everybody, 
at  all  events  by  all  of  mankind  who  are  worthy  of 
consideration. 

15  Accordingly  Socrates  the  senior  ^  thought  that  the 
End  is  to  get  to  know  virtue,  and  he  pursued  an 
Inquiry  into  the  nature  of  justice  and  courage  and 

"  See  1214  a  33  note  ;   but  practical  wisdom  is  specially 
implied  here. 

•*  Gf.  1235  a  37.     A  younger  Socrates  was  a  pupil  of  Plato. 

215 


ARISTOTLE 

121β  b 

μορίων  αντης.     enoUi  8e^  ταυτ'  ευλόγως'  βττιστημας 

γαρ     ωετ'     etvaL    πάσας    τάς    άρ€τάς,    ώσθ      α^α 

σνμβαίν€ίν    ei8eVat    re    την    SiKaLoavvrjV    και    eivat 

δίκαιον    a/ia    yap    μ^μαθ-ηκαμεν    την    γεωμ^τριαν 

καΐ  οΙκοΒομίαν  καΐ  εσμεν  οικοδόμοι  και  γβωμετραΐ' 

10  διοττερ  εζι^τει  τι  iartv  άρετη  αλλ  ου  ττώ?  yiverat 
και  €κ  τίνων,  τοΰτο  δε  em  /xei'  των  εττι,στημών  16 
σνμβαΙν€ί  των  θεωρητικών,  ούθεν  γαρ  έτερον 
τελος'^  εστί  της  αστρολογίας  ονΒε  της  ττερί  φύ- 
σεως επιστήμης  ονΒε  γεωμετρίας  πλην  το  γνωρισαι 
και     θεωρησαι    την    φύσιν    των    πραγμάτων    των 

15  υποκείμενων  ται?  επιστημαις  [ου  μην  άλλα  ίίατα 
σνμβεβηκος  ονθέν  κωλύει  προς  πολλά  των  avay- 
](αίων  eti^ai  χρησίμους  αύτάς  ημΐν),  των  δε  Π 
ποιητικών  επιστημών  έτερον  το  τέλος  της  επι- 
στήμης και  γνώσεως,  οίον  uyteta  μεν  ιατρικής, 
ευνομία  8ε  η  τι  τοιονθ^  έτερον  της  πολιτικής, 
καλόν    μεν    οΰν    και    το    γνωρίζειν    εκαστον    τών  18 

■20  καλών,  ου  μην  άλλα  περί  y'^  άρετης  ου  το  ειδει^αι 
τιμιώτατον  τί  eoTtl•"  άλλα  το  γινώσκειν  εκ  τίνων 
εστίν,  ου  γάρ  εΐ^εναι  βουλόμεθα  τί  εστίν  άνΒρεία 
άλλ'  eti^at  άν8ρεΐοι,  ούδε  τί  εστί  δικαιοσύνη  άλλ 
ttvai  δίκαιοι,  καθάπερ  και  uytatVeti^  μα?<λον  η 
γινώσκειν   τί   εστί   το    uyiatVetl•"   και   εδ   εχειν   την 

25  ^^*•^  μάλλον  η  γινώσκειν  τί  εστί  το  ευ  εχειν. 

^  Fr. :  yap.  ^  rdXos  add.  Cas. 

*  Ric. :  ye  wepi. 

"  The  Greek  term  primarily  denotes  biology,  rather  than 
physics  in  the  modern  sense  (with  which  contrast  the  modern 

216 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  I.  v.  15-18 

each  of  the  divisions  of  virtue.  And  this  was  a 
reasonable  procedure,  since  he  thought  that  all  the 
virtues  are  forms  of  knowledge,  so  that  knowing 
justice  and  being  just  must  go  together,  for  as  soonl  ν 
as  we  have  learnt  geometry  and  architecture,  we>" 
are  architects  and  geometricians  ;  owing  to  which 
he  used  to  inquire  what  virtue  is,  but  not  how  and 

16  from  what  sources  it  is  produced.     But  although  this 

does  happen  in  the  case  of  the  theoretical  sciences, \    i-j, — ψ 
inasmuch   as   astronomy   and  natural  science  **   and     .'       V 
geometry  have  no  other  End  except  to  get  to  know 
and  to  contemplate  the  nature  of  the  things  that  are 
the  subjects  of  the  sciences  (although  it  is  true  that 
they  may  quite  possibly  be  \iseful  to  us  accidentally 

17  for  many  of  our  necessary  requirements),  yet  the 
End  of  the  productive  sciences  is  something  different 
from  science  and  knowledge,  for  example  the  End 
of  medicine  is  health  and  that  of  political  science 
ordered  government,  or  something  of  that  sort, 
different   from    mere    knowledge    of     the    science. 

18  Although,  therefore,  it  is  fine  even  to  attain  a  know- 
ledge of  the  various  fine  things,  all  the  same  neverthe- 
less in  the  case  of  goodness  it  is  not  the  knowledge  of 
its  essential  nature  that  is  most  valuable  but  the 
ascertainment  of  the  sources  that  produce  it.  For 
our  aim  is  not  to  know  what  courage  is  but  to  be 
courageous,  'not  to  know  what  justice  is  but  to  be 
just,  in  the  same  way  as  we  want  to  be  healthy  rather 
than  to  ascertain  what  health  is,  and  to  be  in  good 
condition  of  body  rather  than  to  ascertain  what  good 
bodily  condition  is. 

limitation  of  the  term  'physiology,'  and  of 'physic'  in  the 
sense  of  medicine) ;  accordingly  it  does  not  here  include 
astronomy. 

217 


ARISTOTLE 

1216  b  /  ,  X  /  / 

VI.    IleLpaTeov   Se   Trepl   τούτων   πάντων^    ζ'ητ€Ϊν  1 

την  ττίστιν  δια  των  Χόγων,  μαρτυρίοίς  καΐ  τταρα- 
^^ίγμασί  χρώμ€νον  τοις  φαινομβνοις.  κράτιστον 
μβν  γαρ  ττάντα?  άνθρώττονς  φαίνβσθαι  συνάμα - 
λογοΰντας   τοις    ρηθησομβνοις,   el    8e    μη,   τρόπον 

30  ye  TLva  ττάντας.^  oirep  μζταβίβαζόμβνοι  ποιησονσίν 
€χ6ΐ  γαρ  έκαστος  οΙκβΖόν  τι  προς  την  άλήθβιαν, 
€ζ  ών  άναγκαΐον  heLKvvvaL  πως  π^ρΐ  αυτών  e/c 
γαρ  των  αληθώς  μβν  λεγομένων  ου  σαφώς  Se 
προΐοΰσιν  έ'σται  και  το  σαφώς,  μ^ταλαμβάνουσιν 
ael     τά     γνωριμώτ€ρα     τών^     ^Ιωθότων     Aeyea^at 

35  συγκεγυμίνως .        Βιαφβρουσι     δ       οι     λόγοι     π€ρι  2 
€κάστην  μίθο^ον  οΐ  τ€  φιλοσόφως  λ^γόμβνοι  καΐ  οι 
μη  φίλοσόφως•  διόττερ    και   τώ   πολιτικώ*   ου  χρη 
νομίζ€ΐν  πζρίεργον  efrai  την  τοιαύτην  θβωρίαν  δι 
■^ς  ου  μόνον   το  τι  φαν^ρόν   αλλά  και   το   δια   τι• 
φιλόσοφον  γαρ  το  τοιούτο  π€ρΙ  ίκάστην  μέθο^ον. 

40  heiTai   μίντοι   τοϋτο   πολλής   εύλαβζίας.      €ΐσι   γάρ  3 

1217  a  τιν€ς   οΐ  δια   το   hoKelv  φιλοσόφου   elvai  το   μηθ^ν 

€ΐκη  λβγβιν  άλλα  jnera  λόγου  πολλάκις  λανθάνουσι 
λ€γοντ€ς  αλλότριους  λόγους  της  πραγματείας  και 
κενούς  [τοΰτο  hk  ποιοΰσιν  ότ€  μεν  δι  αγι^οιαν  ore  4 
δε  δι'  άλαζονείαν),  ύφ^  ών  άλίσκβσθαι  συμβαίνει 
και  τους  έμπειρους  και  δυνάμενους  πραττειν  ύπο 
5  τούτων  τών  μητ  εχόντων  μήτε  Βυναμενων  διανΌΐαι/ 
άρχιτεκτονικην  η  πρακτικην,     πάσχουσι  δε  τοΰτο  5 

^  πάντα  (vel  27  χρωμ^ΐΌν$)  Sp.  *  Vic. :   ττάντωί. 

*  <άΐ'τί>  των  ?  Ric.  *   Ric. :  τών  πολιτικών. 

«  Or  perhaps  '  led  on  step  by  step.' 

*  i.e.  practical  men  often  think  that  any  string  of  arguments  ^ 
constitutes  philosophy,  though  the  arguers  may  be  mere  j 
charlatans. 

218 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  I.  vi.  1-5 

1  VI.  And  about  all  these  matters  the  endeavour  The  method 
must   be   made   to   seek  to  convince   by   means   oftoobsirvj^ 
rational    arguments,    using    observed    facts    as    evi- ^^^cts  and 
dences  and  examples.     For  the  best  thing  would  be  their  ^'^ 

if  all  mankind  were  seen  to  be  in  agreement  with  the  reasons. 
views  that  will  be  stated,  but  failing  that,  at  any 
rate  that  all  should  agree  in  some  way.  And  this 
they  will  do  if  led  to  change  their  ground,**  for  every- 
one has  something  relative  to  contribute  to  the 
truth,  and  we  must  start  from  this  to  give  a  sort 
of  proof  about  our  views  ;  for  from  statements  that 
are  true  but  not  clearly  expressed,  as  we  advance, 
clearness  will  also  be  attained,  if  at  every  stage  we 
adopt  more  scientific  positions  in  exchange  for  the 

2  customary  confused  statements.  And  in  every  in- 
vestigation arguments  stated  in  philosophical  form 
are  different  from  those  that  are  non-philosophical  ; 
hence  we  must  not  think  that  theoretical  study  of 
such  a  sort  as  to  make  manifest  not  only  the  nature 
of  a  thing  but  also  its  cause  is  superfluous  even  for 
the  political  student,  since  that  is  the  philosophic  pro- 
cedure in  every  field  of  inquiry.     Nevertheless  this 

3  requires  much  caution.  For  because  to  say  nothing 
at  random  but  use  reasoned  argument  seems  to 
mark  a  philosopher,  some  people  often  without  being 
detected  advance  arguments  that  are  not  germane 
to  the  subject  under  treatment  and  that  have  nothing 

4  in  them  (and  they  do  this  sometimes  through  ignor- 
ance and  sometimes  from  charlatanry),  which  bring 
it  about  that  even  men  of  experience  and  practical 
capacity  are  taken  in  by  these  people,  who  neither 
possess  nor  are  capable  of  constructive  or  practical 

5  thought.^     And  this  befalls  them  owing  to  lack  of 

219 


ARISTOTLE 

1217  a       ^     ^  ^  ^  ,  /       ,  V    ./ 

δι'  άπαώζυσίαν  άτταιδευσια  γαρ  εστί  ττβρι  €καστον 
ττραγμα  το  μη  hvvaaOaL  κρίναν  τους  τ'  οικείου? 
λόγους     του     πράγματος     καΐ     τους     αλλότριους. 

10  καλώ?  δ'  €χ€ΐ  καΐ  το  χωρίς  κρίν€ΐν  τον  της  αίτιας  6 
λόγον  καΐ  το  Ββικνυμενον,  δια  re  το  ρηθέν  αρτιως, 
ΟΤΙ   7τροσ€χ€ΐν   ου   het  ττάντα   τοΓ?   δια   των  λόγων 
άλλα    τΓολλάκι?    μάλλον    τοις    φαίνομίνοις    {νΰν    δ 
όττότ'   αν  λύ€ίν  μη  βχωσυν  αναγκάζονται  τηστ€υ€ΐν 

15  τοις  €ΐρημ€νοις) ,  καΐ  διότι  ττολλακι?  το^  υττο  του 
λόγου  δεδεΐχθαι  δοκούν  αληθές  μβν  cotlv  ου  μβντοι 
δια  ταύτην  την  αίτίαν  δι'  ην  φησιν  ό  λόγος,  εστί 
γαρ  δια  φβύΒους  αληθές  δεΐ^αι•  δηλον  δ'  eV  των 
αναλυτικών . 

VII.    ΙΙξπροοιμιασμβνων  δε  και  τούτων,  λίγωμ^ν  1 
άρζάμ€νοι     πρώτον     απο     τών     πρώτων,       ωσπ€ρ 

20  €Ϊρηται,   ου    σαφώς   λ^γομ^νων ,    ζητοΰντ€ς   έττειτα' 
σαφώς  eipelv  τι  βστιν  τ^  ευδαιμονία,     ομολογείται  2 
δ')7  μεγιστον  eit'ai  και  άριστον  τοϋτο  τών  aya^cul•' 
Tcur  ανθρωπίνων  (ανθρώπινον  he  λεγομεν  οτι  ταχ 
αν    ε'ίη     και    βελτίονός    τίνος    άλλου    τών    όντων 
ευδαιμονία,  οίον  θεοΰ)  •  τών*  γαρ  άλλων  ζωών,  οσα  3 

25  χείρω  την  φύσιν  τών  ανθρώπων  εστίν,  ούθέν 
κοινωνεί  ταύτης  της  προσηγορίας•  ου  γάρ  εστίν 
ευδαίμων  ίππος  οΰδ'  όρνις  ουδ'  ιχθύς  ούδ  άλλο 
τών  όντων  ούθέν  ο  μη  κατά  την  επωνυμιαν  εν 
τη    φύσει    )Μ€Τ6χ€ΐ    θείου    τιΐ'ό?,    άλλα    κατ'    άλλτ^ν 

^  Rac. :  τό  μέν,  *  πρώτων  <τών>  ?  Ric. 

'  ίττειτα  Ras. :  ίπΐ  τό  {<.irpoi4vai>  eVt  ro  ?  Ric). 

*  Rac. :  ruv  μ^ν. 

"  §  1  above. 

"  i.e.  a  proposition  that  logically  follows  from  premisses 

220 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  I.  vi.  5— vii.  3 

education-^for  in  respect  of  each  subject  inability 
to  distinguish  arguments  germane  to  the  subject 
6  from  those  foreign  to  it  is  lack  of  education.  And 
it  is  also  well  to  judge  separately  the  statement  of 
the  cause  and  the  demonstrated  fact,  both  for  the 
reason  stated  just  now,"  that  it  is  not  proper  in 
regard  to  all  things  to  attend  to  theoretical  argu- 
ments, but  often  rather  to  the  facts  of  observation 
(whereas  now  when  men  are  unable  to  refute  an 
argument  they  are  forced  to  believe  what  has  been 
said),  and  also  because  often,  although  the  result 
that  seems  to  have  been  proved  by  the  arguments  is 
true,  it  is  not  true  because  of  the  cause  asserted  in 
the  argument.  For  it  is  possible  to  prove  truth  by 
falsehood,  as  is  clear  from  Analytics.^ 

1  VTI.  These   prefatory  remarks   having  also   been  Happiness 
made,  let  us  proceed  by  starting  first  from  the  first  good^attakT- 
statements,  which,  as  has  been  said,*'  are  not  clearly  ^^e  by 
expressed,    afterwards    seeking   to    discover   clearly 

2  the  essential  nature  of  happiness.  Now  it  is  agreed 
that  happiness  is  the  greatest  and  best  of  human 
goods  (and  we  say  '  human  '  because  there  might 
very  likely  also  be  a  happiness  belonging  to  some 

3  higher  being,  for  instance  a  god)  ;  since  none  of  the 
other  animals,  which  are  inferior  in  nature  to  men, 
share  in  the  designation  '  happy,'  for  a  horse  is  not 
happy,  nor  is  a  bird  nor  a  fish  nor  any  other  existing 
thing  whose  designation  does  not  indicate  that  it 
possesses  in  its  nature  a  share  of  something  divine, 
but  it  is  by  some  other  mode  of  participating  in  things 

that  are  false  may  be  a  true  one  :  see  Anal.  Pr.  ii.,  53  b  26  if.. 
Anal.  Post,  i.,  88  a  20  if.     Aristotle's  simplest  example  is 
the  syllogism  '  A  man  is  a  stone,  but  a  stone  is  an  animal, 
therefore  a  man  is  an  animal.' 
"   1216  b32  ff. 

221 


ARISTOTLE 

1217  a,^,^ 

Tiva  των   aya^cul•"   μ^τοχην  το   μ€ν  β4λτίον   ζγι   το 

δβ  χ€Ϊρον  αυτώΐ'. 

30  'Αλλ'  OTL  τούτον  €χ€ΐ  τον  τρόπον  ύστερον  4 
επίσκ€πτ€ον.  νυν  8e  Χέγωμ^ν^  οτι  των  aya^oir 
τα.  μβν  iariv  άνθρώπω  πρακτά  τά  δ'  ου  πρακτα. 
τοΰτο  δε  Χεγομ€ν  οΰτω  διότι  evia  των  όντων  ούθεν 
μ€Τ€χ€ί  κινήσεως,  ωστ  ουδέ  των^  ayaQdv,  koj? 
ταΰτ'  Ισως  άριστα  την  φύσιν  εστίν,  eVia  δε  ττρακτα 

3/)  μεν,  άλλα  πρακτα  κρείττοσιν  ημών.  επειδή  δε  5 
Βιχώς  λέγεται  το  πρακτόν  [και  γαρ  ων  ένεκα 
ττράττομεν  και  α  τούτων  ένεκα  /χετε'χει  πράζεως, 
οίον  και  την  υγιειαν  και  τον  πλοΰτον  τίθεμεν  των 
πρακτών  και  τά  τούτων  πραττόμενα  χάριν,  τα 
^'    ύytεt^'ά    και    τά    χρηματιστικά) ,    SijXov    οτι    και 

40  την    εύ8αιμονίαν    των    άνθρώπω    πρακτών    άριστον 
θετεον. 
1217  b      VIII.   Έκεπτεον  τοίνυν  τι  το  άριστον  και  ποσαχώς  1 
λεyεται/      εν    τρισι    δη    μάλιστα    φαίνεται    δό^αι? 
ειΐ'αι  τοΰτο.     ^ασι  yap  άριστον  μεν  είναι  πάντων 
αυτό  το  dya^ov,  αυτό  δ'  εΓν'αι  το  o.ya^oi'  ω  υπάρχει 
5  τό  τε  πρώτω   είναι  τών  αγαθών  και  το  αίτιω  τη 
παρουσία  τοις  άλλοις  του  άγαθοΐς^  είναι•  ταύτα  δ'  ^ 
ύπάρχειν^    αμφότερα  τη   ιδε'α  τοΰ  άγαθοΰ  {λέγω  δε 
αμφότερα  το  τε  πρώτον  τών  aya^cov  και  το  τοΓ? 
άλλοι?    αίτιον    dya^ois•    τη    παρουσία   τοΰ    αγαθοΐς 

^  vulg.  \^•/ομβν.  *  τώ»»  Κ,πρακτών^  ?  Ric. 

'  ίίθ(<τοι>  ?  Ric.  *  Rac. :  Xeyerai  ττοσαχώ^. 

®  Vic. :  ά-γαθά.  •  Fr. :  virapxei. 

"  This  promise  is  not  kept. 

*"  Ίδια  is  here  used  in  its  Platonic  sense,  as  a  synonym  for 
elSos,  class-form,  to  denote  the  permanent  immaterial  reality 
that  underlies  any  group  of  things  classed  together  in  virtue 
of  possessing  a  common   quality.     An    ίδ^α   is   jjcrceptible 

i22 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  I.  vii.  3— viii.  2 

good  that  one  of  them  has  a  bettei•  Hfe  and  another 
a  worse. 

4  But  the  fact  that  this  is  so  must  be  considered 
later.*  At  the  present  let  us  say  that  among  things 
good  some  are  within  the  range  of  action  for  a  human 
being  and  others  are  not.  And  we  make  this  dis- 
tinction for  the  reason  that  some  existing  things  do 
not  participate  in  change  at  all,  and  therefore  some 
good  things  do  not,  and  these  are  perhaps  in  their 
nature  the  best  things  ;  and  some  things,  though 
practicable,  are  only  practicable  for  beings  superior 

5  to  us.  And  inasmuch  as  '  practicable  '  has  two 
meanings  (for  both  the  Ends  for  which  we  act  and  the 
actions  that  we  do  as  m^eans  to  those  Ends  have  to 
do  with  action — for  example  we  class  among  things 
practicable  both  health  and  wealth  and  the  pursuits 
that  are  followed  for  the  sake  of  health  and  wealth, 
healthy  exercise  and  lucrative  business),  it  is  clear 
that  happiness  must  be  set  down  as  the  best  of  the 
things  practicable  for  a  human  being. 

1  VIII.  We  must  consider,  therefore,  what  the  best  piato's 
is,  and  in  how  many  senses  the  term  is  used.     The  of  q^^'j 
answer  seems  to  be  principally  contained  in  three  refuted. 
views.     For  it  is  said  that  the  best  of  all  things  is  the 
Absolute  Good,  and  that  the  Absolute  Good  is  that 
which  has  the  attributes  of  being  the  first  of  goods  and 

of  being  by  its  presence  the  cause  to  the  other  goods  of 

2  their  being  good  ;  and  both  of  these  attributes,  it  is 
said,  belong  to  the  Form''  of  good  (I  mean  both  being 
the  first  of  goods  and  being  by  its  presence  the  cause  to 
the  other  goods  of  their  being  good),  since  it  is  of  that 

only  by  the  mind,  but  the  word  does  not  denote  the  content 
of  a  mental  perception,  as  does  the  derivative  '  idea  '  in 
ordinary  English. 

223 


ARISTOTLE 

1217  b 

eivai)•    μάλιστα    re    γαρ    τάγαθον    XeyeaOaL    κατ 

10  €Κ€ίνης  αληθώς  {κατά  μ€τογΎ]ν  γάρ  καΐ  ομοιότητα 
τάλλα  αγαθά  εκείνης  βΐναή,  καΐ  ττρώτον  των 
ά)/α^ώΐ',  αναιρουμένου  γάρ  του  μετεχομενου  άν- 
αιρβΐσθαι  και  τά  μετέχοντα  της  ί8εας  (ά  λέγεται 
τω  jLtexe^etr  εκείνης),  το  δε  πρώτον^  τούτον  εχειν  3 
τον  τρόπον  προς  το   ύστερον   ώστ    eti^at  αυτό  το 

15  αγαθόν  την  ιδεαν»  του  άγαθοΰ'   και  γάρ  χωριστην 
ett'ttt  των  μετεχόντων,  ώσπερ  και  τάς  άλλα?  Ι^εας. 

'  Εστί   μεν   ουν   το    Βιασκοπεΐν   περί   ταύτης   της  4 
8όζης  ετέρας  τε  διατριβής  και  τά  πολλά  λογικω- 
τερας  εζ  ανάγκης•  οΐ  γάρ  άμα  αναιρετικοί  τε  και 
κοινοί  λόγοι  κατ*  ούΒεμίαν  είσιν  άλλην  επιστήμην. 

20  61  δε  δει  συντόμως  ειπείν  περί  αυτών,  λεγομεν^  5 
ΟΤΙ  πρώτον  μεν  το  eirat  ιδεαι^  μη  μόνον  άγαθοΰ 
άλλα  και  άλλου  ότονοΰν  λέγεται  λογικώς  και 
κενώς  {επεσκεπται  δε  πολΧοΐς  περί  αύτοϋ  τρόποις 
και  εν  τοις  εζωτερικοις  λόγοις  και  εν  τοις  κατά 
φιλοσοφίαν)•   εττειτ'    ει    και    οτι    /χάλιστ'    είσιν    at  6 

25  ιδε'αι    και    άγαθοΰ    ιδε'α,    μη    ποτ*    ούδε    χρήσιμος 
προς  ζωην  άγαθην  ουδέ  προς  τάς  πράζεις. 

Πολλαχώ?  γάρ  λέγεται  καΐ  ίσαχώς  τω  οντι  το  7 
aya^ov.     τό  τε  γάρ  6ν,  ώσπερ  εν  άλλοι?  ^ιηρηται, 
σΐ7/Ααινει  τό  μεν  τι  εστί  το  δε  ποιόν  τό  δε  ποσόν 
τό    δε    ττότε     και    προς    τούτοις    τό    μεν     εν    τω 

30  κινεΐσθαι   τό    δε    εν   τω    κινεΐν    και   τό    άγαθόι/   εν 
εκάστη  τών  πτώσεων  εστί  τούτων,   εν  ουσία  μεν 

^  ττρύτΐρον  Sp.  ^  Χ^-^ωμβν  ?  Rac. 

"  The  use  of  this  phrase  by  Aristotle  elsewhere  seems  to 
show  that  it  denotes  doctrines,  recorded  in  books  or  familiar 
invdebate,  that  were  not  peculiar  to  the  Peripatetic  school. 

224. 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  I.  viii.  2-7 

Form  that  goodness  is  most  truly  predicated  (inas- 
much as  the  other  goods  are  good  by  participation 
in  and  resemblance  to  the  Form  of  good)  and  also 
it  is  the  first  of  goods,  for  the  destruction  of  that 
which  is  participated  in  involves  the  destruction  of 
the  things   participating   in    the    Form  (which  get 

3  their  designation  by  participating  in  it),  and  that  is 
the  relation  existing  between  what  is  primary  and 
what  is  subsequent  ;  so  that  the  Form  of  good  is 
the  Absolute  Good,  inasmuch  as  the  Form  of  good 
is  separable  from  the  things  that  participate  in  it, 
as  are  the  other  Porms  also. 

4  Now  a  thorough  examination  of  this  opinion  belongs  a.  The  idea 
to  another  course  of  study,  and  one  that  for  the  most  does  not 
part  necessarily  lies  more  in  the  field  of  Loeic,  for  «"'^t, 
that  is  the  only  science  dealing  with  arguments  that 

5  are  at  the  same  time  destructive  and  general.  But 
if  we  are  to  speak  about  it  concisely,  we  say  that  in 
the  first  place  to  assert  the  existence  of  a  Form  not 
only  of  good  but  of  anything  else  is  an  expression  of 
logic  and  a  mere  abstraction  (but  this  has  been  con- 
sidered in  various  ways  both  in  extraneous  discourses  ** 

6  and  in  those  on  philosophical  lines)  ;  next,  even 
granting  that  Forms  and  the  Form  of  good  exist  in  the 
fullest  sense,  surely  this  is  of  no  practical  value  for 
the  good  life  or  for  conduct. 

7  For  '  good  '  has  many  senses,  in  fact  as  many  as  i.  'good' 

'  being.'     For  the  term  '  is,'  as  it  has  been  analysed  in  several'  '^^ 
other  works,  signifies  now  substance,  now  quality,  now  categories ; 
quantity,  now  time,  and  in  addition  to  these  meanings 
it  consists  now  in  undergoing  change  and  now  in  caus- 
ing it ;  and  the  good  is  found  in  each  of  these  cases  ^ — 

*  i.e.   categories.     The   last   two   specified   are  elsewhere 
designated  Kiveiv  and  κιν€Ϊσθαι,  Action  and  Passion. 

Q  225 


ARISTOTLE 

1217  b 

ό  νους  και  6  deos,  iv  8e  τω  ττοιω  το  Βικαιον,  ev 

8e  τω  ττοσω  το  μετρίον,  iv  8e  τω  πότβ  ό  καιρός, 
το  δε  ^ώάσκον  καΐ  το  Βώασκόμ€νον  rrepl  κίνησιν. 
ώστΓ€ρ  οΰν  ovSe  το  ον  ev  τι  εστί  Trepl^  τα.  είρημβνα,  8 

35  όντως  ovSe  το  aya^ov,  ovSe  €7Τίστημη  εστί  ju.ia 
οντ€  τον  οντος  οντ€  τον  αγαθόν,  αλλ'  ουδέ  τα 
όμοίοσχημόνως  λ€γόμ€να  αγαθά  /χια?  εστί  θβωρησαι, 
οίον  τον  καιρόν  η  το  μ4τριον,  αλλ'  έτερα  eTepov 
καιρόν  Oewpei  και  έτερα  eTepov  μάτριον,  οίον  nepl 
τροφην  μev  τον  καιρόν  και  το  μ€τριον  ιατρική  και 

40  γνμναστικη,  Trepi  δε  τάς  πολ€μικας  7τράζ€ΐς 
στρατηγία,   και   όντως   έτερα   ττερι   ίτίραν  ιτραζιν, 

1218  a  ώστε  σχολί^  αντό  ye  το  aya^oi^  θeωpησaι  ρ,ια?. 

"Έιτι  ev  οσοις  υττάρχει  το  rrpoTepov  και  ύστερον,  9 
ονκ  εστί  κοινον  τι  παρά  ταντα  και  τοντο^  χωριστόν 
ειι^  y'^P  <^*^  '^''  '^^^  ττρώτον  πρότ€ρον,  npoTepov  γαρ  10 
5  το   /cotrov   /cat  χωριστόν  δια  το   άναιρονμ4νον  τον 
κοινον  avaipelaOai  το  ττρώτον.     οΐον  ει  το  διττλάσιον 
•πρώτον     τών     πολλαπλασίων,     ονκ     evhe^eTai     το 
πολλαπλάσιον     το     Koivfj     κaτηγopovμevov     ειΐ'αι 
χωριστόν  εσται  γαρ   τον   Βιπλασίον   πpότepov^   ει 
σvμβaίveL    το     κοινον     είναι     την     ιδε'αν,     οίον     ει 
χωριστόν    πoιησeι€    τις    το    κοινον    ει    ycip    εστί 
10  δικαιοσιίνι^  aya^ov  και  ανδρεία,  έ'στι  τοίνυν,  φασίν, 
αντό  τι  aya^ov  το  ονν  αυτό  πρόσκζίται  προς  τον  11 
λόγον  τον   κοινον.      τοΰτο   δε   τι   αν   eϊη   πλην   ότι 
άι'διον   και  χωριστόν ;      αλλ'   ούδεν  ρ,αλλον   λevκόv 


τταρά  Vic.  *  τούτων  Sp. 

'  lacunam  hie  Sus. 


226 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  I.  viii.  7-11 

in  essence,  as  mind  and  God,  in  quality  justice,  in 
quantity  moderation,  in  time  opportunity,  and  as 
instances   of  change,    the   teacher  and  the  taught. 

8  Therefore,]  ust  as  being  is  not  some  one  thing  in  respect 
of  the  categories  mentioned,  so  neither  is  the  good,  and 
there  is  no  one  science  either  of  the  real  or  of  the  good. 

But   also   even   the   goods   predicated  in   the   same  u.  even  in 
category,  for  example  opportunity  or  moderation,  do  ftTfg'th^e^"'^^ 
not  fall  within  the  province  of  a  single  science  to  study,  subject  of 
but  different  sorts  of  opportunity  and  of  moderation  ββΓβ'ηοββ ; 
are  studied  by  different  sciences,  for  instance  oppor- 
tunity and  moderation  in  respect  of  food  are  studied 
by  medicine  and  gymnastics,  in  respect  of  military 
operations  by  strategics,  and  similarly  in  respect  of 
another  pursuit  by  another  science  ;  so  that  it  can 
hardly  be  the  case  that  the  Absolute  Good  is  the 
subject  of  only  one  science. 

9  Again,  wherever  there  is  a  sequence  of  factors,  a  prior  iii.  aseries 
and  a  subsequent,  there  is  not  some  common  element  ^^^;^°° 

0  beside  these  factors  and  that  element  separable  ;  for  separately 
then  there  would  be  something  prior  to  the  first  in  ^^^^  '"^ ' 
the  series,  for  the  common  and  separable  term  would 

be  prior  because  when  the  common  element  was  de- 
stroyed the  first  factor  Avould  be  destroyed.  For  ex- 
ample, if  double  is  the  first  of  the  multiples,  the 
multiplicity  predicated  of  them  in  common  cannot 
exist  as  a  separable  thing,  for  then  it  will  be  prior  to 
double,  if  it  is  the  case  that  the  common  element  is 
the  Form,  as  it  would  be  if  one  were  to  make  the 
common  element  sepai-able  :  for  if  justice  is  a  good, 
and  courage,  there  is  then,  they  say,  a  Good-in-itself, 

1  so  the  term  '  in  itself '  is  added  to  the  common  defini- 
tion. But  what  could  this  denote  except  that  the 
good  is  eternal  and  separable  ?    Yet  a  thing  that  is 

227 


ARISTOTLE 

1218  a      ^  Ν        ,      ,  ^  ^        ,  f      / 

TO  ττοΧλας  ημέρας  XevKov  rod  /Ltiav  rj^epav  ωστ' 

ovSe  (to   ά)/αθόι^  μάλλον   αγαθόν  τω    aiSiov   elvai• 

15  oi5Se>^   Srj  TO    kolvov  aya^ol•»   ταύτό   ttj    ιδέα*  ττάσι 
γαρ  νπάρχ€ί  κοινόν. 

Άνάτταλιν  δε  και  SeiKTeov  η  ώς  νυν  SeiKvvovaL  ] 
το  αγαθόν  αυτό.  νυν  μεν  γαρ  €Κ  των  μη'^  ομο- 
λογουμένων  εχειν  το  αγαθόν,  e^  εκείνων  τα 
όμολογούμενα  είναι  αγαθά  Βεικνύουσίν  οΐον^  εζ 
αριθμών  οτι  η  δικαιοσύνη  και  ή  uyteta  αγαθόν, 
τάζεις    γαρ    και    αριθμοί,    ώς    τοις    άριθμοΐς    και 

20  ταΐς  μονάσιν  aya^or  υπάρχον  δια  το  είναι  το  εν 
αυτό  τάγαθόν.*^  δει  δ'  εκ  των  όμολογουμενων  οίον  ] 
i5yieta§•  ισ-χύος  σωφροσύνης  οτι  και  εν  τοις  άκινή- 
τοις  μάλλον  το  καλόν  ττάντα  γάρ  τάδε  τάζις  και 
■ηρεμία•  ει  άρα,  εκείνα  μάλλον,  εκείνοις  γάρ  υπ- 
άρχει  ταύτα    μδίλλον. — παράβολος   δε    και   η   από-  1 

25  δει^ι?  οτι  το  εν  αύτο  το  αγαθόν  ότι  οι  αριθμοί 
εφίενται  αύτοΰ^•  οϋτε  γάρ  ώς  εφίενται  λεγουσι^ 
φανερώς  άλλα  λι'αι^  απλώς  τοϋτό  φασι,  και  ορεζιν 
είναι  πώς  αν  τις  ύπολάβοι  εν  οΐς  ζωη  μη  υπάρχει; 
δει  δε  ττερι  τούτου  πραγματευθηναι,  και  μη  άζιοΰν  1 
μηθεν   άλόγως    ο'    και    μετά    λόγου    πιστεΰσαι    ου 

30  ρά8ιον. — τό  τε  φάναι  πάντα  τά  όντα  εφίεσθαι  ενός 

τίνος  άγαθοΰ  ουκ  αληθές'  εκαστον  γάρ  ίδιου  αγαθού 

ορέγεται,   οφθαλμός   οφεως,   σώμα   ύyιειαs■,   οϋτως 

άλλο  άλλου. 

^  <τό  ά7α^ό»'  .  .  .  οΰδβ>  Ras, 

*  μη  add.  Zeller,  ^  οϊον  add.  Ilac. 

*  Fr. :  άΎαθόν. 

*  αυτοί'  add.  ?  Ric.  (supra  post  dirt  Fr.). 

'  Sp. :  \iyovTa.i.  '  Sp.  ζ  Λ. 

"  The  words  rendered  '  the  good  is  .  .  .  eternal'  are  a  con- 
jectural insertion. 

228 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  I.  viii.  11-15 

white  for  many  days  is  no  more  white  than  a  thing  Ι,^ρ-ρ^*^™'*'^ 
that  is  white  for  one  day,  so  that  the  good  is  no  more  afiect 
good  by  being  eternal «  ;    nor  yet  therefore   is   the  1"»''^^ : 
common  good  the  same  as  the  Form,  for  it  is  the 
common  property  of  all  the  goods. 

2  Also  the  proper  method  of  proving  the  Absolute  v.  general 
Good  is  the  contrary  of  the  method  now  adopted.     At  p,.ovVd  from 
present  it  is  from  things  not  admitted  to  possess  ^^H^!^}^^^^' 
goodness  that  they  prove  the  things  admitted  to  be  versa-, 
good,  for  instance,  they  prove  from  numbers  that 
justice  and  health  are  good,  because  they  are  arrange- 
ments and  numbers — on  the  assumption  that  good- 
ness is  a  property  of  numbers  and  monads  because 

3  the  Absolute  Good  is  unity.  But  the  proper  method 
is  to  start  from  things  admitted  to  be  good,  for  in- 
stance health,  strength,  sobriety  of  mind,  and  prove 
that  beauty  is  present  even  more  in  the  unchanging  ; 
for  all  these  admitted  goods  consist  in  order  and  rest, 
and  therefore,  if  that  is  so,  the  things  unchanging  are 
good  in  an  even  greater  degree,  for  they  possess  order 

4  and  rest  in  a  greater  degree. — And  it  is  a  hazardous  vi.  unity  of 
way  of  proving  that  the  Absolute  Good  is  unity  to  say  „ηρ^νβ(ΐ, 
that  numbers  aim  at  unity  ;  for  it  is  not  clearly  stated 

how  they  aim  at  it,  but  the  expression  is  used  in  too 
unq.ualified  a  manner  ;  and  how  can  one  suppose  that 

5  things  not  possessing  life  can  have  appetition  ?  One 
ought  to  study  this  matter  carefully,  and  not  make 
an  unreasoned  assumption  about  something  as  to 
which  it  is  not  easy  to  attain  certainty  even  with  the 

aid  of  reason. — And  the  statement  that  all  existing  vil.  and  not 
things  desire  some  one  good  is  not  true  ;   each  thing  ^-^^ '"  ^*'^^• 
seeks  its  own  particular  good,  the   eye  sight,  the 
body  health,  and  similarly  another  thing  another 
good. 

229 


ARISTOTLE 

1218  a 

"Ort  μ€ν  οΰν  ουκ   eariv    αυτό    tl^    αγαθόν,    e^et  1 
απορίας  τοιαύτας,  και  οτι  ου  χρησιμον  ttj  πολιτικ-η, 
35  αλλ'  (,'διοΓ  τι  aya^ov,  ωσπ€ρ  και  ταΓ?  αλλαι?,  οίον 
γυμναστιΚΎ\  eve^ia. 

^'Έιτι   και  το   ev   τω    λόγω    γβγραμμβνον  η  γαρ  ] 
ουδε/χια    χρησιμον    αυτό    το    του    αγαθού    ειδο?    η 
ττάσαις  ομοίως. 
"Ετι  ου  ττρακτόν. 

Ομοίως  δ'  ουδέ  το  κοινον  αγαθόν  οντ€  αυτό'  ] 
1218  b  aya^oi'  eWiv  (/cat  γαρ  αν  μικρω  ύττάρζαι  άγαθω) 
ούτ€  ττρακτόν•  ου  γαρ  οττως  ύττάρζζΐ  το  οτωοϋν  υπ- 
άρχον η  ιατρική  πραγματεύεται  αλλ'  όπως  ύγι'εια, 
ομοίως  δε  και  των  άλλων  τεχνών  εκάστη,  άλλα  1 
>  7Γθλλα;(α)$•  τό  aya^oi^,  και  έ'στι  τι  αύτου  καλόν','' 
και  το  μεν  πρακτόν  τό  δ'  ου  πρακτόν.  πρακτόν  δε  τό 
τοιούτον  aya^ov,  τό  oi5  ένεκα,  ουκ  έ'στι  δε  τό  εν» 
τοΓ?  άκιντ^τοις•. 

Φανερον  OW*  οτι  οϋτε  η  ιδέα  τάγαθοϋ  τό 
ζητούμενον  αυτό  τό  aya^ol•»  εστίν  οϋτε  τό  κοινόν 
(το  /χεν  yap  άκίνητον  και  ου  πρακτόν,  τό  δε  κινητόν 
10  ρ,εΓ  αλλ  ου  πρακτόν).  τό  δ'  ου  ένεκα  ώς  τέλος 
άριστον  και  αίτιον  των  ύφ*  αυτό  και  πρώτον 
πάντων  ώστε  τοΰτ  αν  ειη  αυτό  τό  aya^oi',  τό  2 
τέλος  τών  άνθρώπω  πρακτών.  τοΰτο  δ'  εστί  τό 
υτΓΟ  την  κυρίαν  πασών,  αϋτη  δ'  εστί  πολιτική  και 
οικονομική  και  φρόνησις•  Βιαφερουσι  γαρ  αύται 
15  αι  ε^ει?  77ρό?  τα?  άλλα?  τω  τοιαΰται  είΐ'αι  {προς  δ' 

^  τό  ?  Rac.  '  ίτι  .  .  .  πρακτόν  seel.  Wilson. 

*  αυτό  τό  ?  Rac.  *  καΐ  .  .  .  κα\6ι>  secl.  Sus. 

^  οΰν  add.  Brandis. 

°  This  sentence  reads  like  a  mere  note.  The  reference 
seems  to  be  to  1217  b  16-1218  a  32,  especially  1217  a  19-25. 
230 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  I.  viii.  16-20 

16  Such   then    are    the   difficulties    indicating    that  b.  The  idea 
the  Absolute  Good  does  not  exist, — and  that  it  is  no  practical 
of  no  use  for  political  science,  but  that  this  has  a  "»?  i^. ^'' "^'"^ 
special  good  of  its  own,  as  have  the  other  sciences         ' 
also — for  instance  the  good  of  gymnastics  is  good 

bodily  condition. 

17  "*  Further  there  is  also  what  has  been  written  in  the 
discourse  :  either  the  Class-form  of  the  good  is  in 
itself  useful  to  no  science,  or  it  is  useful  to  all  alike. 

Further  it  is  not  practicable. 

18  And  similarly  the  good  as  universal  also  is  not  an  nor  is  the 
Absolute  Good  (for  universality  might  be  an  attribute  f,n°verLi. 
of  even  a  small  good),  and  also  it  is  not  practicable  ; 

for  medical  science  does  not  study  how  to  pro- 
cure an  attribute  that  belongs  to  anything,  but  how 
to  procure  health,  and  similarly  also  each  of  the  other 

19  practical  sciences.  But  '  good  '  has  many  meanings, 
and  there  is  a  part  of  it  that  is  beautiful,  and  one 
form  of  it  is  practicable  but  another  is  not.  The  sort 
of  good  that  is  practicable  is  that  which  is  an  obj  ect 
aimed  at,  but  the  good  in  things  unchangeable  is  not 
practicable. 

It  is  manifest,  therefore,  that  the  Absolute  Good  we  For  practice] 
are  looking  for  is  not  the  Form  of  good,  nor  yet  the  Man's  aim 
ffood  as  universal,  for  the  Form  is  unchangeable  and  ^"^^  '^J}^. 

■  ■      Λ  Λ  11  .  1  Till  constitutes 

impracticable,  and  the  universal  good  though  change-  his  Absolute 
able  is  not  practicable.     But  the  object  aimed  at  as  ^°°''• 
End  is  the  chief  good,  and  is  the  cause  of  the  subordi- 

20  nate  goods  and  first  of  all ;  so  that  the  Absolute  Good 
would  be  this — the  End  of  the  goods  practicable  for 
man.  And  this  is  the  good  that  comes  under  the 
supreme  of  all  the  practical  sciences,  which  is  Politics 
and  Economics  and  Wisdom  ;  for  these  states  of 
character  differ  from  the  others  in  the  fact  that  they 

231 


ARISTOTLE 

1218  b 

άλΧηλας  e'i  τι  ^ιαφ^ρουσιν  varepov  XeKTCov).      on  21 

δ'  αίτιον  το  TeXos  των  νφ'  αυτό  δτ^λοΓ  η  διδασκαλία* 
ορισάμενοι  γαρ  το  τ€λος  ταλλα  SeiKvvovoLv  otl 
€καστον  αυτών  aya^oi',  αϊτιον  γαρ  το  οΰ  evcKa• 
οίον  €Tr€L8ri  το    ύγιαίν^ιν  τοδι,  ανάγκη   τοδι*    eti^ai 

20  το  συμφέρον  προς  αύτην,  το  δ  ύγίζίνον  της  ύγιβιας 
αίτιον  ώς  κίνησαν,  καίτοι^  του  eii^at  αλλ'  ου  του 
αγαθόν  elvai  την  uytetav.  έτι  oi)hk  Ββίκνυσιν  ούθζΐς  22 
ΟΤΙ  a.ya^oi'  η  uyieia  {άν  μη  σοφιστής  η  και  μη 
ιατρός,  ούτοι  γαρ  τοις  αλλότριοι?  λόyoιί  σοφίζονται) , 
ώσττ€ρ  οΰδ'  άλλην  άρχην  ού^^μίαν. 

25  Το  δ  ώς  τέΧος^  αγαθόν  άνθρώπω  καΐ  το  άριστον 
των  ττρακτών  σκ€7ττ€ον  ττοσαχώς  το  άριστον  πάν- 
των,* €7T€iSrj  τοΰτο  άριστον,  μετά  ταΰτα  άλλην 
λαβοΰσιν   άρχην  .^ 

^  τοδί  ?  Sp.  :   τύδε. 

^  καίτοι  Ross:   καΐ  τύτε  (και  τόδε  ?  Ric). 

^  τό  δέ  TeXos  ώί  vel  ώί  δε  το  τ4λοί  Ric. 

*  ττάντων  Κ.λέ'γΐταΙ'^  ?  Rac. 

*  έπειδη  .  .  .  αρχήν  secl.  ?  Rac.  (μΐτά  .  .  .  αρχήν  seel.  Sus.). 

«  See  1141  b  21-1 142  a  11  (E.E.  ν.  =  Λ^.£'.  vi.  viii.  init.). 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  I.  viii.  20-22 

are  supreme  (whether  they  differ  at  all  from  one 
!1  another  must  be  discussed  later  on  ").  And  that  the 
End  stands  in  a  causal  relation  to  the  means  sub- 
ordinate to  it  is  shown  by  the  method  of  teachers  ; 
they  prove  that  the  various  means  are  each  good  by 
first  defining  the  End,  because  the  End  aimed  at  is 
a  cause  :  for  example,  since  to  be  in  health  is  so-and- 
so,  what  contributes  to  health  must  necessarily  be 
so-and-so  ;  the  wholesome  is  the  efficient  cause  of 
health,  though  only  the  cause  of  its  existing — it  is 
12  not  the  cause  of  health's  being  a  good.  Furthermore 
nobody  proves  that  health  is  a  good  (unless  he  is  a 
sophist  and  not  a  physician — -it  is  sophists  that 
juggle  with  irrelevant  arguments),  any  more  than  he 
proves  any  other  first  principle. 

After  this  we  must  take  a  fresh  starting-point  ^  and 
consider,  in  regard  to  the  good  as  End  for  man  and 
in  regard  to  the  best  of  practicable  goods,  how  many 
senses  there  are  of  the  term  '  best  of  all,'  since  this 
is  best. 

"  This  clause  and  the  last  clause  of  the  sentence  render 
words  that  look  like  an  interpolation  patched  into  the  text 
from  the  opening  sentence  of  Book  II. 


233 


1218  b 

30  Ο 


I.   Μετά  δε  ταΰτ*  αλλην  λαβοΰσιν  άρχην  πβρί  τών  J 
ίπομένων  XcKreov. 

Πάντα  817  τάγα^ά  τ}  €κτ6ς  η  iv^  Φ^ΧΤ]}  '^^^^ 
τούτων  αίρ£τώτ€ρα  τά  iv  τ-fj  φνχτ],  καθάπβρ  Si- 
αιρούμβθα  καΐ  iv  τοις  €ζωτ€ρίκοΐς  λόγοις.  φρόνη- 
35  σις  γαρ  καΐ  άρ^τη  καΐ  η^ονη  iv  φνχτ],  ων  -η  evta  η 
ττάντα  τβλος  etvai  δοκει  ττασιν.  τών  δε  iv  φνχτ] 
τά  μβν  έ'^ει?  η  Βυνάμ€ΐς  elaL,  τά  δ'  ivipyeiai  καΙ 
κινήσεις. 

Ταύτα  Srj  όντως  ύποκβίσθω,  και  πβρι  αρετής  \ 
ΟΤΙ  iaTiv  η  βέλτιστη  διάθεσι?  η  ^ζις  η  δυι^α^υ-ΐ? 
i2\9  Λ  εκάστων  όσων  iστί  τις  χρησις  η  έργον.  SrjXov  δ' 
εκ  της  iπaγωγης•  εττι  πάντων  γαρ  οϋτω  τίθεμεν 
οίον  ιματίου  αρετή  εστίν,  και  γαρ  έργον  τι  και 
χρησίς  εστίν,  και  ή  βέλτιστη  εζις  του  ιματίου 
αρετή  εστίν  ομοίως  δε  και  πλοίου  και  οικίας  και 
5  τών  άλλων,  ώστε  και  φυχής,  εστί  γάρ  τι  έργον 
αύτης.  και  της  βελτίονος  Βή  εζεως  έστω  βελτιον  [ 
το  έργον,  και  ως  εχουσιν  at  εζεις  προς  άλλήλας, 
οϋτω  και  τά  έργα  τά  από  τούτων  προς  άλληλα 
εχετω.       και    τέλος    εκάστου    το    έργον    φανερον  4 

^  iv  add.  Camot :  ή  <.iv  σώματι  ή  ei'>  Sus.  (et  infra  αίρ^τώτατα 
Rac). 

234 


BOOK  II 

1  I.  After  this  Ave  must  take  a  fresh  starting-point  Ethical 
and  discuss  the  subjects  that  follow.  (^^Ο^νΧΓγΙ 

Now  all  goods  are  either  external  or  within  the  ofHappiness 
spirit,  and  of  these  two  kinds  the  latter  are  prefer-  from'fnnc- 
able,  as  we  class  them  even  in  the  extraneous  dis-  **°'*  °^  ™*°• 
courses."     For  Wisdom  and  Goodness  and  Pleasure 
are  in  the  spirit,  and  either  some  or  all  of  these  are 
thought   by    everybody    to    be    an   End.     And   the 
contents  of  the  spirit  are  in  two  groups,  one  states  or 
faculties,  the  other  activities  and  processes. 

2  Let  these  assumptions,  then,  be  made,  and  let  it  be  Goodness 
assumed  as  to  Goodness  that  it  is  the  best  disposition  ^p®g^"foi?*' 
or  state  or  faculty  of  each  class  of  things  that  have  function 
some  use  or  work.     This  is  clear  from  induction,  for 

we  posit  this  in  all  cases  :  for  instance,  there  is  a 
goodness  that  belongs  to  a  coat,  for  a  coat  has  a  par- 
ticular function  and  use,  and  the  best  state  of  a 
coat  is  its  goodness  ;  and  similarly  with  a  ship  and 
a  house  and  the  rest.     So  that  the  same  is  true  also 

3  of  the  spirit,  for  it  has  a  work  of  its  own.  And  there- 
fore let  us  assume  that  the  better  the  state  is  the 
better  is  the  work  of  that  state,  and  that  as  states 
stand  in  relation  to  one  another  so  do  the  works 

4  that  result  from  them.     And  the  work  of  each  thing 

«  See  note  on  1217  b  23. 

23.5 


ARISTOTLE 

1219  a 

τοίνυν  €Κ  τούτων  otl  βίλτιον  το  βργον  της  βξεως' 

10  το  γαρ  τέλος  άριστον  ώς  τβλος,  υπόκειται,  γαρ 
τέλος  το  βελτιστον  καΐ  το  εσχατον  ου  ένεκα  τάλλα 
πάντα'  δτι  μεν  τοίνυν  το  έργον  βελτιον  της  εζεως 
και  της  διαθέσεως,  8ηλον. 

Αλλά    το    έργον   λέγεται    8ιχώς'    των   μεν    γάρ  5 
εστίν   έτερον  τι  το   έργον  πάρα   την  χρησιν,   οΐον 
οικοδομικής   οικία   αλλ'    ουκ   οικο^όμησις   και  Ια- 

15  τρικης  ύγίεια  αλλ'  ούχ  ύγιαι^σι?  οΰδ'  ιάτρευσις , 
των  δ'  η  χρησις  έργον,  οΐον  οφεως  δρασις  και  μαθη- 
ματικής επιστήμης  θεωρία,  ωστ  ανάγκη  ων  έργον 
η  χρησις  την  χρησιν  βελτιον  eivat  της  εζεως. 

Ύούτων    δε    τούτον    τον    τρόπον    Βιωρισμενων,  6 
λεγομεν   δτι    το   αύτο^    έργον   του  πράγματος   και 

20  της  αρετής  (αλλ'  ούχ  ωσαύτως),  οΐον  σκυτοτομικης 
και  σκυτεύσεως  υπόδημα'  ει  Βή  τις  εστίν  αρετή 
σκυτική'  και  σπουδαίος  σκυτεύς,^  το  έργον  εστί 
σπου^αΐον  ύπόΒημα•  τον  αυτόν  δε  τρόπον  και  επι 
των  άλλων. 

Ετι    έστω    φυχής    έργον   το    ζην   ποιεΐν,   τοΰτο*  η 

25  δε  χρήσις  και  εγρήγορσις  (ό  γάρ  ύπνος  αργία  τις 
και  ησυχία)  •  ωστ  επεί  το  έργον  ανάγκη  εν  καΐ 
ταύτό  είναι  της  φυχής  και  της  αρετής,  έργον  αν 
εΐη  τής  αρετής  ζωή  σπουδαία,     τοΰτ    αρ'  ε'στι  το 

^  αυτό  add.  Rac,  (ταύτό  ante  τό  ίρ-γον  Cas.). 

*  Rac. :  σκ\τικΎΐ$.  ^  Sp. :  σιτου^αίου  σκύτίωί. 

*  Wilsons  τοΰ. 

2S6 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  II.  i.  4-7 

is  its  End;  from  this,  therefore,  it  is  plain  that  the 
work  is  a  greater  good  than  the  state,  for  the  End 
is  the  best  as  being  an  End,  since  the  greatest  good 
is  assumed  as  an  End  and  as  the  ultimate  object  for 
the  sake  of  which  all  the  other  things  exist.  It  is 
clear,  therefore,  that  the  work  is  a  greater  good  than 
the  state  and  disposition. 

But   the    term   '  work  '   has    two    meanings  ;    for  (which  is  not 
some  things  have  a  work  that  is  something  diiFerent  ^productive 
from  the  employment  of  them,  for  instance  the  work  Process), 
of  architecture  is  a  house,  not  the  act  of  building, 
that  of  medicine  health,  not  the  process  of  healing 
or   curing,  whereas    with   other   things   their  work 
is  the  process  of  using  them,  for  instance  the  work 
of  sight  is  the  act  of  seeing,  that  of  mathematical 
science  the  contemplation  of  mathematical  truths. 
So  it  follows  that  with  the  things  whose  work  is  the 
employment  of  them,  the  act  of  employing  them  must 
be  of  more  value  than  the  state  of  possessing  them. 

And  these  points  having  been  decided  in  this  way, 
we  say  that  the  same  work  belongs  to  a  thing  and  to 
its  goodness  (although  not  in  the  same  way)  :  for 
example,  a  shoe  is  the  work  of  the  art  of  shoemaking 
and  of  the  act  of  shoemaking  ;  so  if  there  is  such 
a  thing  as  shoemaking  goodness  and  a  good  shoe- 
maker, their  work  is  a  good  shoe  ;  and  in  the  same 
way  in  the  case  of  the  other  arts  also. 

Again,  let  us  grant  that  the  work  of  the  spirit  is  to  and  its 
cause  life,  and  that  being  alive  is  employment  and  actioTcon- 
beine  awake  (for  sleep  is  a  kind  of  inactivity  and  «titutes 

X  .ιΛ  .1.•  .1  1/•  Happmeas. 

rest)  ;  with  the  consequence  that  smce  the  work  oi 
the  spirit  and  that  of  its  goodness  are  necessarily 
one  and  the  same,  the  work  of  goodness  would  be 
good  life.     Therefore  this  is  the  perfect  good,  which 

237 


ARISTOTLE 

1219  a 

reXeov  αγαθόν ,   δπβρ  ην  η   ^ύ^αιμονία.      ^rjXov  δε  8 

e/c  των  ύποκ€ΐμ€νων  {ην  μέν  γαρ  η  ^ν^αιμονία  το 

30  άριστον,  τα  8e  τβλη  iv  φνχη  καΐ  τα  άριστα  των 
aya^col•',  τα  iv  αντη^  δβ  η  βζις  η  €ν€ργ€ΐα),  inel 
βέΧτιον  η  €ν€ργ€ία  της  Βίαθ€σ€ως  καΐ  της  ββλτίστης 
€^€ω$•  ή  βέλτιστη  eVepyeta  η  δ'  άρβτη  βέλτιστη 
^ζ^^}  την^  της  αρετής  ενεργειαν'  της  φνχης  άριστον 
etvai.     ην  δε   καΐ  η   ευδαιμονία  το  άριστον   εστίν  9 

35  άρα  η  ευδαιμονία  φυχής  άγα^η?*  ενέργεια,  επει 
δε  ην  η  ευδαιμονία  τελεόν  τι,  και  εστί  ζωη  καΐ 
τελεα  και  ατελής,  και  αρετή  ώσαυτω?  (τ^  μεν  γαρ 
ολη,  η  δε  μόριον),  ή  δε  των  ατελών  ενέργεια 
άτελτ^9,  ε'ίη  άν  ή  ευδαιμονία  ζωής  τελείας  ενέργεια 
κατ'   άρετήν  τελείαν. 

Οτι   δε   το   γένος   και   τον   δρον   αυτής   λεγομεν  10 

40  καλώ?,  μαρτύρια  τα  Βοκοΰντα  πάσιν  ήμΐν.  τό  τε 
1219  b  yap  βΰ  ττράττειν  και  το  ευ  ζην  τό  αυτό  τω  εν- 
^αιμονεΐν,  ων  εκάτερον^  χρήσίς  εστί  και  ενέργεια, 
και  ή  ζωή  και  ή  ττράξις•  καΐ  γαρ  ή  πρακτική 
χρηστική  εστίν,  6  μεν  γαρ  χαλκεύς  ποιεΐ  χαλινον 
χρήται   δ     ο    ιππικός.      και   τό   μήτε   μίαν   ήμεραν 

5  είμαι*  εύΒαίμονα  μήτε  τταΓδα  μήθ^  ήλικίαν  πάσαν 
(διό  και  τό  Υίόλωνος  έχει  καλώς,  τό  μή  ζώντ* 
εύΒαιμονίζειν  αλλ'  όταν  λά^τ^  τέλος)•  ούθεν  γαρ 
ατελές•  εϋ8αιμον,  ου  γαρ  δλον.      έτι  δ'   οί  έπαινοι  11 

^  τά  eV  avry  Sus. :  αύτη  aut  αντη. 

*  τψ  add.  ?  Ric.  ^  Βζ. :  ivepyda  ή  aut  ή, 

*  ά-γαθτι  Sp. 

*  ΐκάτΐρον  ?  Kic. :  ΐκαστον. 

•  ■ημέρα.ν  <,€ϋδαίρί.ονα  ποκΐν  μήτ'>  elvai  Fr. 

«  Cf.  1218  b  7-12. 
238 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  II.  i.  8-11 

8  as  we  saw  is  happiness.  And  it  is  clear  from  the 
assumptions  laid  down  (for  we  said  that  happiness  is 
the  greatest  good  and  that  the  Ends  or  the  greatest 
of  goods  are  in  the  spirit,  but  things  in  the  spirit 
are  either  a  state  or  an  activity)  that,  since  an  ac- 
tivity is  a  better  thing  than  a  disposition  and  the 
best  activity  than  the  best  state,  and  since  goodness 
is   the   best  state,  the   activity   of  goodness  is   the 

9  spirit's  greatest  good.  But  also  we  saw  that  the 
greatest  good  is  happiness.  Therefore  happiness 
is  the  activity  of  a  good  spirit.  And  since  we  saw  " 
that  happiness  is  something  perfect,  and  life  is 
either  perfect  or  imperfect,  and  the  same  with  good- 
ness (for  some  goodness  is  a  whole  and  some  a  part), 
but  the  activity  of  imperfect  things  is  imperfect,  it 

would  follow  that  happiness  is  an  activity  of  perfect  Definition  of 
life  in  accordance  with  perfect  goodness.  Happiness. 

0  And  that  our  classification  and  definition  of  it  are  Definition 
correct  is  evidenced  by  opinions  that  we  all  hold,  by^^common 
For  we  think  that  to  do  well  and  live  well  are  the  same  Sense. 

as  to  be  happy  ;  but  each  of  these,  both  life  and 
action,  is  employment  and  activity,  inasmuch  as  active 
life  involves  employing  things  —  the  coppersmith 
makes  a  bridle,  but  the  horseman  uses  it.  There  is 
also  the  evidence  of  the  opinion  that  a  person  is  not 
happy  for  one  day  only,^  and  that  a  child  is  not  happy, 
nor  any  period  of  life  "  (hence  also  Solon's  advice  holds 
good,  not  to  call  a  man  happy  while  he  is  alive,  but 
only  when  he  has  reached  the  end),  for  nothing  incom- 

1  plete  is  happy,  since  it  is  not  a  whole.     And  again, 

*  A  single  happy  day  does  not  make  one  a  happy  {i.e. 
fortunate)  man. 

*  It  is  a  mistake  to  say  that  youth  (or  maturity,  or  old  age) 
is  the  happy  time  of  life. 

239 


ARISTOTLE 

1219  b 

της    άρ€τ-ης    δια    τα    epya,    καΐ    τά    εγκώμια    των 

10  έργων  (και  στεφανοννται  οι  νικώντες,  αλλ  ονχ  ol 
Βννάμενοί  νικαν  μη  νικώντες  hi),  και  το  κριναν 
€Κ  των  έργων  οττοϊός  τις  εστίν.  έτι  δια  τι  η  ] 
ευδαιμονία  ουκ  επαινείται ;  οτι  δια  ταυτην  τάλλα, 
η  τω  εις  ταυτην  αναφερεσθαι  η  τω  μόρια  eiP'ai 
αύτης.     διό  έτερον  ευδαιμονισμός  και  ετταινος  και 

15  εγκώμιον   το   μεν  γαρ   εγκώμιον   λόγος   τοΰ   καθ 
εκαστον   έργου,   6   δ'    έπαινος   τοΰ^   τοιούτον   eiv'ai 
καθόλου,     6    δ'     εύΒαιμονισμός    τέλους.^       και    το  ] 
απ    ορούμενον  δ'   ενίοτε  8ηλον   εκ    τούτων    δια   τι 
77θτ'  ούθεν  βελτίους  οΐ  σπουδαίοι  των  φαύλων  τον 
ημισυν  τοΰ  βίου,  όμοιοι  γαρ  καθεύ8οντες  πάντες. 

20  αίτιον  δ'  ΟΤΙ  αργία  φνχης  6  ύπνος  αλλ  ουκ  ενέργεια. 
διό  και  άλλο  ει  τι  μόριόν  εστί  φυχης,  οΐον  το  ] 
θρεπτικόν,  η  τούτου  άρετη  ουκ  εστί  μόριον  της 
δλης  αρετής,  ώσπερ  ούδ'  η  του  σώματος•  εν  τω 
ύπνω  γαρ  μάλλον  ενεργεί  το  θρεπτικόν,  το  δ 
αισθητικόν  και  τό*  όρεκτικον  ατελή  εν  τω  ύπνω. 
όσον  δε  τοΰ  πη*  κινεΐσθαι  μετεχουσι,  και  αι  φαν- 

25  τασίαι    βελτίους    αί    των    σπουδαίων,  εάν    μη    διά 
νόσον  ή  πήρωσιν. 

Μέτά  ταύτα  περί  φνχής  θεωρητεον    ή  γάρ  αρετή  ] 
φυχής,  ου  κατά  συμβεβηκός.      επεί  δ'  άνθρωπίνην 
άρετήν   ζητοΰμεν,   ύποκείσθω   δυο  μ^ρη   φνχής  τά 
λόγου  μετέχοντα,  ου  τον  αυτόν  8ε  τρόπον  μετεχειν 

90  λόγου   άμφω,   άλλα   τω   μεν  το   επιτάττειν  τω   δε 

1  τοΰ  add.  Βζ,  ^  Βζ. :  τέ\ο%.  »  τό  add.  Rac. 

*  πχ,  ?  (cf.  Ν. Ε.  1029  b  9)  Cas. :  μτ?. 

240 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  II.  i.  11-15 

there  are  the  praises  given  to  goodness  on  account 
of  its  deeds,  and  panegyrics  describing  deeds  (and  it 
is  the  victorious  who  are  given  Avreaths,  not  those 
who  are  capable  of  winning  but  do  not  win)  ;  and 
there  is  the  fact  that  we  judge  a  man's  character 

12  from  his  actions.  Also  why  is  happiness  not  praised  ? 
It  is  because  it  is  on  account  of  it  that  the  other  things 
are  praised,  either  by  being  placed  in  relation  to  it 
or  as  being  parts  of  it.  Hence  felicitation,  praise 
and  panegyric  are  different  things  :  panegyric  is  a 
recital  of  a  particular  exploit,  praise  a  statement  of  a 
man's  general  distinction,  felicitation  is  bestowed  on 

13  an  end  achieved.  From  these  considerations  light 
is  also  thrown  on  the  question  sometimes  raised — 
what  is  the  precise  reason  why  the  virtuous  are  for 
half  their  lives  no  better  than  the  base,  since  all  men 
are  alike  when  asleep  ?     The  reason  is  that  sleep  is 

14  inaction  of  the  spirit,  not  an  activity.  Hence  the 
goodness  of  any  other  part  of  the  spirit,  for  instance 
the  nutritive,  is  not  a  portion  of  goodness  as  a  whole, 
just  as  also  goodness  of  the  body  is  not  ;  for  the 
nutritive  part  functions  more  actively  in  sleep,  where- 
as the  sensory  and  appetitive  parts  are  ineffective  in 
sleep.  But  even  the  imaginations  of  the  virtuous,  so 
far  as  the  imaginative  faculty  participates  in  any  mode 
of  motion,  are  better  than  those  of  the  base,  provided 
they  are  not  perverted  by  disease  or  mutilation. 

L5  Next  we  must  study  the  spirit ;  for  goodness  is  a  Psychology 
property  of  the  spirit,  it  is  not  accidental.  And  since  ^θίηΐ"^"'*^ 
it  is  human  goodness  that  we  are  investigating,  let  us 
begin  by  positing  that  the  spirit  has  two  parts  that 
partake  of  reason,  but  that  they  do  not  both  partake 
of  reason  in  the  same  manner,  but  one  of  them  by 
having  by  nature  the  capacity  to  give  orders,  and  the 

R  241 


ARISTOTLE 

1219  b 

τό^    ττζίθ^σθαί    καΐ    άκον€ΐν    ττ^φυκάναι    (et    he    τι 
iarlv   irepws   άλογον,   άφ^σθω   τούτο   το   μοριον) . 
διαφέρει  δ'   ovdev  οντ    el  /χερισττ^  τ)  φνχη  οϋτ    et  16 
a^eprjs,    e^et   μεντοι   hvva^ei,g   διαφόρους   και   τα? 
eLpημevaς,   ώσττερ   ev  τω   καμπύλω  το   κοίλον  και 

35  το  κνρτον  ά^ίαχώριστον,  και  το  ev9v  καΐ  το  Xev- 
κόν,  καίτοι  το  evdv  ου  XevKov  αλλ  ή^  κατά  σνμ- 
β€βηκ6ς  και  ουκ  ουσία  ttj  αύτοϋ.^  άφ-ηρηται*  17 
δ€  και  e'i  τι  άλλο  εστί  μ€.ρος  φνχης,  οίον  το 
φυτικόν.^  ανθρωπινής  yo-p^  Φ^Χΐ^  '''^  βιρημ€να 
μόρια   Ί'δια,   διό   ο?3δ'    αί   άρ€ται   αί  τοΰ   θρεπτικού 

40  και  αύζητικοΰ^  ανθρώπου•  Sei  yap,  el  fj  άνθρωπος, 
λoyισμόv   et'eivai    προς^    '^PXV^   '<^<^^   ττραζιν,   άρχει 

1220  a  δ'    ό    λογισμός    ου    λογισμού    αλλ'    ορέξεως    και 

παθημάτων    ανάγκη    αρα    ταυτ'    εχειν    τα    μ^ρη-  18 
και  ώσπερ  η  ευεξία  σύγκειται  εκ  των  κατά  μόριον 
αρετών,  ούτω  και  η  της  φυχης  άρετη  η  τέλος. 

^Αρετής  δ'  €ΐδτ7  δυο,  η  μεν  ηθική  η  8ε  διανοητική-  IS 
5  επαινοΰμεν  γάρ  ου  μόνον  τους  δικαίους  αλλά  και 
τους  συνετούς  και  τους  σοφούς.  επαινετον  γαρ 
ύπεκειτο  η*  άρετη  η  το  έργον,  ταύτα  δ  ουκ 
ενεργεί  αλλ'  είσιν  αυτών  ενεργειαι.  επει  δ  αί  2C 
διανοητικαι  μετά  λόγου,  αί  μεν  τοιαΰται  τοΰ  λογον 
έχοντος    ο    επιτακτικόν    εστί    της    φυχης    ^   λόγον 

^  τψ  μ^ν  .  .  ,  τ6  .  .  .  τφ    δέ   .   .   .  τό  Ric.  :    το    μέν  .   .   .  τφ 
.  .   .  τό  δέ  .  .  ,  τφ. 
2  άλλ'  7)  Ric. :  άλλα. 
^  Ric. ;   ουσία  τον  αντοΰ  [ουσία  τό  αυτό  Βζ.). 

*  άφ-ηρήσθω  Fr. :  άφίίσθω  Βζ.  *  Vict. :   φυσικόν. 

*  Γ :  δέ.  '  Βζ. :   όρΐκτικοΰ. 

*  Ric. :   καΐ  (ώ$  Sus.).  *  ή  Sol. :  -η. 

"  i.e.  the  part   '  connected   with   nutrition   and   growth,' 
man's  animal  life,  which  is  irrational  absolutely,  and  not 

242 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  11.  i.  15-20 

other  to  obey  and  listen  (let  us  leave  out  any  part 

6  that  is  irrational  in  another  way  ").  And  it  makes 
no  difference  whether  the  spirit  is  divisible  or  is  un- 
divided yet  possessed  of  different  capacities,  namely 
those  mentioned,  just  as  the  concave  and  convex 
sides  in  a  curve  are  inseparable,  and  the  straight- 
ness  and  whiteness  in  a  straight  white  line,  although 
a  straight  thing  is  not  white  except  accidentally  and 

7  not  by  its  own  essence.  And  we  have  also  abstracted 
any  other  part  of  the  spirit  that  there  may  be,  for 
instance  the  factor  of  growth  ;  for  the  parts  that  we 
have  mentioned  are  the  special  properties  of  the 
human  spirit,  and  hence  the  excellences  of  the  part 
dealing  with  nutrition  and  growth  are  not  the  special 
property  of  a  man,  for  necessarily,  if  considered  as  a 
man,  he  must  possess  a  reasoning  faculty  for  a  prin- 
ciple and  with  a  view  to  conduct,  and  the  reasoning 
faculty  is  a  principle  controlling  not  reasoning  but 

8  appetite  and  passions  ;  therefore  he  must  necessarily 
possess  those  parts.  And  just  as  a  good  constitution 
consists  of  the  separate  excellences  of  the  parts  of  the 
body,  so  also  the  goodness  of  the  spirit,  as  being  an 
End,  is  composed  of  the  separate  virtues. 

9  And  goodness  has   two   forms,  moral  virtue   and  Moral  and 
intellectual  excellence  ;  for  we  praise  not  only  the  ooo^dnessl^ 
just  but  also  the  intelligent  and  the  wise.     For  we 
assumed  **  that  what  is  praiseworthy  is  either  good- 
ness or  its  work,  and  these  are  not  activities  but  possess 

0  activities.  And  since  the  intellectual  excellences 
involve  reason,  these  forms  of  goodness  belong  to  the 
rational  part,  which  as  having  reason  is  in  command 

merely  in  the  sense  of  not  possessing  reason  but  being  capable 
of  obedience  to  it. 

"  Cf.  1218  a  37  if.,  1219  b  8  ff.,  15  £F. 

243 


ARISTOTLE 

1220  a 

10  e^et,  at  δ  ηθίκαΐ  του  αλόγου  μ€ν  άκολουθητίκοΰ 
δε  κατά  φύσιν  τω  Χόγον  βχοντί'  ου  γαρ  Χάγομβν 
ποίος  τι?  το  ήθος,  οτι  σοφός  η  Β^ινός,  αλλ'  otl 
πράος  ύ]  θρασυς. 

Mera  ταΰτα  σκ€πτ€ον  πρώτον  π^ρΐ   άρζτης  ηθι-  2 
κης  τι  €στι  καΐ  ποία  μόρια  αυττ^?  (et?  τοϋτο  γάρ 

15  ανηκται)  και  γίνεται  δια  τίνων,  hel  Βη  ζητίΐν  ωσ- 
πβρ  iv  τοις  άλλοις  €χοντ€ς  τι  ζητοΰσι  πάντβς, 
ώστβ  δει  δια  των  αληθώς  μέν  λ&γομ€νων  ου  σαφώς 
δε  πβιράσθαι  λαβείν  το  καΐ^  αληθώς  και  σαφώς, 
νυν  γάρ  ομοίως  εχομεν  ώσπερ  αν  €ΐ  εΙΒείημεν'  και  2! 
uytetal•'  οτι   η    άριστη    διαθεσι?    του   σώματος    και 

ϋΟ  Κορισκον^  οτι*  ο  τών  iv  τη  αγορά  μελάντατος•  τι 
μεν  γαρ  εκατερον  τούτων  ουκ  ΐσμεν,  προς  μεντοι 
το  ειδει^αι  τί  εκάτερον  αύτοΖν^  προ  έργου  το  ούτως 
εχειν. — ύποκείσθω  hrj  πρώτον  η  βέλτιστη  διά^εσι?  2! 
ύπο  τών  βέλτιστων  γίγνεσθαι  και  πράττεσθαι  τα* 
άριστα    περί    εκαστον    απο    της    εκάστου    αρετής, 

25  οίον  πόνοι  τε  άριστοι  και  τροφή  άφ^  ων  γίνεται 
ευεξία,  και  από  της  ευεξίας  πονονσιν  άριστα'  ετι  2^ 
πάσαν  διάθεσίΓ  υπό  τών  αύτώι^  γίγνεσθαι  τε""  και 
φθείρεσθαι  πώς  προσφερομένων,  ώσπερ  ι5')/ιεια  υπό 
τροφής  και  πόνων  και  ώρας•  ταΰτα  δε  δτ^λα  εκ 
της  επαγωγής,     και  η  άρετη  άρα  η  τοιαύτη  διά- 

30  θεσίς  εστίν  η  γινεταί  τε  ύπό  τών  άριστων  περί 
φυχην  κινήσεων  /cat  άφ^  ^ς  πράττεται  τα  άριστα 
της   φυχής    έργα    καΐ   πάθη'    και    ύπό   τών   αυτών  2ί 

^  το  και  Ric. :  και  τό. 
*  ΐΐδ€ίημ(ΐ'  add.  Sp.  ^  Rac. :  Κορίσκο^, 

*  ότι  add.  Sp.  *  rec.  Μ*":  αύτη^. 

*  τά  add.  Rac.  '  re  add.  Rac. 

»  Cf.  1240  b  25  n. 
244 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  II.  i.  20-2δ 

of  the  spirit  ;  whereas  the  moral  virtues  belong  to 
the  part  that  is  irrational  but  by  nature  capable  of 
following  the  rational — for  in  stating  a  man's  moral 
qualities  we  do  not  say  that  he  is  wise  or  clever  but 
that  he  is  gentle  or  rash. 

}1      After  this  we  must  first  consider  Moral  Goodness —  Moral 
its  essence  and  the  nature  of  its  divisions  (for  that  is  Jh  virtue 
the  subject  ηοΛν  arrived  at),  and  the  means  by  which  (Bk.  ii.  fin.) 
it  is  produced.     Our  method  of  inquiry  then  must  be  and  genesis. 
that  employed  by  all  people  in  other  matters  when 
they  have  something  in  hand  to  start  with — we  must 
endeavour  by  means  of  statements  that  are  true  but 
not  clearly  expressed  to  arrive  at  a  result  that  is  both 

52  true  and  clear.  For  our  present  state  is  as  if  we 
kncAv  that  health  is  the  best  disposition  of  the  body  and 
that  Coriscus  "  is  the  darkest  man  in  the  market-place ; 
for  that  is  not  to  know  what  health  is  and  who  Coriscus 
is,  but  nevertheless  to  be  in  that  state  is  a  help  to- 

13  wards  knowing  each  of  these  things. — Then  let  it  first 
be  taken  as  granted  that  the  best  disposition  is  pro- 
duced by  the  best  means,  and  that  the  best  actions 
in  each  department  of  conduct  result  from  the  excel- 
lences belonging  to  each  department — for  example, 
it  is  the  best  exercises  and  food  that  produce  a  good 
condition  of  body,  and  a  good  condition  of  body  en- 

24  ables  men  to  do  the  best  work  ;  further,  that  every 
disposition  is  both  produced  and  destroyed  by  the 
same  things  applied  in  a  certain  manner,  for  example 
health  by  food  and  exercises  and  climate ;  these  points 
are  clear  from  induction.  Therefore  goodness  too  is  a  fuller  de- 
the  sort  of  disposition  that  is  created  by  the  best  virtue"  °^ 
movements  in  the  spirit  and  is  also  the  source  of  the 
production  of  the  spirit's  best  actions  and  emotions  ; 

ί5  and  it  is  in  one  way  produced  and  in  another  way 

245 


ARISTOTLE 

1220  a 

ττώς  /xer  ytVerat  πώς  δε  φθείρΐταί,  καΐ  ττρος  ταΰτα 

Ύ]  χρησις  αντης  νφ^  ών  καΐ  αϋζβται  καΐ  φθβίρβται 

ττρος  ά  ββλτίστα  Βιατίθησίν.      σημβΐον  δ     δτι,  ττερι 

35  η^βα  καΐ  λυπηρά  καΐ  η  άρ€τη  και  η  κακία•  at 
γαρ  κολάσει?  Ιατρζΐαι  ονσαι.  καΐ  γινόμΐναι  δια  των 
evavTicov,  καθάπβρ  βπΐ  των  άλλων,  δια  τούτων 
elaiv. 

II.  "Οτι    μ€.ν    τοίνυν   η    ηθική    άρ€τη    π€ρΙ    rjSea  ] 
καΐ  λυπηρά  εστί,  ^ηλον.      εττει  δ     εστί  το  ήθος — 
1220  b  ώσπ€ρ  καΐ  το  όνομα  σημαίνει  δτι  άπό   εθους  έχει 
την     επίΒοσιν,    εθίζεται    δε    ύττ'     αγωγής    το    μη 
εμφυτον^  τω  πολλάκις   κινεΐσθαί  πως  ούτως  η^η^ 
ενεργητικόν  (ο  εν  τοις  άφύχοις  ούχ  όρώμεν,  ουδέ 
γάρ    αν   μυριάκις   ρίφης    άνω    τον   λίθον   ουδέποτε 
Γ)  ποιήσει  τοΰτο  μη  βία)- — διό    έστω  το^  ήθος  τοΰτο, 
φυχής  κατά  επιτακτικόν  λόγον  δυνάμενη*  άκολουθεΐν 
τω  λόγω  ποιότης.     λεκτεον  Βή  κατά  τί  της  φυχής  i 
ποι    αττα^  ήθη.      εσται   δε    κατά   τε   τάς   δυν-α/χει?  ί 
των  παθημάτων  καθ^  ας  πώς^  παθητικοί  λέγονται 
και  κατά  τάς  εζεις  καθ^  άς  προς  τα  πάθη  τοιούτοι^ 

10  λέγονται  τω  πάσχειν  πως  ή  απαθείς  ειρ'αι. 

Μετά    ταΰτα   ή   ^ιαίρεσις   εν   τοις  Βιειλεγμενοις^  4 
των  παθημάτων  και  των  8υνάμεων  και  των  έξεων. 

^  Fr. :  εθίζεται  δέ  το  ύττ'  ά-γω-γηί  μη  έμφυτου. 

"  ήδη  Rac. :  ^077  το.  *  τό  add.  llac. 

*  Sp.  (cf.  Stob.  Eel.  eth.  p.  36) :  δυναμένου  δ'. 

*  ΤΓΟί'  ά,ττα  Sol.  {τΓοι  άττα  τα  ?  Rac,  ΊΓθώτη$  τα  Sp.)  :   ττοΓ'  &ττα. 

*  Rac. :  ώϊ.  '  τοιούτοι  Ric. :  ταΰτα. 

*  Ras. :   άιτη\\α•γμένοι^. 

"  e.g.  fever,  which  is  caused  by  heat,  is  cured  by  cold 
(the  contrary  doctrine  to  homoeopathy,  shnilia  similibus 
curantnr). 

^  ηθοί  derived  from  ίθο$  by  lengthening  of  e  to  ?; :  cf.  N.E. 

246 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  II.  i.  25— ii.  4> 

destroyed  by  the  same  things,  and  its  employment 
of  the  things  that  cause  both  its  increase  and  its  de- 
struction is  directed  towards  the  things  towards  which 
it  creates  the  best  disposition.  And  this  is  indicated  The  hedon- 
by  the  fact  that  both  goodness  and  badness  have  to  '^^^'^  factor. 
do  with  things  pleasant  and  painful  ;  for  punishments, 
which  are  medicines,  and  which  as  is  the  case  with 
other  cures  "  operate  by  means  of  opposites,  operate 
by  means  of  pleasures  and  pains. 

1  II.  It  is  clear,  therefore,  that  Moral  Goodness  has 
to  do  with  pleasures  and  pains.  And  since  moral 
character  is,  as  even  its  name  implies  that  it  has  its 
growth  from  habit, **  and  by  our  often  moving  in  a 
certain  way  a  habit  not  innate  in  us  is  finally  trained 
to  be  operative  in  that  way  (which  we  do  not  observe 
in  inanimate  objects,  for  not  even  if  you  throw  a  stone 
upwards  ten  thousand  times  will  it  ever  rise  upward 
unless  under  the  operation  of  force) — let  moral  char-  The  moral 
acter  then  be  defined  as  a  quality  of  the  spirit  in  accord-  character. 
ance  with  governing  reason  that  is  capable  of  following 

2  the  reason.  We  have  then  to  say  what  is  the  part 
of  the  spirit  in  respect  of  which  our  moral  characters 

3  are  of  a  certain  quality.  And  it  will  be  in  respect  of 
our  faculties  for  emotions  according"to  which  people 
are  termed  liable  to  some  emotion,  and  also  of  the 
states  of  character  according  to  which  people  receive 
certain  designations  in  respect  of  the  emotions,  be- 
cause of  their  experiencing  or  being  exempt  from 
some  form  of  emotion. 

4  After  this  comes  the  classification,  made  in  previous 
discussions,"  of  the  modes  of  emotion,  the  faculties 

II,  ill.  4.     This  clause  and  the  one  following  interrupt  the 
construction  of  the  sentence. 

"  Perhaps  a  reference  to  N.E.  1105  b  20,  inserted  in  the 
belief  that  the  Eudemian  Ethics  is  the  later  work. 

247 


ARISTOTLE 

1220  b 

Aeyo»  δε  πάθη  μ€ν  τά  τοιαύτα,  θνμον  φόβον  αιδώ 
βπιθυμίαν,  δλως  οΐς  έ'ττβται  ώς  βπΐ  το  πολύ  η 
αισθητική  η^ονη  η  λύπη  καθ^  αυτά•  και  κατά  μβν  5 

15  ταύτα  ουκ  έ'στι  ποιότης  [αλλά  πάσχ€ΐΥ,  κατά  δε 
τάς  Βυνάμ^ις  ποιότης-  λέγω  δε^  Βυνάμας  καθ^  ας 
λέγονται  κατά  τά  πάθη  οι  ενεργούντες,  οίον  άργιλος 
ανάλγητος  ερωτικός  αισχυντηλός  αναίσχυντος, 
εζεις  Se  elaiv  οσαι  α'ίτιαί  είσι  του  ταύτα  η  κατά 
λόγον  ύπάρχειν  η  εναντίως,  οίον  ανδρεία  σωφροσύνη 

20  δείλια  ακολασία. 

III.   Αιωρισμενων    δε     τούτων    ληπτεον    δτι    εν  1 
ατταντι    συνέχει   και    διαιρετοί    εστίν    υπέροχη    και 
ελλειφις   και   μέσον,   και   ταύτα   η   προς   άλληλα   η 
προς    ημάς,    οίον    εν    γυμναστική,    εν    ιατρική,    εν 

25  οικοδομική,  εν  κυβερνητική,  και  εν  οποιαοϋν  πράξει 
και  επιστημονική  και  αν  επιστημονική  και  τεχνική 
και  ατεχνω-  η  μεν  γάρ  κίνησις  συνεχές,  ή  8ε  2 
πράξις  κίνησις.  εν  πάσι  δε  το  μέσον  το  προς 
ημάς  βελτιστον  τοΰτο  γάρ  εστίν  ώς  η  επιστήμη 
κελεύει    και    6    λόγος.      πανταχού    δε    τοΰτο    καΐ 

30  ποιεί  την  βελτίστην  εξιν.  και  τοΰτο  Βηλον  δια 
της  επαγωγής^και  τοΰ  λόγου•  τά  γάρ  εΥαντια 
φθείρει  άλληλα•  τά  δ'  άκρα  και  άλλτ^λοι?  και  τω 
μέσω  ει^αι^τια,  το  γάρ  μέσον  εκάτερον  προς 
εκατερον  εστίν,  οΐον  το  ίσον  τοΰ  μεν  ελάττονος 
μείζον  τοΰ  μείζονος  δε  ελαττον.  ώστ  ανάγκη  3 
την    ηθικην     άρετην    περί    μεσ'     άττα     εΓι/αι     και 

35  μεσοτητα    τίνα.       ληπτεον    άρα    η    ποία    μεσάτης 

^  pravum  glossema  Rac. 
^  δ€  Sus. :   δέ  ras. 

"  This  interpolation  was  made  by  an  editor  who  derived 
ΐΓοιότη^  from  TTou'iv, 

248 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  II.  ii.  4— m.  3 

and  the  states  of  character.  By  emotions  I  mean 
such  things  as  anger,  fear,  shame,  desire,  and  gener- 
ally those  experiences  that  are  in  themselves  usually 
5  accompanied  by  sensory  pleasure  or  pain.  And  to 
these  there  is  no  quality  corresponding  [but  they  are 
passive]."  But  quality  corresponds  to  the  faculties  : 
by  faculties  I  mean  the  properties  acting  by  which 
persons  are  designated  by  the  names  of  the  various 
emotions,  for  instance  choleric,  insensitive,  erotic, 
bashful,  shameless.  States  of  character  are  the  states 
that  cause  the  emotions  to  be  present  either  rationally 
or  the  opposite  :  for  example  courage,  sobriety  of 
mind,  cowardice,  profligacy. 

1  III.  These  distinctions  having  been  established,  it  Virtue  and 
must  be  grasped  that  in  every  continuum  that  is  divis-  ^eaif  In*^'^*^ 
Ible  there  is  excess  and  deficiency  and  a  mean,  and  conduct. 
these  either  in  relation  to  one  another  or  in  relation  to 

us,  for  instance  in  gymnastics  or  medicine  or  archi- 
tecture or  navigation,  and  in  any  practical  pursuit  of 
whatever  sort,  both  scientific  and  unscientific,  both 

2  technical  and  untechnical  ;  for  motion  is  a  continuum, 
and  conduct  is  a  motion.  And  in  all  things  the  mean 
in  relation  to  us  is  the  best,  for  that  is  as  knowledge 
and  reason  bid.  And  everywhere  this  also  produces 
the  best  state.  This  is  proved  by  induction  and 
reason  :  contraries  are  mutually  destructive,  and  ex- 
tremes are  contrary  both  to  each  other  and  to  the 
mean,  as  the  mean  is  either  extreme  in  relation  to  the 
other — for  example  the  equal  is  greater  than  the  less 

3  and  less  than  the  greater.  Hence  moral  goodness 
must  be  concerned  with  certain  means  and  must  be 
a  middle  state.  We  must,  therefore,  ascertain  what 
sort  of  middle  state  is  goodness  and  with  what  sort  of 

249 


1220  b 


ARISTOTLE 

αρ€τη   καΐ   Ttepl   ποία    μβσα.       είληφθω   Sr)   τταρα-  '■. 
Βείγματος    χάριν,  και   θεωρβίσθω    'ίκαστον   €κ   της 
υπογραφής' 


1221  a 


10 


οργιλότης 

θρασντης 

αναισχυντία 

ακολασία 

φθόνος 

KepSos 

ασωτία 

αλαζονεία 

κολακβία 

αρέσκεια 

τρνφερότης 

χαυνότης 

Βαπανηρία 

πανουργία 


αοργησια 

δβιλια 

καταπληζις 

αναισθησία 

άνώνυμ,ον 

ζημία 

άνελευθερία 

ειρωνεία 

απέχθεια 

αύθάδεια 

κακοπάθεια 

μικροφυχία 

μικροπρέπεια 


πραοτης. 

άν8ρεία. 

αιδώ?. 

σωφροσύνη. 

νεμεσις. 

Βίκαιον. 

ελευθεριοτης. 

φιλία, 
σεμνότης . 
καρτέρια . 
μεγαλοφυχία. 
μεγαλοπρέπεια . 
φρόνησις. 


τα   μεν   πάθη    ταύτα    και   τοιαύτα   συμβαίνει   ταΐς  δ 
φυχαΐς,  πάντα  hk  λέγεται  τα  μεν  τω  ύπερβάλλειν 

15  τα  οε  τω  ελλειπειν .  όργίλος  μεν  γάρ  εστίν  ο 
μάλλον  η  8εΐ  όργιζόμενος  και  θάττον  και  πλείοσιν 
η  οις  δει,  άόργητος^  8ε  ο  ελλείπων  και  οΐς  και 
οτε  και  ως•  και  θρασύς  μεν  ο  μήτε  ά  χρη  φοβούμενος 
μηθ^  οτε  μήθ^  ως,  8ειλ6ς  8ε  6  και  ά  μη  8ει  και 
Ότ   ου  8ει  και  ως  ου  8ει.     ομοίως  8ε  και  ακόλαστος  β 

20  και^  ο  επιθυμητικος  και  6*  υπερβάλλων  πάσιν  δσοις 

1  Rac.  (cf.  Ν.Ε.  1108  a  7  et  1100  b  33):  afaXyrjaia. 
^  Rac, :  άι>άλyηros.  '  [καί]  Bz.  *  [καΐ  ό]  Vict, 

"  This   place   is   filled    in    N.E.    1108   a   7    by    άοίκγησία, 
Spiritlessness,  lack  of  irascibility,  and  perhaps  the  Greek 
should  be  altered  to  that  here, 
250 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  II.  iii.  4-6 


4  means  it  is  concerned.  Let  each  then  be  taken  by 
way  of  illustration  and  studied  with  the  help  of  the 
schedule  : 


Irascibility 

Rashness 

Shamelessness 

Profligacy 

Envy 

Profit 

Prodigality 

Boastfulness 

Flattery 

Subservience 

Luxuriousness 

Vanity 

Extravagance 

Rascality 


Spiritlessness  " 

Cowardice 

Diffidence 

Insensitiveness 

(nameless  *) 

Loss 

Meanness 

Self-depreciation 

Surliness 

Stubbornness 

Endurance  ** 

Smallness  of  Spirit 

Siiabbiness 

Simpleness 


Gentleness 

Courage 

Modesty 

Temperance 

Righteous  Indignation 

The  Just 

Liberality 

Sincerity  " 

Friendliness 

Dignity 

Hardiness 

Greatness  of  Spirit 

Magnificence 

Wisdom. 


5  These  and  such  as  these  are  the  emotions  that  the  The  Vices  oi 
spirit  experiences,  and  they  are  all  designated  from  Jjeflct.*" 
being  either  excessive  or  defective.     The  man  that 

gets  angry  more  and  more  quickly  and  with  more 
people  than  he  ought  is  irascible,  he  that  in  respect 
of  persons  and  occasions  and  manner  is  deficient  in 
anger  is  insensitive  ;  the  man  that  is  not  afraid  of 
things  of  which  he  ought  to  be  afraid,  nor  when  nor  as 

6  he  ought,  is  rash,  he  that  is  afraid  of  things  of  which  he 
ought  not  to  be  afraid,  and  when  and  as  he  ought  not 
to  be,  is  cowardly.^  Similarly  also  one  that  is  a  prey 
to  his  desires  and  that  exceeds  in  everything  possible 

*  In  JV.E.   1108   b  2    έπιχαιρ^κακία.  Malice,  rejoicing    in 
another's  misfortune. 

"  N.E.  IV.  vii.  shows  that  sincerity  in  asserting  one's  own 
merits  is  meant. 

**  '  Submission  to  evils  '  (Solomon) :  not  in  N.E. 

'  The  shameless  and  diffident  are  omitted  here;   see  the 
table  above. 

251 


ARISTOTLE 

1221a 

εν84χ€ται,  αναίσθητος  8e  6  ελλείπων  /cat  μη^^  όσον 
βελτίον  καΐ  κατά  την  φνσι.ν  ετηθυμών,  αλλ'  άττα^η? 

β  ωσπερ  λίθος.      κερΒαλεος  δε  ο  ττανταχόθεν  ττλεον-  7 

εκτικός,    ζημίώ8ης    8e    6    εΐ   μη^   μη^αμόθεν    αλλ' 
όλιγαχόθεν.     άλαζών  8e  ο  πλείω  των  υπαρχόντων 

3        25  προσποιούμενος,   ε'ίρων   8e    ο    ελάττω.      καΐ    κόλαζ  8 
μεν  ο  πλείω  συνεπαινών  η  καλώς  έχει,  άπεχθητίκός 

'^  δε    ο     ελάττω.       καΐ    το    μεν    λίαν    προς    ηΒονην 

αρέσκεια,  το  δ  ολΐ)/α  και  μόγις  αυ^άδεια.  ert  δ'  9 
6  μεν  μη^εμίαν  υπομένων  λυπην,  μηΒ^  ει  βελτιον, 
30  τρυφερός,  6  8ε  πάσαν  ομοίως  ως  μεν  απλώς  ειπείν 
ανώνυμος,  μεταφορά  δε  λέγεται  σκληρός  και 
ταλαίπωρος  και  κακοπαθητικός .  χαΰνος  δ'  6  Κ 
μειζόνων  άζιών  αυτόν,  μικρόφυχος  δ'  ο  ελαττόνων. 
ετι  δ'  άσωτος  μεν  6  προς  άπασαν-  8απάνην 
υπερβάλλων,     ανελεύθερος     δε     ό     προς     αττασαν» 

(■-      35  ελΧείπων.      ομοίως    δε    και    ό   μικροπρεπης    και    6  11 
σαλάκων,  6  μεν  γαρ  υπερβάλλει  το  πρέπον,  6  δ' 

ΐί\  ελλείπει    του    πρέποντος.      και    6    μεν    πανούργος 

πάντως    και   πάντοθεν   πλεονεκτικός,   ό   δ'    εύήθης 

5         ούδ'    όθεν    δει.       φθονερός    δε    τω    λυπεΐσθαι    επΙ  12 

πλείοσιν    εύπραγίαις   η    δει,    και    ya/a    οΐ   άζιοι    ευ 

40  πράττειν  λυποΰσι   τους   φθονερούς   ευ   πράττοντες  • 

ο  δ'  ενάντιος  άνωνυμώτερος ,  εστί  δ'  ό  υπερβάλλων 

1221  b  τώ"    /χή     λυπεΐσθαι    μη8'     επΙ    τοις    άναζίοις     ευ 

πράττουσιν,  αλλ'   ευχερής  ώσπερ  οι  γαστρίμαργοι 

προς    τροφην,    ο    δε    8υσχερης    κατά    τον    φθόνον 

εστίν. — το  δε  προς  εκαστον  μη   κατά  συμβεβηκός  13 

^  (ί  μη  add.  Fr.  (άλλ'  <e!'  7e>  Bussemaker). 

'^  τφ  Sp. :  iwi  τφ. 


"  Envy  in  §  12  comes  here  in  the  schedule. 


252 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  II.  iii.  6-13 

is  profligate,  and  one  that  is  deficient  and  does  not 
desire  even  to  a  proper  degree  and  in  a  natural  way, 
but  is  as  devoid  of  feeling  as  a  stone,  is  insensitive." 

7  The  man  that  seeks  gain  from  every  source  is  a 
profiteer,  and  he  that  seeks  gain  if  not  from  no  source, 
yet  from  few,  is  a  waster.^  He  that  pretends  to  have 
more  possessions  than  he  really  has  is  a  boaster,  and 
he  that  pretends  to  have  fewer  is  a  self-depreciator. 

8  One  that  joins  in  approval  more  than  is  fitting  is  a 
flatterer,  one  that  does  so  less  than  is  fitting  is  surly. 
To  be  too  complaisant  is  subservience  ;  to  be  com- 
plaisant   seldom    and    reluctantly   is    stubbornness. 

9  Again,  the  man  that  endures  no  pain,  not  even  if  it  is 
good  for  him,  is  luxurious;  one  that  can  endure  all  pain 
alike  is  strictly  speaking  nameless,  but  by  metaphor 

10  he  is  called  hard,  patient  or  enduring.  He  that  rates 
himself  too  high  is  vain,  he  that  rates  himself  too  low, 
small-spirited.  Again,  he  that  exceeds  in  all  ex- 
penditure is  prodigal,  he  that  falls  short  in  all,  mean. 

11  Similarly  the  shabby  man  and  the  swaggerer — the 
•  latter  exceeds  what  is  fitting  and  the  former  falls 

below  it.  The  rascal  grasps  profit  by  every  means 
and  from  every  source,  the  simpleton  does  not  make 

12  profit  even  from  the  proper  sources.  Envy  consists 
in  being  annoyed  at  prosperity  more  often  than  one 
ought  to  be,  for  the  envious  are  annoyed  by  the  pros- 
perity even  of  those  who  deserve  to  prosper  ;  the 
opposite  character  is  less  definitely  named,  but  it  is 
the  man  that  goes  too  far  in  not  being  annoyed  even 
at  the  prosperity  of  the  undeserving,  and  is  easy- 
going, as  gluttons  are  in  regard  to  food,  whereas  his 
opposite  is  difficult-tempered  in  respect  of  jealousy, — 

13  It  is  superfluous  to  state  in  the  definition  that  the 

''  The  prodigal  and  mean  in  §  10  comes  here  in  the  schedule. 

253 


ARISTOTLE 

1221  b 

δ  ούτως  e^eiv  πβρίίργον  διορι'ζειν^•  ού^^μία  γαρ 
επιστήμη  οϋτ€  θεωρητική  ούτε  ποιητική  οντ€ 
λέγει  οντε  πράττει  τοΰτο  προσΒιοριζουσα,  άλλα 
τοΰτ  εστί  προς  τάς  συκοφαντίας  των  τεχνών  τάς 
λογικάς.  απλώς  μεν  οΰν  Βιωρίσθω  τον  τρόπον  14 
τούτον,  άκριβεστερον  δ'  δταν  περί  τών  εζεων 
λέγω  μεν  τών  αντικείμενων. 

10  Αυτών  Βε  τούτων  τών  παθημάτων  εΐ8η  κατ- 
ονομάζεται τώ  Βιαφερειν  κατά  την  υπερβολην  η 
χρόνου  η  του  μάλλον  η  προς  τι  τών  ποιουντων 
τά  πάθη.  λέγω  δ'  οΐον  όζΰθυμος  μεν  τω  θάττον  15 
πάσχειν  η  δβι,  χαλεπός  δε  και  θυμώΒης  τω 
μάλλον,  πικρός  δβ  τω  φυλακτικός  etvat  της  όργης, 

15  πληκτης   δε   καΐ  λοώορητικός  ταΐς   κολάσεσι  ταΙς 
άπό   της   όργης.      όφοφάγοι   δε    και   γαστρίμαργοι  16 
και  οίνόφλυγες  τω  προς  όποτερας  τροφής  άπολαυσιν 
€χειν  την  διίρ'α/χιν'  παθητικην  παρά  τον  λογον. 

Ου  δει  δ'   άγνοεΐν  Οτι  IVta  τών  λεγομένων  ουκ  17 
εστίν  εν  τω   πώς  λαμβάνειν ,   αν  πώς  λαμβανηται 

20  τό^  μάλλον  πάσχειν.  οΐον  μοιχός  ου  τω  μάλλον 
η  δει  προς  τάς  γαμετάς  πλησιάζειν  {ου  γάρ  εστι^), 
άλλα  μοχθηρία  τις  αύτη  ηΒη^  εστίν,  συνειλημμενον 
γάρ  τό  τε  πάθος  λέγεται  και  τό  τοιόν^ε  εΓι^αι• 
ομοίως  δε  και  η  ύβρις.  διό  και  άμφισβητοΰσι,  18 
συγγενεσθαι    μεν    φάσκοντες    αλλ'    ου    μοιχ^νσαι, 

25  άγνοοϋντες  γάρ  η  άναγκαζόμενοι,  και  πατάζαι 
μεν  αλλ'  ούχ  ύβρίσαι•  ομοίως  δε  και  επι  τά  άλλα 
τά  τοιαύτα. 

1  ττροσδωρίζΐΐν  ?  (ut  De  Interpr.  17  a  36,  Met.  hi.,  1005 
b21)  Rac. 

2  Ric.  τφ.  *  Rac. :  δή. 

"In  Book  III.  *  roiofde—  μοχθ-ηρόν. 

254 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  11.  in.  13-18 

specified  relation  to  each  thing  must  not  be  accidental ; 
no  science  whether  theoretical  or  productive  makes 
this  addition  to  the  definition  either  in  discourse  or  in 
practice,  but  this  addition  is  aimed  against  the  logical 
L4  quibbling  of  the  sciences.  Let  us  then  accept  these 
simple  definitions,  and  let  us  make  them  more  precise 
when  we  are  speaking  about  the  opposite  dispositions.** 

But  these  modes  of  emotion  themselves  are  divided  Sub-species 
into  species  designated  according  to  their  difference  °  "'*^' 
in  respect  of  time  or  intensity  or  in  regard  to  one 
15  of  the  objects  that  cause  the  emotions.  I  mean  for 
instance  that  a  man  is  called  quick-tempered  from 
feeling  the  emotion  of  anger  sooner  than  he  ought, 
harsh  and  passionate  from  feeling  it  more  than  he 
ought,  bitter  from  having  a  tendency  to  cherish  his 
anger,  violent  and  abusive  owing  to  the  acts  of  retalia- 
te tion  to  which  his  anger  gives  rise.  Men  are  called 
gourmands  or  gluttons  and  drunkards  from  having  an 
irrational  liability  to  indulgence  in  one  or  the  other 
sort  of  nutriment. 

17  But  it  must  not  be  ignored  that  some  of  the  vices  Some  Vices 
mentioned  cannot  be  classed  under  the  heading  of '^  ^°'"*^" 
manner,  if  manner  is  taken  to  be  feeling  the  emotion 

to  excess.  For  example,  a  man  is  not  an  adulterer 
because  he  exceeds  in  intercourse  with  married 
women,  for  '  excess  '  does  not  apply  here,  but 
adultery  merely  in  itself  is  a  vice,  since  the  term 
denoting  the  passion  implicitly  denotes  that  the  man 

18  is  vicious  ''  ;  and  similarly  with  outrage.  Hence  men 
dispute  the  charge,  and  admit  intercourse  but  deny 
adultery  on  the  ground  of  having  acted  in  ignor- 
ance or  under  compulsion,  or  admit  striking  a  blow 
but  deny  committing  an  outrage  ;  and  similarly  in 
meeting  the  other  charges  of  the  same  kind. 

255 


ARISTOTLE 

1221  b 

IV.  Έ>ι,λημμ€νων  8e  τούτων,  μβτά  ταΰτα  XcKTeov  1 
OTL  ineiSr)  Svo  μ4ρη  της  φυχης  καΐ  αϊ  άρ€ταΙ  κατά 
ταΰτα    Βιτ^ρηνται,    και    αϊ  /xev   του   λόγον   €χοντος 

30  Βιανοητικαί,^  ών  epyov  άλτ^^εια,  η  πβρί  του  πώς 
€χ€ΐ  η  TrepL  γβν^σβως,  αϊ  δε  του  αλόγου  βχοντος 
δ  ορ^ξιν  [ου  γαρ  οτιοΰν  μίρος  €χ€ΐ  της  φυχης  2 
ορβξιν  el  μζριστη  βστιν),  ανάγκη  8η  φαΰλον  το 
ήθος  και  σττου^αΐον  eivai  τω  Βιώκβιν  και  φεύγβιν 
ήΒονάς  τίνα?  και  λύττας.      SrjXov  Se  τοϋτο   e/c  των 

35  διαιρέσεων  των  rrepi  τα  πάθη  και  τάς  8ννάμ€ΐς 
και  τάς  Ίξ^ις.  αι  μ^ν  γαρ  3υνάμ€ΐς  και  αϊ  ^ξβις 
τών^  παθημάτων ,  τα  δε  πάθη  λύπη  και  ηΒονη 
Βιώρισταΐ'  ώστε  δια  τε  ταΰτα  και  δια  τάς  3 
€μπροσθ€ν  θέσεις  συμβαίνει  πάσαν  ηθικην  άρβτην 
πβρι   η8ονάς    είναι    και   λύπας.      πάσα   γαρ   φυχη' 

40  ύφ     οίων    πεφυκε    γινεσ^αι    χειρών    και    βελτίων, 

1222  Λ  προς    ταΰτα    και   περί    ταΰτά    εστίν   ή    έξις.*      δι' 4 

η8ονάς  δε  και  λύπας  φαύλους  φαμεν  είναι,  τω 
διώκειν  και  φεύγειν  η  ώς  μη  δει  η  ας  μη  δει. 
διο  και  διορίζονται  πάντες^  προχείρως  άττά^ειαν 
και  ηρεμίαν  περί  ήΒονάς  και  λύπας  είναι  τα? 
5  αρετας,  τάς  δε  κακίας  εκ  των  εναντίων. 

V.  Επει    δ      υ770κ:ειται    άρετη    είναι    η    τοιαύτη  \ 
εζις  άφ*  ης  πρακτικοί  των  βελτίστων  και  καθ^  ην 
άριστα  διάκεινται  περί  το  βελτιστον,  βελτιστον  δε 
και   άριστον  το   κατά   τον   ορθόν  λόγον,   τούτο   δ' 

^  [διανοηηκαί]  ?  Ilac.  *  <amai>  των  Bus. 

^  ττάσηί  yap  ψνχηί  Βζ. 

*  Βζ. :  ηδονή.  6  [ττάι/τίί]  Spengel :  rtvey  ?  Sus. 

"  Cf.  1220  b  7-20.  "  See  1218  b  37  ff. 

2.56 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  II.  iv.  1— v.  1 

1  IV.  These  points  having  been  taken,  we  must  The  hedon- 
next  say  that  since  the  spirit  has  two  parts,  and  the  anaiysed'!*"^ 
virtues   are  divided  between  them,  one  set  being 

those  of  the  rational  part,  intellectual  virtues,  whose 
work  is  truth,  whether  about  the  nature  of  a  thing  or 
about  its  mode  of  production,  while  the  other  set 
belongs  to  the  part  that  is  irrational  but  possesses 

2  appetition  (for  if  the  spirit  is  divided  into  parts, 
not  any  and  every  part  possesses  appetition),  it 
therefore  follows  that  the  moral  character  is  vicious 
or  virtuous  by  reason  of  pursuing  or  avoiding  certain 
pleasures  and  pains.  This  is  clear  from  the  classifica- 
tion "  of  the  emotions,  faculties  and  states  of  char- 
acter. For  the  faculties  and  the  states  are  con- 
cerned with  the  modes  of  emotion,  and  the  emotions 

3  are  distinguished  by  pain  and  pleasure  ;  so  that  it 
follows  from  these  considerations  as  well  as  from  the 
positions  already  laid  down  that  all  moral  goodness 

4  is  concerned  with  pleasures  and  pains.  For  our 
state  of  character  is  related  to  and  concerned  with 
such  things  as  have  the  property  of  making  every 
person's  spirit  worse  and  better.  But  we  say  that 
men  are  wicked  owing  to  pleasures  and  pains, 
through  pursuing  and  avoiding  the  wrong  ones  or 
in  the  wTong  way.  Hence  all  men  readily  define  the 
virtues  as  insensitiveness  or  tranquillity  in  regard  to 
pleasures  and  pains,  and  the  vices  by  the  opposite 
qualities. 

1  V.  But  since  it  has  been  assumed  ^  that  goodness 
is  a  state  of  character  of  a  sort  that  causes  men  to  be 
capable  of  doing  the  best  actions  and  gives  them  the 
best  disposition  in  regard  to  the  greatest  good,  and 
the  best  and  greatest  good  is  that  which  is  in  accord- 
ance with  right  principle,  and  this  is  the  mean  be- 

s  257 


ARISTOTLE 

1222  a  ,      ,       ,        ,  ,  ^ 

10  ean  το  μίσον  υπερβολής  και  eXXeiijiews  της  προς 

ημάς,  άναγκαΐον  αν  €Ϊη  την  ηθικην  άρ€την  κατ'  αύτην 

ίκάστην^  μεσότητα   elvai   καΐ^   π€ρΙ   μ^σ"    άττα    iv 

ηοοναΐς  και  λυτται?  και  rjSeai  και  λνττηροΐς.     έ'σται  2 

δ    η  μεσάτης  oTe  μεν  ev  ηΒοναΐς  {και  γαρ  ύπβρβολη 

και  ζλλβιφις),  ore  δ'  iv  λντταις,  6τβ  δ'  iv  άμφοτ€ραις . 

1".  ο  γαρ  ύττβρβάλλων  τω  χαίρ€ΐν  τω  -qSei  ύπβρβάλλβι 
και  ο  τω  λυπεΐσθαι  τω  ivavTico,  και  ταντα  η 
απλώς  η  προς  τίνα  ορον,  οΐον  όταν  μάλλον  η*  ως 
οι  πολλοί•  6  δ'  αγαθός  ως  δβι. — evret  δ'  €στί  τις  3 
ζζις  αφ  ης  τοιούτος  βσται  6  βχων  αύτην  ώστε 
του    αυτού    πράγματος    6*    μ€ν    άπο8€χ€σθαι    την 

20  νπβρβολην   ό*   δε   την   ελλβιφιν,  ανάγκη    ώς    ταύτ 
άλληλοις    ivavTia    και    τω    μ€σω,    οϋτω    και    τάς 
εζ^ις  άλλ-^λαι?  ivavτίaς  elvai  και  τη  άρ€τη. 

Σινμβαίν€ΐ     μέντοι     τα?     άι/τι^εσει?     evda     μέν  4 
φανερωτερας    eWt    πάσας,    'ένθα    δε    τάς    επι    την 
νπερβολήν,     ένιαχού     δε     τάς     iπι     την     ζλλβιφιν. 

25  αίτιον  δε  της  ivavτιώσεως  δτι  ουκ  aei  iπι  ταύτα'  fi 
της  άνισοτητος  η  όμοιότης^  προς  το  μέσον,  αλλ' 
ότέ  μβν  θάττον  αν  μεταβαίη  άπο  της  υπερβολής 
ετΓΐ  την  μ4σην  e^iv,  ότε  δ'  από  της  ε'λλει'^εω?,  ης 
ος^  πλέον  ά77ε';ι^ε(.*  οΰτος  δοκτει  ivavτιώτεpoς 
elvai,  οίον  και  περί  το  σώμα  iv  μεν  τοις  πόνοις 
νγιεινότερον      η      υπερβολή      της      iλλείφεως      και 

30  €γγύτερον  τού  μέσου,  iv  δε  τη  τροφή  ή   ελλειφις 

*•  Ric. :   καθ'  αυτόν  ΐκαστον.  ^  καΐ  Sus. :   ί}. 

'  μάλλον  ή  lac. :  μη.  *  ό  (bis)  Βζ. :   ου. 

^  ταντα  <^ρχ€ταί>  vel  <ήκει^  Ric, 

'  Βζ. :  ^  ομοώτητο$.  '  5s  add.  Sus. 

*  απέχων  Μ•». 

258 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  11.  v.  1-6 

tween  excess  and  deficiency  relative  to  ourselves,  it 
would  necessarily  follow  that  moral  goodness  corre- 
sponds with  each  particular  middle  state  and  is 
concerned   with   certain   mean   points   in   pleasures 

2  and  pains  and  pleasant  and  painful  things.  And 
this  middle  state  will  sometimes  be  in  pleasures  (for 
even  in  these  there  is  excess  and  deficiency),  sometimes 
in  pains,  sometimes  in  both.  For  he  that  exceeds 
in  feeling  delight  exceeds  in  the  pleasant,  and  he  that 
exceeds  in  feeling  pain  exceeds  in  the  opposite — and 
this  whether  his  feelings  are  excessive  absolutely 
or  excessive  in  relation  to  some  standard,  for  in- 
stance are  felt  more  than  ordinary  men  feel  them  ; 
whereas  the  good  man  feels  in  the  proper  way. — 

3  And  since  there  is  a  certain  state  of  character  which 
results  in  its  possessor's  being  in  one  instance  such 
as  to  accept  an  excess  and  in  another  such  as  to 
accept  a  deficiency  of  the  same  thing,  it  follows  that 
as  these  actions  are  contrary  to  each  other  and  to  the 
mean,  so  also  the  states  of  character  that  cause  them 
are  contrary  to  each  other  and  to  virtue. 

4  It  comes  about,  however,  that  sometimes  all  the  one  of 
oppositions  are  more  evident,  sometimes  those  on  the  extremes 
side  of  excess,  in  some  cases  those  on  the  side  of  maybe  mor 

5  deficiency.     The  cause  of  this  contrariety  is  that  the  the  virtue" 
resemblance  does  not  always  reach  the  same  point  than  the 
of  inequality  in  regard  to  the  middle,  but  sometimes 

it  may  pass  over  more  quickly  from  the  excess, 
sometimes  from  the  deficiency,  to  the  middle  state, 
the  person  farther  removed  from  which  seems  to 
be  more  contrary  :  for  instance,  with  regard  to  the 
body  excess  is  more  healthy  and  nearer  the  middle 
than  deficiency  in  the  case  of  exercises  but  deficiency 

6  than  excess  in  the  case  of  food.     Consequently  the 

259 


ARISTOTLE 

1222  a 

νπ€ρβολης•      ώστ€    καΐ    αϊ   ττροαψζτικαΐ    e^etg    at  6 
φίλογυμναστικαΐ    φίλοϋγί€Ϊς    μάλλον    eaovrat    καθ^ 
€κατ€ραν  την  atpeaiv,  €νθα  μ€ν  οι  ττολνττονώτβροι^ 
βνθα     δ      OL    ΰποσταηκώτζροι,^    καΐ    ivavrios    τω 

35  μ€τριω  και  τω  ώς  ο  λόγος  ένθα  μ€ν  6  άπονος 
καΐ  ουκ  άμφω,  evda  Se^  ο  απολαυστικός  καΐ 
ούχ  ο  πβίνητίκός.  συμβαίνει  δε  τοϋτο  διότι  "η  7 
φύσις  ευθύς  ού  προς  άπαντα  ομοίως  άφεστηκε  του 
μέσου,  αλλ'  ^ττον  μεν  φιλόπονοι  εσμεν  μάλλον  δ' 
απολαυστικοί•     ομοίως    δε    ταυτ'     e^ei     και    περί 

40  φυχης.  εναντιαν  δε  τίθεμεν  την  εζιν  εφ^  ην  τε  8 
αμαρτάνομεν  μάλλον  και  εφ'  ην  οι  πολλοί,  η  δ' 
έτερα  ώσπερ  ουκ  ούσα  λανθάνει,  δια  γαρ  το  ολίγον 
αναίσθητος  εστίν,  οίον  όργην  πραότητι  και  τον  9 
1222  b  opyAor  τω  πράω'  καίτοι  εστίν  υπερβολή  και  επι 
το  ΐλεων  ειν-αι  και  το*  καταλλακτικόν  είναι  και 
μη  όργίζεσθαι  ραπιζόμενον,  αλλ'  ολίγοι  οΐ  τοι- 
ούτοι, επ*  εκείνο  δε  πάντες  ρεπουσι  μάλλον  διό 
και  ού  κολακικον^  ό  θυμός. 

5  Έττει  δ'  εΐληπται  η  Βιαλογη  των  εζεων  καθ'  10 
έκαστα  τα  πάθη  fj  και*  ύπερβολαι  και  ελλείφεις, 
και  των  εναντίων  εζεων  καθ'  ας  εχουσι  κατά  τον 
ορθόν  λόγον  [τις  δ'  ό  ορθός  λόγος  και  προς  τίνα 
δει  ορον  αποβλέποντας  λέγειν  τό  μέσον  ύστερον 
επισκεπτεον) ,  φανερόν  οτι  πάσαι  αϊ  ηθικαΐ  άρεταΐ 

^  αΐ  πολνπονώτβραί  Βζ.  *  αί  ύττοστατικώτΐραι  Βζ. 

'  Βζ. :   δέ  και.  *  τό  ,  .  .  τ6  Βζ. :  τφ  .  .  ,  τψ. 

'  καταλλακτίκόν  Fr.,  ΐΰκ6\αστον  ?  Ric. 

•  17  "fti  Ras. :  καϊ  αί. 

"In  respect  of  amount  of  exercise. 
*  In  respect  of  amount  of  food. 

'  A  probable  alteration  of  the  Greek  gives  '  is  not  ready 
to  make  up  a  quarrel.'  ■*  See  1249  a  21  if. 

£60 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  II.  v.  6-10 

states  of  will  favourable  to  athletic  training  will  be 
variously  favourable  to  health  according  to  the  two 
different  fields  of  choice — in  the  one  case  '^  the 
over-energetic  men  (will  be  nearer  the  mean  than 
the  slack  ones) ,  in  the  other  ^  the  too  hardy  <will 
be  nearer  the  mean  than  the  self-indulgent  ones)  ; 
and  also  the  character  contrary  to  the  moderate  and 
rational  will  be  in  the  one  case  the  slack  and  not 
both  the  slack  and  the  over-energetic,  and  in  the 
other  case  the  self-indulgent  and  not  the  man  who 

7  goes  hungry.  And  this  comes  about  because  from  the 
start  our  nature  does  not  diverge  from  the  mean  in  the 
same  way  as  regards  everything,  but  in  energy  we  are 
deficient  and  in  self-indulgence  excessive  ;  and  this  is 

8  also  the  same  with  regard  to  the  spirit.  And  we  class 
as  contrary  to  the  mean  the  disposition  to  which  we, 
and  most  men,  are  more  liable  to  err  ;  whereas  the 
other  passes  unnoticed  as  if  non-existent,  because  its 

9  rarity  makes  it  not  observed.  For  instance  we  count 
anger  the  contrary  of  gentleness  and  the  passionate 
man  the  contrary  of  the  gentle  ;  yet  there  is  also 
excess  in  the  direction  of  being  gentle  and  placable 
and  not  being  angry  when  struck,  but  men  of  that 
sort  are  fe\^,  and  everyone  is  more  prone  to  the  other 
extreme  ;  on  which  account  moreover  a  passionate 
temper  is  not  a  characteristic  of  a  toady." 

10  And  since  we  have  dealt  with  the  scheme  of  RecapituU- 
states  of  character  in  respect  of  the  various  emotions  *^'"°' 
in  which  there  are  excesses  and  deficiencies,  and  of 
the  opposite  states  in  accordance  with  which  men 
are  disposed  in  accordance  with  right  principle 
(though  the  question  what  is  the  right  principle 
and  what  rule  is  to  guide  us  in  defining  the  mean 
must  be  considered  later  '^,  it  is  evident  that  all  the 

261 


ARISTOTLE 

1222  b 

10  καΐ  κακίαι  Trepl  ηΒονών  καΐ  λυπών  νττζρβολάς  καΐ 
eAAeti/iets"  etat,  /cat  rjSoval  /cat  λΰπαι  άπο  των 
€ΐρημ€νων  βζ^ων  /cat  παθημάτων  γίνονται,  άλλα  11 
μην  η  γ€  βζΧτίστη  e^t?  η  περί  έκαστα  μίση  iaTLV. 
Βηλον  τοίννν  ΟΤΙ  at  aperat  η  ττασαι  η  τούτων  τινίς 
€σονται  των  μ^σοτητων. 

15      VI.   Αάβωμ€ν    ονν    αλλτ^ν    άρχην    της    €πιούσης  1 
σκ€φ€ως.       etat    δτ^    ττασαι    μέν    αϊ    ούσίαι    κατά 
φνσιν   TLveg    άρχαί,  διο    /cat    ίκάστη    ττολλά  δύνα- 
ται τοιαύτα  yevvav,  οίον  άνθρωπος  ανθρώπους  /cat 
ζωον^  δλως  ζώα  καΐ  φυτόν  φυτά.     προς  8e  τούτοις  2 
ο    y'    άνθρωπος    /cat    πράζ^ών    τινών    ioTiv    άρχη 

20  μόνον  τών   ζώων  τών  γαρ  άλλων  ούθβν  ύποιμ^ν 
αν  πράττ€ΐν.      τών  δ'   αρχών  οσαι  τοιαϋται,  δθ€ν  3 
πρώτον  αϊ  κινησ€ΐς,   κύριαι  λέγονται,  μάλιστα  δε 
δt/cαtωs■   άφ^   ων  μη   evhi^eTai   άλλως,   ην   Ισως   6 
θεός  άρχει,     iv  δε  rat?  άκινήτοις  άρχαΐς,  οίον  iv  4 
ταΐς    μαθηματικαΐς,    ουκ    εστί    το    κυριον    καίτοι 

25  λέγεται  γ€  καθ^  ομοιότητα•  και  γαρ  βνταΰθα 
κινούμενης  της  άρχης  πάντα  μάλιστ*  αν  τα  δει- 
κννμενα  μεταβάλλοι,  αυτά  δε  δι'^  αυτά  ου  μετα- 
βάλλει άναιρούμενον  θάτερον^  ύπο  θατερου  αν  μη  τώ 
την  ύπόθεσιν  άι^ελεΐι^  και  hi  εκείνης  δεΓ^αι.  ο  δ  5 
άνθρωπος    άρχη    κινήσεως    τίνος'    η    γαρ    πραζις 

30  κίνησις.      επει   δ'    ώσπερ    εν   τοις   άλΧοις   η    άρχη 

^  Sus. :  ζψον  bv. 

*  5k  δι'  ?  Ric.  ^  Rieckher :  αναιρουμένου  θατέρου, 

"  The  writer  proceeds  to  distinguish  the  strict  sense  of 
^PXVt  '  origin  or  cause  of  change '  (which  applies  to  man  as 
capable  of  volition  and  action)  from  its  secondary  sense, 
'cause  or  explanation  of  an  unchanging  state  of  things' 
(which  a))plies  to  the  '  first  principles  '  of  mathematics). 

*  e.g.  if  αρχή  A  led  to  Β  and  C,  of  which  C  was  absurd. 

262 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  11.  v.  10— vi.  5 

forms  of  moral  goodness  and  badness  have  to  do  with 
excesses  and  deficiencies  of  pleasures  and  pains, 
and  that  pleasures  and  pains  result  from  the  states 
11  of  character  and  modes  of  emotion  mentioned.  But 
then  the  best  state  in  relation  to  each  class  of  thing 
is  the  middle  state.  It  is  clear,  therefore,  that  the 
virtues  will  be  either  all  or  some  of  these  middle 
states. 

1  VI.  Let  us,  therefore,  take  another  starting-point  Freedom  of 
for  the  ensuing  inquiry."     Now  all  essences  are  by  iuiman  con- 
nature  first  principles  of  a  certain  kind,  owing  to  which  f^uct  is  con- 
each  is  able  to  generate  many  things  of  the  same  sort  necessary. 
as  itself,  for  example  a  man  engenders  men,  and  in 

2  general  an  animal  animals,  and  a  plant  plants.  And 
in  addition  to  this,  obviously  man  alone  among 
animals  initiates  certain  conduct — for  we  should  not 

3  ascribe  conduct  to  any  of  the  others.  And  the  first 
principles  of  that  sort,  which  are  the  first  source  of 
motions,  are  called  first  principles  in  the  strict  sense, 
and  most  rightly  those  that  have  necessary  results  ; 
doubtless  God  is  a  ruling  principle  that  acts  in  this 

4  way.  But  the  strict  sense  of  '  first  principle  '  is  not 
found  in  first  principles  incapable  of  movement,  for 
example  those  of  mathematics,  although  the  term  is 
indeed  used  of  them  by  analogy,  for  in  mathematics 
if  the  first  principle  were  changed  virtually  all  the 
things  proved  froiti  it  would  change,  though  they 
do  not  change  owing  to  themselves,  one  being 
destroyed  by  the  other,  except  by  destroying   the 

5  assumption  and  thereby  establishing  a  proof. **  But 
man  is  a  first  principle  of  a  certain  motion,  for 
action  is   motion.     And  since   as   in  other  matters 

then  C  by  refuting  A  would  refute  the  other  consequence  Β 
(Solomon). 

263 


ARISTOTLE 

1222  b 

aiTta    €στί    των    δι'    αύτην    όντων    η    γινομένων , 

Set  νοησαί  καθάπ^ρ  €πΙ  των  άποΒ€ίζ€ων.     el  γαρ  6 

ζχοντος  τον  τριγώνου  δυο  όρθάς  ανάγκη  το  τ€τρά- 

γωνον    €χ€ΐν   τ€τταρας    όρθάς,   φανβρον   ώς   αίτιον 

τούτου  το  δυο  όρθάς  €χ€ίν  το  τρίγωνον    el  δε  ye 

3&  μβταβάλλοι^   το   τρίγωνον,  ανάγκη    καΐ   το   τ€τρά- 

γωνον  μβταβάλλζίν,   οίον   el  τρ€Ϊς,   e^,   el  Be   τέτ- 

ταρας,^  οκτώ'  καν  el  μη  μeτaβάλλei^  τοιούτον  δ' 

eoTL,   κάκ€Ϊνο  τοιούτον  άναγκαΐον  eii^ai. 

ΔηλοΓ  δ     ο   eπιχeιpoΰμev  οτι  άναγκαΐον  €κ  των  7 

αναλυτικών    νυν    δ'    ovTe    μη    Xeγeιv    οντ€    Xeγeιv 

ακριβώς    οΐόν   τ€   πλην   τοσούτον.      el   γαρ   μηθ€ν 

40  άλλο    αίτιον   του   το   τρίγωνον   ούτως   e^eiv,   αρχή 

τι?   O.V   eΊη   τοΰτο    και  αίτιον  τών  ύστ€ρον.      ωστ   8 

eXnep   εστιι/   eVia   τών   όντων   €vSeχόμ€va   έναντίως 

exeiv,  ανάγκη  και  τάς  αρχάς  αυτών  etvai  τοιαύτας' 

1223  a  €κ  γάρ  τών  e^  ανάγκης  άναγκαΐον  το   συμβαίνον 

εστί,   τα   he   γe   evτeΰθev   evheχeτaι   yev'eo^ai   εττι* 

τάναντία.     και  ά*  e(^'  αύτοΐς  εστί  τοις  άνθρώττοις, 

ΤΓολλά    τών    τοιούτων,    και    άρχαι    τών    τοιούτων 

eloiv    αυτοί.      ώστε    όσων    πpάζeωv    6    άνθρωπος  9 

5  εστίν  αρχή  και  κύριος,  φavep6v  οτι  evheχeτaι  και 

^ινεσ^αι    και   μή,    και    οτι    ε(^'    αύτώ    ταϋτ     εστί 

yι^'eσ^αι  και  μή,  ων  γe  κύριος  ε'στι  του  είναι  και 

^  μ€ταβάλ\(ΐ  Ilic. 

*  Sp. :  τέττηρίί.  '  Ric. :  μ€ταβάλ\θί, 

*  έττΐ  add.  Βζ.  »  Fr. :  δ. 

»  C/.  ^ηαί.  Ροίί.  Ι.  i. 
264 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  11.  vi.  5-9 

the  first  principle  is  a  cause  of  the  things  that  exist 
or  come  into  existence  because  of  it,  we  must  think 

6  as  we  do  in  the  case  of  demonstrations.  For  example, 
if  as  the  angles  of  a  triangle  are  together  equal  to 
two  right  angles  the  angles  of  a  quadrilateral  are 
necessarily  equal  to  four  right  angles,  that  the  angles 
of  a  triangle  are  equal  to  two  right  angles  is  clearly 
the  cause  of  that  fact;  and  supposing  a  triangle 
were  to  change,  a  quadrilateral  would  necessarily 
change  too — for  example  if  the  angles  of  a  triangle 
became  equal  to  three  right  angles,  the  angles  of  a 
quadrilateral  would  become  equal  to  six  right  angles, 
or  if  four,  eight  ;  also  if  a  triangle  does  not  change 
but  is  as  described,  a  quadrilateral  too  must  of 
necessity  be  as  described. 

7  The  necessity  of  Avhat  we  are  arguing  is  clear  from 
Analytics "  ;  at  present  we  cannot  either  deny  or 
affirm  anything  definitely  except  just  this.  Sup- 
posing there  were  no  further  cause  of  the  triangle's 
having  the  property  stated,  then  the  triangle  would 
be  a  sort  of  first  principle  or  cause  of  the  later  stages. 

8  Hence  if  in  fact  there  are  among  existing  things  some 
that  admit  of  the  opposite  state,  their  first  principles 
also  must  necessarily  have  the  same  quality ;  for  of 
things  that  are  of  necessity  the  result  is  necessary, 
albeit  the  subsequent  stages  may  possibly  happen 
in  the  opposite  way.  And  the  things  that  depend  on 
men  themselves  in  many  cases  belong  to  this  class 
of  variables,  and  men  are  themselves  the  first  prin- 

9  ciple  of  things  of  this  sort.  Hence  it  is  clear  that  Therefore 
all  the  actions  of  which  a  man  is  the  first  principle  vlce^are"*^ 
and  controller  may  either  happen  or  not  happen,  voluntary. 
and  that  it  depends  on  himself  for  them  to  happen 

or  not,  as  he  controls  their  existence  or  non-existence. 

265 


ARISTOTLE 

1223  a 

τοΰ  μη  elvaL.      δσα  δ     βφ    αντώ  ear  ι  ποί€Ϊν  τη  μη 

TTOLciv,  αίτιο?  τούτων  αντος^  εστίν,  και  όσων  αίτιο?, 
€^'  αι5τω.     €7Γ6ΐ  δ'  η  τ€  αρετή  καΐ  η  κακία  και  τα  10 

10  άττ'  αυτών  έργα  τα  μεν  επαινετά  τά  δε  φεκτα 
{φεγεται  γαρ  καΐ  επαινείται  ου  τά}  εξ  ανάγκης  η 
τύχη?  η  φύσεως  υπάρχοντα  αλλ'  όσων  αύτοι  "αί- 
τιοι εσμεν,  όσων  γαρ  αλλάς  αίτιος  εκείνος  και  τον 
φόγον  και  τον  επαινον  €χει),  8ηλον  οτι  και  η  αρετή 

15  και  η  κακία  περί  ταΰτ  εστίν  ων  αύτος  αίτιος  και 
άρχη  πράζεων.  ληπτεον  άρα  ποιων  αύτος  αίτιο?  1 1 
Λταί  άρχη  πράζεων.  πάντες  μεν  Srj  όμολογοΰμεν, 
οσα  μεν  εκούσια  και  κατά  προαίρεσιν  την  έκαστου, 
εκείνων'^  αίτιον  eivai,  οσα  δ'  ακουσία,  ουκ  αυτόν 
αίτιον,  πάντα  δ'  οσα  προελόμενος,  και  εκών  Βηλον 
οτι.     8ηλον  τοίνυν  οτι  και  η  αρετή  και  η  κακία  τών 

20  εκουσίων  αν  εΐησαν. 

VII.   Αηπτεον    άρα    τι    το    εκούσιον    και    τι    το  1 
άκούσιον,    και    τι    εστίν    η    προαίρεσις,    επεώη    η 
άρετη  και  η  κακία  ορίζεται  τούτοις•  και*  πρώτον 
σκεπτεον  το  εκούσιον  και  το  άκούσιον.     τριών  8η  2 
τούτων  εν  τι  8όζειεν  άν^  eivai,  ήτοι  κατ    ορεζιν  η 

•2ό  κτατά  προαίρεσιν  η  κατά  Siavoiav,  το  μεν  εκούσιον 
κατά  τούτων  τι,  το  δ  ακούσιοι^  πάρα  τούτων  τι. 
αλλά  μην  ή  ορεζις  εις  τρία  διαι/3€Γται,  ei?  βούλησιν  3 

^  Βζ. :  oiVoj.  ^  Fr. :  διά  τά. 

'  Fr. :  ίκ€Ϊνοι>.  *  καΐ  add.  Fr.  *  Άν  add.  Sp. 

266 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  II.  vi.  9— vii.  3 

But  of  things  which  it  depends  on  him  to  do  or  not 
to  do  he  is  himself  the  cause,  and  what  he  is  the 

10  cause  of  depends  on  himself.  And  since  goodness 
and  badness  and  the  actions  that  spring  from  them 
are  in  some  cases  praiseworthy  and  in  other  cases 
blameworthy  (for  praise  and  blame  are  not  given 
to  things  that  we  possess  from  necessity  or  fortune 
or  nature  but  to  things  of  which  we  ourselves  are 
the  cause,  since  for  things  of  which  another  person 
is  the  cause,  that  person  has  the  blame  and  the 
praise),  it  is  clear  that  both  goodness  and  badness 
have  to  do  with  things  where  a  man  is  himself  the 

11  cause  and  origin  of  his  actions.  We  must,  then,  ascer- 
tain what  is  the  kind  of  actions  of  which  a  man  is 
himself  the  cause  and  origin.  Now  we  all  agree 
that  each  man  is  the  cause  of  all  those  acts  that  are 
voluntary  and  purposive  for  him  individually,  and 
that  he  is  not  himself  the  cause  of  those  that  are 
involuntary.  And  clearly  he  commits  voluntarily 
all  the  acts  that  he  commits  purposely.  It  is  clear, 
then,  that  both  goodness  and  badness  will  be  in  the 
class  of  things  voluntary. 

1  VII.  We  must,  therefore,  ascertain  what  voluntary  the 

,     .  1  τ  1        ,     .  •  l•      •  VOLUNTAItY 

and  mvoluntary  mean,  and  what  is  purposive  choice,  (cc.  vii  ix). 
since  they  enter  into  the  definition  of  goodness  and  acung°by 
badness.     And  first  we  must  consider  the  meaning  of  impulse, 

xTl•  ijj.     whether  in 

2  voluntary  and  mvoluntary.    Now  they  would  seem  to  the  form  of 
refer  to  one  of  three  things — conformity  with  appe-  appetite 
tition,  or  with  purposive   choice,  or  with  thought  : 
voluntary  is  Avhat  conforms  with  one  of  these  and  in- 

3  voluntary  is   what  contravenes   one   of  them.     But 
moreover  there  are  three  subdivisions  of  appetition — 

267 


ARISTOTLE 

1223  a 

/cat   θνμον  /cat   έττιθυμίαν ,  ώστε  ταύτα  hLaiperiov• 
/cat  πρώτον  τό^  κατ    ίτηθυμίαν. 

lS,o^eLe    δ'    αν   παν   το    κατ     €πίθνμίαν   ίκούσιον  4 
eti^at.      το    γαρ    ακονσιον   παν   hoKel   elvai  βίαιον, 
30  το   8e  βίαιον  λυπηρόν,   /cat   παν   δ   άναγκαζόμβνοι 
ποιονσιν  η  πάσχονσιν ,  ωσπβρ  /cat  Ένηνός  φησί' 

παν  γαρ  άναγκαΐον  πραγμ    άνιαρον  ζφν 

ώστ'  et  Tt  λυπηρον  βίαίον  /cat  et  Tt*  βιαιον  λύπη-  5 

ρόν   το   δε   παρά   την  €πίθυμίαν   παν    λνπηρόν   {η 

35  γαρ  επιθυμία  τον  rjheos),  ώστε  βίαιον  /cat  άκονσίον. 

το  άρα  κατ    βπιθνμίαν  ίκονσιον    ει^αντ/α  γαρ  ταϋτ 

άλληλοι?.     έτι  1^  μοχθηρία  ά8ικώτ€ρον  πάσα  7ΓOtεt,  6 

■jj  δ'   άκρασία  μοχθηρία  δo/cεt  εtvαt•  ό  δ     άκρατης 

οίος    κατά'    Ti^f     βπιθυμίαν    παρά    τον    λογισμόν 

πράτταν,  ά/cpατευεταt  δ'  όταν  Ινβργη  κατ    αύττ^ν'• 

1223  b  ώσ^'     6     άκρατης     άδt/C7^σεt     τω     πραττ€ΐν     κατ 

€πιθυμίαν .       το    δ'    α,δt/cεt^'    Ικούσιον*•    €κών    άρα 

πράζ^ι,  και  ίκούσιον  το  κατ    €πιθυμιαν.     και  γαρ 

άτοπον   €1   hiKaioTepoi   έσονται   οι   άκρατ€Ϊς   γινό- 

/xε^Όt/ — ε/c  μβν  τοίννν  τούτων  δό^ειει/  αν  το  κατ   7 

5  επιθυμίαν  ίκούσιον  elvai•  e/c  δε  τώι^δε  τουναντίον , 

άπαν  γάρ  ο  ίκών  τις  πράττει  βουλόμενος  πράττει, 

^  τό  add.  Cas.  ^  ei  τι  rec.  Ρ•' :  d. 

'  olos  κατά  Sp. :  δ  κατά.  et  oios  infra  ante  ττράττΐΐν. 

*  τό  δ'  .  .  .  ΐκούσιον  hie  Rac. :  supra  ante  ώσθ'  ό  άκρατψ. 

*  /cat  7άρ  •  •  .  -/ιν&μ^νοι  Supra  post  τφ  πράττ€ΐν  κατ  έιτιθνμίαν 
tr.  ?  Rac. 

"  Quoted  also  Met.  1015  a  28  and  (without  author's  name) 
Rhet.  1370  a  10,  and  =  Theognidea  472  (but  that  has  χρημ 
άνιαρόν);  probably  by  the  elder  Evenus  of  Paros,^.  460  b.c. 
(Bowra,  CI.  Rev.  xlviii.  2). 

*  In  the  Mss.  this  sentence  precedes  the  one  before. 

268 


I  EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  II.  vii.  3-7 

'  wish,  passion  and  desire  ;   so  that  we  have  to  dis- 

:  tinguish   these.     And   first   we    must   consider   con- 

;'  formity  with  desire. 

ΐ:      It  would  seem  that  everything  that  conforms  with  (to  yield  to 

:    J.  .  1,  1-.•^  ii,•  •         Λ       Λ.  which  can 

desire    is    voluntary,     tor    everything    involuntary  bs  shown 

(seems  to  be  forced,  and  what  is  forced  and  everything  as  both 
that  people  do  or  suffer  under  necessity  is  painful,  and  in- 
as  indeed  Evenus  says  :  voluntary), 

For  all  necessity  doth  cause  distress —  <* 

so  that  if  a  thing  is  painful  it  is  forced  and  if  a  thing 
is  forced  it  is  painful  ;    but  everything  contrary  to 

t  desire  is  painful  (for  desire  is  for  what  is  pleasant), 
so  that  it  is  forced  and  involuntary.  Therefore  what 
conforms  with  desire  is  voluntary,  for  things  con- 
trary to  and  things  in  conformity  with  desire  are 
opposite  to  one  another.  Again,  all  wickedness 
makes  a  man  more  unrighteous,  and  lack  of  self- 
control  seems  to  be  wickedness  ;  and  the  uncontrolled 
I  man  is  the  sort  of  man  to  act  in  conformity  with  desire 
contrary  to  calculation,  and  he  shows  his  lack  of 
control  when  his  conduct  is  guided  by  desire  ;  so 
that  the  uncontrolled  man  will  act  unrighteously  by 
acting  in  conformity  with  desire.  But  unrighteous 
action  is  voluntary. **  Therefore  he  will  be  acting 
voluntarily,  and  action  guided  by  desire  is  voluntary. 
Indeed  it  would  be  strange  if  those  who   become 

ί  uncontrolled  will  be  more  righteous." — From  these  or  of  anger 
considerations,  then,  it  would  appear  that  what  is  in  sa°me^^ 
conformity  with  desire  is  voluntary  ;  and  from  this  the  reason), 
opposite  **  follows,  for  all  that  a  man  does  voluntarily 


ί 


<^  This  sentence  would  come  in  better  above,  after  '  acting 
in  conformity  with  desire.' 

"*  Viz.  that  what  is  against  desire  is  involuntary. 

269 


ARISTOTLE  i 

/cat  δ  jSouAerat  ίκών,  βουλίται  δ  ονθ^Ις  ο  oterat 
elvai  κακόν,  άλλα  /χι^ι^  ο  άκρατβυόμ^νος  ονχ  α 
βονΧζταί  TTOLel,  το  yap  τταρ'  δ  οΓεται  βΙΧηστον 
elvai   ττράτταν   δι'    Ιττιθυμίαν   άκρατ€ύ€σθαί  ioTLV 

10  ώστε  α/χα  σνμβησβταί  τον  αυτόν  εκόντα  και  άκοντα 
πράττ€ΐ,ν.  τοΰτο  δ'  αδύνατον,  έτι  δ  ό  εγκρατής  8 
hiKaioTTpayqaei,,  καΐ  μάλλον  της  άκρασίας'  η  γαρ 
€γκράτ€ΐα  άρβτή,  ή  δ'  άρβτη  δικαιοτέρου?  ποιεί. 
€γκρατ€ν€ται  δ'  δταν  ττράτττ]  τταρα  την  βτηθυμίαν 
κατά  τον  λογισμόν.     ώστ    ει  το  ρ-έν  δικαΐ07Γρα•)/εΓν 

15  €κούσίον,  ώσττερ  και  το  άδικειν  {αμφω  γαρ  δοκει 
ταύτα  εκούσια  είναι,  και  ανάγκη  ει  θατ^ρον 
ίκούσιον  και  θάτβρον),  το  δε  παρά  την  βτηθυμίαν 
άκονσιον,  άμα  άρα  6  αύτος  το  αυτό  ττράζα  εκών 
και  άκων. 

Ό  δ'  αυτό?  λόγο?  και  ττερι  θυμοΰ•  άκρασία  γάρ  9 
και   εγκράτεια   και    θυμοΰ   δοκει    είναι   ώσττερ   και 

20  ζττιθυμίας,  και  το  παρά  τον  θυμον  λνπηρόν  και 
βίαιον  η  κάθίζίς,  ώστ'  ει  το  βίαιον  άκουσιον,  το 
κατά  τον  θυμον  ίκούσιον  αν  eh]  πάν.  €θΐκ€  δε 
και  'Ηράκλειτο?  λε'γειν  ει?  τήν  Ισχύν  του  θυμοΰ 
βλίφας  ΟΤΙ  λυπηρά  η  κώλυσις  αυτού•  "  χαλεττόν 
yap  "  ^τ^σι  "  θυμώ  μάχεσθαι,  φυχης  γάρ  ώνεΐται." 

25  ει  δ'  αδύνατον  το  αύτό^  εκόντα  και  άκοντα  πράττουν  1 
άρ,α   και''   κατά   το   αυτό    τοΰ  πράγματος,   μάλλον 
ίκούσιον    το    κατά   βούλησιν    τοΰ    κατ     ^πιθυμίαν 

^  Ρ*>:  τό  αυτόν  Μ*»:  rbv  αντόρ  edd.  **  και  Βζ. :  το. 

"  The  natural  philosopher  of  Ephesus,yi.  c.  513  b.c.  His 
sentence  ended  δ  τι  yap  olv  XPvtv  yivfcdai,  ψνχψ  uvehai, 
lamblichus,  Protrepticus,  p.  140. 

270 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  II.  vii.  7-10 

he  wishes  to  do,  and  what  he  wishes  to  do  he  does 
voluntarily,  but  nobody  wishes  what  he  thinks  to  be 
bad.  But  yet  the  uncontrolled  man  does  not  do 
what  he  wishes,  for  being  uncontrolled  means  acting 
against  what  one  thinks  to  be  best  owing  to  desire  ; 
hence  it  will  come  about  that  the  same  person  is 
acting    voluntarily    and   involuntarily    at    the    same 

8  time.  But  this  is  impossible.  And  further,  the 
self-controlled  man  will  act  righteously,  or  more 
righteously  than  lack  of  control  will  ;  for  self-control 
is  goodness,  and  goodness  makes  men  more  righteous. 
And  a  man  exercises  self-control  when  he  acts  against 
his  desire  in  conformity  with  rational  calculation. 
So  that  if  righteous  action  is  voluntary,  as  also  un- 
righteous action  (for  both  of  these  seem  to  be  volun- 
tary, and  if  one  of  them  is  voluntary  it  follows  of 
necessity  that  the  other  is  also),  whereas  what  is 
contrary  to  desire  is  involuntary,  it  therefore  follows 
that  the  same  person  will  do  the  same  action  volun- 
tarily and  involuntarily  at  the  same  time. 

9  The  same  argument  applies   also  in  the  case  of  or  of  wish 
passion  ;    for  there  appear  to  be  control  and  lack  of  in^oives^**" 
control  of  passion  as  well  as  of  desire  and  what  is  contra- 
contrary    to    passion    is   painful    and  restraint   is    a  '''*^*''°°)• 
matter  of  force,  so  that  if  what  is  forced  is  involun- 
tary, what  is  in  accordance  with  passion  Λνΐΐΐ  always 

be  voluntary.  Even  Heracleitus  "  seems  to  have  in 
view  the  strength  of  passion  when  he  remarks  that 
the  checking  of  passion  is  painful ;  for  '  It  is  difficult 
(he  says)  to  do  battle  with  passion,  for  it  buys  its  wish 
10  at  the  price  of  life.'  And  if  it  is  impossible  to  do  the 
same  act  voluntarily  a,nd  involuntarily  at  the  same 
time  and  in  respect  of  the  same  part  of  the  act, 
action  guided  by  one's  wish  is  more  voluntary  than 

271 


ARISTOTLE 

1228  b 

καΐ   θυμόν.      τ€κμηρίον  δε'•   ττολλά  γαρ  πράττομ€ν 

βκόντζς  avev  οργής  καΐ  €ττιθυμίας. 

AetVerat    άρα    el    το    βουλόμενον    καΐ    ίκούσιον  11 

30  ταύτο  σκβφασθαί.  φαίν€ταί  δε  καΐ  τοΰτο  aSvvarov. 
ύττόκβίταί  γαρ  ημΐν  καΐ  ^οκ€Ϊ  η  μοχθηρία  άδικω- 
ripovg  TTOieZv,  rj  δ'  άκρασία  μοχθηρία  τι?  φαίνεται. 
σνμβήσ€ται  δε  τουναντίον  βούλ^ται  μβν  γαρ  ονθίΐς 
α  o'leTat  eivai  κακά,  ττράττΐΐ  δ  όταν  γίνηται^ 
άκρατης'    ει    ουν   το   μβν   aSiKelv   €Κούσιον,   το    δ' 

35  eKovoLOv  το  κατά  βούλησιν,  όταν  άκρατης  •)/εν7^ται, 
ovK€TL  άδικτ^σει,  αλλ'  εσται  δικαιότερο?  η  πριν 
γενέσθαι  άκρατης,  τοΰτο  δ'  άδυνατοΓ.  οτι  μεν 
τοίνυν  ουκ  εστί  το  εκούσιον  το  κατά  ορεζιν  ττράτ- 
τειν  οι)δ'  άκουσιον  το  παρά  την  ορεζιν  φανερόν. 

VIII,  "Οτι  δ'    ού8έ    κατά   ττροαίρεσιν,   ττάλιν   εκ  1 
τώνδε  δτ^λον.      το  μεν  γάρ  κατά  βουλησιν  ώς  ουκ 
άκουσιον^    απεδείχθη,    άλλα   μάλλον^    παν    ο    βου- 
1224  a  λεται   και  εκούσιον    άλλ     οτι    κ:αι   μη   βουλομενον 
εν^εχεταί  πράττειν  εκόντα,  τοΰτο  δε'δεικται  μόνον.* 
πολλά  δε  βουλόμενοι  πράττομεν  εζαίφνης,  προαιρεί- 
ται δ'  ουδει?  ουδει^  εξαίφνης. 
5      Ει  δε  ανάγκη  μεν  ην  τριών  τούτων  εν  τι  είναι  2 
το  εκούσιον,  η   κατ*   ορεζιν    η   κατά  προαίρεσιν  η 

^  So]. :  "γίνηται. 

*  οΰχ  ώϊ  (κούσων  ?  Rac.  {ούχ  ώ?  ά.κ.  Ras. :  ojs  ά/c.  ουκ.  Βζ.). 

*  μάλλον  <δτι>  ?  RaC.  *   [μόνον]  Sol. 


"  Or,  altering  the  text,  '  It  was  proved  not  that  acting  in 
accordance  with  one's  wishes  is  the  same  as  acting  volun- 
tarily, but  rather  that  all  one  wishes  is  also  voluntary  although 
it  is  possible  to  act  voluntarily  without  wishing — this  is  all 
that  has  been  proved  ;   but  many  things  that  we  wish — — ' 

"  Cf.  1223  a  23  ff. 

272 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  II.  vn.  10— viii.  2 

action  guided  by  desire  or  passion.  And  a  proof  of 
this  is  that  we  do  many  things  voluntarily  without 
anger  or  desire. 

It  remains,  therefore,  to  consider  whether  acting 
as  we  wish  and  acting  voluntarily  are  the  same. 
This  also  seems  impossible.  For  it  is  a  fundamental 
assumption  with  us,  and  a  general  opinion,  that 
wickedness  makes  men  more  unrighteous  ;  and  lack 
of  self-control  seems  to  be  a  sort  of  wickedness. 
But  from  the  hypothesis  that  acting  as  we  wish  and 
acting  voluntarily  are  the  same  the  opposite  will 
result  ;  for  nobody  wishes  things  that  he  thinks  to 
be  bad,  yet  he  does  them  when  he  has  become  un- 
controlled, so  if  to  do  injustice  is  voluntary  and  the 
voluntary  is  what  is  in  accordance  with  one's  wish, 
then  when  a  man  has  become  uncontrolled  he  will  no 
longer  be  acting  unjustly  but  will  be  more  just  than 
he  was  before  he  lost  control  of  himself.  But  this  is 
impossible.  Therefore  it  is  clear  that  acting  volun- 
tarily does  not  mean  acting  in  accordance  with 
appetition  nor  acting  involuntarily  acting  in  op- 
position to  appetition. 

VIII.  Also  it  is  clear  from  the  following  considera-  nor  is  it 
tions  that  voluntary  action  does  not  mean  acting  in  p„^polive. 
accordance  with  purposive  choice.  It  was  proved  <* 
that  acting  in  accordance  with  one's  wish  is  not 
acting  involuntarily,  but  rather  everything  that  one 
wishes  is  also  voluntary — it  has  only  been  proved  that 
it  is  possible  to  do  a  thing  voluntarily  without  wish- 
ing ;  but  many  things  that  we  wish  we  do  suddenly, 
whereas  nobody  makes  a  purposive  choice  suddenly. 

But  if  as  we  said  ^  the  voluntary  must  necessarily  Therefore 
be  one  of  three  things — what  is  in  conformity  with  ap-  gx^jygiQn 
petition,  or  with  purposive  choice,  or  with  thought — , 

τ  273 


ARISTOTLE 

1224  a 

Kara  SidvoLav,  τούτων  δε  τα  δυο  μτ]  εστί,  λείττεται 

ev  τω  Βιανοονμενόν  πως  πράττ€ΐ,ν  elvai  το  ίκούσιον. 

€TL   Be   μΛκρόν  προαγαγόντ€ς   τον   λόγον   ^τηθώμ^ν  3 

τέΧος  τω  ττβρί  τον  βκουσίου  καΐ  ακουσίου  Βιορισμω, 

10  hoKei  γαρ  το  βία  καΐ  μτ)  βία  τι  TTOLeiv  οΙκεΐα  τοις 
€ίρ'ημ€νοίς  elvai•  τό  re  γαρ  βίαιον  άκούσιον  και 
το  άκούσιον  τταν  βίαιον  elvat  φαμέν.  ώστβ  Trepl 
του  βία  σκ€7ττ€ον  πρώτον  τι  εστί  και  πώς  €χ€ΐ 
προς  το  ίκούσιον  /cat  άκούσιον.  Sofcei  δη  τό  4 
βίαιον   καΙ   τό    άναγκαΐον   άντίΚ€Ϊσθαι,    καΐ   η   βία 

15  καΐ  ή  ανάγκη,  τω  €κουσίω  και  ttj  πβιθοΐ  €πι 
των  πραττομάνων.  καθόλου  he  τό  βίαιον  και  την 
ανάγκην  και  €.πι  τών  άφύχων  Xeγoμev•  και  γαρ 
τον  λίθον  άνω  και  το  πυρ  κάτω  βία  και  άναγκαζό- 
μeva  φ4ρ€σθαι  φaμev,  ταΰτα^  δ  όταν  κατά  την 
φύσ€ΐ^  και  την  καθ*  αυτά  ορμην  φ€ρηται,  ου  βία 
— ου    μην    οι)δ'    εκούσια    λέγεται,    αλλ     ανώνυμος 

20  η  άντίθεσις,  όταν  δε  παρά  ταύτην,  βία  φαμεν. 
ομοίως  δε  και  επι  εμφνχων  και  επι  τών  ζώων  5 
όρώμεν  βία  πολλά  και  πάσχοντα  και  ποιοΰντα, 
όταν  παρά  την  εν  αύτώ  ορμην  έξωθεν  τι  κινη.  ev 
μεν  τοις  άφύχοις  άπλη  η  άρχη,  ev  δε  τοις  εμφύχοις 
πλεονάζει•  ου  γάρ   άει  η  όρεζις   και   ό  λόγος  συμ- 

25  φωνεΐ.       ώστ     επι    μεν   τών    άλλων   ζώων  απλούν  6 
τό   βίαιον,   ώσπερ   επι   τών   άφύχων   {ου   γαρ   έχει 

^  Fr, :  τοΰτο,  *  ν.1.  φνσιν. 

274 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  II.  viii.  2-6 

and  if  it  is  not  the  two  former,  it  remains  that  volun-  «f.  i323  a  21) 
tariness  consists  in  acting  with  some  kind  of  thought,  voluntary 

3  Moreover,  let  us  put  a  conclusion  to  our  delimitation  ^^^^"jjj  °" 
of  the  voluntary   and  involuntary  by  carrying  the 
argument  a  little  further.     Acting  under  compulsion  Compulsion 

Ο  ^  is  irom 

and  not  under  compulsion  seem  to  be  terms  akin  without; 
to  the  ones  mentioned  ;   for  we  say  that  everything 
forced  is  involuntary  and  everything  involuntary  is 
forced.     So  we  must  first  consider  the  exact  meaning 
of  '  forced,'  and  how  what  is  forced  is  related  to  the 

4  voluntary  and  involuntary.  It  seems,  then,  that  in 
the  sphere  of  conduct  '  forced  '  or  '  necessary,'  and 
force  or  necessity,  are  the  opposite  of  '  voluntary,' 
and  of  persuasion.  And  we  employ  the  terms  force 
and  necessity  in  a  general  sense  even  in  the  case  of 
inanimate  objects  :  we  say  that  a  stone  travels  up- 
wards and  fire  downwards  by  force  and  under  neces- 
sity, whereas  when  they  travel  according  to  their 
natural  and  intrinsic  impulse  we  say  that  they  do 
not  move  under  force — although  nevertheless  they 
are  not  spoken  of  as  moving  voluntarily  :  the  state 
opposite  to  forced  motion  has  no  name,  but  when 
they  travel  contrary  to  their  natural  impulse  we  say 

5  that  they  move  by  force.  Similarly  also  in  the  case 
of  living  things  and  of  animals,  we  see  many  being 
acted  on  by  force,  and  also  acting  under  force  when 
something  moves  them  from  outside,  contrary  to  the 
impulse  within  the  thing  itself.  In  inanimate  things 
the  moving  principle  is  simple,  but  in  living  things  it 

is  multiple,  for  appetition  and  rational  principle  are  whereas  the 

6  not  always  in  harmony.     Hence  whereas  in  the  case  fmpu!se°by 
of  the  other  animals  the  factor  of  force  is  simple,  yeason  is 
as  it  is  in  the  case  of  inanimate  objects,  for  animals  and       ' 
do  not  possess  rational  principle  and  appetition  in  ^ο^^^^^^^ν 

275 


ARISTOTLE 

1224  a 

λόγον  καΐ  ope^Lv  Ιναντίαν,  άλλα  τ^  ope^et  ζτ^)'  ev 

ο  ανθρώττω  eveariv  αμφω,  καΐ  ev  tlvl  -ηλίκία,  "^ 
και  το  πράττ€ΐν  άττοΒίΒομ^ν  {ου  γαρ  φαμ€ν  το 
παιΒίον   7τράττ€ίν,   ovSe   το    θηρίον,   άλλα,    τόν^  η8η 

30  δια  λογισμόν  πράττοντα) .  δο/cet  δή  το  βίαιον  7 
άτταν  λυπηρον  eivai,  καΐ  ούθ€ΐς  βία  μίν  ίτοιεΙ 
"χαίρων  he.  διό  ττβρι  τον  Ιγκραττ]  καΐ  τον  άκρατη 
πλείστη  άμφισβητησίς  εστίν.  Ιναντίας  γαρ  ορμάς 
€χων  αύτος  ίκάτ^ρος^  αύτω  πράττ€ί,  ώσθ^  ο  τ' 
€γκρατΎ]ς    βίΟ-,    φασίν,    άφελκων^    αντον    άττό    των 

35  rjSewv  Ιτηθυμών^   [αλγβΐ  γαρ   άφέλκων  ττρος  αντι- 
τ€ΐνονσαν  την  ορεζιν),  6  τ    άκρατης  βία  παρά  τον 
λογισμόν.     'ήττον  Se  δο/cet   λνπβΐσθαι,  η    γάρ  eVt-  8 
θνμία    του    η^βος,    fj    άκολουθβΐ    χαίρων    ωσ&*    6 
άκρατης  μάλλον  €κών  καΐ  ου  βία,  οτι  ου  λυπηρώς. 
η   δε  τταθώ  τη  βία  και   ανάγκη   άντιτίθ€ται,  6  δ' 
1224  b  εγκρατής  βφ    α  ττεττεισται  ά'γεται/  καΐ  πορ€υ€ται 
ου  βία  άλλ'  βκών  η  δ'  Ιτηθυμία  ου  ττεισασα  ayet, 
ου  γαρ  /χετεχει  λόγου,     οτι  μ€ν  ουν  SokoOgcv  ούτοι  9 
μόνον*  βία  και  άκοντες  notelv,  και  δια  tiV  αΐτίαν, 
ότι  κα^    ομοιότητα  τίνα  του  βία,  καθ*  ην  και  επι 
5  των    αφυχων   λ^γομεν,    (ϊρηται.      ου   μην    άλλ'    ei  ίο 
τι?    προσθειη^    το    iv    τω    8ιορισμω    ηροσκείμενον 

^  lac. :  άλλ'  6ταν.  *  Sp. :  ?«αστο5. 

'  Sp. :  άφέλκβι. 

*  Bek. :  έττιθυμιών  {των  ζ,των^  ήδ^ων  επιθυμιών  Fr.)• 

*  &^ΐται  ?  Sol.  {όρμψ  ?  Ric):  Λγβι. 

•  Rac. :  μόνοι.  '  Sp. :  ιτροσθτϊ. 

"  Or  '  conduct.' 
276 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  II.  viii.  6-10 

opposition  to  it,  but  live  by  their  appetition,  in  man 
both  forms  of  force  are  present — that  is,  at  a  certain 
age,  the  age  to  which  we  attribute  action  **  in  the 
proper  sense  ;  for  we  do  not  speak  of  a  child  as 
acting,  any  more  than  a  wild  animal,  but  only  a  person 
who  has  attained  to  acting  by  rational  calculation. 

7  So  what  is  forced  always  seems  to  be  painful,  and  no 
one  acting  under  force  acts  gladly.  Consequently  there 
is  a  great  deal  of  dispute  about  the  self-controlled 
man  and  the  uncontrolled.  For  each  of  them  acts 
under  a  conflict  of  impulses  within  him,  so  that  the 
self-controlled  man,  they  say,  acts  under  force  in 
dragging  himself  away  from  the  pleasures  that  he 
covets  (for  he  feels  pain  in  dragging  himself  away 
against  the  resistance  of  appetition),  while  the  un.- 
controlled  man  acts  under  force  in  going  contrary 

8  to  his  rational  faculty.  But  he  seems  to  feel  less 
pain,  because  desire  is  for  what  is  pleasant,  and  he 
follows  his  desire  ;  so  that  the  uncontrolled  man 
rather  acts  voluntarily  and  not  under  force,  because 
not  painfully.  On  the  other  hand  persuasion  is 
thought  to  be  the  opposite  of  force  and  necessity  ; 
and  the  self-controlled  man  is  led  towards  things 
that  he  has  been  persuaded  to  pursue,  and  proceeds 
not  under  force  but  voluntarily  ;  whereas  desire 
leads  a  man  on  without  employing  persuasion,  since 

9  it  possesses  no  element  of  rational  principle.  It  has, 
then,  been  stated  that  these  men  only  seem  to  act 
under  force  and  involuntarily  ;  and  we  have  shown 
the  reason — it  is  because  their  action  has  a  certain 
resemblance  to  forced  action,  just  as  we  speak  of 
forced  action  even  in  the  case  of  inanimate  objects 

10  too.     Yet  nevertheless  if  one  added  there  also  the 
addition  made  in  our  definition,  the   statement  is 

277 


ARISTOTLE 

1224  b 

κακ€Ϊ,   λύεται   το   λ^χθβν.      όταν   μβν   γάρ   τι   των 

ζξωθζν  τταρά  την  ev  αντω  όρμην  Kivfj  η  Ύ]ρ€μίζ'η, 

βία  φαμβν,  όταν  8e  μη,  ου  βία•  iv  δε  τω  ΙγκρατέΙ 

10  /cat  ακρατ€Ϊ  η  καθ  αύτον  ορμή  ivovaa  ayei  {αμφω 
γαρ  €χ€ΐ),  ωστ  ου  βία  ού^έτ€ρος  αλλ'  ίκών  δια 
ye  ταύτα  πράττοί  αν  ουδ'  άναγκαζόμ€νος,  την  11 
γάρ  έξωθεν  άρχην  την  παρά  την  όρμην  η  €μποΒί- 
ζουσαν  η  κινούσαν  ανάγκην  λ4γομ€ν,  ώσπβρ  et  τις 
λαβών    την    χ^ΐρα    τύπτοι    τινά    άντιτβίνοντος    και 

16  τω  βούλβσθαι  και  τω  €πιθυμ€Ϊν•  όταν  δ'  €σωθ€ν 
η  αρχή,  ου  βία.  eVt^  και  ή8ονή  και  λύπη  iv 
άμφοτ€ροις  eveoTiv  και  γάρ  6  €γκρατ€υόμ€νος  1 2 
λυπβΐται  παρά  την  επιθυμίαν  πράττων  ή8η  και 
χαίρει  την  am  ελπίΒος  η^ονήν  δτι  ύστερον  ώφελη- 
θήσεται    η    και    ή8η    ωφελείται    ύγιαίνων,    και    ό 

20  άκρατης  χαίρει  μεν  τυγχάνων  άκρατευόμενος  ου 
επιθυμεί  λυπεΐται  8έ  την  άττ'  ελπίδος  λύπην,  οΐεται 
γαρ  κακόν  πράττειν.  ώστε  τό  μεν  βία  εκάτερον  13 
φάναι  ποιεΐν  έχει  λόγον,  και  δια  την  όρεζιν  και 
δια  τον  λογισμόν  εκάτερον  άκοντα  ποτέ  πράττειν 
κεχωρισμενα    γάρ    όντα    εκάτερα    εκκρουεται    υπ* 

25  άλλτ^λωι^.       όθεν    και    επι    την    όλην    μεταφερουσι 
φυχήν,  ότι  επι^  των  εν  φυχη  τι  τοιούτον  όρώσιν. 
επι  μεν  ουν  των  μορίων  ενδερ^βται  τοϋτο  λέγειν,  η  14 
δ     όλη    εκοΰσα   φυχη    και   του    άκρατους    και   του 
1  Sus.:  6τι.  2  δτ-ί  f  πι  Sol. :  δτι. 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  II.  viii.  10-14 

refuted.  For  we  speak  of  a  thing  as  being  forced 
to  act  when  something  external  moves  it  or  brings 
it  to  rest,  acting  against  the  impulse  within  the  thing 
itself — when  there  is  no  external  motive,  we  do  not 
say  that  it  acts  under  force  ;  and  in  the  uncontrolled 
man  and  the  self-controlled  it  is  the  impulse  present 
in  the  man  himself  that  drives  him  (for  he  has  both 
impulses),  so  that  as  far  as  these  considerations  go 
neither  of  them  Avould  be  acting  under  force,  but 

11  voluntarily  ;  nor  yet  are  they  acting  of  necessity, 
for  by  necessity  we  mean  an  external  principle  that 
either  checks  or  moves  a  man  in  opposition  to  his 
impulse — as  if  A  were  to  take  hold  of  B's  hand  and 
with  it  strike  C,  B's  will  and  desire  both  resisting ; 
whereas  when  the  source  of  action  is  from  within,  we 

12  do  not  speak  of  the  act  as  done  under  force./  Again, 
both  pleasure  and  pain  are  present  in  both  cases  ;  for 
a  man  exercising  self-control  both  feels  pain  when  he 
finally  acts  in  opposition  to  his  desire  and  enjoys  the 
pleasure  of  hoping  that  he  will  be  benefited  later  on, 
or  is  even  being  benefited  already,  by  being  in  good 
health  ;  and  the  uncontrolled  man  enjoys  getting 
what  he  desires  owing  to  his  lack  of  self-control, 
but  feels  prospective  pain  because  he  thinks  he  is 

13  doing  a  bad  thing.  Hence  it  is  reasonable  to  say 
that  each  does  what  he  does  under  compulsion,  and 
that  each  is  at  one  point  acting  involuntarily,  from 
motives  both  of  appetition  and  of  rational  calculation 
— for  calculation  and  appetition  are  things  quite 
separate,  and  each  is  pushed  aside  by  the  other. 
Hence  men  transfer  this  to  the  spirit  as  a  whole, 
because  they  see  something  of  this  sort  in  the  ex- 

14  periences  of  the  spirit.  Now  it  is  admissible  to  say 
this  in  the  case  of  the  parts,  but  the  spirit  as  a  whole 

279 


ARISTOTLE 

1224  b 

€γκρατοΰς   πράττ€ί,   βία   δ'    ovBerepog,^   άλλα  των 

ev  βκΐίνοίς  τι.,  evret  /cat  φύσ^ι  αμφότερα  εχομεν 
30  καΐ  γαρ  6  λόγος  φύσει  υπάρχει"  οτί  εωμενης  της 
γενέσεως  και  μη  πηρωθείσης  ei'eWat,  και  ή  επι- 
θυμία ΟΤΙ  ευθύς  εκ  γενετής  ακολουθεί  και  eVeaTti^• 
σχεΒον  8ε  τούτοις  δυσι  το  φύσει  8ιορίζομεν,  τω  τε  15 
δσα  ευθύς  γινομενοις  ακολουθεί  πάσι,  και  δσα 
εωμενης  της  γενέσεως  εύθυπορεΐν  yiVerat  ημΐν, 
35  οίον  πολιά,  και  γήρας  και  ταλλα  τα  τοιαύτα,  ώστε 
μη  κατά  φύσιν  εκάτερος  πράττει  πώς,^  απλώς  Be 
κατά  φύσιν  εκατερος,  ου  την  αύτην.  αΐ  μεν  οΰν  16 
περί  τον  εγκρατή  και  άκρατη  άπορίαι  αύται,*  περί 
του  βία  πράττειν  η  αμφότερους  η  τον  έτερον, 
ώστε  η  μη  εκόντας  η  άμα  βία  και  εκόντας,^  εΐ 
hk   το   βία    άκούσιον,^   άμα    εκόντας    και    άκοντας 

1225  a  πράττειν  σχεδόν  8ε  εκ  των  είρημενων  8ηλον  ημΐν 

ως  άπαντητεον. 

Αεγονται  δε  κατ'  αλλοΓ  τρόπον  βία  και  άναγκα•  17 
σθεντες  πραζαι  ού  διαφωνούντος  του  λόγου  και 
της  όρεζεως,  όταν  πράττωσιν  ο  και  λυπηρόν  και 
5  φαΰλον  ύπολαμβάνουσιν  άλλα'  μη  τούτο  πράτ- 
τονσιν^  7Γλΐ7}/αι  η  Βεσμοι  η  θάνατοι  ώσιν  ταύτα 
γάρ  φασιν  άναγκασθεντες  πράξαι.  η  ού,  αλλά  18 
πάντες  εκόντες  ποιοΰσιν  αυτά  ταύτα,'  εζεστι  γάρ 

^  ούδίτέρον  ?  Rac.  *  υπάρχει  Ras. :  άρχων. 

»  ττώ?  add.  ante  μη  Sus.,  hie  Sol.  (cf.  1225  a  12  ed.). 

*  αύται  add.  Bus.  *  Sp. :   άκοντα!. 

•  Bz. :  έκούσιον.  '  Rac. :  άλλ'  &v. 

*  Sp. :  νράττωσι.  *  Sp. :  atVo  τούτο. 

280 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  II.  viii.  14-18 

both  in  the  uncontrolled  and  in  the  self-controlled 
man  acts  voluntarily,  and  in  neither  case  does  the 
man  act  under  compulsion,  but  one  of  the  parts  in 
them  so  acts — for  we  possess  by  nature  both  parts  ; 
since  rational  principle  is  a  natural  property,  because 
it  will  be  present  in  us  if  our  growth  is  allowed  and 
not  stunted,  and  also  desire  is  natural,  because  it 

15  accompanies  and  is  present  in  us  from  birth  ;  and 
these  are  pretty  nearly  the  two  things  by  which  we 
define  the  natural — it  is  what  accompanies  every- 
body as  soon  as  he  is  born,  or  else  what  comes  to 
us  if  development  is  allowed  to  go  on  regularly,  for 
example  grey  hair,  old  age,  etc.  Therefore  each  of 
the  two  persons  in  a  way  acts  not  in  accordance  with 
nature,  but  absolutely  each  does  act  according  to 
nature,  though  not  according  to  the  same  nature. 

16  The  difficulties,  then,  raised  about  the  uncontrolled 
and  the  self-controlled  man  are  these  :  do  both,  or 
does  one  of  them,  act  under  compulsion,  so  that 
they  either  act  not  voluntarily  or  else  voluntarily 
and  under  compulsion  at  the  same  time — and  if  what 
is  done  under  compulsion  is  involuntary,  act  volun- 
tarily and  involuntarily  at  the  same  time  ?  And  it 
is  fairly  clear  from  what  has  been  said  how  these 
difficulties  are  to  be  met. 

17  But  there  is  another  way  in  which  people  are  said  Mixed  acts 
to  act  under  compulsion  and  of  necessity  without  Voluntary 
disagreement  between  rational  principle  and  appe-  s^^^caufed 
tition,  when  they  do  something  that  they  consider  iay  over- 
actually   painful    and   bad   but   they    are   faced   by  nwtfvesf 
flogging  or  imprisonment  or.  execution  if  they  do  not 

do  it  ;  for  in  these  cases  they  say  that  they  are  acting 

18  under  necessity.  Possibly,  however,  this  is  not  the 
case,  but  they  all  do  the  actual  deeds  willingly,  since 

281 


ARISTOTLE 

1225  a 

μη    ποί€Ϊν    αλλ'    eKcluo    νττομ^Ιναι    το    πάθος.      έ'τι  19 

LOWS  τούτων  τά  μ€ν  φαίη  τις  άν  τά  δ'   ου.      δσα 

10  μβν  γαρ  εφ'  αύτω  των  τοιούτων  μη  ύττάρζαι  η 
νπαρξαι,^  καΐ^  οσα  πράττβι  α  μη  βούλ€ταί  ίκών 
πραττ€ΐ  και  ου  βία•  οσα  8e  μη  βφ*  αύτώ  των 
τοιούτων,  ^ια  πως,  ου  μεντοι  y  απλώς  οτι  ουκ 
αύτο  τοΰτο  προαιρείται  ο  πράττει  αλλ'  ου  eve- 
κα•  €π€ΐ  και  iv  τούτοις  εστί  τι?  Βιαφορά.     el  γαρ  20 

15  iv-a  μη  λάβη  φηλαφών  άποκτείνη,  γελοίος  άν  εϊη 
ει  λεγοι  οτι  βία  και  άναγκαζόμενος,  άλλα  8εΐ 
μείζον  κακόν  και  λυπηρότερον  είναι  δ  πείσεται 
μη  ποιιησας.  ούτω  γαρ  άναγκαζόμενος  και  η^  βία 
πράξει  η  ου  φύσει  όταν  κακόν  άγαθοΰ  ένεκα  η 
μείζονος  κακοΰ  απολύσεως  πράττη,  και  άκων  ye• 

20  ου  γαρ  εφ  αύτω  ταύτα.  διό  και  τόν  έρωτα  21 
πολλοί  άκούσιον  τιθεασιν  και  θυμούς  ενίους  και 
τα  φυσικά,  ότι  ισχυρά  και  ύπερ  την  φύσιν  και 
συγγνώμην  εχομεν  ως  πεφυκότα  ^ιάζβσ^αι  την 
φύσιν.  και  μάλλον  άν  8όζειε  βία  και  άκων 
πραττειν   ίνα   μη    άλγη    ισχυρώς   η    ίνα   μη   ήρεμα, 

2•''  και   όλως   ϊνα  μη   άλγη   η   Ινα  χαίρη.      τό  γαρ   εφ^ 

1  μη  πραξαι  ή  πραξαι  Sp.  ^  καΐ  (vel  άύ)  Βζ, :   Μ. 

'   Βζ.  :  μη. 

'  Or  '  for  in  those  of  such  acts  which  it  rests  with  himself 
to  do  or  not.' 

*  i.e.  in  blind-man's-l>uff,  μνΐνδα  or  χα\κη  μυΐα. 
283 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  II.  viii.  18-21 

it  is  open  to  them  not  to  do  them  but  to  endure 

19  the  penalty  threatened.  Moreover,  perhaps  someone 
might  say  that  in  some  cases  these  actions  are  done 
of  necessity  and  in  others  not.  For  in  cases  where 
the  presence  or  absence  of  such  circumstances  de- 
pends on  the  agent  himself,"  even  the  actions  that  he 
does  without  wishing  to  do  them  he  does  willingly 
and  not  under  compulsion  ;  but  where  in  such  cases 
the  circumstances  do  not  rest  with  himself,  he  acts 
under  compulsion  in  a  sense,  though  not  indeed 
under  compulsion  absolutely,  because  he  does  not 
definitely  choose  the  actual  thing  that  he  does  but 
the  object  for  which  he  does  it  ;    since  even  in  the 

20  objects  of  action  there  is  a  certain  difference.  For 
if  someone  were  to  kill  a  man  to  prevent  his  catching 
him  by  groping  for  him,**  it  would  be  ridiculous  for 
him  to  say  that  he  had  done  it  under  compulsion 
and  of  necessity — there  must  be  some  greater  and 
more  painful  evil  that  he  will  suffer  if  he  does  not 
do  it.  It  is  when  a  man  does  something  evil  for 
the  sake  of  something  good,  or  for  deliverance  from 
another  evil,  that  he  will  be  acting  under  necessity 
and  by  compulsion,  or  at  all  events  not  by  nature  ; 
and  then  he  will  really  be   acting  unwillingly,  for 

21  these  actions  do  not  rest  with  himself.  On  this 
account  many  reckon  even  love  as  involuntary,  and 
some  forms  of  anger,  and  natural  impulses,  because 
their  power  is  even"  beyond  nature  ;  and  we  pardon 
them  as  naturally  capable  of  constraining  nature. 
And  it  would  be  thought  that  a  man  is  acting  more 
under  compulsion  and  involuntarily  when  his  object 
is  to  avoid  violent  pain  than  when  it  is  to  avoid  mild 
pain,  and  in  general  more  when  his  object  is  the 
avoidance  of  pain  than  when  it  is  to  gain  enjoyment. 

283 


ARISTOTLE 

1225  a 

αύτω,  els  ο  avayerat  όλον,  τοντ    iarlv  δ  ή  αύτον 
φύσις    οία    re    φ€ρ€ίν•    δ    δε    μη    οία    re    μη8'    iarl 
της    ξκβίνου    φύσει    ορέξεως    η    λογισμού,    ουκ    εφ^ 
αντώ.     διό  και  τους  ενθουσιώντας  και  προλέγοντας,  22 
καιττερ  οιανοιας  έργον  ττοιονντας,  δμως  ου  φαμεν 

30  εφ^  αύτοΐς  eii^at  οϋτ^  ειπείν  α  εΐπον  ούτε  ττραξαι 
α  έπραξαν,  αλλά  μην  ούΒε  δι'  επιθυμίαν  ώστε  23 
ψ  Siavoiai  τίνες  και  πάθη  ουκ  εφ"  ήμΐν  είσΐν 
η  πράξεις  αϊ  κατά  τάς  τοιαύτας  8ιανοίας  καΐ 
λογισμούς,  αλλ'  ωσπερ  Φιλόλαο?  εφη  εΐναί  τινας 
λόγους  κρείττους  ημών. 

Ώστ    ei  το  εκούσιον  και  άκούσιον  και  προς  το 

3ό  ρια  έ'δβι  σκεφασθαι,  τοΰτο  μεν  ούτω  8ιηρησθω  (οι 
γαρ  /χάλιστ'  εμπο^ίζοντες  το  εκούσιον  .  .  .*  ώ?  ^ια 
πράττοντες,  αλλ'  εκόντες). 

IX.  Εττει  δε  τοϋτ"  έχει  τέλος,  και  ούτε  τη  ι 
ορεξει  ούτε  τη  προαιρεσει  το  εκούσιον  ώρισται, 
\ZZbh  λοιπόν  8η  όρίσασθαι  τό^  κατά  την  8ιάνοιαν.  ho  κει  2 
οη  εναντίον  eit-ai  το  εκούσιον  τω  άκουσίω,  και  το 
εώότα  η  δν  η  ω  η  ου  ένεκα  {ενίοτε  γάρ  οι8ε  μεν 
ΟΤΙ  πατήρ  αλλ  ούχ  ίνα  άποκτείνη  αλλ'  ίνα  σώση, 
ωσπερ  αί   Πελιάδε?,  ήτοι  ώς  το8ι*  μεν  πόμα  αλλ' 

5  ώς  φίλτρον  και  οΐνον,  το  δ'  ην  κώνειον)  τώ 
αγνοοΰντα^   και   ον   και   ω    και   δ   δι'    άγνοιαν,  μη 

^  ^  ?  Ric. :  και.  "  lacunam  edd. 

»  το  e  Μ. Μ.  1188  b  26  Sp. :  τα. 
*  τοδί  Fr. :  δτι.  ^  Ricckher :  ayvoovpri. 

"  Pythagorean  philosopher  contemporary  with  Socrates. 

*  Some  words  seem  to  have  been  lost  here  (αλλά  suggests 
that  they  contained  a  negative). 

"  The  daughters  of  Pelias,  King  of  lolchus,  cut  him  up 
and  boiled  him,  having  been  told  by  Medea  (who  wanted 
Jason  to  leave  his  throne)  that  this  would  restore  his  youth. 
284 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  II.  viii.  21— ix.  2 

•  For  what  rests  with  himself — and  it  wholly  turns. on 
this — means  what  his  nature  is  able  to  bear  ;  what 
his  nature  is  not  able  to  bear  and  what  is  not  a 
matter  of  his  own  natural  appetition  or  calculation 

22  does  not  rest  with  himself.  On  this  account  also 
in  the  case  of  persons  who  are  inspired  and  utter 
prophecies,  although  they  perform  an  act  of  thought, 
nevertheless  we  do  not  say  that  saying  what  they 
said  and  doing  what  they  did  rested  with  themselves. 

23  Nor  yet  do  we  say  that  what  men  do  because  of 
desire  rests  with  themselves  ;  so  that  some  thoughts 
and  emotions,  or  the  actions  that  are  guided  by  such 
thoughts  and  calculations,  do  not  rest  with  ourselves, 
but  it  is  as  Philolaus  "  said — '  some  arguments  are 
too  strong  for  us.' 

Hence  if  it  was  necessary  to  consider  the  voluntary 
and  involuntary  with  reference  also  to  acting  under 
compulsion,  let  this  be  our  decision  of  the  matter 
(for  those  who  cause  most  hindrance  .  .  .  the  volun- 
tary .  .  .**  as  acting  under  compulsion,  but  voluntarily). 

1  IX.  Now  that  this  is  concluded,  and  as  the  volun-  Definition  of 
tary  has  been  found  not  to  be  defined  by  appetition,  andTn^^'^^ 
nor  yet  by  purposive  choice,  it  therefore  remains  to  voluntary. 
define  it  as  that  which  is  in  accordance  with  thought,  in  ignorance 

2  Now    the    voluntary   seems    to   be    the   opposite   of  '^^l^f  i^ 
the    involuntary ;    and    acting    with    knowledge    of  involuntary. 
either  the   person   acted    on   or    the   instrument   or 

the  result  (for  sometimes  the  agent  knows  that  it  is 
his  father  but  does  not  intend  to  kill  him  but  to  save 
him — as  the  Peliads  "  did — or  knows  that  what  he 
is  oiFering  is  a  drink  but  oifers  it  as  a  love-charm  or 
wine,  when  really  it  is  hemlock)  seems  to  be  the 
opposite  of  acting  without  knowing  the  person  acted 
on,  the  instrument  and  the  nature  of  the  act,  through 

285 


ARISTOTLE 

1225  b 

κατά  συμβββηκός.     το  8e  δι'  άγνοιαν  /cat  ο  και  ω 

και  ον  ακονσιον.     το  evavTiov   άρ     ίκούσιον.     οσα  3 

μεν    ονν    e^'    iavTW    ον    μη    πράτταν    ττράττα    μη 

αγνοών  /cat  8t'  αυτόν,  ίκούσια  ταϋτ    ανάγκη  elvai, 

10  /cat  το  εκουσιον  τοΰτ  eoTLv  οσα  δ  αγνοών  και 
δια  το  άγνοξίν,  άκων.  inci  he  το  €πιστασθαι  και  4 
το  βιδεναι  Sittov,  ev  μβν  το  €χ€ΐν,  ev  be  το  χρησθαι 
τη  επιστήμη,  6  έχων  μη  χρώμενος  he  εστί  μεν 
ώς  hiKatws  αν^  αγνοών  Χεγοιτο,  εστί  δ'  ώς  ου 
hiKaiwg,  οίον  ει  δι'  a/ieAeiai'  μη  εχρητο.     ομοίως 

15  hε  και  μη  έχων  τις  φεγοιτο  άν,  ει  δ  pdhiov  η 
αναγκαΐον  ην  μη  εχει^  δι'  a/xeAeial•'  η  ήhovηv  η 
λύττην.     ταυτ'  οΰν  TrpoohiopiOTiov. 

Υ\ερι  μεν  οΰν  του  εκουσίου  και  ακουσίου  hi- 
ωρισθω^  τοϋτον  τον  τρόπον. 

Χ.    ΐίερί   hε   προαιρέσεως  μετά   τοΰτο   λεγωμεν,  ΐ 
hιaπopησavτες     πρώτον     τω     λόγω     περί     αύτης. 

20  hιστάσειε  γαρ  άν  τις  εν  τω  γένει  πεφυκε  και  εν 
ποίω  ^εΓρ'αι  αύτην  χρή,  και  πότερον  ου  ταύτόν 
το  εκούσιον  και  το  προαιρετόν  η  ταύτόν  εστίν, 
μάλιστα  δε  Aeyerat  παρά  Ttt'OiP'  και  ζητοΰντι  2 
hόζειεv*  άν  hυoΐv  etvat  θάτερον  η  προαίρεσις,  ήτοι 
δό^α  η  ορεζις'  αμφότερα  γάρ  φαίνεται  παρακολου- 

25  θοΰντα.      ΟΤΙ  μεν  οΰν  ουκ   εστίν  ορεζις,   φανερόν.  3 

'  ac  add.  Ras.  ^  et-η  μη  ίχοι  ?  Ric. 

'  δίτιρήσθω  ?  Rac.  *  Fr. :   δόξΐΐΐ  δ'. 

"  Perhaps  the  Greek  should  be  altered  to  give  '  Let  this 
be  our  decision.' 

*  The  term  denotes  not  the  deliberate  choice  of  an  object 
but  the  selection  of  means  to  attain  an  object :   see  §  7. 

286 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  II.  ix.  2— x.  3 

ignorance  and  not  by  accident.     But  to  act  through 
ignorance  of  the  act,  the  means  and  the  person  acted 

3  on  is  involuntary  action.  Therefore  the  opposite  is 
voluntary.  It  follows  then  that  all  the  things  that 
a  man  does  not  in  ignorance,  and  through  his  own 
agency,  when  it  is  in  his  power  not  to  do  them,  are 
voluntary  acts,  and  it  is  in  this  that  the  voluntary 
consists  ;  and  all  the  things  that  he  does  in  ignorance, 
and  through  being  in  ignorance,  he  does  involun- 

4  tarily.  But  since  to  understand  or  know  has  two 
meanings,  one  being  to  have  the  knowledge  and  the 
other  to  use  it,  a  man  who  has  knowledge  but  is  not 
using  it  would  in  one  case  be  justly  described  as 
acting  in  ignorance  but  in  another  case  unjustly — 
namely,  if  his  non-employment  of  the  knowledge 
were  due  to  carelessness.  And  similarly  one  would 
be  blamed  for  not  having  the  knowledge,  if  it  were 
something  that  was  easy  or  necessary  and  his  not 
having  it  is  due  to  carelessness  or  pleasure  or  pain. 
These  points  therefore  must  be  added  to  our  defini- 
tion. 

Let  this,  then,  be  our  mode  of  definition  "  about  the 
voluntary  and  involuntary. 

1  X.  Next   let   us   speak   about  purposive   choice, *'  Purpose. 
first   raising  various   diflliculties   about   it.     For   one 
might   doubt    to    which    class    it   naturally    belongs 

and  in  what  class  it  ought  to  be  put,  and  whether 
the  voluntary  and  the  purposely  chosen  are  diiferent 

2  things  or  the  same  thing.  And  a  view  specially 
put  forward  from  some  quarters,  which  on  inquiry 
may  seem  correct,  is  that  purposive  choice  is  one 
of  two    things,    either    opinion    or    appetition  ;    for 

3  both   are   seen    to    accompany    it.     Now    it   is    eVi-  it  is  not 
dent  that  it  is  not  appetition  ;   for  in  that  case  it  X^e  It  i*"' 

287 


ARISTOTLE 

1225  b  ^^ 

η  γαρ  βούλησις  αν  ^ίη  η  βπι,θνμία  η  θυμός-  ονθ- 
ei?  γαρ  opeyerat  μηθβν  ττζττονθώς  τούτων,  θυμός 
μ€ν  ούν  και  Ιτηθυμία  και  τοις  θηρίοις  υπάρχει, 
ττροαιρεσίς  δ  ου.  ert  8e  καΐ  οΐς  ύττάρχ^ι  αμφω 
ταΰτα,  πολλά  καΐ  ανβυ  θυμοΰ  καΐ  επιθυμίας  προ- 
αιρούνται-   και    €v    τοις    πάθβσιν    6ντ€ς    ου    προ- 

30  αιροϋνται  άλλα  καρτβροΰσιν.  έτι  Ιπιθυμία  μεν  και 
θυμός  del  μετά  λύπης,  προαιρούμβθα  he  ττολλά 
και  άνευ  λύπης.  άλλα  μην  ovSe  βούλησις  και  4 
προαίρβσις  ταύτόν  βούλονται  μέν  γαρ  evia  και 
των  αδυνάτων  ζΐΒότζς,  οΐον  ^ασιλευειι^  τ€  πάντων 
ανθρώπων  και  αθάνατοι  eivai,  προαιρείται  δ'  ούθ- 

35  €ΐς  μη  άγνοών  ότι  άhύvaτov,  ούδ'  όλως  ο  8υνα- 
τον  μεν,  μη  εφ*  αύτω  δ'  οϊεται  πράξαι  η  μη 
πράζαι.  ώστε  τοντο  μεν  φανερόν,  ότι  ανάγκη^ 
το  προαιρετον  των  εφ*  αύτω  τι  eii^ai.      ομοίως  8ε  5 

1226  a  δτ^λοϊ^  ΟΤΙ  ού8έ  8όξα,  ουδ'  απλώς  ει  τις  οϊεταί  τι- 

των  γαρ  εφ*  αύτω  τι  ην^  το  προαιρετον,  8οξάζομεν 
δε  πολλά  και  των  ούκ  όντων  εφ*  ημιν,  οίον  την 
οιάμετρον  άσύμμετρον^-  ετι  ούκ  εστί  προαίρεσις 
5  αληθής  η  φευΒής.  ούΒε  8ή  ή  των  εφ*  αύτω  όν-  6 
των  πρακτών  8όζα  fj  τυγχάνομεν  οΐόμενοι  8εΙν  τι 
πραττειν  ή  ού  πραττειν  κοινόν  hk  περί  Βόζης 
τούτο  και  βουλήσεως .  ούθεις  γαρ  τέλος  ούθεν  7 
προαιρείται,  αλλά  τά  προς  το  τέλος,     λέγω  δ'  οίον 

^  Ρ** :  ava-yKT)  μ(ν  Μ  •>,  ίνά-γκΎ)  Tjv  Fr. 
^  Βζ. :  ehai.  *  Rac. :  σύμμΐτρον. 

•"  1223  a  16-19. 

*  The  Mss.  give  '  commensurable,'  but  there  is  no  point  in 
specifying  an  untrue  opinion.     C/.  N.E.  1112  a  22  irepl  δή 

288 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  II.  χ.  3-7 

would  be  either  wish  or  desire  or  passion,  since  nobody  not  passion 
wants  to  get  a  thing  without  having  experienced 
one  of  those  feelings.  Now  even  animals  possess 
passion  and  desire,  but  they  do  not  have  purposive 
choice.  And  again,  beings  that  possess  both  of 
these  often  make  choices  even  without  passion  and 
desire  ;  and  while  they  are  experiencing  these  feel- 
ings do  not  make  a  choice  but  hold  out.  Again, 
desire  and  passion  are  always  accompanied  by  pain, 

4  but  we  often  make  a  choice  even  without  pain.     But  nor  '**  '* 

■L    •         •  J.   _li.  •   i_   wish,  nor 

moreover  purposive  choice  is  not  the  same  as  wish  opinion, 
either  ;  for  men  wish  for  some  things  that  they  know 
to  be  impossible,  for  instance  to  be  king  of  all  man- 
kind and  to  be  immortal,  but  nobody  purposively 
chooses  a  thing  knowing  it  to  be  impossible,  nor  in 
general  a  thing  that,  though  possible,  he  does  not 
think  in  his  own  power  to  do  or  not  to  do.  So  that 
this  much  is  clear — a  thing  purposively  chosen  must 
necessarily   be   something   that   rests   with   oneself. 

5  And  similarly  it  is  manifest  that  purposive  choice  is 
not  opinion  either,  nor  something  that  one  simply 
thinks  ;  for  we  saw  "  that  a  thing  chosen  is  something 
in  one's  own  power,  but  we  have  opinions  as  to  many 
things  that  do  not  depend  on  us,  for  instance  that 
the  diagonal  of  a  square  is  incommensurable  ^  with 

6  the  side  ;  and  again,  choice  is  not  true  or  false.     Nor  since  it| 
yet  is  purposive  choice  an  opinion  about  practicable  means  only, 
things  within  one's  own  power  that  makes  us  think  not  to  Ends; 
that  we  ought  to  do  or  not  to  do  something ;  but 

this  characteristic  is  common  to  opinion  and  to  wish. 

7  For  no  one  purposively  chooses  any  End,  but  the 
means   to   his   End — I   mean   for   instance   no   one 

των  άϊδίων  ούδύ^  βουλεύβται,  οίον  irepi  του  κόσμου,  ή  τηί  διαμέτρου 
καΐ  τηί  wXevpds  δτι  άσύμμ€τροι  (where  Κ*"  has  σύμμετροι). 

υ  289 


ARISTOTLE 

1226  a 

ovdeis    ύγιαίν€ΐν    προαψ€Ϊταί,    αλλά    περιττατ^Ιν    "η 

10  καθησθαι  του  vyiaiveLV  eveKcv,  ουδ'  €ύΒαίμον€Ϊν, 
αλλά  χρηματίζ^σθαι  η  KLvSvveveiv  του  eu8at/Aovetv 
eve/ca,  και  όλως  8ηλοΐ  aet  ό^  ττροαιρούμβνος  τι  τ€ 
καΐ  τίνος  eVe/ca  προαιρβΐται,  έ'στι  8e  το  jLtel•»  τίνο?^ 
ου  eVe/ca  προαιρείται  άλλο,  το  8e  τι,  ο  ττροαιρύται 
€V€Ka   άλλου,      βουλβται   he   ye  μάλιστα   το   τίλος,  8 

15  /cat  δοξάζει*  Selv  καΐ  ύγιαίνζίν  καΐ  eu  πράττ€ΐν. 
ώστ£  φαν€ρ6ν  διά  τούτων  οτι  άλλο  καί  Βόζης  καΐ 
βουλησβως.  βούλ^σθαι  μεν  γαρ*  καΐ  Βοξάζξΐν^ 
μάλιστα  του  τέλους,  προαίρεσις  δ'  ουκ  εστίν. 

"Οτι  μεν  ουν  ουκ  έ'στιν  ουτ€  βούλησις  ούτε  Βόζα  9 
οϋθ^    ύπόληφις   απλώς   ή   ττροαίρεσις,   ^ηλον   τι  hk 
διαφέρει  τούτων;     και  ττώς  έχει  προς  το  εκούσιον ; 
άμα  hk  Βηλον  έ'σται  και  τι  εστί  προαίρεσις.     εστί  10 

20  δτ)  των  δυνατών  και  είναι  «:αι  μ-η  τά  μεν  τοιαύτα 
ώστε  ενΒεχεσθαι  βουλεύσασθαι  περί  αυτών,  περί 
ενίων  δ'  ουκ  ενδέχεται,  τά  μεν  γαρ  δυνατά  μεν 
εστί  και  eivai  και  μη  είναι,  αλλ'  ουκ  εφ*  ημΐν 
αυτών  η  γενεσις  εστίν  αλλά  τά  ρ.εν  διά  φύσιν  τά 

25  δε  δι'  άλλα?  αίτια?  γίνεται•  περί  ων  ουδει?  αν 
ουδ'  εγχειρησειε  βουλευεσθαι  μη  άγνοών.  περί  11 
ενίων''  δ'  ενδέχεται  μη  μόνον  το  είναι  και  μη,  αλλά 
κται  το'  βουλεύσασθαι  τοις  άνθρώποις'  ταύτα  δ' 
εστίν  οσα  εφ^  ημΐν  εστί  πράζαι  η  μη  πράζαι.  διό 
ου  βουλευόμεθα  περί  τών  εν  ΊνδοΓ?,  ούδε  πώς  αν 

30  ό    κύκλος    τετραγωνισθείη  •    τά    μkv    γάρ    ουκ    εφ' 

^  6  add.  Fr.  ^  rlvos  <?j'e/ca>  ?  Rac.  *  Vic. :  δοξάί^ίΐν. 

*  yap  add.  Sp.  *  Sp. :  δόξα. 

'  sic  Sol. :  ων.  ">  lacunam  hie  edd. 

"  See  p.  199,  note  c. 
290 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  11.  χ.  7-11 

chooses  to  be  healthy,  but  to  take  a  walk  or  sit  down 
for  the  sake  of  being  healthy,  no  one  chooses  to  be 
well  off,"  but  to  go  into  business  or  to  speculate  for 
the  sake  of  being  well  off ;  and  generally,  one  who 
makes  a  choice  always  makes  it  clear  both  what  his 
choice  is  and  what  its  object  is,  '  object  '  meaning 
that  for  the  sake  of  which  he  chooses  something  else 
and  '  choice  '  meaning  that  which  he  chooses  for  the 

8  sake  of  something  else.  Whereas  clearly  it  is  speci- 
ally an  End  that  a  man  wishes,  and  the  feeling  that 
he  ought  to  be  healthy  and  prosperous  is  an  opinion. 
So  these  considerations  make  it  clear  that  purposive 
choice  is  diff"erent  from  both  opinion  and  wish. 
Forming  wishes  and  forming  opinions  apply  specially 
to  one's  End  ;   purposive  choice  is  not  of  Ends. 

9  It  is  clear,  then,  that  purposive  choice  is  not  either  but  it  arisei 
wish  or  opinion  or  judgement  simply  ;    but  in  what  deliberate 
does  it  differ  from  them  ?     and  how  is  it  related  to  «pinion 
the  voluntary  ?     To  answer  these  questions  will  make  by  wish^ 

10  it  clear  what  purposive  choice  is.  Now  of  things 
that  can  both  be  and  not  be,  some  are  such  that  it  is 
possible  to  deliberate  about  them,  but  about  others 
it  is  not  possible.  Some  things  can  either  be  or  not 
be  but  their  coming  into  being  does  not  rest  with  us, 
but  in  some  cases  is  due  to  the  operation  of  nature 
and  in  others  to  other  causes  ;  and  about  these 
things  nobody  would  deliberate  unless  in  ignorance 

11  of  the  facts.  But  with  some  things  not  only  their 
existence  or  non-existence  is  possible,  but  also  for 
human  beings  to  deliberate  about  them  ;  and  these 
are  all  the  things  that  it  rests  with  us  to  do  or  not 
to  do.  Hence  we  do  not  deliberate  about  affairs  in 
India,  or  about  how  to  square  the  circle  ;  for  affairs 
in  India  do  not  rest  with  us,  whereas  the  objects  of 

291 


ARISTOTLE 

1226  a   ,    ;  ,     _, 

ημΐν,^  τα  oe  npoaipera  /cat  πρακτά  των  e^'  ημΐν 
όντων  εστί,  το  δ'  δλως  ου  πρακτόν  {fj  και  SrjXov 
δτι  ovSe  8όξα  απλώς  η  ττροαίρζσίς  ioTLv).  αλλ'  12 
ovSe  των'  ήμΐν  πρακτών  πβρί  άττάντων.  διο  καΐ  13 
άπορήσβιεν  αν  τις,  τι  8ή  ποθ'  οΐ  μεν  Ιατροί  βου- 
35  λενονταί  περί  ων  εχονσι  την  ετηστήμην  οΐ  δε 
γραμματικοί  ου;  αΐτιον  δ'  δτι  Βιχτ]  γινομένης 
της  αμαρτίας  {η  γαρ  λογιζόμενοι  άμαρτάνομεν,  η 
κατά.  την  αϊσθησιν  αυτό  Βρώντες)  εν  μεν  τη  ια- 
τρική   άμφοτερως  ενδέχεται    άμαρτεΐν,   εν    δε    τη 

1226  b  γραμματική   κατά  την  αΐ'σ^τ^σιι^   και  ττραζιν,   περί 
■ής    αν    σκοπώσιν,    εις    άπειρον^    ηξουσιν.     επεώη  14 
ούν   ούτε  8όζα  ούτε  βούλησις  η*   προαίρεσίς   εστίν 
ως  εκατερον,  ουδ    άμφω  {εξαίφνης  γαρ  προαιρείται 
μεν  ούθείς,  Βοκεΐ  δε  Βεΐν^  πράττειν  και  βούλονται) , 
s  ώ?*  εξ  άμφοΐν  άρα•    άμφω  γαρ  υπάρχει  τω   προ- 
αιρουμενω    ταύτα.      άλλα    πώς     εκ    τούτων    σκε- 
τττεον  ^ηλοΖ  δε  πως  και  τό  όνομα  αυτό.     η  γάρ  Ι5 
προαίρεσις  αΐρεσις  μεν  εστίν,  ούχ  απλώς  8ε,  αλλ' 
έτερον    πρό    έτερου•    τοΰτο    δε    ούχ    οΐόν    τε    αΐ'ει» 
σκεφεως   και  βουλής,      διό   εκ   Βόξης  βουλευτικής 
εστίν  η  προαίρεσις. 
10      ΙΙερΙ  μεν  8η  του  τέλους  ού8εις  βουλεύεται,  άλλα  16 
τούτο  κείται  πάσι,  περί  δε  τών  εις  τοΰτο  τεινόν- 
των, ποτερον  τόδε  η  τόδε  συντείνει,  ή  8ε8ογμενον 
τοΰτο  πώς  εσται.     βουλευόμεθα  δε  πάντες''  τοΰτο 

*  11.  30-33  traiecit  Βζ. :  mif,  το  δ'  δ\ω$  ού  πρακτόν•  άλλ'  ουδέ 
nepi  των  έν  ήμΐν  ττρακτών  nepl  άττάντων  y  και  δηλον  οτι  ουδέ  δόξα 
άττλώϊ  ή  ττροαίρΐσίί  έστι•  τα  δ(  προαιρετά  και  πρακτά  τών  iv  ήμΐν 
όντων  4στίν,  δώ  κτλ. 

^  τών  Rac. :   wepi  τών  έν, 

'  (is  άκρψη  πεϊραν  Bus.  *  ή  Βζ. :   έστι. 

*  δ(ϊν  add.  ?  Sus,  «  [ώ$]  aut  <δη\ον>  ών  Sp. 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  II.  χ.  11-16 

choice  and  things  practicable  are  among  things  rest- 
ing with  us,  and  squaring  the  circle  is  entirely  im- 
practicable (and  thus  it  is  clear  that  purposive  choice 

12  is  not  simply  opinion  either).  But  purposive  choice 
does  not  deal  with  all  the  practicable  things  resting 

13  with  us  either.  Hence  one  might  also  raise  the 
question,  why  is  it  exactly  that,  whereas  doctors  de- 
liberate about  things  in  their  field  of  science,  scholars 
do  not  ?  The  reason  is  that  since  error  occurs  in  two 
ways  (for  we  err  either  in  reasoning,  or  in  perception 
when  actually  doing  the  thing),  in  medicine  it  is 
possible  to  err  in  both  ways,  but  in  grammar  error 
only  occurs  in  our  perception  and  action,  to  investi- 
gate which  would  be  an  endless  undertaking. 

14  Since  then  purposive  choice  is  not  either  opinion 
nor  wish  separately,  nor  yet  both  (for  no  one  makes 
a  deliberate  choice  suddenly,  but  men  do  suddenly 
think  they  ought  to  act  and  wish  to  act),  therefore 
it  arises  as  from  both,  for  both  of  them  are  present 

15  with  a  person  choosing.  But  how  purposive  choice 
arises  out  of  opinion  and  wish  must  be  considered. 
And  indeed  in  a  manner  the  actual  term  *  choice  ' 
makes  this  clear.  '  Choice  '  is  '  taking,'  but  not 
taking  simply — it  is  taking  one  thing  in  preference  to 
another  ;  but  this  cannot  be  done  without  considera- 
tion and  deliberation  ;  hence  purposive  choice  arises 
out  of  deliberative  opinion. 

16  Now  nobody  deliberates  about  his  End  —  this 
everybody  has  fixed  ;  but  men  deliberate  about  the 
means  leading  to  their  End— does  this  contribute  to 
it,  or  does  this  ?  or  when  a  means  has  been  decided 
on,  how  will  that  be  procured  ?  and  this  deliberation 

7  M":  πάντωί  pn  (sed  cf.  N.E.  1113  a  5  ΐκα.στο%). 

2.93 


ARISTOTLE 

1226  b 

€ως   αν   et?   ημάς   άναγάγωμ€ν   της   γ^νέσ^ως   την 
αρχήν,     el    δή    προαιρείται  μβν   μηθίΐς  μη  πάρα-  Γ 

15  σκ€υασαμ€νος  μη^€  βονλβυσάμβνος  ei^  χείρον  η 
βελτιον,  βουλευβται^  δ'  όσα  e^'  ήμΐν  earl  των 
ουνατών  καΐ  eivai  καΐ  μη  των  προς  το  τβλος, 
Βηλον  ΟΤΙ  ή  προαίρ^σις  μίν  βστιν  ορ^ζις  των  Ιφ' 
αύτω  βουλβυτίκή.  άπαντα^  γαρ  βονλ^υόμβθα  α 
και  προαιρούμ^θα,  ου  μέντοι  γε  α  βουλΐυόμεθα 
πάντα    προαιρονμβθα.      λέγω    δε    βουλευτικήν    ης 

20  αρχή  και  αίτια  βονλ^υσίς  ε'στι,  και  ορέγεται  δια 
το  βουλενσασθαι .  διό  οντε  εν  τοις  άλλοις  ζωοις  U 
εστίν  η  προαιρεσις  οϋτε  εν  πάση  ηλικία  ούτε 
πάντως*  έχοντος  ανθρώπου•  ουδέ  γαρ  το  βουλεύ- 
σασ^αι,  οι5δ'  ύπόληφις  του  δια  τι,  αλλά  ^οξάσαι 
μεν  ει  ποιητεον  ή  μή  ποιητεον  ούθεν  κωλύει  πολ- 

25  λοΐς  ύπάρχειν  το  8ε  δια  λογισμού  ούκετι.  εστί  γαρ  π 
τ6^  βουλευτικον  της  φυχής  το  θεωρητικον  αίτια? 
τινός•  η  γαρ  οΰ  ένεκα  μία  των  αίτιων  εστίν 
το  μεν  γαρ  δια  τι  αίτια,  οΰ  δ'  ένεκα  εστίν  ή 
γίγνεταί  τι,  τοϋτ  αίτιοι^  φαμεν  efvai,  οΓον  του 
)3αδιζ€ΐι^  ή  κομώή  των  χρημάτων,  ει  τούτου  ένεκα 

30^3αδιζ€ΐ.        διό     οι?     μηθεις     κείται     σκοπός,     ου 
βουλευτικοί,      ώστ     επει   το   μεν   εφ*    αύτω    ον   ή  2( 
ττράττειν  ή  μή  πράττειν  εάν  τις  πράττη  ή  άπρακτη 
δι'    αύτον    και    μή    δι'    άγνοιαν,    εκών    πράττει    ή 

1  Fr. :  ή.  2  ^_ι_  βoύ\fτaι. 

'  Βζ, :  άττοιτί S. 

*  Βζ. :  παντόί  (τταιτόι  <.\oyoi>>  Sp.).  *  τό  add.  Sus. 

294 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  II.  χ.  16-20 

as  to  means  we  all  pursue  until  we  have  carried  the 
starting-point  in  the  process  of  producing  the  End 

17  back  to  ourselves.  If,  then,  nobody  chooses  without 
first  preparing,  and  deliberating  as  to  the  comparative 
merits  of  the  alternatives,  and  a  man  deliberates  as 
to  those  among  the  means  to  the  End  capable  of 
existing  or  not  existing  that  are  within  our  power. 

it    is    clear    that    purposive    choice    is    deliberative  Definition  of 
appetition   of  things  within  one's  power.       For  we  chofce!' '^ 
deliberate  about  everything  that  we  choose,  although 
of  course  we  do  not  choose  everything  that  we  de- 
liberate about.     I  call  appetition  deliberative  when 
its  origin  or  cause  is  deliberation,  and  when  a  man 

18  desires  because  of  having  deliberated.  Therefore 
the  faculty  of  purposive  choice  is  not  present  in 
the  other  animals,  nor  in  man  at  every  age  nor  in 
every  condition,  for  no  more  is  the  act  of  deliberation, 
nor  yet  the  concept  of  cause  :  it  is  quite  possible 
that  many  men  may  possess  the  faculty  of  forming 
an  opinion  whether  to  do  or  not  to  do  a  thing  without 
also  having  the  power  of  forming  this  opinion   by 

19  process  of  reasoning.     For  the  deliberative  faculty  is  peiibera- 
the  spirit's  power  of  contemplating  a  kind  of  cause —  ^"'"' 
for  one  sort  of  cause  is  the  final  cause,  as  although 
cause   means    anything   because    of  which   a   thing 
comes  about,  it  is  the  object  of  a  thing's  existence  or 
production  that  we  specially  designate  as  its  cause  : 

for  instance,  if  a  man  walks  in  order  to  fetch  things, 
fetching  things  is  the  cause  of  his  walking.  Con- 
sequently people  who    have    no    fixed  aim  are  not 

20  given  to  deliberation.  Hence  inasmuch  as  if  a  man 
of  his  own  accord  and  not  through  ignorance  does  or 
refrains  from  doing  something  resting  with  himself 
either  to  do  or  not  to  do,  he  acts  or  refrains  from 

295 


ARISTOTLE 

1226  b    , 

απρακτβΐ,   πολλά   8e   των   τοιούτων  ■πράττομ€ν   ου 

βουλ€νσάμ€νοι  ovSe  προνοησαντ€ς,  ανάγκη  το  μ€ν 
προαιρβτον  ατταν»  €κούσιον  elvai,  το  δ'  4κούσιον 
35  μτ]^  προαψβτόν,  καΐ  τά  μεν  κατά  ττροαίρεσίν  πάντα 
€κουσια  et^at,  τά  δ'  Ικονσια  μη  πάντα  κατά 
προαίρεσιν.  άμα  δ'  e/c  τούτων  φανερον  καΐ  οτι  21 
καλώς  διορίζονται  ot  των  α^ικημάτων^  τά  μεν 
ακούσια     τά     δ'     εκούσια^     τά     δ'     e/c     προνοίας 

1227  Λ  νομό  θ  βτοΰσ  IV '    el   γάρ    και   μη    Βιακριβοΰσιν,    αλλ' 

άπτονται    ye    πη    της    αληθείας.      άλλα    περί    μεν  22 
τούτων  εροϋμεν  εν  τη  περί  των  8ικαίων  επισκεφεί' 
η    8ε    προαίρεσις    δτι    ούτε    απλώς   βούλησις    ούτε 
8όζα   εστί,   8ηλον,   άλλα   δό^α   τε   και  ορεζις   όταν 
ό  εκ  τον  βουλεύσασθαι  συμπερανθώσιν. 

Έιπει  8ε  βουλεύεται  άει  6  βονλενόμενος  ενεκά 
τίνος,  και  εστί  σκοπός  τις  άει  τω  βουλευομενω 
προς  ον  σκοπεί  το  συμφέρον,  περί  μεν  του  τέλους 
ούθεις  βουλεύεται,  άλλα  τοΰτ'  εστίν  άρχη  και 
ύποθεσις,   ώσπερ   εν  ταΐς   θεωρητικαΐς   επιστημαις  23 

10  υποθέσεις  {εΐρηται  8έ  περί  αυτώΐ'  εν  μεν  τοις  εν 
ο-ρχη  βραχεως,  εν  8ε  τοις  άναλυτικοΐς  δι'  ακρί- 
βειας)• περί  8ε  τών  προς  το  τέλος  φερόντων  η 
σκέφις  και  μετά  τέχνης  και  άνευ  τέχνης  πάσίν 
εστίν,  οίον  ει  πολεμώσιν  η  μη  πολεμώσι  τούτω* 
βουλευομένοις .  εκ  προτέρου  8ε  μάλλον  ecrrai  το  24 
8ι'    δ,    τοϋτ     εστί    το    ου    ένεκα,    οίον    πλούτος    η 

1Γ)  η8ονη   η   τι   άλλο   τοιούτον   δ   τυγχάνει   ου    ένεκα. 

^  μη  ζ,&ΤΓαρ^  ?  Sus.  ^   Βζ. :  παθημάτων. 

'   Rac.  :  τα  μίν  εκούσια  τά  δ'  ακούσια. 

*  τούτφ  Fr.  {TovT<f)l  ?  Rac.) :  τοντο. 

'  Not  in  E.E.,  but  cf.  N.E.  1135  a  16  fF. 
296 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  II.  χ.  20-24 

acting  voluntarily,  but  yet  we  do  many  such  things 
without  deliberation  or  previous  thought,  it  neces- 
sarily follows  that,  although  all  that  has  been  pur- 
posively  chosen  is  voluntary,  '  voluntary  '  is  not  the 
same  as  '  chosen,'  and,  although  all  things  done 
by  purposive   choice   are   voluntary,   not   all  things 

21  voluntary  are  done  by  purposive  choice.  And  at  the 
same  time  it  is  clear  from  these  considerations  that 
the  classification  of  offences  made  by  legislators  as  in- 
voluntary, voluntary  and  premeditated  is  a  good  one  ; 
for  even  if  it  is  not  precisely  accurate,  yet  at  all  events 

22  it  approximates  to  the  truth  in  a  way.  But  we  will 
speak  about  this  in  our  examination  of  justice."  As 
to  purposive  choice,  it  is  clear  that  it  is  not  absolutely 
identical  with  wish  nor  with  opinion,  but  is  opinion 
plus  appetition  when  these  follow  as  a  conclusion 
from  deliberation. 

But  since  one  who  deliberates  always  deliberates  Deliberation 
for  the  sake  of  some  object,  and  a  man  deliberating  considers 
always  has  some  aim  in  view  with  reference  to  which  Ends! 
he  considers  what  is  expedient,  nobody  deliberates 
about  his  End,  but  this  is  a  starting-point  or  assump- 

23  tion,  like  the  postulates  in  the  theoretic  sciences 
(we  have  spoken  about  this  briefly  at  the  beginning 
of  this  discourse,  and  in  detail  in  Analytics  ^)  ; 
whereas  with  all  men  deliberation  whether  technical 
or  untechnical  is  about  the  means  that  lead  to  their 
End,  e.g.  when  they  deliberate  about  whether  to  go 

24  to  war  or  not  to  go  to  war  with  a  given  person.  And 
the  question  of.  means  will  depend  rather  on  a  prior 
question,  that  is,  the  question  of  object,  for  instance 
wealth  or  pleasure  or  something  else  of  that  kind  which 
happens  to  be  our  object.     For  one  who  deliberates 

"  See  1214  b  6  ff.,  and  Anal.  Post,  i.,  72  a  20  and  context. 

297 


ARISTOTLE 

1227  a 

povXeveraL  γαρ  6  βουλξυόμζνος  el^  άττό  του  τέλους 
έσκετΓται  r)^  on   e/cetae^  συντείνει  οττως  εΙς  αυτόν 
αναγάγγ)*  η  τ^*  ατ3τό§•  δυι^αται  teVai*  προς  το  τέλος, 
το   8ε  τέλος  εστί  φύσει  μεν  άεΐ  αγαθόν  καΐ  περί  25 
ού  κατά  μέρος  βουλεύονται  {οΐον  ιατρός  βουλεύσαιτο 

20  άν  ει  δω'  φάρμακον ,  και  στρατηγός  που  στρατό - 
πε8εύσηται)  οϊς  αγαθόν  το  τέλος  το  απλώς  άριστον 
εστίν  παρά  φύσιν  δε  και  κατά*  ^ιαστροφην  ού  το  26 
αγαθόν  άλλα  το  φαινόμενον  aya^ov.  α'ίτιον  δ'  οτι 
των  όντων  τοΐς^  μεν  ουκ  εστίν  εττ'  άλλω  χρησασθαι 
η  προς  α  πεφυκεν,  οΐον  6φει•  ού  γάρ  οΐόν  τ'  ι8εΐν 

25  ού  μη  εστίν  όφις,  οΰδ'  άκοΰσαι  ού  μη  εστίν  άκοη' 
αλλ'  άπο  επιστήμης  ποιησαι  και  ού  μη  εστίν  η 
επιστήμη.  ού  γάρ  ομοίως  της  uytetas•  η  αύτη 
επιστήμη  και  νόσου,  αλλά  της  μεν  κατά  φύσιν 
της  δε  παρά  φύσιν.  ομοίως  δε  και  ή  βούλησις  27 
φύσει   μεν   του   αγαθού   εστί,   παρά   φύσιν   δε    και 

30  του  κακού,  και  βούλεται  φύσει  μεν  το  αγαθόν, 
παρά  φύσιν  δε  και  κατά^"  8ιαστροφήν  και  τό 
κακόν. 

Άλλα  μην  εκάστου  γε  φθορά  και  διαστροφή 
ούκ  εις  τό  τυχόν  αλλ'  εις  τά  εναντία  και  τά  μεταζύ. 
ού  γάρ  εστίν  εκβήναι  εκ  τούτων,  επει  και  η 
απάτη    ούκ    εις   τά   τυχόντα   γίνεται,    αλλ'    εις    τα 

35  εναντία  οσοις  εστίν  εναΐ'τια,  και  εΙς  ταύτα  των 
εναντίων    α    κατά    την    επιστήμην    εν'αν'τια    εστίν. 

1  Mb^.  2  ^add.  Fr.  ^     »  Rac:  ΐκΰ. 

*  Ric. :  ayayrj.  ^  7]  add.  Rac. 
*  Uvai  add.  Rac.  '  Sp. :  δφ-η. 

*  κατά  add.  Syl. :   δια  στροφην  lac,  διαστροφή  Fr. 
"  Ric. :  τά.  "  κατά  add.  Syl. 

2.98 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  II.  χ.  24-27 

deliberates  if  he  has  considered,  from  the  standpoint 
of  the  End,  either  what  tends  to  enable  him  to  bring 
the  End  to  himself  or  how  he  can  himself  go  to  the 

25  End."     And  by  nature  the  End  is  always  a  good  and  wish  for 
a  thing  about  which  men  deliberate  step  by  step  (for  ^'"^^ 
example  a  doctor  may  deliberate  whether  he  shall 

give  a  drug,  and  a  general  where  he  shall  pitch  his 
camp)  when  their  End  is  the  good  that  is  the  absolute 

26  best  ;  but  in  contravention  of  nature  and  by  perver- 
sion not  the  good  but  the  apparent  good  is  the  End. 
The  reason  is  that  there  are  some  things  that  cannot 
be  employed  for  something  other  than  their  natural 
objects,  for  instance  sight — it  is  not  possible  to  see  a 
thing  that  is  not  visible,  or  to  hear  a  thing  that  is  not 
audible  ;  but  a  science  does  enable  us  to  do  a  thing 
that  is  not  the  object  of  the  science.  For  health 
and  disease  are  not  the  objects  of  the  same  science 
in  the  same  way  :  health  is  its  object  in  accordance 
with  nature,  and  disease  in  contravention  of  nature. 

27  And  similarly,  by  nature  good  is  the  object  of  wish, 
but  evil  is  also  its  object  in  contravention  of  nature  ; 
by  nature  one  wishes  good,  against  nature  and  by 
perversion  one  even  wishes  evil. 

But  moreover  with  everything  its  corruption  and 
perversion  are  not  in  any  chance  direction,  but  leads 
to  the  contrary  and  intermediate  states.  For  it  is 
not  possible  to  go  outside  these,  since  even  error 
does  not  lead  to  any  chance  thing,  but,  in  the  case 
of  things  that  have  contraries,  to  the  contraries,  and 
to  those  contraries   that   are   contrary  according  to 

"  i.e.  he  works  back  in  thought  from  his  intended  End 
to  some  means  to  its  attainment  that  is  already  within  his 
power. 

299 


ARISTOTLE 

1227  a    ^     ^ 

ανάγκη    άρα   καΐ   την   άττάτην   και   την   προαίρ€σιν  2ί 
ατΓΟ   του   jxeaov   €πΙ   τα   ev'avTta   γίν^σθαι    (ei^av'Tta 
8e  τω  μέσω  το  πλέον  καΐ  το  ελαττον). — αίτιον  δε 
το   -qhv   καΐ  το   λνττηρόν   οντω  γαρ   εχ€ΐ   ωστ€  τη 

<ο  φνχη  φαίνεσθαί  το  μεν  η^ύ  aya^or  καΐ  το  η^ιον 
άμεινον,  καΐ  το  λνττηρόν  κακόν  και  το  λυπηρότερον 
1227  b  χείρον,  ώστε  και  εκ  τούτων  Βηλον  οτι  ττερί  ή^ονάς  2ί 
και  λυττας  η  άρετη  και  η  κακία'  περί  μεν  γαρ 
τα  προαιρετά  τυγχάνονσιν  ονσαι,  η  Βε  προαίρεσις 
περί  το  αγαθόν  και  κακόν  και  τα  φαινόμενα, 
:>  τοιαύτα  δβ  φύσει  ήΒονη   και  λύπη. 

Ανάγκη    τοίνυν,    επεώη    η    άρετη    μεν    ή    ηθική  30 
αύτη    τε    μεσάτης    τίς    εστί    και    περί    η^ονάς    και 
λύπας  πάσα,  η  δε  κακία  εν  υπερβολή  και  ελλείφει 
και   περί   ταύτα   τη    άρετη,   την   άρετην   eii/αι   την 
ηθικην  εζιν  προαιρετικην  μεσότητος  της  προς  ημάς 

10  εν  η8εσι  και  λυπηροΐς  καθ^  οσα  ποιος  τις  λέγεται 
το  ήθος  η  χαίρων  η  λυπούμενος  [6  γαρ  φιλόγλυκυς 
η  φιλόπικρος  ού  λέγεται  ποιος  τι?  το  ήθος). 

XI.   Ύούτων    δε    Βιωρισμενων    λεγωμεν    πότερον  1 
η  άρετη  άναμάρτητον  ποιεί  την  προαίρεσιν  καΐ  το 
τέλος  ορθόν  ούτως  ώστε  ου  ένεκα  δει  προαιρεΐσθαι, 

15  17»  ώσπερ  δοκεΐ  τισί,  τον  λόγον.  έστι  δε  τούτο 
εγκράτεια,  αύτη  γαρ  ού  διαφθείρει  τόν  λόγον  έστι 
δ    άρετη  και  εγκράτεια  έτερον,     λεκτέον  δ'  ύστερον  2 

"  This  division  of  contraries  is  unusual :  elsewhere  {e.g. 
Met.  K,  1061  a  18)  Aristotle  merely  states  that  contraries 
are  the  objects  of  the  same  science. 

*  The  connexion  of  pleasure  and  pain  with  virtue  is  here 
clearer  than  in  N.E.,  and  forms  part  of  the  definition  (Stocks). 
300 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  11.  χ.  28— χι.  2 

28  their  science."     It  therefore  necessarily  follows  that  perverted  by 
both    error    and  purposive  choice  take  place    from  pain. 

the  middle  point  to  the  contraries  (the  contraries 
of  the  middle  being  the  more  and  the  less). — And 
the  cause  is  pleasure  and  pain  ;  for  things  are  so 
constituted  that  the  pleasant  appears  to  the  spirit 
good  and  the  more  pleasant  better,  the  painful  bad 

29  and  the  more  painful  worse.  So  from  these  things 
also  it  is  clear  that  goodness  and  badness  have  to  do 
with  pleasures  and  pains  ;  for  they  occur  in  con- 
nexion with  the  objects  of  purposive  choice,  and  this 
has  to  do  with  good  and  bad  and  what  appears  to  be 
good  and  bad,  and  pleasure  and  pain  are  by  nature 
things  of  that  kind. 

30  It  therefore  follows  that  since  moral  goodness  is  Definition  of 
itself  a  middle  state  and  is  entirely  concerned  with  q  °^ness  or 
pleasures  and  pains,  and  badness  consists  in  excess  Virtue. 
and  defect  and  is  concerned  with  the  same  things  as 
goodness,  moral  goodness   or  virtue  is   a  state   of 
purposively  choosing  the  mean  in  relation  to  ourselves 

in  all  those  pleasant  and  painful  things  in  regard  to 
which  according  as  a  person  feels  pleasure  or  pain 
he  is  described  as  having  some  particular  moral  qual- 
ity ^  (for  a  person  is  not  said  to  have  a  particular 
moral  character  merely  for  being  fond  of  sweets  or 
savouries). 

1  XI.  These  things  having  been  settled,  let  us  say  Virtue  and 
whether  goodness  makes  the  purposive  choice  correct  vo'iuntary, 
and  the  End  right  in  the  sense  of  making  the  agent  moral 
choose  for  the  sake  of  the  proper  End,  or  whether  appties  to 
(as  some  hold)  it  makes  the  rational  principle  right.  ^^^1^°*^^® 
But  what  does  this  is  self-control — for  that  saves  the  Λvhich'dβ- 
rational  principle  from  being  corrupted ;   and  good-  Character, 

2  ness   and  self-control   are   different.     But  we  must 

301 


ARISTOTLE 

1227  b 

π€ρΙ  αυτών,  inel  οσοις  ye  δοκίΐ  τον  λόγον  ορθόν 
παρ€χ€ίν  rj  άρβτη,  τοΰτο  αίτιον  η  μβν  €γκράτ€ία 
τοιούτον,  των  €παίν€τών  δ'  η  εγκράταα.     λβγωμ,βν  3 

20  Se  προαπορησαντ€ς .  έ'στι  γαρ  τον  μβν  σκοττον 
ορθόν  €Lvat,  iv  δε  τοις  ττρος  τον  σκοττον  δια- 
μαρτάν€ΐ.ν•  εστί  δε  τον  μβν  σκοττον  ημαρτησθαι, 
τά  δε  TTpos  eKelvov  ττβραίνοντα  ορθώς  εχειν»•  /cat 
μ-ηΒβτζρον.  ττοτίρον  δ  τ]  άρβτη  ττοιεΓ  τον  σκοττον^  4 
η  τα  προς  τον  σκοττον;  τίθέμβθα  hrj  οτι  τον 
σκοττον,   διότι   τούτου   ουκ   έ'στι   συΧΚογισμος   ούδε 

25  Χόγος,  άλλα  δτ]  ώσττ€.ρ  άρχη  τοΰτο  υττοκ^ίσθω. 
οϋτ€  γαρ  ιατρός  σκοττβΐ  ει  δει  ύγιαίν^ιν  ύ]  μη, 
αλλ'  ει  ττ€ριττατ€Ϊν  η  μη,  οϋτ€  6  γυμναστικός  ει 
δει  ει5  εχειν»  τ)  μη,  αλλ'  ει  τταλαισαι  ■^  μή.     ομοίως  5 

ουο     αΛΛτ^     ουθ€μία   ττερι    του    τεΛου?.      ωσττ^ρ 
γαρ   ταΐς    θζ,ωρητικαις    αι    ύποθεσας    αρχαί,    οΰτω 

30  και  ταΐς•  ττοιητίκαΐς  το  τέλος  άρχη  και  ύπόθεσις- 
επβώη  δεΓ  τοϊ'δι^  ύγιαίνειν,  ανάγκη  τοδι  ύττάρξαι 
ει  εσται  εκείνο,  ωσττερ  εκτει,  ει  έστι  το  τριγωνον 
δυο  όρθαί,  ανάγκη  τοδι  είναι,  τη?  /χει»  our  νοησεω?  6 
αρχή  το  τε'λο?,  τη?  δε  ττράζεως  η  της  νοήσεως 
τελευτη.     ει  ουν  ττάσης  ορθότητας  η  ό  λόγος  η  η 

35  άρετη    αίτια,    ει   μη    6   λόγος,   δια   την   άρετην   αν 

^  σκοπόν  <όρ^όΐ'>  ?  Rac. 
*  άλλί;  <Ηχρη>  ?  Rac.  ^  Sp. :  τόδ(. 

"  Or,  altering  the  text,  *  makes  the  aim  right.' 

802 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  II.  xi.  2-6 

speak  about  this  later,  since  all  who  do  hold  that  good-  and  not  to 
ness  makes  the  rational  principle  right  think  so  on  which  may 
the   ground  that  that  is  the  nature  of   self-control  be  done 

ο  .  11.  TT       •         under  com- 

3  and   self-control   is    a   praiseworthy   thing.     Having  pulsion. 
raised  this  preliminary  question  let  us  continue.     It 

is  possible  to  have  one's  aim  right  but  to  be  entirely 
wrong  in  one's  means  to  the  end  aimed  at ;  and  it  is 
possible  for  the  aim  to  have  been  wrongly  chosen 
but  the  means  conducing  to  it  to  be  right  ;    and  for 

4  neither  to  be  right.  But  does  goodness  decide  the 
aim  "  or  the  means  to  it  ?  Well,  our  position  is  that 
it  decides  the  aim,  because  this  is  not  a  matter  of 
logical  inference  or  rational  principle,  but  in  fact  this 
must  be  assumed  as  a  starting-point.  For  a  doctor 
does  not  consider  whether  his  patient  ought  to  be 
healthy  or  not,  but  whether  he  ought  to  take  walking 
exercise  or  not,  and  the  gymnastic  trainer  does  not 
consider  whether  his  pupil  ought  to  be  in  good 
condition  or  not,  but  whether  he  ought  to  go  in  for 

5  wrestling  or  not  ;  and  similarly  no  other  science 
either  deliberates  about  its  End.  For  as  in  the 
theoretic  sciences  the  assumptions  are  first  principles, 
so  in  the  productive  sciences  the  End  is  a  starting- 
point  and  assumption  :  since  it  is  required  that  so- 
and-so  is  to  be  in  good  health,  if  that  is  to  be  secured 
it  is  necessary  for  such-and-such  a  thing  to  be  pro- 
vided— ^just  as  in  mathematics,  if  the  angles  of  a 
triangle  are  together  equal  to  two  right  angles, 
such-and-such    a    consequence    necessarily  follows. 

6  Therefore  the  End  is  the  starting-point  of  the  pro- 
cess of  thought,  but  the  conclusion  of  the  process  of 
thought  is  the  starting-point  of  action.  If,  then,  of 
all  Tightness  either  rational  principle  or  goodness  is 
the  cause,  if  rational  principle  is  not  the  cause  of 

303 


ARISTOTLE 

1227  ^    ,       ,  „ 

όρθον  elrj  το  reXos,  αλλ'  ου  τα  ττρος  το  τέλος, 
τέλος  δ'  εστί  το  ου  ένεκα•  εστί  γαρ  ττασα  προαίρεσις  7 
Τίνος  καΐ  ενεκά  τίνος,  ου  μεν  οΰν  ένεκα  το  μέσον 
εστίν,  ου  αίτια  η  άρετη  τώ^  ττροαιρείσθαϊ^'  εστί 
μεντοι  η  προαίρεσις  ου  τούτου,  άλλα  των  τούτου 
40  ένεκα,     το    μεν    ούν    τυγχάνειν    τούτων  άλλης  Βυ-  8 

1228  a  νάμεως  οσα   ένεκα    του    τέλους    δει   ττράττειν,  του 

hk  το  τέλος  ορθόν  εΐναί  της  προαιρέσεως  -rf  άρετη 
αίτια,  καΐ  δια  τοΰτο  εκ  της  ττροαψεσεως  κρίνομεν  9 
ποΐός  τις,  τοΰτο  δ'  εστί  το  τίνος  ένεκα  ττράττεί 
αλλ'  ου  τι  ττράττει.  ομοίως  δε  και  η  κακία  των  εν-  Κ 
ό  αντίων  ένεκα  ττοιεί  την  προαιρεσιν.  ει*  Βή  τις,  εφ^ 
αύτω  ον  πράττειν  μεν  τα  καλά  άπρακτεΐν  δε  τα 
αισχρά,  τουναντίον  ττοιεΓ,  Βηλον  otl  ου  σττουΒαΙός 
εστίν  ούτος  6  άνθρωπος.  ωστ  ανάγκη  την  τε 
κακίαν  εκούσιον  εΐναί  καΐ  την  άρετην  ούΒεμία 
γάρ    ανάγκη    τα    μοχθηρά    ττράττειν.      δια    ταύτα  11 

10  καΐ  φεκτον  η  κακία  καΐ  η  άρετη  επαινετόν  τά 
γάρ  ακούσια  αισχρά  και  κακά  ου  φεγεται^  ούΒε 
τά  αγαθά  επαινείται,'^  άλλα  τά  εκούσια.  ετι 
πάντας  επαινοΰμεν  και  φεγομεν  εις  την  προαίρεσιν 
βλέποντες  μάλλον  η  εις  τά  έργα  {καίτοι  αιρετώτερον 
η  ενέργεια  της  αρετής),  otC  πράττουσι  μεν  φαΰλα 

15  και  άναγκαζομενοι,  προαιρείται  δ    ούΒείς.     ετι  διά  12 
το  μη  ράΒιον  eirat  ιΒεΐν  την  προαίρεσιν  όποια  τις, 

^  Ft.  :  τό.  *  Ric. :   νροαιρίΐσθαι  οδ  iVesa. 

*  ή  Fr. :  ον  ή.  *  νροαίρίσιν  <eZi'at>.     «/  ?  Rac. 

»  Ρ»»:   ψΐκτα  Mb.  «  Pb;  έτταΐί-ίτά  Μ^. 

'  ^Tt  Aid. 

304 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  II.  xi.  6-12 

the  Tightness  of  the  End,  then  the  End  (though  not 
the  means  to  the  End)  will  be  right  owing  to  goodness. 

7  But  the  End  is  the  object  for  which  one  acts  ;  for 
every  purposive  choice  is  a  choice  of  something  and 
for  some  object.  The  End  is  therefore  the  object 
for  which  the  thing  chosen  is  the  mean,  of  which 
End  goodness  is  the  cause  "  by  its  act  of  choice — 
though  the  choice  is  not  of  the  End  but  of  the  means 

8  adopted  for  the  sake  of  the  End.  Therefore  though 
it  belongs  to  another  faculty  to  hit  on  the  things  that 
must  be  done  for  the  sake  of  the  End,  goodness  is 
the  cause  of  the  End  aimed  at  by  choice  being  right. 

9  And  owing  to  this  it  is  by  a  man's  purposive  choice 
that  we  judge  his  character — that  is,  not  by  what  he 

10  does  but  what  he  does  it  for.  Similarly  also  badness 
causes  purposive  choice  to  be  made  from  the  op- 
posite motives.  If  therefore,  when  a  man  has  it  in 
his  power  to  do  what  is  honourable  and  refrain  from 
doing  what  is  base,  he  does  the  opposite,  it  is  clear 
that  this  man  is  not  virtuous.  Hence  it  necessarily 
follows  that  both  badness  and  goodness  are  volun- 
tary ;   for  there  is  no  necessity  to  do  wicked  things. 

11  For  this  reason  badness  is  a  blameworthy  thing  and 
goodness  praiseworthy  ;  for  involuntary  baseness  and 
evil  are  not  blamed  nor  involuntary  good  things 
praised,  but  voluntary  ones  are.  Moreover  we  praise 
and  blame  all  men  with  regard  to  their  purpose 
rather  than  with  regard  to  their  actions  (although 
activity  is  a  more  desirable  thing  than  goodness), 
because  men  may  do  bad   acts   under  compulsion, 

12  but  no  one  is  compelled  to  choose  to  do  them.  More- 
over  because  it  is  not  easy  to  see   the   quality  of 

<»  Virtue  by  choosing  the  right  means  to  achieve  the  End 
causes  the  End  to  be  realized. 

X  805 


ARISTOTLE 

1228  a 

ια    ταύτα    e/c    των    epywv    αναγκαζόμεθα    κρίνειν 
οττοΐός     τις•     α'φ€τώτ€ρον    μ€ν    ονν     η      ivepyeia,  13 
€παίν€τώτ€ρον  δ'  η  ττροαίρζσις.     €κ  τ€  των  κ^ιμβνων 
ονν     συμβαίνει    ταύτα    καΐ    ctl    ομολογςΐται    τοΐς^ 
φαινομένοις. 

^  όμολοΎΐΐ  Tois  Sp. 


306 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  Π.  χι.  12-13 

a  man's  purpose  we  are  forced  to  judge  his  char- 
13  acter  from  his  actions  ;  therefore  activity  is  more 
desirable,  but  purpose  more  praiseworthy.  And  this 
not  only  follows  from  our  assumptions  but  also  is 
admitted  by  reason  of  observed  facts." 

"  Or,  emending  the  text,  '  agrees  with  observation.' 


307 


1228  a 

.     Utl     μεν    ovv    μεσοτητες    τ      eiai     ev    rats  1 
aperdis    καΐ    aurat    ττροαιρετικαί,    καΐ    αί   ei^avrtai 

-'J  κακίαι  καΐ  rives  elalv  αύται,  καθόλου  εΐρηται- 
καθ  €κάστην  8e  λαμβάνοντας  λέγωμαν  εφεζης, 
και  πρώτον  €Ϊ7τωμ€ν  Ttepl  ανδρεία?. 

Σχεδόν  δΐ7  hoKei  πασιν  δ  τ    avhpeios  etvat  ττερί  2 
φόβους  καΐ  η  ανδρεία  μία  των  αρετών,     διείλομεν 
δ'    ev   Trj   ^ίαγραφ-η   ττρότερον^   θράσος    και   φόβον^ 

30  εναντία•  καΐ  γάρ  εστί  πως  αντικείμενα  άλλτ^λοι?. 
8ηλον  ουν  δτι  και  οΐ  κατά  τάς  εζεις  ταύτας  3 
λεγόμενοι  ομοίως  άντικείσονται  σφίσιν  αύτοΐς, 
οίον  ό  δειλό?  {οδτος  γάρ  λέγεται  κατά  το  φοβεΐσθαι 
μάλλον  η  δει  και  θαρρεΐν  ^ττον  ύ]  δει)  και  6  θρασύς 
{και     γάρ     οΰτος     κατά     το     τοιούτος     είναι     οιο? 

85  φοβεΐσθαι  μεν  -ήττον  η  δει  θαρρεΐν  δε  μάλλον  η 
δει•  διό  και  παρωνυμιάζεται,  ό  γάρ  θρασύς  παρά 
το  θράσος  λε'^εται  παρωνύμως) .  ώστ  επει  ύ)  4 
ανδρεία  εστίν  η  βέλτιστη  εζις  περί  φόβους  και 
θάρρη,  δει  δε  μηθ^  ούτως  ώς  οι  θρασεΐς  (τα  μεν 
γαρ  ελλείπουσι  τά  δ'  ύπερβάλλουσι)  μηθ'  ούτως 
1228  b  α>?  οΐ  δειλοί  (και  yap  ούτοι  ταύτο  ποιοΰσι,  πλην 

*  τ'  ΐΐσΐ  Rac. :   etVi  re.  ^  Βζ. :   irOTepov. 

»  Βζ.  :  φ6βο$. 

»  1220  b  39,  1221  a  17-19. 
808 


/ 


BOOK  III 

1  I.  It  has  then  been  stated  in  general  terms  that  the  mohal 
there  are  middle  states  in  the  virtues  and  that  these  Virtues. 
are  purposive,  and  also  that  the  opposite  dispositions 

are  vices  and  vv^hat  these  are.  But  let  us  take  them 
separately  and  discuss  them  seriatim.  And  first  let 
us  speak  about  Courage. 

2  Now  almost  everybody  holds  that  the  brave  man  cooeaoe,   : 
is  concerned  with  fears,  and  that  courage  is  one  of  ^^^^^^^" 
the  virtues.     And  in  our  schedule  <*  previously  we  rashness 
distinguished  daring  and  fear  as  contraries,  for  they  cowardice. 
are   indeed  in  a   manner  opposed  to  one    another. 

3  It  is  clear,  therefore,  that  the  persons  named  after 
these  states  of  character  will  also  be  similarly 
opposed  to  each  other — that  is,  the  coward  (for  that 
is  the  term  that  denotes  being  more  afraid  than 
is  proper  and  less  daring  than  is  proper)  and 
the  daring  man  (for  that  denotes  the  character- 
istic of  being  less  afraid  than  is  proper  and  more 
daring  than  is  proper — and  from  this  the  name  is 
derived,  as  the  word  '  daring  '  is  cognate  with  the 

4  word  '  dare  ').  So  that  since  courage  is  the  best 
state  of  character  in  relation  to  feelings  of  fear  and 
daring,  and  the  proper  character  is  neither  that  of  the 
daring  (for  they  fall  short  in  one  respect  and  exceed 
in  another)  nor  that  of  the  cowardly  (for  they  also 
do  the  same,  only  not  as  regards  the  same  things 

309 


ARISTOTLE 

1228  b 

ov  TTepl  ταύτα  αλλ'  e^  εναντίας,  τω  μ€ν  γαρ  Oappeiv 

ελλειτΓουσι  τω  δε  φοββΐσθαι  νπ€ρβάλλονσί) ,  hrjXov 

ώς  ή  μβση  biadeaig  θρασύτητας  καΐ  δείλια?  €στΙν 

ανδρεία•  αντη  γαρ  β€λτίστη. 

Αοκ€Ϊ    δ'    6    avSpcLos    άφοβος    είναι    ώς    εττι    το  5 

5  πολυ,  6  δε  δειλό?  φοβητικός,  καΐ  6  μβν  και  ττολλά 

και    ολίγα    και   μ€γάλα    και   μικρά    φοβ€Ϊσθαι    και 

σφόΒρα  και  ταχύ,  ό  δε  το  εναντίον  η  ου  φοβεΐσθαι 

τ)   ηρβμα    και  μόλις   και  ολι-^άκι?   και  μεγάλα'   και 

ό  /χεν  υπομένει  τα    φοβερά  σφόδρα,  6  δε  ούδε  τα 

ήρεμα,      ποία  οΰν  υπομένει  6   άνΒρεΐος;     πρώτον,  6 

10  πότερον  τά  αύτώ  φοβερά  η  τά  ετερω;  ει  μεν  Srj 
τά  ετερω  φοβερά,  ούθεν  σεμνόν  φαίη  αν  τις  είναι• 
ει  δε  τά  αύτω,  ειτ^  αν  αύτώ  μεγάλα  και  ττολλά^ 
φοβερά•  τά  δε  φοβερά^  φόβου  ποιητικά  εκάστω  ω 
φοβερά,  οίον  ει  μεν  σφόδρα  φοβερά,  εΐη  αν  ισχυρός 
ό    φόβος,    ει    δ'    ήρεμα,    ασθενής•    ώστε    συμβαίνει 

15  τον  άνδρειον  μεγάλους  φόβους  και  πολλούς  φο- 
βεΐσθαι.^  εδόκει  δε  τουναντίον  η  ανδρεία  άφοβον 
παρασκευάζειν,  τοΰτο  δ'  είναι  ε'ν  τω  η  μηθεν  η 
ολίγα  φοβεΐσθαι  και  ήρεμα  και  μόλις,  αλλ'  ισω?  7 
το  φοβερόν  λέγεται,  ώσπερ  και  το  η^ύ  και  τάγα^όν, 
Βιχώς.    τά  μεν  γάρ  απλώς,  τά  δε  τινι  μεν  και  η8εα 

^  πολλά  cm.  Μ^. 

*  τά  δ(  φοβΐρα  add.  Βζ,  (τά  δ^  φοβΐρα  τοιούτον  add.  ?  Rac). 

'  v.l.  τΓοιεΐσθαι  vulg. 


"  Or,  emending  the  text,  '  of  corresponding  fear.' 
310 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  III.  i.  4-7 

but  inversely — they  fall  short  in  daring  and  exceed 
in  being  afraid),  it  is  clear  that  the  middle  state  of 
character  between  daring  and  cowardice  is  courage, 
for  this  is  the  best  state. 

5  And  it  seems  that  the  brave  man  is  in  general  What 
fearless,  and  the  coward  liable  to  fear  ;   and  that  the  th"brave*'^ 
latter  fears  things  Avhen  they  are  few  in  number  and  ^^^  endure? 
small  in  size  as  well  as  when  numerous  and  great, 

and  fears  violently,  and  gets  frightened  quickly, 
whereas  the  former  on  the  contrary  either  never 
feels  fear  at  all  or  only  slightly  and  reluctantly  and 
seldom,  and  in  regard  to  things  of  magnitude  ; 
and  he  endures  things  that  are  extremely  formidable, 
whereas  the  other  does  not  endure  even  those  that 

6  are  slightly  formidable.  What  sort  of  things,  then, 
does  the  brave  man  endure  ?  First,  is  it  the  things 
that  are  formidable  to  himself  or  formidable  to 
somebody  else  ?  If  the  things  formidable  to  some- 
body else,  one  >vould  not  indeed  call  it  anything 
remarkable  ;  but  if  it  is  those  that  are  formidable 
to  himself,  what  is  formidable  to  him  must  be  things 
of  great  magnitude  and  number.  But  formidable 
things  are  productive  of  fear "  in  the  particular 
person  to  whom  they  are  formidable — that  is,  if 
they  are  very  formidable,  the  fear  they  produce  will 
be  violent,  if  slightly  formidable,  it  will  be  weak  ; 
so  it  follows  that  the  brave  man's  fears  are  great 
and  many.  Yet  on  the  contrary  it  appeared  that 
courage  makes  a  man  fearless,  and  that  fearlessness 
consists  in  fearing  nothing,  or  else  few  things,  and 

7  those  slightly  and  reluctantly.  But  perhaps  '  for- 
midable '  is  an  ambiguous  term,  like  '  pleasant ' 
and  '  good.'  Some  things  are  pleasant  and  good 
absolutely,  whereas   others   are  so  to   a  particular 

311 


ARISTOTLE 

1228  b        ^      ^  ^     ^  ^        ^  ,        „       ,  Ν  V  V  ,  / 

20  «rat   aya^a    iariv,   απλώς    δ     ov,    άλλα   τουναντίον 

φαΰλα  καΐ  ονχ  rjhea,  οσα  τοις  ττονηροΐς  ωφέλιμα, 

και  δσα  rjhea  τοις  τταώίοίς  τ^  παώία.     ομοίως  8e  8 

και  τα  φοββρα  τα  μ€.ν  άττλώς  εστί,  τα  δε  τινι*  α 

μ€ν  δη  ό^  δειλό?  φοβείται  fj  δειλό?,  τα  μ€ν  ovhevi 

25  βστι   φοβ€ρά,   τα    δ'    •ηρέμα•   τα   δε    τοι?    ττλε ιστοί? 
φοββρά,     και     ό'σα     ττ^     άνθρωπίντ)     φνσ€ί,     ταϋθ 
απλώς  φοβέρα  λβγομζν.     6  δ'  ανδρείο?  ττρο?  ταΰτ   9 
έχει    αφόβως,    και    νπομενβι    τα    τοιαύτα    φοβερά, 
α  έ'στι  /χέν  ώ?  φοβ€ρα  αντώ  εστί  δ    ώ?  ου,  ^  μ^ν 
άνθρωπος   φοβερά,  fj    δ'   ανδρείο?   ου  φοβ€ρά   αλλ 

30  η  ηρβμα,  η  ούΒαμώς.  έ'στι  μβντοι  φοββρα  ταΰτα• 
τοις  γαρ  πλείστοι?  φοββρά.  διό  /cat  επαινείται  η  10 
'έ'^ι?•  ώσττερ  yap  ό  ισχυρός  και  υγιεινό?  έ';)(ει.  και 
yap  ούτοι  ου  τω  ύπο  μηθενος  ο  μεν  πόνου  τριβεσθαι 
ό  δ'  υπό  /χτ7δερ,ια?  υπερβολής  τοιούτοι  εισιν,  άλλα 
τω   υπό   τούτων   απαθείς   είναι  η   άττλώ?   -η   -ήρεμα 

35  υ0'  ων  οι  πολλοί  και*  οί  ττλεΓστοι.  οι  ρ.έν  οΰν  11 
νοσοϋδει?  και  ασθενεί?  και  δειλοί  και  υπό  τών 
κοινών  παθημάτων  πάσχουσί  τι,  πλι^ν  θαττόν  τε 
και  μάλλον  η  οι  πολλοί,  .  .  .  '  και  έτι  ύφ*  ων  οί 
πολλοί  πάσχουσιν ,  υπό  τούτων  απαθείς  -η  όλως  η 
ήρεμα. 

ΆτΓορεΐται  δ'  ει  τω  άνΒρείω  ούθεν  ε'στι  φοβερόν,  12 

^  ό  add.  Fr,  ^  οΐ  πολλοί  <^>  καΐ  vel  οί  Αλλοι  και  ?  Ric. 

^  <οί  δ'  vyieivol  καΐ  Ισχυροί  καΐ  άνδρύοι  ύιτό  των  μΐ-γίστων 
πάσχονσιν,  άλλα  βραδύτΐρόν  re  και  iJTTov  ή  οΊ  πολλοίς  Βζ.  (aut 
seel,  και  ίτι  .  .  .  ηρέμ,α  ut  prave  e  11.  34  seq.  repetita). 

°  The  words  '  the  healthy,  strong  and  brave  .  .  .  mass  of 
men'  are  a  conjectural  addition  to  the  ms.  text. 

312 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  III.  i.  7-12 

person  but  absolutely  are  not  so,  but  on  the  contrary 
are  bad  and  unpleasant — all  the  things  that  are 
beneficial  for  the  base,  and  all  those  that  are  pleasant 

8  to  children  qua  children.     And  similarly  some  things  Analogy 
are  formidable  absolutely  and  others  to  a  particular  and^" 
person  :   thus  the  things  that  the  coward  qua  coward  'Strength. 
fears  are  some  of  them  not  formidable  to  anybody 

and  others  only  slightly  formidable,  but  things  that 
are  formidable  to  most  men,  and  all  that  are  formid- 
able  to   human   nature,   we   pronounce   to   be   for- 

9  midable  absolutely.  But  the  brave  man  is  fearless 
in  regard  to  them,  and  endures  formidable  things 
of  this  sort,  which  are  formidable  to  him  in  one  way 
but  in  another  way  are  not- — they  are  formidable  to 
him  qua  human  being,  but  qua  brave  not  formid- 
able except  slightly,  or  not  at  all.  Yet  such  things 
really   are   formidable,   for   they   are   formidable   to 

10  most  men.  Owing  to  this  the  brave  man's  state 
of  character  is  praised,  because  it  resembles  that  of 
the  strong  and  the  healthy.  These  have  those  char- 
acters not  because  no  labour  in  the  one  case  or 
extreme  of  temperature  in  the  other  can  crush  them, 
but  because  they  are  not  affected  at  all,  or  only 
affected  slightly,  by  the  things  that  affect  the  many 

11  or  the  majority.  Therefore  whereas  the  sickly  and 
weak  and  cowardly  are  affected  also  by  the  afflictions 
commonly  felt,  only  more  quickly  and  to  a  greater 
extent  than  the  mass  of  men,  the  healthy,  strong  and 
brave,  although  affected  by  the  very  great  afflictions, 
are  affected  by  them  more  slowly  and  less  than  the 
mass  of  men,"  and  moreover  they  are  entirely  un- 
affected or  only  slightly  affected  by  things  that  affect 
the  mass. 

12  But  the  question  is  raised  whether  to  the  brave 

313 


ARISTOTLE 

1228  b 

ov8     av  φοβηθίίη.      η  ovdkv  κωλύει  τον  €ίρημ€νον 

i229&  τρόπον;      η    γαρ    avSpeia    άκολονθησις^    τω    λόγω 
eoTLV,  ο  8e  λόγος  το  καλόν  αίρζΐσθαι  /ceAeuei.     διό 
και  ο  μη  δια  τούτον^  ύττομ^νων  αυτά,  ούτος  ήτοι 
€ζ€στηκ€ν   η    θρασνς•   6   δε   δια   το    καλόν   άφοβος  ΐ; 
5  και   αν8ρ€Ϊος  μόνος,      ό  μέν  ονν  δειλό?   και  α  μη 
δει  φοβ€Ϊται,  ό  δε  θρασύς  και  α  μη  δει  dappei•  ό 
δ     ανδρείο?   άμφω   α   δει,    και   ταύτη   μέσος   εστίν, 
α  γαρ   αν  6  λόγος   κελεύι^,   ταντα   και   θαρρβΐ  και 
φοβζίται•     6    δε    λόγος    τα    μ€γάλα    λυπηρά    και 
φθαρτικά  ου  κελειίει  ύπομβνβιν,  αν  μη  καλά  η.     6  U 
10  μ€ν  οΰν  θρασύς,  και  ει  μη  κελεύει,  ταϋτα  θαρρεί, 
Ο  οε  οείΛο?  ουο     αν  κεΛευτ^'   ο   ο     ανορ€ΐος  μονός 
iav  κελεύη. 

'  Εστί  δ'  εί'δτ^  αι^δρεια?  πέντε  λεγόμενα  καθ*  It 
ομοιότητα-  τά  αυτά  γάρ  ύπομενουσιν ,  αλλ'  ου  δια 
τα  αυτά.  /χια  μεν  πολιτική•  αύτη  δ'  εστίν  η  δι' 
αιδώ  ούσα.  δευτέρα  η  στρατιωτική•  αύτη  δε  δι' 
Ιό  εμπειριαν  και  το  ειδε'ναι,  οΰχ  ωσπερ  Έωκράτης 
€φη,  τά  δεινά,  άλλα*  τάς  βοηθείας  των  Βεινών. 
τρίτη  δ  η  δι'  άπειρίαν  και  άγνοιαν,  δι'  ην  τά  16 
τταιδια  και  οι  μαινόμενοι  οι  μεν  ύπομενουσι  τά 
φερόμενα^  οΐ  δε  λαμβάνουσι  τους  οφεις.  άλλη  δ' 
η  κατ  ελ-ττιδα,  κα^'  ην  οι  τε  κατευτυχηκότες 
20  ΤΓολλακι?  ύπομενουσι  τους  κινδύνους  και  οι 
μεθύοντες•  εύελπώας  γάρ  ποιεί  6  οίνος,     άλλη  δε  17 

*  άκολονθητικη  Bus.  *  V.l.  τοΰτο:  τούτων  Cas. 

'  Rac. :  μύνοί'.  *  Syl.  (άλλα  το  lac.) :  άλλ'  δτι. 

*  ένιφΐρίιμΐνα  ?  (cf.  b  27)  Rac. 

i 

"  Plato,  Protagoras  360  d. 
314 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  III.  i.  12-16 

man  nothing  is  formidable,  and  whether  he  would  The  brave 
be  insensible  to  fear.     Or  is  it  not  possible  that  he  when^^'^^ 
may  feel  fear  in  the  way  described  ?     For  courage  is  reasonable. 
folloAving  reason,  and  reason  bids  us  choose  what  is 
fine.     Hence  he  who  endures  formidable  things  not  on 
account  of  reason  is  either  out  of  his  mind  or  daring, 

13  but  only  he  who  does  so  from  motives  of  honour 
is  fearless  and  brave.  The  coward,  therefore,  fears 
even  things  that  he  ought  not  to  fear,  and  the  daring 
man  is  bold  even  about  things  about  which  he  ought 
not  to  be  bold,  but  the  brave  man  alone  does  both 
as  he  ought,  and  is  intermediate  in  this  respect, 
for  he  feels  both  confidence  and  fear  about  what- 
ever things  reason  bids  ;  but  reason  does  not  bid 
him  endure  things  that  are  extremely  painful  and 

14  destructive,  unless  they  are  fine.  The  daring  man, 
therefore,  faces  such  things  with  confidence  even  if 
reason  does  not  bid  him  face  them,  and  the  coward 
does  not  face  them  even  if  it  does,  but  only  the  brave 
man  faces  them  if  reason  bids. 

15  There  are  five  kinds  of  courage  so  called  by  analogy,  pive 
because  brave  men  of  these  kinds  endure  the  same  unreal 
things  as  the  really  courageous  but  not  for  the  same  courage. 
reasons.     One  is  civic  courage  ;    this  is  courage  due 

to  a  sense  of  shame.  Second  is  military  courage  ; 
this  is  due  to  experience  and  to  knowledge,  not  of 
what  is  formidable,  as  Socrates  said,**  but  of  ways 

16  of  encountering  what  is  formidable.  Third  is  the 
courage  due  to  inexperience  and  ignorance,  that 
makes  children  and  madmen  face  things  rushing  on 
them,  or  grasp  snakes.  Another  is  the  courage 
caused  by  hope,  which  often  makes  those  who  have 
had  a  stroke  of  luck  endure  dangers,  and  those  who 
are  intoxicated — for    wine    makes    men    sanguine. 

315 


ARISTOTLE 

1229  a 

δια   ττάθος   άλόγιστον,   οϊον   δι'    €ρωτα   καΐ   θυμόν. 

αν    τ€    γαρ    ipa,    θρασνς    μάλλον    η    δειλό?,    καΐ 

υπομένει   ττολΧούς    KLvhvvovs,    ωσττερ    6    iv    Mera- 

ττοντίω  τον  τνραννον  άττοκτβίνας  καΐ  ό   iv  Κρτ^ττ^ 

2ό  μνθολογονμενος•  καΐ  δι'  οργην  καΐ  θυμον  ωσ- 
αύτως' €κστατικ6ν  γαρ  6  θυμός,  διό  και  οι  άγριοι 
σύες^  ανδρείοι  Βοκοΰσιν  eirai,  ουκ  6ντ€ς•  όταν  γαρ 
€κστώσι,  τοιούτοι  eiaiv,  ei  Be  μτ^,  ανώμαλοι, 
ώσπερ  οι  θρασ€Ϊς.  όμως  δε  μάλιστα  φυσική  η  1 
του  θυμοΰ•  άήττητον  γαρ  ό  θυμός,  διό  και  οΐ 
τταϊδε?  άριστα  μάχονται,     δια,  νόμον  δε  η  ττολιτικη  1 

30  ανδρεία,  κατ'  άλτ^^ειαν  δε  ούΒβμία  τούτων,  άλλα 
ττρό?  τα?  τταρακελευσει?  τάς  iv  τοις  κίνδυνοι?  χρή- 
σιμα ταύτα  ττάντα. 

Περί  δε  των  φοβερών  νυν  μεν  απλώς  είρηκαμεν,  2 
βελτιον    δε    Βιορίσασθαι    μόίλλον.      δλως    μεν    οΰν 
φοβερά   λέγεται    τα    ποιητικά    φόβου,    τοιαύτα    δ' 

35  εστίν  οσα  φαίνεται  ποιητικά  λύπης  φθαρτικης• 
τοις  γάρ  άλλην  τινά  προσΒεχομενοις  λύπην  έτερα 
μεν  αν  τις  Ισως  λύπη  γένοιτο  και  πάθος  έτερον, 
φόβος  δ'  ουκ  εσται,  οΐον  ει  τις  προορώτο  οτι 
λυτΓτ^σεται  λύπην  ην  οι  φθονοΰντες  λυπούνται,  η 
τοιαύτην    οΐαν    οί    ζηλοΰντες    η    οι    αίσχυνόμενοι. 

40  άλλ'  ε77ΐ  ρ,όναι?  ταΓ?  τοιαυται?  φαινομεναις  εσεσ^αι  2 
λυτται?  φόβος  γίνεται  όσων  η  φύσις  αναιρετική  του 
1229  b  ζτ^ ν.      διό    και    σφόδρα    τίνες    οντες    μαλακοί    περί 
ενια  ανδρείοι  εισι,  και  ενιοι  σκληροί  και'  καρτερικοί 
και    δειλοί.      και    8η    και    δοκει    σ;^εδόν    ίδιον   της  2 

"  Unknown. 
316 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  III.  i.  17-22 

17  Another  is  due  to  some  irrational  emotion,  for 
example  love  or  passion.  For  if  a  man  is  in  love  he 
is  more  daring  than  cowardly,  and  endures  many 
dangers,  like  the  man  "  who  murdered  the  tyrant  at 
Metapontium  and  the  person  in  Crete  in  the  story  *  ; 
and  similarly  if  a  man  is  under  the  influence  of  anger 
and  passion,  for  passion  is  a  thing  that  makes  him 
beside  himself.  Hence  wild  boars  are  thought  to 
be  brave,  though  they  are  not  really,  for  they  are 
so  when  they  are  beside  themselves,  but  otherwise 

18  they  are  variable,  like  daring  men.  But  neverthe- 
less the  courage  of  passion  is  in  the  highest  degree 
natural  ;  passion  is  a  thing  that  does  not  know  defeat, 
owing  to   which   the   young   are   the   best   fighters. 

19  Civic  courage  is  due  to  law.  But  none  of  these  is 
truly  courage,  though  they  are  all  useful  for  encour- 
agement in  dangers. 

20  Up  to  this  point  we   have  spoken  about  things  Only 
formidable  in  general  terms,  but  it  will  be  better  terror  are 
to  define  them  more  precisely.     As  a  general  term  the  sphere 
'  formidable  '  denotes  what  causes  fear,  and  that  is  °     ourage. 
a  property  of  things  that  appear  capable  of  causing 

pain  of  a  destructive  kind :  for  persons  expecting 
some  other  pain  might  perhaps  experience  a  different 
sort  of  pain  and  a  different  feeling,  but  will  not  have 
fear — for  example  if  a  man  foresaw  that  he  was  going 
to  feel  the  pain  felt  by  the  jealous,  or  the  sort  of 
pain  felt  by  the  envious  or  by  those  who  are  ashamed. 

21  But  fear  only  occurs  in  the  case  of  pains  that  seem 
likely  to  be  of  the  kind  whose  nature  it  is  to  destroy 
life.  Hence  some  people  who  are  even  very  soft 
about  certain  things  are  brave,  and  some  who  are 

22  hard  and  enduring  are  also  cowardly.  Moreover  it 
is  thought  to  be  almost  a  special  property  of  courage 

817 


ARISTOTLE 

1229  b 

avSpeias  etvat  το  nepi  τον  θάνατον  καΐ  την  τούτου 

δ  λύπην  €χ€ΐν  πώς'  et  γάρ  τι?  €'ίη  τοιούτος  οίος  προς 
άλβα?  καΐ  φνχη  καΐ  τάς  τοιαύτας  λνπας  ύπομβνζ- 
τίκός^  ώς  ό  λόγος,  ακίνδυνους  ούσας,  προς  δε  τον 
θάνατον  καΐ  μαλακός  καΐ  π€ρίφοβος,  μη  δι'  άλλο 
τι  πάθος  άλλα  δι'  αύτην  την  φθοράν,  άλλο?  δε 
προς  μ€ν   e/ceiVa?  μαλακός,   προς   δε   τον   θάνατον 

10  άπα^τ^?,  €Κ€Ϊνος  μβν  αν  ειρ'αι  δο^ειε  δειλό?,  ούτος 
δ'   άι^δρεΓο?.      καΐ  γάρ  κίνδυνος  εττι  rot?  τοιούτοι?  21 
λε)/εται   μόνοις   των   φοβερών   όταν  πλησίον  η   το 
της     τοιαύτης     φθοράς     ποιητικόν,     φαίνεται     δε 
Λτινδυνο?  όταν  πλησίον  φαίνηται} 

Τά  μ^ν  ούν  φοβζρά  π€ρι  όσα  φαμ€ν  είναι  τον 
avSpeiov    ε'ίρηται    8η    ότι    τά    φαινόμενα    ποιητικά 

V)  λύπης  της  φθαρτικης,  ταΰτα  μβντοι  πλησίον  τε 
φαινόμενα  και  μη  πόρρω,  και  τοσαΰτα  τω  μεγΐθΐΐ 
όντα  η  φαινόμενα  ώστ  είναι  σύμμ€τρα  προς 
άνθρωπον  έ'νια  γάρ  ανάγκη  παντι  φαίν^σθαι  2' 
άνθρώπω  φοββρά  και  8ιαταράττ€ΐν,  ούθ^ν  γάρ 
κωλύει,   ώσιτερ   θ€ρμά  και  φυχρά  και  των  άλλων 

■ίο  Βυνάμ€ων  ενια?  ύπερ  τ^^ιά?  είναι  και  τάς  τοΰ 
ανθρωπίνου  σώματος  έ'^ει?,  ούτω  και  των  πβρι 
την  φυχην  παθημάτων. 

Οί  μ€ν  ουν*  δειλοί  και  θρασβΐς  διαψεύδονται  δια 
τά?  ε^ ει?,  τω  μ€ν  γάρ  δειλω  τά  τε  μη  φοβερά  Βοκ€ΐ 
φοβ€ρά   είναι   και   τά  ηρβμα  σφό8ρα,  τω  δε  θρασίΐ 

25  τουναντίον  τά  τε  φοβερά  θαρραλέα  και  τά  σφόδρα 
ηρ€μα•  τω  δ'  άνδρειω  τάληθη  μάλιστα,    διόττερ  ούτ   2. 
ει  τι?  ϋΤΓΟ/χενει*  τά   φοβερά   δι'    άγνοιαν,  ανδρείο?, 

^  ύπομίνετικόί  <eZi'ai>  ?  Ric. 

^  Syl. :  φαίνίται.  '  οβι»  add.  Βζ. 

*  ΰτΓομίνΐί  Ρ•> :  -χοι  Μ*»,  Syl. 

318 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  III.  i.  22-25 

to  be  of  a  certain  disposition  in  regard  to  death  and 
the  pain  of  death  ;  for  if  a  man  were  such  as  to  be 
capable  of  rational  endurance  in  respect  of  heat  and 
cold  and  pains  of  that  sort  that  are  not  dangerous, 
but  at  the  same  time  soft  and  excessively  timid  about 
death,  not  because  of  any  other  feeling  but  just 
because  it  brings  destruction,  while  another  man  was 
soft  in  regard  to  those  pains  but  impassive  as  regards 
death,  the  former  would  be  thought  a  coward  and 

23  the  latter  brave.  For  we  speak  of  danger  only  in 
the  case  of  such  formidable  things  as  bring  near  to 
us  what  causes  destruction  of  that  sort,  and  when  this 
appears  near  it  appears  to  be  danger. 

The  formidable  things,  therefore,  in  relation  to 
which  we  speak  of  a  man  as  brave  are,  we  have 
said,  those  that  appear  likely  to  cause  pain  of  the 
destructive  kind — provided  that  these  appear  close 
at  hand  and  not  far  off,  and  are  or  appear  to  be  of 

24  a  magnitude  proportionate  to  a  human  being  ;  for 
some  things  must  necessarily  appear  fearful  to  every 
human  being  and  throw  everybody  into  alarm,  since 
it  is  quite  possible  that,  just  as  heat  and  cold  and  some 
of  the  other  forces  are  above  us  and  above  the  con- 
ditions of  the  human  body,  so  also  are  some  mental 
sufferings. 

Therefore  whereas  the  cowardly  and  the  daring  The 
are  mistaken  owing  to  their  characters,  since  the  extremes, 
coward  thinks  things  not  formidable  formidable 
and  things  slightly  formidable  extremely  formidable, 
and  the  daring  man  on  the  contrary  thinks  formid- 
able things  perfectly  safe  and  extremely  formidable 
things  only  slightly  formidable,  to  the  brave  man  on 
the  other  hand  things  seem  exactly  what  they  are. 

25  Hence  a  man  is  not  brave  if  he  endures  formidable 

319 


ARISTOTLE 

1229  b 

οίον  €1  Tts  τους  κεραυνούς  ύπομβνοι^  φβρομ^νονς^ 
δια  /xai'tat',  ουτ  el  γινώσκων  όσος  6  κίνδυνος, 
δια  θνμόν,   οΐον  οι  KeArot    προς   τά    κύματα  όπλα 

30  ατταντώσι  λαβόντ€ς•  καΐ  όλως  ή  βαρβαρική  avhpeia 
μ€τά  θνμοΰ  εστίν.  eVtot  δε  /cat  hi  άλλα?  η^ονας  2 
νπομβνουσιν  και  γαρ  ο  θυμός  η^ονην  '^χ^ι  τινά, 
μ€τ  ελτΓίδο?  γάρ  εστί  τιμωρίας,  αλλ'  όμως  ουτ^ 
€L  δια  ταύτην  οϋτ^  el  δι'  άλλην  η^ονην  ύπομ€ν€ί 
τις  τον  θάνατον,  η  φυγην^  μ€ΐζόνων  λυπών,  ού8€ΐς 

35  δικαίως  άν^  άνΒρβΐος  λέγοιτο  τούτων,  et  γάρ  rfv  2 
τ^δυ  το  άποθνησκίΐν,  πολλάκις  άν  δι'  άκρασίαν 
απ€θνησκον  οι  ακόλαστοι,  ωσπ€ρ  και  νΰν  αύτοΰ 
μβν  του  άποθνησκβιν  ουκ  όντας  τββος,  των 
ποιητικών  δ'  αύτοΰ,  πολλοί  δι'  άκρασίαν  π^ρι- 
πίπτουσιν  €ΐ8ότ€ς,  ών  ούδει?  αν*  ανδρείο?  eivat 
8o^€iev,  €1  και  πάνυ  Ιτοίμως^  άποθνησκίΐν.^     ουτ' 

40  ei  φξύγοντες  τό  πονβΐν,  όπ€ρ  ττολλοι  ποιοΰσιν,  ού8€ 
τών     τοιούτων     ούθ€ΐς     άν8ρ€Ϊος,     καθάπερ     και 
t230  a   Αγάθων  φησι 

φαύλοι  βροτών  γάρ  του  πονίΐν  ησσώμίνοι 
θαν€Ϊν  βρώσιν. 

ωσπβρ  και  τόν  Xeipa>va  μυθολογοΰσιν  οι  ποιηται 
δια  την  από  του  'έλκους  ό^ύνιην  ευ^ασ^αι  άποθαν^ιν 
άθάνατον  όντα.     παραπλησίως  δε  τούτοις  και  όσοι  2 
5  δι   €μπ€ΐρίαν  ύπομ4νουσι  τους  κιvhύvoυς ,  όνπ€ρ  τρό- 

^  ΰτΓομένοι  Syl. :   υπομένει. 

*  έΐΓΐφβρομένον$  ?  (cf.  a  17)  Rac. 

*  <διά>  φυ-γψ  ?  Rac, 

*  Siv  bis  add.  Sp.  '  v.l.  (τοΙμο%. 

*  άποθνΐ}σκΐί  Vic. :  -κοι  ?  Rac. 

"  This  appears  to  be  loosely  quoted  from  a  verse  passage  : 
S20 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  III.  i.  25-28 

things  through  ignorance  (for  instance,  if  owing  to  The  motives 
madness  he  were  to  endure  a  flight  of  thunderbolts),  courage. 
nor  if  he  does  so  owing  to  passion  when  knowing 
the  greatness  of  the  danger,  as  the  Celts  '  take  arms 
and  march   against   the   waves  '  "  ;  and  in  general, 
the  courage  of  barbarians  has  an  element  of  passion, 

26  And  some  men  endure  terrors  for  the  sake  of  other 
pleasures  also — for  even  passion  contains  pleasure  of 
a  sort,  since  it  is  combined  with  hope  of  revenge. 
But  nevertheless  neither  if  a  man  endures  death  for 
the  sake  of  this  pleasure  nor  for  another,  nor  for  the 
sake  of  avoiding  greater  pains,  would  any  of  these 

27  persons  justly  be  termed  brave.  For  if  dying  were 
pleasant,  profligates  would  be  dying  constantly, 
owing  to  lack  of  self-control,  just  as  even  as  it  is, 
when,  although  death  itself  is  not  pleasant,  things 
that  cause  it  are,  many  men  through  lack  of  self- 
control  knowingly  encounter  it  ;  none  of  whom 
would  be  thought  brave,  even  though  he  were  thought 
to  die  quite  readily.  Nor  yet  are  any  of  those  brave 
who,  as  many  men  do,  commit  suicide  to  escape  from 
trouble,  as  Agathon  *  says  : 

-The  base  among  mankind,  by  toil  o'ercome. 
Conceive  a  love  of  death. 

As  also  Cheiron,"  in  the  legendary  story  of  the  poets, 
because  of  the  pain  from  his  wound  prayed  that 

28  though  immortal  he  might  die.  And  in  like  manner 
to  these,  all  who  face  dangers  because  of  experience 

cf.  N.E.  ill.  7.  7.  An  echo  of  the  story  survives  in  Shake- 
speare's metaphor,  '  to  take  arms  against  a  sea  of  troubles.' 

*  Athenian  tragic  poet,  friend  of  Plato. 

"  The  Centaur  sage  and  physician,  accidentally  wounded 
by  a  poisoned  arrow  of  Heracles,  transferred  his  immortality 
to  Prometheus, 

Υ  321 


ARISTOTLE 

1230  a 

πον  σχ^Βόν  οι  ττλεΐστοι  των  στρατιωτικών  ανθρώ- 
πων ύττομένουσιν.  αντο  γαρ  τουναντίον  €χ€ΐ  η  ως 
ωετο  Έωκράτης,  €πιστημην  οίόμζνος  ett-at  την  άν- 
8peiav.  οϋτβ  γαρ  δια  το  eiSeVat  τα  φοβίρα  θαρ- 
ρονσιν  OL  βπι  τους  ιστούς  ai^a^att'eiv  €7τιστάμ€νοι, 
10  αλλ  ΟΤΙ  Γσασι  τα?  βοηθίίας  τών  ^^ινών  οντ€  δι'  ο 
θαρραλεώτβρον  αγωνίζονται,  τοΰτο  avSpeia,  και  γαρ  2 
al•'  Ύ]   ισχύς    και    ο   πλοΰτος  κατά  θ€ογνιν  avhpeia 

τ 

eiel•"• 

ττας  γαρ  άνηρ  ττενίτ)  Β€8μημ€νος. 

φαν€ρώς  δ  ^  evioi  δβιλοι  6ντ€ς  όμως  υττομίνουσι 
δι  €μπ€ΐριαν,  τοΰτο  δε  οτι  ουκ  οϊονται  κίνΒυνον 
15  eit'ai,  ίσασι  γαρ  τας  βοηθείας,  σημζΐον  δε'•  οταΐ' 
γαρ  μη  €χ€ΐν  οΐωνται  βοήθβιαν  αλλ'  η8η  πλησίον 
fi  το  heivov,  ούχ  ύπομίνουσιν.  άλλα  πάντων  τών  3 
τοιούτων  αίτιων^  οι  δια  την  αιδώ  υπομένοντας 
/Μάλιστα  φαν€ΐ€ν  αν"  avSpeloi,  καθάπβρ  και  "Ομηρος 
τον  "Έικτορά  φησιν  ύπομέιναι  τον  κίνΒυνον  τον 
προς  τον  'Α;(ΐλλ€α• 

20  "Έικτορα  δ'  αιδώ?  eiXe- 


ΐΙουλυΒάμας  μοι  πρώτος  βλαγχξίην  άναθήσαι. 

και  εστιΐ'  η  πολιτική  avSpeia  αϋτη.     η  δ'  αληθής  ii 
οϋτ€   αϋτη   οΰ'τ'   ςκαίνων  ού^αμία,   αλλ'   όμοια  μέν, 
ωσπβρ  και  ή  τών  θηρίων,  α  δια  τον  θυμόν  όμόσ€ 
τη    πληγή    φάρβται.      οϋτβ    γαρ    οτι    ά8οζήσ€ΐ    Sei 

*  δ'  add.  Rieckher.  »  [αΙτΙων]  ?  Ric. :  dvdpeiwv  Sp. 

*  άν  add.  Sus.  «  και  add.  Fr. 

322 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  III.  i.  28-31 

are  not  brave  ;  this  is  how  perhaps  most  of  the  mili- 
tary class  face  dangers.  For  the  fact  is  the  exact 
opposite  of  the  view  of  Socrates,  who  thought  that 
bravery  was  knowledge  :  sailors  who  know  how  to 
go  aloft  are  not  daring  through  knowing  what  things 
are  formidable,  but  because  they  know  how  to  pro- 
tect themselves  against  the  dangers  ;  also  courage 
is  not  merely  what  makes  men  more  daring  fighters, 

29  for  in  that  case  strength  and  wealth  would  be  courage 
— as  Theognis  puts  it  : 

For  every  man  by  poverty  subdued." 

But  manifestly  some  men  do  face  emergencies  in 
spite  of  being  cowards,  owing  to  experience,  and 
they  do  so  because  they  do  not  think  that  there  is 
any  danger,  as  they  know  how  to  protect  themselves. 
A  proof  of  this  is  that  when  they  think  that  they 
have  no  protection  and  that  the  cause  of  alarm  is  now 

30  close  at  hand,  they  turn  tail.  But  among  all  such 
causes,  it  is  when  shame  makes  men  face  what  is 
alarming  that  they  would  appear  to  be  bravest,  as 
Homer  says  Hector  faced  the  danger  of  encountering 
Achilles  : 

And  shame  on  Hector  seized '' 

and 

Polydamas  will  be  the  first  to  taunt  me."      » 

31  Civic  courage  is  this  kind.  But  true  courage  is  neither 
this  nor  any  of  the  others,  though  it  resembles 
them,  as  does  the  courage  of  wild  animals,  which 
are  led  by  passion  to  rush  to  meet  the  blow.  For 
it  is  not  -from  fear  that  he  will  incur  disgrace  that  a 


"  Theognis  177.  ''  Not  in  our  Homer. 

'  Iliad  xxii.  100. 


323 


ARISTOTLE 

1230  a       ^  ^  ,^  ,      ,        /  „ 

μ€.ν€ίν   φοβούμβνον,^   ovre   δι     όργήν,   ovre   δια.   το 

25  μη  νομίζβιν  άττοθανεΐσθαι  η  δια  το  8υνάμ€ΐς  €χ€ίν 
φυλακτικάς•  ovSe  γαρ  οίησ^ται  ούτω  ye  φοβζρόν 
eirai  ούθβν.  αλλ'  inetSri  πασά  y'^  άρβτη  προαψ€-  3: 
τικϊ^  (τοΰτο  δε  ττώ?  λ€γομ€ν,  εϊρηταί  ττρότ^ρον, 
OTL  eVe/cct  τινο?  πάντα  αίρ^ΐσθαι  ττοιεΓ,  /cai  τοΰτό 
εστί    το    ου    eVe/ca    το    «ταλοΓ),    δτ^λορ»    οτι    και    τ^ 

30  avSpeia  άρ€τη  τι?  ούσα  €νβκά  tlvos  ποιησίί  τά 
φοβίρά  ύττομ€ν€ΐν,  ώστ  οϋτ€  δι  ayvoial•'  {ορθώς 
γαρ  μάλλον  TTOiet  Kpiveiv)  οϋτ€  δι'  τ^δοΓτ^ν,  αλλ' 
οτι  καλόν',  €7Γ€ΐ,  αν  ye  jlit)  καλοΓ  fj  άλλα  μανικόν, 
ούχ  ύττομ€ν€Ζ^'  αίσχρόν  γάρ. 

ΏερΙ  ΤΓοΐα  μ€ν  οΰν  €στΙν  η  avSpeia  μζσότης  καΐ  3ί 

35  τίνων  καΐ  δια  τι,  και  τά  φοβ€ρά  τίνα  Βυναμιν 
€χ€ΐ,  σχ€86ν  βΐριηται  κατά  την  παρονσαν  €φο8ον 
Ικανώς. 

II.  riepi  δε  σωφροσύνης  και  ακολασίας  μ€τά  1 
ταύτα  διελε'σ^αι  π€ίρατ€ον.  λeyeται  δ'  ο  ακόλαστο? 
77θλλα;^ώ?.  ο  τε  yap  /u,-)^  Κ€κολασμ€νος  πως*  μηΒ^ 
1230  Ιατρζύμβνος^  ωσπβρ  άτμητος  6  μη  τ^τμημένος• 
και  τούτων  6  μ€ν  8υνατ6ς  6  δ'  ά8ύνατος•  άτμητον 
γάρ  τό  Te  μη  8υνάμ€νον  τμηθηναί  και  το  8υνατόν 
μ(.ν  μη  τ€τμημ€νον  δε,  τον  αύτον  δε  τρόπον  και 
τό   ακόλαστοι^•   και   yap   τό   ρ,ι)   πζφυκός  Βζχβσθαι  2 

5  κόλασιΐ',  και  τό  πΐφυκύς  μέν  μη  Κ€Κολασμ€νον  δε 

'  Cas. :  φοβονμίΐΌνί.  *  7  add.  Μ•". 

*   Ric. :  ΰπομένα,  *   ττω  \'ict. 

'  Sp. :  ϊατιχυάμίΐΌί, 

324, 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  III.  i.  31— ii.  2 

man  ought  to  stand  his  ground,  nor  from  motives  of 
anger,  nor  because  he  does  not  think  that  he  will  be 
killed  or  because  he  has  forces  to  protect  him,  for  in 
that  case  he  will  not  think  that  there  is  really  any- 

32  thing  to  be  afraid  of.  But,  since  indeed  all  goodness 
involves  purposive  choice  (it  has  been  said  before 
what  we  mean  by  this — goodness  makes  a  man 
choose  everything  for  the  sake  of  some  object,  and 
that  object  is  what  is  fine),  it  is  clear  that  courage 
being  a  form  of  goodness  will  make  a  man  face  for- 
midable things  for  some  object,  so  that  he  does  not 
do  it  through  ignorance  (for  it  rather  makes  him 
judge  correctly),  nor  yet  for  pleasure,  but  because 
it  is  fine,  since  in  a  case  where  it  is  not  fine  but  insane 
he  will  not  face  them,  for  then  it  would  be  base  to 

,_^do  so. 

33  i  We  have  now  given  an  account  that  is  fairly  ade- 
quate for  our  present  procedure  of  the  kind  of  things 
in  relation  to  which  Courage  is  a  middle  state,  and 
between  what  vices  and  for  what  reason  it  is 
this,  and  what  is  the  power  that  formidable  things 
exercise. 

II.  We  must  next  attempt  to  decide  about  Tem-  Temper- 
perance    and    Profligacy.      The    term    '  profligate  '  profligacy 
(unchaste)    has    a   variety   of  meanings.     It   means  its  meaning. 
the  man  who  has  not  been  (as  it  were)  '  chastized  ' 
or  cured,  just   as  '  undivided  '  means   one   that  has 
not  been  divided  ;  and  these  terms  include  both  one 
capable  of  the  process  and  one  not  capable  of  it  : 
'  undivided  '    means    both    that    which    cannot    be 
divided  and  that  which  though  it  can  be  has  not  been  ; 
2  and  similarly  with  '  unchaste  ' — it  denotes  both  that 
which  is  by  nature  incapable  of  chastening  and  that 
which,  though  capable,  has  not  actually  been  chast- 

325 


ARISTOTLE 

1230  b  ^       ^ 

TTepl    αμαρτίας    rrepl    a?    όρθοπραγ^ΐ    6    σώφρων, 
cooTTep    ol    τταΓδε?"    κατά    ταντην    γαρ    ακόλαστοι 
λέγονται   την   άκολασίαν ,    eVt    δ'    αλλοι^   τρόπον   οΐ  3 
8υσίατοι    καΐ    οι    ανίατοι    πάμτταν    δια.    κολάσ€ως. 
πλ€οναχώς   δε   λεγομένης   της   ακολασίας ,   οτι   μ^ν 

10  τΓ€ρι  ήΒονάς  τινας  και  λνπας  ίίσί,  φαν^ρόν,  και 
ΟΤΙ  ev  τω  Trepi  ταύτας  8ιακ€Ϊσθαί  πως  και  άλΑτ^λω^ 
Βιαφέρουσι  και  των  άλλων  8ΐ€γράφαμ€ν  δέ  πρότ€- 
ρον  πώς  την  άκολασίαν  6νομάζοντ€ς  μ€ταφ€ρομ€ν. 
τους  δε^  άκινητως  έχοντας  δι'  άΐ'αισ^τ^σιαι^  προς  4 
ταύτας  τάς^   η^ονάς   οι  μ€ν  καλονσιν  αναίσθητους, 

15  οι  δ  άλλοι?  ονομασι  τοιούτοις  προσαγορ€υουσιν^ ' 
εστί  δ'  ου  πάνυ  γνώριμον  το  πάθος  ούδ'  επιπόλαιον  5 
δια  το  πάντας  €πι  θάτερον  άμαρτάν€ΐν  μάλλον  και 
πάσιν  eivai  σνμφυτον  την  τών  τοιούτων  η^έων  ■ήτ- 
ταν  και  αϊσθησιν.  μάλιστα  δ'  eioi  τοιούτοι  οίους 
οΐ    κωμω8ο8ώάσκαλοι    παράγουσιν    άγροίκους,    οι 

20  ουδέ*  τά  μέτρια  και  τα  αναγκαία  πλησιάζουσι  τοις 
ηΒέσιν. 

ΈτΓβι   δ'    ο    σώφρων   εστί   π€ρι   ηΒονάς,   άναγκη  & 
και  π€ρι  επιθυμίας  τινάς  αύτον  elvai.     δει  δή  λα- 
βείν  περί   τ  ίνας.     ου   γαρ    περί    πάσας    ουδέ    περί 
άπαντα  τά  rjSea   6   σώφρων   σώφρων   εστίν,   άλλα 
τη   μ€ν  8όζη   π€ρι   δυο   τών  αισθητών,   π€ρι  τ€  το 

J5  γβυστόν    και    το    άπτόν,    τη    δ     αλτ^^εια    περί    το 

*  Sus. :  -yap. 

^  ταύταί  ras  Sp. :  ras  αύτά,^. 

'  irpoaayopeuovaiv  Κοϊον  .  .  .  >  S^s.  (cf.  1231  b  1). 

*  ούδ'  e<i>  vel  ούδ'  i<s>  ?  Rac. 

"  ακόλαστα  (lit.  '  incorrigible  ')  often  means  no  more  than 
'  naughty  '  (Solomon). 

326 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  III.  ii.  2-6 

ened  in  respect  of  the  errors  as  regards  which  the 
temperate  man  acts  rightly,  as  is  the  case  with 
children  ;    for  of  them  it  is  in  this  sense  that  the 

3  term  '  unchaste  '  ^  is  used,  whereas  another  use  of 
it  again  refers  to  persons  hard  to  cure  or  entirely  in- 
curable by  chastisement.  But  though  '  profligacy  ' 
has  more  than  one  sense,  it  is  clear  that  the  profligate 
are  concerned  with  certain  pleasures  and  pains  and 
that  they  differ  from  one  another  and  from  the  other 
vicious  characters  in  being  disposed  in  a  certain 
manner  towards  these  ;  and  we  described  previously 
the  way  in  which  we  apply  the  term  '  profligacy  ' 

4  by  analogy.^     Persons  on  the  other  hand  who  owing  it»  oppo- 
to  insensitiveness  are  uninfluenced  by  these  pleas-  sltfvenesT 
ures  are  called  by  some  people  '  insensitive  '  and  by  ^^'^^• 
others  are  designated  by  other  names  of  the  same 

5  sort ;  but  the  state  is  not  a  very  familiar  one  nor  of 
common  occurrence,  because  all  men  err  more  in  the 
other  direction,  and  susceptibility  and  sensitiveness 
to  pleasures  of  this  sort  are  natural  to  everybody.  It 
specially  attaches  to  persons  like  the  boors  who  are 
a  stock  character  in  comedy — people  who  steer  clear 
of  pleasures  even  in  moderate  and  necessary  indul- 
gences. 

6  And  since  the  temperate  character  is  shown  in  Only  some 
connexion  with  pleasures,  it  follows  that  it  is  also  the*sphere 
related  to  certain  desires.     We  must,  therefore,  ascer-  of  Tem- 
tain  what  these  are.     For  the  temperate  man  is  not  P®''*"*'®• 
temperate  about  all  pleasures  nor  about  everything 
pleasant,  but  apparently  about  the  objects  of  two 

of  the  senses,  taste  and  touch,  and  in  reality  about 

*■  This  seems  to  refer  to  words  which  must  have  been  lost 
at  1221  a  20  (Solomon). 

327 


ARISTOTLE 

1280b    ^        ^ 

ατΓτόν   7T€pl  γαρ   την  δια  της   οφ^ως  ηΒονην  των  7 

καλών   {avev   βπιθνιχίας  αφροδισίων)   η  λνττην  των 
αισχρών,    καΐ    π€ρί    την    δια    της    άκοης    τών    ev- 
αρμόστων    η    ανάρμοστων,    eVt    δ€    ττρος    τάς    δι 
οσφρήσεως ,  τάς  τ€  άπο  ευωχίας  καΐ  τάς  άπο  δυσ- 

30  ωΒίας,  ουκ  εστίν  6  σώφρων  ουδέ  γαρ  ακόλαστος 
ουδείς  λέγεται  τω  πάσχειν  (ύπο  τούτωνΥ  η  μη 
πασχειν  ει  γοΰν  τις  η  καλόν  άνΒριάντα  θεώμενος  8 
η  ιπττον  η  άνθρωπον,  η  άκροώμενος  αΒοντος,  μη 
βονλοιτο  μήτε  εσθίειν  μήτε  ττίνειν  μήτε  άφροΒισιά- 
ζειν,  άλλα  τά  μεν  καλά  θεωρεΐν  τών  δ'   αγόντων 

35  ακονειν,  ουκ  αν  Βόζειεν  ακόλαστος  efp'ai,  ώσπερ 
οι5δ'  οι  κηλούμενοι  παρά  ταΐς  Έ^ειρήσιν.  αλλά  9 
περί  τα  δυο  τών  αισθητών  ταΰτα  περί  άπερ  και 
τάλλα  θηρία  μόνα  τυγχάνει  αισθητικώς  έχοντα  και 
χαίροντα  και  λυπούμενα,  περί  τά  γευστά  και 
απτά,  περί  Βε  τά  τών  άλλων  αισθήσεων'  ήΒεα  1C 
1231  a  σχεδόν  ομοίως  άπαντα  φαίνεται  άναισθήτως  δια- 
κείμενα, οίον  περί  εύαρμοστίαν  ή  κάλλος'  ούθεν 
γαρ  ο  τι  και  άζιον  λόγου  φαίνεται  πάσχοντα  αύτη 
τη  θεωρία  τών  καλών  ή  τη  άκροάσει  τών  εύαρ- 
μοστων,  ει  μή  τί  που  συμβεβηκε  τερατώδες,     αλλ* 

5  ούΒε    προς    τά    εύώΒη    ή    8υσώ8η•    καίτοι    τάς    γε 
αισ^ησ6ΐ?   όξυτερας   εχουσι   πάσας,   αλλά   και   τών  11 
οσμών  ταυται?   χαίρουσιν   οσαι   κατά   συμβεβηκός 
εύφραίνουσιν ,   αλλά  μή   καθ'   αύτάς•   λέγω   δε  μή^ 
καθ   αύτάς  αΐς  ή*  ελπίζοντες  χαίρομεν  ή  μεμνημε- 

»  Fr.  2  pb;  αισθητών  Μ". 

'  μη  add.  Fr.  *  Fr.  :  μη. 

328 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  III.  ii.  7-11 

7  the  objects  of  touch.  For  the  temperate  man  is 
not  concerned  with  the  pleasure  of  beautiful  things 
(apart  from  sexual  desire)  or  pain  caused  by  ugly 
things,  the  medium  of  which  is  sight,  nor  with  the 
pleasure  of  harmonious  sounds  or  pain  of  discords 
conveyed  through  the  medium  of  hearing,  nor  yet 
with  the  pleasures  and  pains  of  smell,  derived  from 
good  and  bad  scents  ;  for  neither  is  anyone  termed 
profligate  because  of  being  sensitive  or  not  sensitive 

8  to  sensations  of  that  sort — for  example,  a  man  would 
not  be  considered  profligate  if  when  looking  at  a 
beautiful  statue  or  horse  or  person,  or  listening  to 
someone  singing,  he  did  not  wish  for  food  or  drink 
or  sexual  indulgence  but  only  wished  to  look  at  the 
beautiful  objects  or  listen  to  the  music, — any  more 
than  the  persons  held  spell-bound  in  the  abode  of  the 

9  Sirens.  Temperance  and  profligacy  have  to  do  with 
those  two  sorts  of  sensory  objects  in  relation  to  which 
alone  the  lower  animals  also  happen  to  be  sensitive 
and  to  feel  pleasure  and  pain— the  objects  of  taste 

10  and  of  touch,  whereas  about  virtually  all  the  pleasures 
of  the  other  senses  alike  animals  are  clearly  so  con- 
stituted as  to  be  insensitive — e.g.  harmonious  sound, 
or  beauty  ;  for  clearly  they  are  not  affected  in  any 
degree  worth  speaking  of  by  the  mere  sight  of 
beautiful  objects  or  by  listening  to  musical  sounds, 
except  possibly  in  the  case  of  some  miraculous  occur- 
rences. Nor  yet  are  they  sensitive  to  good  or  bad 
smells,  although  it  is  true  that  all  their  senses  are 

11  keener  than  man's  ;  but  even  the  smells  they  enjoy 
are  those  that  have  agreeable  associations,  and  are 
not  intrinsically  agreeable.  By  smells  not  intrinsic- 
ally agreeable  I  mean  those  that  we  enjoy  because 
of  either  anticipation  or  recollection,  for  example  the 

329 


ARISTOTLE 

1231  a  ^         ^^ 

vol,  οίον  οφων  καΐ  ποτών,  δι'   irepav  γαρ  rjSovrjv 

ίΟ  ταύταις  χαίρομεν,  την  τον  φαγ^ΐν  η  metv  καθ^ 
αυτά?  8e  otat  at  των  ανθών  elaiv  (διο  ΙμμβΧώς 
ζφη  Ίίτρατόνικος  τα}  μέν  καλόν  οζαν,  τα}  δβ  rjSv). 
€7761  καΐ  τών  πβρί  το  γ€νστ6ν  ου  rrepl  πασαν  12 
TjSovTjv  €πτόηται  τα  θηρία,  ουδ'  όσων  τώ  άκρω 
της  γΧώττης  η   αΐσθησις,   αλλ'   όσων  τω  φάρυγγι, 

1Γ)  καΐ  eoLKev  αφη  μάλλον  η  γβυσβί  το  ττάθος•  διο  οΐ 
οφοφάγοί  ουκ  βϋχονται  την  '}'λώτταν  ^χ^ιν  μακράν 
άλλα  τον  φάρυγγα  γβράνον,  ώσττ€ρ  Φιλόζ€νος  6 
Ερυ^ιδο?.^  ωστ€  irepl  τα  άπτόμβνα  ως  άττλώς  13 
eLTTelv  θ^τέον  την  άκολασιαν ,  ομοίως  δε  και  ο 
ακόλαστο?    mepl    τας    τοιαύτας    €στίν•    οίνοφλυγ ια 

20  γαρ  και  γαστριμαργια  και  λα^ΐ'εια  και  οφοφαγια^ 
και  πάντα  τα  τοιαύτα  περί  τάς  €ίρημ4νας  βστιν 
αίσθησης,  €ίς  άπβρ  μόρια  η  ακολασία  διαιρείται. 
π€ρι  δε  τα?  δι'  οφεως  η  άκοης  η  όσφρησ€ως  14 
ηΒονάς  ούθβις  λέγεται  ακόλαστο?  eav  ύπβρβάλλη, 
αλλ'  άν€υ  όι/ειδου?  τα?  αμαρτίας  φ€γομ€ν  ταύτα?, 

25  και   όλως  πβρί  όσα  μη  λέγονται  €γκρατ€Ϊς•  οι  δ 
άκρατει?  ουκ  ει'σιν  ακόλαστοι  ουδέ  σώφρονβς. 

'Αναίσθητος  μ^ν  ουν,  η   όπως  δει   όνομάζ^ιν,   ο  U 
οϋτως    €χων    ώστε    και    ελλείπει^    όσων    ανάγκη 
κοινωνύν  ως   €πΙ  το   πολύ  τται^τα?   και  χαιρβιν  ο 
δ'    υπερβάλλων    ακόλαστος .      πάντες    γαρ    τούτοις  \{ 

:io  φύσει  τε  -χαίρουσι  και  επιθυμίας  λαμβάνονσι,  και 

^  τά  ,  .  .  τά  Cas. :  ras  .  .  .  ras. 
*  Syl. :  έρύξίΟί,  έξ  ϋριδο^.  '  όψοφα^ία  καΐ  \ayvtia  Ric. 

"  Α  contemporary  musician,  a  number  of  whose  smart 
sayings  are  recorded  by  Athenaeus  viii.  347  f-352  d. 

330 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  ΠΙ.  π.  11-16 

smell  of  things  to  eat  or  drink,  for  we  enjoy  these 
scents  on  account  of  a  different  pleasure,  that  of 
eating  or  drinking  ;  by  intrinsically  agreeable  I  mean 
scents  such  as  those  of  flowers  (this  is  the  reason  of 
Stratonicus's*  neat  remark  that  the  scent  of  flowers  is 
beautiful  but  that  of  things  to  eat  and  drink  sweet). 

12  For  even  the  pleasures  of  taste  are  not  all  attractive 
to  animals,  nor  are  those  perceived  with  the  tip  of 
the  tongue,  but  those  perceived  by  the  throat,  the 
sensation  of  which  seems  more  like  touch  than 
taste  ;  so  that  gourmands  do  not  pray  that  they  may 
have  a  long  tongue  but  a  crane's  gullet,  like  Philo- 

13  xenussonof  Eryxis.^    It  follows  that  broadly  speaking  Profligacy 
profligacy  must  be  considered  to  be  related  to  the  t/neuished 
objects  of  touch,  and  likewise  it  is  with  pleasures  of  from  incon- 
that  sort  that  the  profligate  is  concerned  ;    for  tip-  *'°^"'^®• 
pling  and  gluttony  and  lechery  and  gormandizing 

and  the  like  all  have  to  do  with  the  sensations  speci- 
fied, and  these  are  the  departments  into  which  pro- 

14  fligacy  is  divided.  But  nobody  is  called  profligate 
if  he  exceeds  in  regard  to  the  pleasures  of  sight  or 
hearing  or  smell  ;  those  errors  we  criticize  without 
severe  rebuke,  and  generally  all  the  things  in- 
cluded under  the  term  '  lack  of  self-control  '  :  the 
uncontrolled  are  not  profligate,  yet  they  are  not 
temperate. 

15  Therefore  the  person  of  such  a  character  as  to 
be  deficient  in  all  the  enjoyments  which  practically 
everybody  must  share  and  must  enjoy,  is  insensitive 
(or  whatever  the  proper  term  is),  and  he  that  ex- 

16  ceeds  in  them  is  profligate.  For  all  people  by  nature 
enjoy  these  things,  and  conceive  desires  for  them, 

"  Mr.  Hospitable,  son  of  Mistress  Belch — presumably  a 
character  in  comedy. 

331 


ARISTOTLE 

1231  a      ^ 

ovK  eiGLV  ov8e  Xeyovrai  ακόλαστοι,  ου  γαρ  VTrep- 
βαλλονσι    τω    χαίρ^ιν    μάλλον    η    δβι    τνγχάνοντ€ς 
και  λυττ^ίσθαι  μάλλον  -η  δει  μη  τνγχάνοντ€ς•  οι5δ' 
ανάλγητοι,   ου   γαρ   ελλειττουσι    τω   χαίρ€ΐν   η   λυ 
π€Ϊσθαί,  αλλά  μά?^ον  νττβρβάλλουσιν . 
35       Ettci  δ'  eoTLV  ύπβρβολη  καΐ  ζλλαφι,ς  ττ€ρΙ  αυτά,  17 
8ηλον  OTL  καΐ  μεσάτης,  καΐ  βέλτιστη  αϋτη  η  e^is, 
και     αμφοΐν     Ιναντία.       ωστ'     et^     σωφροσύνη     η 
β€λτίστη    βξις    πβρί    α    ο    ακόλαστος,    η    7Τ€ρΙ    τά 
ηοβα  τα  αρημζνα  των  αισθητών  μ^σότης  σωφροσύνη 
αν  €ίη,  μ€σοτης  ούσα  ακολασίας  καΐ  άι^αισ^τ^σια?• 
1231  h  η     δ'     υπερβολή     ακολασία,     η     δ'     ελλειφις    ήτοι 
ανώνυμος  η  τοις  είρημένοις  όνόμασι  προσαγορβυο- 
μ€νη.       ακρφβστερον    δε     π€ρΙ     του    γένους    των  18 
ηδονών  έσται  8ίαιρ€Τ€ον  iv  τοις  λεγομενοις  ύστερον 
περί  εγκράτειας  καΐ  άκρασίας. 
5      III.   Ύον    αυτόν    Βε    τρόπον    ληπτεον    καΐ    περί  1 
πραότητας  καΐ  χαλεπότητος.     καΐ  γαρ  τον  πράον 
περί    λύπην    την    από    θυμοΰ    γιγνομενην    όρώμεν 
οντά,    τω   προς   ταύτην   εχειν   πώς.      Βιεγράφαμεν 
οε   καΐ   άντεθήκαμεν  τω   όργίλω   καΐ  χαλεπώ   καΐ 
αγριω    (πάντα    γαρ    τά    τοιαύτα    της    αυττ]?    eWt 
10  διαθέσεως)  τόν  άν8ραπο8ώ8η  και  τόν  άνόργητον^• 
σχε8όν  γάρ  ταύτα  μάλιστα  καλοΰσι  τους  μη8^  εφ^  2 
οσοις  8εΐ  κινούμενους  τόν  θυμόν,  αλλά  προπηλακι- 
ζομενους    ευχερώς    και    ταπεινούς    προς    τάς    ολι- 
γωρίας'   εστί    γάρ    άντικείμενον    τω    μεν    ταχύ    τό 

1  Sp.:  ώστ€.       2  Rac.  (cf.  1220  b  38,  1221  a  17):  άνόητον. 

"  άνά\•γητοι    is   thrown    in    as    a    possible    synonym    for 
αναίσθητοι.  See  §  15. 

*  Perhaps  in  a  sentence  lost  at  1230  b  15. 
«  See  1220  b  38,  1221  b  12-15. 

S32 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  III.  n.  16— iii.  2 

without  being  or  being  called  profligate,  for  they 
do  not  exceed  by  feeling  more  joy  than  they  ought 
when  they  get  them  nor  more  pain  than  they  ought 
when  they  do  not  get  them  ;  nor  yet  are  they 
unfeeling,"  for  they  do  not  fall  short  in  feeling  joy 
or  pain,  but  rather  exceed. 

17  And  since  there  are  excess  and  deficiency  in  re- 
gard to  these  things,  it  is  clear  that  there  is  also  a 
middle  state,  and  that  this  state  of  character  is  the 
best  one,  and  is  the  opposite  of  both  the  others. 
Hence  if  temperance  is  the  best  state  of  character 
in  relation  to  the  things  with  which  the  profligate 
is  concerned,  the  middle  state  in  regard  to  the  pleas- 
ant objects  of  sense  mentioned  will  be  Temperance, 
being  a  middle  state  between  profligacy  and  in- 
sensitiveness  :  the  excess  will  be  Profligacy,  and  the 
deficiency  will  either  be  nameless  or  will  be  denoted 

18  by  the  terms  mentioned.  **  We  shall  have  to  define 
the  class  of  pleasures  concerned  more  exactly  in  our 
discussion  of  Self-control  and  Lack  of  Control  later  on. 

1  III.  And  also  the  nature  of  Gentleness  and  Harsh-  gentlk- 
ness  must  be  ascertained  in  the  same  way.     For  we  r^semuneur 
see  that  the  term  '  gentle  '  is  concerned   with  the  of  insult. 
pain  that  arises  from  passion — a  man  is  gentle  by 

being  disposed  in  a  certain  way  towards  that  pain. 
And  in  our  diagram  '^  we  opposed  to  the  irascible 
and  harsh  and  fierce  man  (for  all  such  traits  belong 
to  the  same  disposition)  the  slavish  and  spiritless  ^ 

2  man  ;  for  these  are  perhaps  the  most  usual  words 
to  denote  those  whose  passion  is  not  aroused  even  at 
all  the  things  at  which  it  ought  to  be,  but  who  undergo 
insulting  treatment  readily  and  meet  slights  with 
humility  ;   since  as  opposed  to  feeling  the  pain  that 

■^  The  Mss.  give  '  slavish  and  senseless.' 

333 


ARISTOTLE 

1231b  ^      ο,       ,     , 

μολίς,    τω    ο     ηρβμα    το    σφό8ρα,    τω    δβ    ττολύν 

15  χ^ρόνον  το  ολίγον  λνπ€Ϊσθαί  ταύτην  την  λνττην  rjv 
καλοΰμβν  θυμόν.  εττει  δ'  ωστηρ  καΧ  ΙττΧ  των  3 
αΚΚων  β'ίπομζν,  και  €ντανθ^  €στΙν  ύττβρβολή  καΐ 
ζλλξίφίς  (ο  μ€ν  γαρ  χαλξπος  τοιούτος  βστιν,  6  και 
θαττον  και  μάλλον  ττάσχων^  καΐ  ττλ^ίω  χρόνον  καΐ 
οτ     ου   δεΓ   καΐ   οποίοις    ου    8et   και    €πΙ    ττολλοΐς, 

20  ο  δ  ανδρατΓοδώδτ^?  τουναντίον) ,  Βηλον  οτι  έ'στι 
τις  και  ο^  μ€σος  της  άνισότητος.  irrei  ουν  ημαρτη-  4 
//.evat  αμφότβραι  at  e^et?  €Κ€Ϊναι,  φαν^ρον  οτι  €πι- 
€ΐκης  η  μέση  τούτων  βξις-  οϋτ€  γαρ  TrpoTcpei 
ούθ  ύστ€ρίζ€ΐ,  οϋτ€  οΐς  ου  δει  οργίζεται  οϋτ( 
οΐς  8ei  ουκ  όργίζ€ται.     ωοτ    inei  και  ττραότης  η 

25  βέλτιστη  €ξις  ττβρι  ταύτα  τα  πάθη  εστίν,  €Ϊη  αν 
και  ή  ττραότης  μεσάτης  τις,  και  ο  πράος  μέσος  του 
χαλβποϋ  και  του  άν8ραπο8ώ8ους . 

IV.  Έστι    Se    και   η   μ€γαλοφυχία    και   η   μ€γα-  1 
λοπρ€π€ΐα    και    η    Ιλ^υθίριότης    μ€σότητ€ς,    η    μεν 
ΐλευθεριότης  περί  χρημάτων  κτήσιν  και  άποβολην. 

30  ο  μβν  γαρ  κτήσει  μ^ν  πάση  μάλλον  χαίρων  η  δει 
αποβολή  he  πάση  λυπούμενος  μάλλον  η  Sel 
ανελεύθερος,  ο  δ'  αμφότερα  ήττον  η  8εΐ  άσωτος, 
ο  ο  άμφω  ώς  Βεΐ  ελευθέριος  [τοΰτο  8έ  λέγω  το 
ως  οεΐ,  και  επι  τούτων  και  επι  των  άλλων,  το 
ως  ο  λόγος  6  ορθός),     επει  δ'  εκείνοι  μεν  είσιν  εν  2 

3'i  υπερβολή  και  ελλείφει,  οπού  hk  εσχατά  εισι,  και 
μέσον,  και  τοΰτο  βελτιστον,  εν  8έ  περί  εκαστον 
τω  εΊ8ει  το  βελτιστον , ανάγκη  και  την  ελευθεριότητα 

*  ό  καΐ  .  .  ,  πάσχων :  olos  και  .  .   .  ττάσχίΐν  Sp. 
2  [ό]  ?  Rac. 

"  i.e.  half-way  between  excess  and  defect. 
334 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  III.  iii.  2— iv.  2 

we  call  passion  quickly,  extremely  or  for  a  long  time 
there  is  feeling  it  slowly,  slightly,  or  for  a  short  time. 

3  And  since,  as  we  said  in  the  other  cases,  so  here  also 
there  is  excess  and  deficiency  (for  the  harsh  man  is 
the  sort  of  man  that  feels  this  emotion  too  quickly, 
too  long,  at  the  wrong  time,  with  the  wrong  kind  of 
people,  and  with  many  people,  while  the  slavish 
man  is  the  opposite),  it  is  clear  that  there  is  also  some- 
body who  is  at  the  middle  point  in  the  inequality." 

4  Since,  therefore,  both  those  states  of  character  are 
wrong,  it  is  clear  that  the  state  midway  betAveen  them 
is  right,  for  it  is  neither  too  hasty  nor  too  slow- 
tempered,  nor  does  it  get  angry  with  the  people  with 
whom  it  ought  not  nor  fail  to  get  angry  with  those 
with  whom  it  ought.  So  that  since  the  best  state  of 
character  in  regard  to  those  feelings  is  gentleness. 
Gentleness  also  would  be  a  middle  state,  and  the 
gentle  man  Avould  be  midway  between  the  harsh  man 

Wand  the  slavish  man. 

ί  1 J    IV.  Greatness    of   Spirit    and    Magnificence    and  f^iberal- 
j  Liberality  are  also  middle  states.     Liberality  is  the  ,η^άη  be- 
mean  in  regard  to  the  acquisition  and  expenditure  tweenMean- 
of  wealth.     The  man  who  is  more  pleased  than  he  prciisaiity 
ought  to  be  by  all  acquisition  and  more  pained  than  '"F;f^g"|. 
he  ought  to  be  by  all  expenditure  is  mean,  he  that  ing. 
feels  both  feelings  less  than  he  ought  is   prodigal, 
and  he  that  feels  both  as  he  ought  is  liberal  (what  I 
mean  bv  '  as  he  ought,'  both  in  this  and  in  the  other 
2  cases,  is  '  as  right  principle  directs  ').     And  since  the 
two    former    characters    consist   in    excess    and   de- 
ficiency, and  where  there  are  extremes  there  is  also 
a  mean,  and  that  mean  is  best,  there  being  a  single 
best  for  each  kind  of  action,  a  single  thing,  it  neces- 
sarily follows  that  liberality  is  a  middle  state  between 

335 


ARISTOTLE 

1231  b 

μ€σοτητα    elvat    ασωτία?    καΐ    aveXevdepias    Trepl 
χρημάτων    κτησιν    καΐ    άποβολην.       Βυχώς    δε    τα  3 
χρήματα   λέγομ^ν   καί   την   χρηματιστικην   η   μ€ν 

1232  a  γαρ   καθ^   αυτό   χρήσις   του   κτήματος   €στιν,   οίον 

υποδήματος  ή  ιματίου,  ή  δε  κατά  συμβζβηκος 
μβν,  ου  μύντοι  οϋτως  ώς  αν  ει  τις  σταθμω 
χρησαίτο  τω  ύπο8ήματί,  αλλ'  οίον  ή  πώλησις  και 
ή  μίσθωσις-  χρήται  γαρ  fi  υπόδημα}  6  δε  ^ιλ-  4 
r.  άργυρος  6  πβρι  το  νόμισμα  ioTiv  €σπου8ακώς,  το 
δε  νό/χισ/χα  της  κτήσβως  άντι  της  κατά  συμβίβηκος 
χρήσβώς  Ιστιν.  6  δ'  άνζλ^ύθζρος  ^ΐη  αν'  και  5 
άσωτο?  περί  τον  κατά  συμβββηκος  τρόπον  τοΰ 
χρηματισμού•  και  γάρ  ε'ττι  τοΰ  κατά  φύσιν  χρη- 
ματισμού    την     αϋ^τ^σιΐ'     διώκει.       6     δ'     άσωτος 

10  ελλείπει  των  αναγκαίων,  6  δ'  ελευθέριο?  την 
7Τ€ριουσιαν  8ώωσιν.  αυτών  δε  τούτων  €ΐ8η  Γ» 
λέγονται  Βιαφίροντα  τω  μάλλον  και  ήττον  π^ρΐ 
μόρια•  οίον  άν^λ^ύθ^ρος  φβώωλός  και  κίμβιξ  και 
αίσχροκ€ρ8ής,  φειδωλό?  μέν  iv  τω  μη  προΪ€σΟαι, 
αισχροκερδής  δ'   iv  τω  ότιοΰν  προσίεσθαι,  κίμβιξ 

15  δε  6  σφό8ρα  π€ρΙ  μικρά  8ιατ€ΐνόμ€νος,  παραλογισ- 
της  δε  και  άποστερητής  ο  άδικο?  κατ'  άνΐλευθζρίαν 
και  τοΰ  ασώτου  ωσαύτως  λαφύκτης  μεν  6  iv  τώ  7 
ατακτω?    άΐ'αλισκειρ',    άλoyιστos■    δε    ό    iv   τω   μη 
υπομ€ν€ΐν  τήν  από  λογισμού  λύπην. 

V.    Yiepi  δε  μεγαλοψυχίας  ε'κ  τών  τοις  μεγάλο-  Ι 

■Λ)  φύχοις  άποΒώομενων  δει  8ιορίσαι  τό  ΐ8ιον.     ώσπερ' 

*  <g>  υπόδημα  Rac.  {νηοδήματι  V^ic,  ύποδήματι  <rj  ΰπ6δημα> 
Sus.) :  ΰτΓοδήματοί  aut  -τα.  *  ν.1.  &ν  (Ιη.  ^  Βζ. :  αίτιον. 

"  Cf.  Pol.  I.,  1257  a  14,  where  the  use  of  a  shoe  for  sale  is 
included  with  its  use  for  wear  under  xpfjffit  καθ'  αί'τό,  but  dis- 
336 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  III.  iv.  2— v.  1 

prodigality  and  meanness  as    regards    getting    and 

3  parting  with  wealth.  But  the  terms  '  wealth  '  and 
'  art  of  wealth  '  we  use  in  two  senses,  since  one 
way  of  using  an  article  of  property,  for  example 
a  shoe  or  a  cloak,  is  proper  to  the  article  itself," 
another  is  accidental,  though  not  as  using  a  shoe  for 
a  weight  would  be  an  accidental  use  of  it,  but  for 
example  selling  it  or  letting  it  on  hire,  for  these  uses 

4  do  employ  it  as  a  shoe.  The  covetous  man  is  the 
party  whose  interest  centres  on  money,  and  money 
is  a  thing  of  ownership  instead  of  accidental  use. 

5  But  the  mean  man  might  be  even  prodigal  in 
regard  to  the  accidental  mode  of  getting  wealth, 
inasmuch  as  it  is  in  the  natural  acquisition  of  wealth 
that  he  pursues  increase.  The  prodigal  man  lacks 
necessities,   but   the   liberal   man    gives   his  super- 

6  fluity.  And  of  these  classes  themselves  there  are 
species  designated  as  exceeding  or  deficient  in 
respect  of  parts  of  the  matter  concerned :  for 
example,  the  stingy  man,  the  skinflint  and  the  profit- 
eer are  mean  —  the  stingy  in  not  parting  with 
money,  the  profiteer  in  accepting  anything,  the  skin- 
flint is  he  who  is  very  excited  about  small  sums  ; 
also  the  man  who  offends  by  way  of  meanness  is  a 

7  false  reckoner  and  a  cheat.  Similarly  '  prodigal ' 
includes  the  spendthrift  who  is  prodigal  in  un- 
regulated spending  and  the  reckless  man  who  is 
prodigal    in  not  being  able    to  endure  the  pain  of 

^calculation. 

1 J    V.  On  the  subject  of  Greatness  of  Spirit  we  must  Μαονλνι- 
"^define  its  characteristic  from  the  attributes  of  the  it  implies 

-^  all  the 

'  11/.•  '      :  '       .    <     u  •      virtues. 

tinguished  from  it  as  ούχ   o/xoiws   καθ    avro,  because  not  its 

οικεία  χρησιν,  ού  yap  αλλαγή?  'ένΐκα  yayovev.     The  term  χρήματα 

itself  denotes  to  the  Greek  ear  '  useful  things.' 

ζ  337 


ARISTOTLE 

1232  a       ^ 

γαρ   και  τα   άλλα    {ά)^    κατά   την   γξίτνίασιν   καΐ 
ομοιότητα     μ-^χρι     τον     λανθάνει^      (βιαφ4ρονταΥ 
■πόρρω  προϊόντα,  και  vrept  την  μεγαλοφυχίαν  ταντο 
συμβ€βηκ€ν.       διό    ivioTe    οι    ivavTLOi    τον    αντοΰ  2 
αντιποιούνται,  οίον  6  άσωτος  τω  eXevOepito  και  6 

25  ανθάΒης  τω  σ€μνω  και  ο  θρασνς  τω  avSpeio)•  eiVt 
γαρ  και  ττβρι  ταύτα  και  όμοροι  μ^χρι  τινός,  ώσπ^ρ 
ο  αν8ρ€Ϊος  υπομονετικός  κιν8ννων  και  ό  θρασνς, 
αλλ  ο  μεν  ίοδε  ό  δ'  ώδε*  ταντα  δε  διάφοροι 
πλείστον,  λόγομεν  Se  τον  μογαλόφνχον  κατά  την  3 
τοΰ  ονόματος  προσηγορίαν,  ώσπορ  iv  μεγέθοι  τινι 

30  φνχης  και  Βννάμει.*  ωστ€  και  τω  σβμνω  και  τω 
μεγαλόπρεποι  όμοιος  eij^at  δο/cet,  ότι^  και  ττάσαι? 
ται?  άρεταΐς  άκολονθεΐν  φαίνεται.  και  γάρ  το  4 
ορθώς  κρΐναι  τά  μεγάλα  και  μικρά  των  αγαθών 
επαινετόν  8οκ€Ϊ  8ε  ταΰτ'  eii'at  μεγάλα  ά  8ιώκει 
6  την  κρατίστην  έχων  εξιν  περί  τά  τοιαύτα*  ή8εα, 

35  η    8ε    μεγαλοφνχία    κρατίστη.      κρίνει    δ'    η    περί  5 
εκαστον  άρετη   το  μείζον  και  το   ελαττον  ορθώς, 
άπερ^  ο  φρόνιμος  αν  κελενσειε  και  η  άρετη, ^  ώστε 
εττεσθαι  αυττ^  πάσας  τάς  άρετάς,  η  αντην  επεσθαι 
ττασαι?. 

'  Ετι  8οκεΐ  μεγαλοφύχον  eii^ai  το  καταφρονητικόν  6 

efi^ai.    εκάστη  δ'  άρετη  καταφρονητικονς  ποιεί  τών 

1232  b  πάρα  τον  λόγον  μεγάλων,  οΐον    άν8ρεία^  κιν8ννων 

{μέγα    γάρ    ήγεΐσθαι^'^    οιεται    «Γναι    τών    αισχρών 

και  πλήθος  ού  πάν  φοβερόν),  και  σώφρων  'η8ονών 

'  Γγ.  2  Cas_ .  ^Qj5  χανθάνειν.  »  Rac. 

*  Γ :   δvvάμ(ωs.  *  Sus. :  Sre. 

•  τοιαντα  Ric. :  τοιαντ  εΐναι  (e  priore  linea). 

'   κάθατΓ(ρ  ?  Sp. 
*  ή  <τοιαι)τ77>  άρΐΤΎ)  vel  ή  φρόνησίί  ?  Rac, 
»  ay8pe:os  Sp.  ιβ  τ,^ύσθαι  (cf.  1233  a  31)  add.  Sol. 

338 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  III.  v.  1-6 

great-spirited  man.  For  just  as  in  the  other  cases 
of  things  that,  owing  to  their  affinity  and  similarity 
up  to  a  point,  are  not  noticed  to  differ  Avhen  they 
advance  further,  the  same  has  happened  about  great- 

2  ness  of  spirit.  Hence  sometimes  the  opposite  char- 
acters claim  the  same  quality,  for  instance  the  ex- 
travagant man  claims  to  be  the  same  as  the  liberal, 
the  self-willed  as  the  proud,  the  daring  as  the  brave  ; 
for  they  are  concerned  with  the  same  things,  and 
also  are  neighbours  up  to  a  point,  as  the  brave  man 
can  endure  dangers  and  so  can  the  daring  man,  but 
the  former  in  one  way  and  the  latter  in  another,  and 

3  that  makes  a  very  great  difference.  And  we  use  the 
term  '  great-spirited  '  according  to  the  designation 
of  the  word,  as  consisting  in  a  certain  greatness  or 
power  of  spirit.  So  that  the  great-spirited  man 
seems  to  resemble  both  the  proud  man  and  the 
magnificent,  because  greatness  of  spirit  seems  to  go 

4  with  all  the  virtues  also.  For  it  is  praiseworthy  to 
judge  great  and  small  goods  rightly  ;  and  those 
goods  seem  great  which  a  man  pursues  who  possesses 
the  best  state  of  character  in  relation  to  such  pleas- 

5  ures,  and  greatness  of  spirit  is  the  best.  And  the 
virtue  concerned  with  each  thing  judges  rightly  the 
greater  and  the  smaller  good,  just  as  the  wise  man 
and  virtue  would  bid,  so  that  all  the  virtues  go  with 
it,  or  it  goes  with  all  the  virtues. 

6  Again,  it  is  thought  characteristic  of  the  great-  indifferent 
spirited  man  to  be  disdainful.     Each  virtue  makes  iarfty^"' 
men  disdainful  of  things  irrationally  deemed  great  : 

for  example,  courage  makes  a  man  disdainful  of 
dangers,  for  he  thinks  that  to  consider  danger  a  great 
matter  is  a  disgraceful  thing,  and  that  numbers  are  not 
always  formidable  ;    and  the  sober-minded  man  dis- 

339 


ARISTOTLE 

1332  b 

μεγάλων  καΐ  ττολλών,  καΐ  iXevdepLog  χρημάτων, 
μβγαλοφνχου  δε  τοΰτο  δο/cet  etvai^  δια  το  rrepl  7 
5  ολίγα  σττουΒάζζΐν  καΐ  ταύτα  μεγάλα,  και  ονχ 
ό  τι^  δο/cet  €Τ€ρω  τινί.  καΐ  μάλλον  άν  φροντίσ€ΐ€ν 
ανηρ  μεγαλόψυχος  τι  δο/cet  ivl  σπονΒαίω  η  πολ- 
λοίς τοις  τυγχάνουσιν,^  ώσττερ  ^Αντιφών  '4φη 
προς  Αγάθωνα  καταψηφισμένος*  την  άπολογίαν 
επαινεσαντα.      καΐ  το   ολίγωρον  του  μεγαλοφυχου 

10  μάλιστ    είναι  πάθος  ΐ8ιον.      πάλιν  περί  Tt/Lt^9   και  8 
του  ζην  και  πλούτου,  περί  ων  σπου8άζειν  Βοκοΰσιν 
οι  άνθρωποι,  ονθέν  φροντίζειν^  περί  των  άλλων  πλην 
περί  τιμής•  και  λυποΐτ^  άν^  άτιμαζόμενος  και  αρχό- 
μενος υπό  αναξίου,  και  χαίρει  μάλιστα  τυγχάνων. 
Ούτω   μεν   ουν   ^όζειεν    άν    eVavrta»?    e'xeti',    το  9 

lii  γαρ  είναι  τε  /ActAtCTTa  περί  τιμήν  και  καταφρονη- 
τικον  eti^ai  των  πολλών  /cat  Βό^ης^  ούχ  όμολογεΐσθαι. 
οεΐ  οε   τοΰτο   8ιορίσαντας   ειπείν,      εστί   γαρ   τιμή  ίο 
και  μικρά  και  μεγάλη  8ιχώς•  η  γαρ  τω  υπό  πολλών 
τών  τυχόντων  η    /cat*  ύπό^  τών   άξιων   λόγου,  και 

20  πάλιν  τω  επι  τίνι  η  τιμή  8ιαφερει•  μεγάλη  γάρ 
ου  τω  πληθει  τών  τιμώντων  ούΒε  τω  ποιώ  μόνον, 
αλλά  και  τω  τιμία^"  ett-af  τη  άληθεία  8ε  και  at 
αρχαι  και  ταλλα  aya^a  τίμια  και  afta  σπου8ης 
ταΰτα  όσα  μεγάλα  αληθώς  εστίν,  ώστε  και  άρετη 

^  ehai  add.  Rac. :  τοΰτο  δοκ(ΐ  ant  δοκΰ  τοΰτο. 

*  Rac. :  δη  edd.  ^  τυχοΰσιν  Cas. 

*  ν.Ι.  κατΐψΐυσμένωί.  *  φροντίζΐί  Cas. 

'  Ric.  (vel  Χυττηθησΐταί)  :  λνπηθήσοιτ  &ι>. 

'  fhai  TTjs  τών  ττολλων  δόξηί  ?  (λαϊ  cm.  Γ)  Rac, 

*  Ric. :  1j.  »  ί/7ΓΟ  ?  Ric. :  τφ  ύιτδ. 

"  Sol.  (τίμια  ?  Ric.) :  ημίαν. 

'  Λ  variant  reading  gives  'as  Λ.  said  to  A.  when  he  in- 
340 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  III.  v.  6-10 

dains  great  and  numerous  pleasures,  and  the  liberal 

7  man  wealth.  But  the  reason  why  this  is  thought 
characteristic  of  the  great-spirited  man  is  because  of 
his  caring  about  fcAV  things  and  those  great  ones, 
and  not  about  Λvhatever  somebody  else  thinks. 
And  a  great-spirited  man  would  consider  more  what 
one  virtuous  man  thinks  than  what  many  ordinary 
people  think,  as  Antiphon  after  his  condemnation 
said  to  Agathon  when  he  praised  his  speech  for  his 
defence.'*  And  a  feeling  thought  to  be  specially 
characteristic  of  the   great-spirited  man  is  disdain. 

8  On  the  other  hand,  as  to  the  accepted  objects  of  but  loves 
human  interest,  honour,  life,  wealth,  he  is  thought  to  i^ono"•" 
care  nothing  about  any  of  them  except  honour  ;   it 
would  grieve  him  to  be  dishonoured  and  ruled  by 
someone  unworthy,  and  his  greatest  joy  is  to  obtain 
honour. 

9  Thus  he  might  therefore  be  thought  inconsistent, 
on  the  ground  that  to  be  specially  concerned  about 
honour  and  to  be  disdainful  of  the  multitude  and  of 

10  reputation  do  not  go  together.  But  in  saying  this  ot  the  nobi. 
we  must  distinguish.  Honour  is  small  or  great  in  '^""^• 
two  ways  :  it  differs  in  being  conferred  either  by 
many  ordinary  people  or  by  persons  of  consideration, 
and  again  it  differs  in  what  it  is  conferred  for,  since 
its  greatness  does  not  depend  only  on  the  number  or 
the  quality  of  those  who  confer  it,  but  also  on  its 
being  honourable  ;  and  in  reality  those  offices  and 
other  good  things  are  honourable  and  worthy  of 
serious  pursuit  that  are  truly  great,  so  that  there  is 

sincerely  praised  his  defence.'  For  Antiphon's  indictment 
as  a  leader  in  the  revolution  of  the  Four  Hundred  at  Athens 
see  Thuc.  viii.  68.  Agathon  is  presumably  the  tragic  poet, 
see  Plato's  Symposium.  The  anecdote  is  not  recorded  else- 
where. 

341 


ARISTOTLE 

1232  b      ^ 

ovSe^ia  av€v  μζγέθους'  διό  hoKovai  μ.€γαλοφύχους 
25  not€iv  ζκαστη  ττβρι  ο  εστίν  εκάστη  αύτώι^,  ωσπερ 
απομβν.  αλλ'  όμως  εστί  τίς  τταρά  τάς  άλλας  11 
αρετας  μια  μεγαλοφνχία,  ωστε^  καΐ  ίδια  μεγαλό- 
φνχον  τούτον  λεκτεον  τον  έχοντα  ταυτην.  επεί 
δ  εστίν  ενια  των  aya^cul•-  τά  μεν  τίμια  τα.  δ'  ου/ 
ως  οίωρισθτη  ττρότερον,  των  τοιούτων  δ'  aya^ojl•' 
βστι  τά  juev  μεγάλα  κατ  αληθειαν  τά  δε  μικρά, 
30  'cat  τούτων  eVtot  α^ιοι  /cat  ά^ιοΰσιν  αύτοιί?,  εν 
τούτοις  ζητητεος  6  μεγαλόφυχος.  τετραχώς  δ'  12 
ανάγκη  διαφερειν  εστί  μεν  γαρ  άζιον  είναι 
μεγάλων  και  άζιοϋν  εαυτόν  τούτων,  εστί  hk  μικρά 
και  άζιον  eti^at"  τηλικοντων  και  άζιοΰν  εαυτόν 
τούτων,  έστι  δ  άνάτταλιΐ'  προς  εκάτερα  αυτών  ό 
35  μ^ν  γάρ  αν  εΐη  τοιούτος  οίος  άζιος  ων  μικρών 
μεγάλων*  άζιοΰν  εαυτόν  τών  εντίμων  άγα^ώι^,  ο 
8ε  άζιος  ων  μεγάλων  άζιοίη  αν  μικρών  εαυτόν, 
ό  μεν  οΰν  άξιος  μικρών,  μεγάλων  δ'  ά^ιώΐ'  εαυτόν,  13 
φεκτός•  άνόητον  γάρ  και  ου  καλόν  τό  παρά  την 
aftW*  τιη/χάνειν.     φεκτός  δε   fcat   οστι?   a^tos"  ώι^ 

1233  a  υπαρχόντων  αύτώ  τών  τοιούτων  μετεχειν  μη  άζιοΐ 

εαυτόν.       λείπεται    8ε    ενταύθα    ενάντιος    τούτοις  14 
αμφοτεροις   όστις   ων   άζιος  μεγάλων   άξιοι   αυτός 
εαυτόν    τούτων,    και    τοιούτος    εστίν    οίος    άζιοΰν^ 

^  Γ :  (cawep.  ^  ου  add.  Sol. 

^  elvat  (vel  eluai  τι^α)  Ric. :   riva. 

*  [μεγάλων]  ?  liac 

*  άξίαν  ζ.άξιοΰντα  vel  ο'ώμ^ρον  vel  χαννούμ^νον'^  Ric. 

•  οίον  άξιοι  Ric.  (οΓοϊ  άξιοι  Sp.). 

•  See  a  39.  »  i.e.  11.  17  ff. 

*  Perhaps  the  lecturer  points  to  a  diagram  (Solomon). 
342. 


EUDEMIAN  ELTHICS,  III.  v.  io-l4 

no  goodness  without  greatness  ;  owing  to  which  each 
of  the  virtues  seems  to  make  men  great-spirited  in 
regard  to  the  things  Avith  which  that  virtue  is  con- 

11  cerned,  as  we  said.*  But  nevertheless  there  is  a 
single  virtue  of  greatness  of  spirit  side  by  side  with 
the  other  virtues,  so  that  the  possessor  of  this  virtue 
must  be  termed  great-spirited  in  a  special  sense. 
And  since  there  are  certain  goods  which  are  in  some 
cases  honourable  and  in  others  not,  according  to 
the  distinction  made  before,''  and  of  goods  of  this 
sort  some  are  truly  great  and  others  small,  and  some 
men  deserve  and  claim  the  former,  it  is  among 
these    men    that   the    great-spirited   man   must   be 

12  looked  for.     And  there  are  necessarily  four  varieties  Four 
of  claim  :    it  is  possible  to  deserve  great  things  and  towardr 
to  claim  them  as  one's  desert  ;    and  there  are  small  iionoiu•. 
things  and  a  man  may  deserve  and  claim  things  of    . 
that  size  ;    and  as  regards  each  of  these  ΐΛνο  classes 

of  things  the  reverse  is  possible — one  man  may  be 
of  such  a  character  that  although  deserving  small 
things  he  claims  great  ones — the  goods  held  in  high 
honour,   and   another  man  though  deserving  great 

13  things  may  claim  small  ones.  Now  the  man  worthy 
of  small  things  but  claiming  great  ones  is  blame- 
worthy, for  it  is  foolish  and  not  fine  to  obtain  what 
does  not  correspond  to  one's  deserts.  And  he  also 
is  blameworthy  who  though  worthy  of  such  things 
does  not  deem  himself  worthy  to  partake  of  them 

14  although  they  are  available  for  him.     But  there  is  Definition  of 
left  here  "  the  man  who  is  the  opposite  of  both  of  nj^ty. 
these,  who  being  worthy  of  great  things  claims  them 

as  his  desert,**  and  is  of  such  a  character  as  to  deem 

^  The  Greek  phrase  combines  the  senses  of  rating  one's 
deserts  high  and  asserting  one's  claims. 

343 


ARISTOTLE 

1238  a   ,  ,  „  ,  ,  Ν        /  /  y      y 

iavTov  οΰτος  €7ταιν€τος  και  μ€σος  τούτων.     €7Τ€ΐ  1ί 

5  οΰν  π€ρΙ  τιμής  alpeaiv  καΐ  χρησιν  καΐ  των  άλ- 
λων αγαθών  των  εντίμων  αρίστη  εστί  δια^εσι?  η 
μ€γαλοφνχία  /cat  ου  ττερί  τα  χρήσιμα,^  και  τοϋτ 
άτΓοδιδο/Λβν  τω  μβγαλόφυχω ,^  άμα  8e  /cat  η  μβσοτης 
[αντη]^  ε7ταίν€τωτάτη ,  Βηλον  otl  /cat  ή  μ€γαλοφυχία 
μζσότης  άν  €Ϊη.     των  δ'  εναντίων,  ωσπ^ρ  Steypa-  U 

10  φαμ€ν,  Ύ)  μ€ν  cttl  το  άζιοΰν  ίαυτον  αγαθών  μβγάλων 
άνάζίον  οντά  χαυνότης  {τους  τοιούτους  γαρ  χαυ- 
νονς  λέγομ^ν  όσοι  μίγάλων  οΐονται  άζιοι  elvai  ουκ 
οντές),  η  δε  vrept  το  άζιον  οντά  μη  άζιοΰν  εαυτόν 
μεγάλων  μικροφυχία  {μικρόφυχος*  γαρ  eti^at  8οκ€Ϊ 
όστις    υπαρχόντων    δι'    ά    Βικαίως    αν    άζιοΐτο    μη 

15  a^toi  μηθΐνός  μεγάλου  εαυτόν),  ωστ  ανάγκη  καΐ 
την  μ€γαλοφυχίαν  βΐναι  μ^σότητα  χαυνότητος  και 
μικροφυχίας.  ό  δε  τέταρτος  των  διορισθέντων  γ 
οϋτ€  πάμπαν  φ^κτος  οϋτ€  μ€γαλόφυχος,  ire/Jt 
ooSev  ων  €χον^  μέγεθος-  οϋτ€  γαρ  άζιος  οϋτ€  άζιοΐ 
μεγάλων,    διό    ουκ    ενάντιος•     καίτοι    ho^eiev    αν 

20  εναντίον  ett^at  τω  μεγάλων  άζιον  οντά  μΕγάλων  το 
μικρών   οντά   άζιον  μικρών^   άζιοΰν    εαυτόν,      ουκ  u 
εστί.   δ    ενάντιος  ουδέ'  τω  μ^μτττος  etvai,  ως  γαρ  ό 

*  ού  vepl  τα  χρ-ήσιμα  hic  Ric. :  post  άνοδίδομεν. 

*  Fr. :  TOf  μεΎο,λόφνχον.  '  Rac. 

*  Fr. :  μικροψύχον. 

*  ώΐ'  έχον  Rac.  {ίχορ  ών  Sus.) :  ίχων. 

•  μικρών  add.  Sus.  '  Sp. :  οί!τ«. 

"  Or,  emending  the  text,  '  and  is  as  worthy  as  he  claims 
to  be.' 

344 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  III.  v.  14-18 

himself  worthy "  :  he  is  praiseworthy,  and  he  is  in 

15  the  middle  between  the  two.  Since,  therefore,  great- 
ness of  spirit  is  the  best  disposition  in  relation  to  the 
choice  and  the  employment  of  honour  and  of  the  other 
good  things  that  are  esteemed,  and  not  in  relation 
to  useful  things,  and  since  we  assign  this  to  the 
great-spirited  man,  and  since  also  at  the  same  time 
the  middle  state  is  most  praiseworthy,  it  is  clear  that 
even   greatness   of  spirit  must   be   a  middle   state. 

16  And  of  the  opposites  as  shown  in  our  diagram,  the  Vanity. 
one  in  the  direction  of  deeming  oneself  worthy  of 
great  goods  when  one  is  not  worthy  is  vanity  (for 

the  sort  of  men  that  fancy  themselves  worthy  of 
great  things  though  they  are  not  we  call  vain),  and 
the  one  that  is  concerned  with  not  deeming  oneself 
worthy  of  great  things  when  one  is  worthy  of  them 
is  smallness  of  spirit  (for  if  a  man  does  not  think 
himself  worthy  of  anything  great  although  he  pos- 
sesses qualities  which  would  justly  make  him  con- 
sidered worthy  of  it,  he  is  thought  small-spirited)  ; 
so  that  it  follows  that  greatness  of  spirit  is  a  middle 

17  state  between  vanity  and  smallness  of  spirit.     But  Modest  Seif- 
the   fourth   of  the   persons   in   our   classification   is  ^**^'"^'"• 
neither    entirely    reprehensible    nor    is    he    great- 
spirited,  as  he  is  concerned  with  nothing  possessing 
greatness,  for  he  neither  is  nor  thinks  himself  worthy 

of  great  things  ;  owing  to  which  he  is  not  the  op- 
posite of  the  man  of  great  spirit.  Yet  thinking 
oneself  worthy  of  small  things  when  one  is  worthy 
of  small  things  might  be  thought  the  opposite  of 
thinking  oneself  worthy  of  great  ones  when  one  is 

18  Λvorthy  of  great  ones ;  but  he  is  not  opposite  to  the 
great-spirited  man  because  he  is  not  blameworthy 

34,5 


ARISTOTLE 

1233  a 

λόγος  KeXevei  €χβι•  καΐ  6  αυτός  iari  rfj  φυσ€ΐ  τω 
μζγαλοφύχφ•  ών  γαρ  αζιοι,  τούτων  άζιοΰσιν  αυτούς 
άμφω.     και  ο  μ^ν  yerotr'  αν  μ€γαλόφυχος ,  αξιώσει  19 

25  γαρ  ών  βστίν  άζίος•  6  8e  μικρόφυχος,  δς  υπαρ- 
χόντων αύτω  μβγαλων  κατά  τιμήν  aya^cDt'  ούκ 
άξιοι,  τι  αν  €7toUl^  el  μικρών  αζιος  rjv;  η'^  γαρ 
άν^  μζγάλων  άξιων  χαΰνος  ην,'^  η  en  €λαττόνων. 
ΟΙΟ  και  ούθβις  άν  (ϊποι  μικρόφνχον  et  τις  μέτοικος  20 
ών  άρχ€ΐν  μη   άξιοι  ίαυτον  αλλ'   ύττζίκ€ΐ,   αλλ'   et 

30  τις  ^ύγβνης  ών  και  -ηγούμενος  μβγα  elvai  το  άρχ€ΐν. 

VI.  Έστι   8e   και   ό  μ€γαλοπρ€ττης   ού   -nepi  την  Ι 

τυχοΰσαν    πραξιν    και    ττροαίρβσιν,    άλλα    την    δα- 

πάνην/'  el  μη  που  κατά  μ€ταφοράν  λέγομβν  άν€υ 

8e  Βαπάνης  μεγαλοπρέπεια  ούκ  εστίν,  το  μεν  γαρ 

35  πρέπον  εν  κόσμω  εστίν,  6  8ε  κόσμος  ούκ  εκ  των 
τυχόντων  άναλωμάτων,  αλλ'  εν  υπερβολή  των 
αναγκαίων  εστίν.  ό  8η  εν  μεγάλη  δαπάνη  του  2 
πρέποντος  μεγέθους  προαιρετικός,  και  της  τοιαύτης 
μεσότητος  και  επι  τη  τοιαύτη  rjSovfj^  ορεκτικός, 
μεγαλοπρεπής .  ό  δ'  επι  τό  μείζον  και  παρά  μέλος  3 
ί23Ζ\)  ανώνυμος•  ού  μην  αλλ'  έχουσϊ'  τινά  γειτνίασιν 
ους    καλοΰσί   τίνες    άπειροκάλους    και    σαλάκωνας. 

1   Γ:   eiVoi.  ''Mb;   et  Pb. 

^  αν  οπα.  ΜΙ^:  ei  yap  μεγάλων  αξίων  ζαΰτόν  άνάξιον'^  ών  Sp. 

*  post  ^ν  lacunam  Sus. 

'  άλλα  την  δαττάν-ην  infra  post  λ^ομεν  Ric. 

*  δαπάντι  ?  Ric.  '  Cas. :  έχα. 

"  The  MS.  reading  hardly  gives  a  sense.  An  emendation 
gives  '  for  if  he  conceitedly  thought  himself  worthy  of  great 
things  when  unworthy,'  and  supposes  a  gap  in  the  text  before 
the  following  words. 

*  A  probable  emendation  substitutes  '  expenditure  '  for 
'  pleasure.' 

*  The  MS.  text  gives  '  he  has  a  certain  set  of  neighbours 
346 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  III.  v.  18— vi.  3 

either,  for  his  character  is  as  reason  bids,  and  in 
nature  he  is  the  same  as  the  great-spirited  man,  for 
both  claim  as  their  desert  the  things  that  they  are 

19  worthy   of.     And  he   might  become   great-spirited,  Mean- 

for  he  will  claim  the  things  that  he  is  worthy  of ;  ^P^^tedness. 
whereas  the  small-spirited  man,  who  when  great 
goods  corresponding  to  his  worth  are  available  does 
not  think  himself  worthy  of  them, — what  would  he 
have  done  if  his  deserts  were  small  ?  For  either  he 
woxild  have  conceitedly  thought  himself  worthy  of 

20  great  things,  or  of  still  less.**  Hence  nobody  would 
call  a  man  small-spirited  for  not  claiming  to  hold 
office  and  submitting  to  authority  if  he  is  a  resident 
alien,  but  one  would  do  so  if  he  were  of  noble  birth 

Viand  attached  great  importance  to  office. 
l)     VI.  The  Magnificent  Man  also  (except  in  a  case  Magnifl- 
)    when  we  are  using  the  term  metaphorically)  is  not  ^''"°'^• 
concerned  with  any  and  every  action  and  purposive 
choice,  but  with  expenditure.     Without  expenditure 
there  is   no   magnificence,  for  it   is   what  is  appro- 
priate in  ornament,  and  ornament  does  not  result 
from  any  chance  expenditure,  but  consists  in  going 

2  beyond  the  merely  necessary.  Therefore  the  mag- 
nificent man  is  the  man  who  purposively  chooses 
the  appropriate  greatness  in  great  expenditure,  and 
who   even  on   the   occasion   of  a  pleasure  ^   of  this 

3  nature   aims   at  this  sort  of  moderation.     There  is  its  excess 
no  name  denoting  the  man  who  likes  spending  to  '"^     ^^^  ' 
excess   and  inappropriately  ;    however  the   persons 
whom   some   people   call   tasteless   and   swaggering 

have  a  certain  affinity  to  him."     For  instance  if  a 

whom  some  people  call  .  .  .'  :  but  -γειτρίασίί  is  abstract  at 
1232  a  21  and  Pol.  i.,  1257  a  2.  Its  concrete  use  in  later  Greek, 
'  neighbourhood  '='set  of  neighbours'  (Plutarch,  etc.)  has 
led  to  corruption  here. 

347 


ARISTOTLE 

1233  b 

οίον  el  els  γάμον  δαπανών  τις  του  αγαπητού, 
πλούσιος  cor,  δο/cet  ττρ4ττ€ΐν  εαυτω  τοιαύτην  κατα- 
σκίυην  οΐαν^  άγαθοΒαιμονιστας  ίστιώντι,  οντος 
5  μ^ν  μικροττρβπης,  6  δε  τοιοιίτους  8€χομ€νος  €Κ€ΐνως 
μη  8όζης  χάριν  μη^€  δι'  βζουσίαν  όμοιος  τω 
σαλάκωνι,  6  δε  /car'  άζίαν  και  ώς  6  λόγος  μβγαλο- 
ττρζττης•  το  γαρ  πρ€7τον  κατ*  άζίαν  ίστίν  ovdev 
γαρ  πρ€π€ΐ  των  παρά  την  άζίαν.  δει  δε  πρέπον  4 
(^καθ  έκαστοι')^  είναι*  και  γαρ  του  πράττοντος^ 
κατ  άζίαν,  και  περί  ον^  και  πβρι  δ,  οίον  π^ρΐ  οίκξτου 

10  γάμον  eTepov  το  πρέπον  και  π€ρι  ερωμένου•  και 
αύτω,  ειττερ  εστί*  τοσούτον  η  τοιούτον,  οίον  την 
θ^ωρίαν  ουκ  ωοντο^  Θε/χιστοκλεΓ  πρέπ^ιν  ην  έποιη- 
σατο  Όλυμπίαζΐ,  δια  την  προϋπάρζασαν  ταπεινό- 
τητα, άλλα  Κι/χωΐΊ.  ό  δ'  όπως  έτυχαν  έχων  προς  5 
την  άζίαν  ούθΐΐς^   τούτων. 

15      Και   ετΓ     έλβυθβριότητος  ωσαύτως'   εστί  γάρ  τις 
οϋτ    ελευθέριος  ού'τ'  ανελεύθερος.^ 

VII.   Σ;^εδόρ'  δε  και  των  άλλων  έκαστα  των  περί  Ι 
το  ήθος  επαιί'ετώι^  κ:αι  φεκτών  τα  μεν  ύπερβολαί 
τα   δ     έλλείφεις   τά   δε   μεσότητές   εισι   παθητικαί, 
οίον   ο   φθονερός  και  ό*  επιχαιρέκακος.       καθ*   ας 

20  γάρ  έξεις  λέγονται,  6  μεν  φθόνος  το  λνπεΐσθαι  έπι 

^  Rac. :  οίον.  2  lac. 

*  Bus. :  πρίίΓοντοί.  *  lac, :  καΊ  ιτρέττον. 

"  έστϊ  ?  lac.  :  έηΐ,     {βστϊ  τοσοΰτα  και  toiovtos,  ant  ftwtp  έστΙ 
τοσούτον  κα.1  τοιούτον  tr.  supra  post  9  wepi  δ  Ric.) 

*  Sp.  (vel  ψΐτο  .  .  .  coinici  nomine  oniisso) :  i^sto. 
'  ούδύί  Γ:  δ  oi'Seis. 

*  Cas. :  Tis  J)s  έλΐνθέριοί  6ταν  (XtvOepos. 

*  ό  add.  Rac. 

»  i.e.  persons  who  only  drink  the  formal  toast  ('  Here's  to 
Good  Luck  '),  with  which  dinner  ended. 
348 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  III.  vi.  3— vii.  1 

rich  man  spending  money  on  the  wedding  of  a 
favourite  thinks  it  fitting  for  him  to  have  the  sort 
of  arrangements  that  vt'ould  be  fitting  when  enter- 
taining abstainers,"  he  is  shabby,  while  one  who 
entertains  guests  of  that  sort  after  the  manner  of 
a  wedding  feast,  if  he  does  not  do  it  for  the  sake 
of  reputation  or  to  gain  an  office,  resembles  the 
swaggerer  ;  but  he  that  entertains  suitably  and  as 
reason  directs  is  magnificent,  for  the  fitting  is  the 
suitable,    as    nothing   is    fitting   that   is    unsuitable. 

4  But  it  must  be  fitting  in  each  particular,  that  is, 
in  suitability  to  the  agent  and  to  the  recipient  and 
to  the  occasion — for  example,  what  is  fitting  at  the 
wedding  of  a  servant  is  not  what  is  fitting  at  that  of 
a  favourite  ;  and  it  is  fitting  for  the  agent  himself, 
if  it  is  of  an  amount  or  quality  suitable  to  him— 
for  example  people  thought  that  the  mission  that 
Themistocles  conducted  to  Olympia  was  not  fitting 
for  him,  because  of  his  former  low  station,  but  would 

5  have  been  for  Cimon.^  But  he  who  is  casual  in 
regard  to  the  question  of  suitability  is  not  in  any  of 
these  classes. 

Ο     Similarly  in  regard  to  liberality  :    a  man  may  be 
(J)  neither  liberal  nor  illiberal. 

1 1      VII.  Generally  speaking  the   other  praiseworthy  Moderate 
'     and  blameworthy  states   of  character   also   are   ex-  tvorth™""'' 
cesses  or  deficiencies  or  middle  states,  but  in  respect  states  of 

/•  .  r.        .  .1  .  J  Feeling. 

of  an  emotion  :  for  mstance,  the  envious  man  and 
the  malicious.  For — to  take  the  states  of  character 
after   which   they  are   named — Envy  means   being 

*  The  story  of  Themistocles  at  the  Olympic  festival  incur- 
ring disapproval  by  vying  with  Cimon  in  the  splendour  of 
his  equipment  and  entertainments  is  told  by.  Plutarch,  Vit. 
Them.  5. 

34.9 


ARISTOTLE 

1233  b 

τοις   κατ     άζίαν   eu   πράττουσίν   Ιστιν,   το   δε   του 
εττιχαιρζ κάκου   ττάθος   €στΙν^  αυτό   άνώννμον,  αλλ' 
6   €χων   Βηλός   eVri^   τω    χαίρ^ιν^    ταΓ?    παρά    την 
άζίαν   κακοττραγίαις'  μέσος  δε   τούτων  6   ν€μ€ση-  2 
τίκος,   και   ο   €κάλουν  οΐ  αρχαίοι  την  ν€μ€σίν,  το 

25  ΑυττζΙσθαι  μβν  inl  ταΐς  παρά  την  άζίαν  κακο- 
πραγίαις  καΐ  ^ύπραγίαις,  χαίρβιν  δ'  eVt  ται?  ά^ιαι?• 
δί.0  καΐ  deov  οϊονται  eivai  την  νάμ^σιν. 

Αιδώ?  δε  μ€σότης  άναισχυντίας  και  καταπλήξεων  •  3 
ο  μβν  γάρ  μηΒβμιάς  φροντίζων  8όξης  αναίσχυντος, 
ο    δε    πάσης    ομοίως    καταπλήζ ,    ο    δε    της    των 
φαινομένων  επιεικών  αΐ^ήμων. 

30  Φίλια  δε  μεσάτης  έχθρας  και  κολακεία?•  6  μ€ν  4 
γαρ  €ύχ€ρώς  άπαντα  προς  τάς  επιθυμίας  ομιλών 
κόλαζ,  ο  δε  προς  άπάσας  άντικρούων  άπ€χθητικός , 
ο  δε  μη*  προς  αττασαν  η8ονην  μητ^  ακολουθών  μητ^ 
αντιτβίνων,  αλλά  προς  το  φαινόμενον  ββλτιστον, 
φίλος. 

Άί.      Σίζμνότης  δε  μ€σότης  αυ^αδεια?   και  αρέσκεια?•  ό 
ό   μ€ν   γάρ   μη^έν  προς    eTepov    ζών    αλλά^   κατα- 
φρονητικός  αύθάΒης,  6  δε  πάντα  προς  άλλον  και" 
πάντων  βλάττων  άρεσκος,  6  δε  τα  μίν  τα  δε  μη, 
και  προς  τους  άζίους  οϋτως  €χων,  σεμνός. 

Ο  δ'  αληθής  και  άπλοϋς,  ον  καλοΰσιν  αύθέκαστον,  ο 
μέσος  του  είρωνος  και  αλαζόνος•  6  μεν  γάρ  επι  τά 

1234  a  χείρω  καθ^  αύτοϋ  φευΒόμενος  μη  άγνοών  είρων,  ό 

δ     67Γΐ   τά  βελτίω   άλαζών,   6  δ'   ως   βχει,   αληθής 

^  ίστίν  Sp.  :   ΐπΐ  rb.  *  ίστι  Cas, :  iirl. 

'  ό  χαίρων  Hie.  ■•  /:λ7)  Sp. :  μήτΐ. 

*  άλλα  Γ :  οηι.  codd.  (nonnulli  άκαταφρονητικό^). 

*  καΐ  Sp. :   ^  καί. 

"  The  man  who  calls  each  thing  itself,  i.e.  what  it  reall\ 
is,  calls  a  spade  a  spade. 

350 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  III.  vii.  1-6 

pained  at  people  who  are  deservedly  prosperous, 
while  the  emotion  of  the  malicious  man  is  itself 
nameless,  but  the  possessor  of  it  is  shown  by  his 

2  feeling  joy  at  undeserved  adversities  ;  and  midway 
between  them  is  the  righteously  indignant  man, 
and  what  the  ancients  called  Righteous  Indignation 
— feeling  pain  at  undeserved  adversities  and  pro- 
sperities and  pleasure  at  those  that  are  deserved  ; 
hence  the  idea  that  Nemesis  is  a  deity. 

3  Modesty  is  a  middle  state  between  Shamelessness 
and  Bashfulness  :  the  man  who  pays  regard  to 
nobody's  opinion  is  shameless,  he  who  regards 
everybody's  is  bashful,  he  who  regards  the  opinion 
of  those  who  appear  good  is  modest. 

4  Friendliness  is  a  middle  state  between  Animosity 
and  Flattery  ;  the  man  who  accommodates  himself 
readily  to  his  associates'  desires  in  everything  is  a 
flatterer,  he  who  runs  counter  to  them  all  shows 
animosity,  he  who  neither  falls  in  with  nor  resists 
every  pleasure,  but  falls  in  with  what  seems  to  be  the 
best,  is  friendly. 

5  Dignity  is  a  middle  state  between  Self-will  and 
Obsequiousness.  A  man  who  in  his  conduct  pays 
no  regard  at  all  to  another  but  is  contemptuous 
is  self-willed  ;  he  who  regards  another  in  everything 
and  is  inferior  to  everybody  is  obsequious  ;  he  who 
regards  another  in  some  things  biit  not  in  others, 
and  is  regardful  of  persons  worthy  of  regard,  is 
dignified. 

6  The  truthful  and  sincere  man,  called  '  downright,'" 
is  midway  betΛveen  the  dissembler  and  the  charlatan. 
He  that  wittingly  makes  a  false  statement  against 
himself  that  is  depreciatory  is  a  dissembler,  he  that 
exaggerates  his  merits  is  a  charlatan,  he  that  speaks 

351 


ARISTOTLE 

1234  a         ^  ,   „  /  y    "\  '       ^      1   \ 

/cat  καθ'  "Ομηρον  π€ττννμ€νος•  και  ολωζ  ο  μ€ν  φιλ- 
αλήθης, οΐ  δε  φίλοφ€υΒ€Ϊς  .^ 

"Εστί  δε   καΐ  η   ^ύτραττ^λία  μ€σότης,  και  ο  ev-  7 

•Ο  τράπίλος  μέσος  του  άγροίκον  /cat  δυστραπελου 
/cat  τον  βωμολόχου.  ωσπερ  γαρ  περί  τροφην  ο 
σικχός  του  παμφάγου  δtα0ε'pεt  τω  6  μεν  μηθεν  η 
ολίγα  /cat  ;^αλε7Γώ9  ττροσίεσθαι,  6  δε  πάντα  ευχερώς, 
οϋτω  /cat  ό  άγροικος  έχει  προς  τον  φορτικον  και 
βωμολόχον  6  μεν  γαρ  ούθέν  γελοΐον  αλλ'  η^  χαλε- 

10  πώς  προσίεται,  6  δε  πάντα  ευχερώς  /cat  τ^δε'ω?. 
δει  δ'  ούΒετερον,  άλλα  τα  μεν  τα  δε  μή,  και  κατά 
λόγον  ούτος  δ'  ό*  ευτράπελος,  η  δ'  ά77όδεtζ•tJ  η  8 
αυτί]•  τ^  '^^  yct/f'  ευτραπελία  η  τοιαύτη,  και  μη  ην 
μεταφέροντες  λεγομεν,  επιεικέστατη  έξις,  και  η 
μεσάτης   ε'7Γαt^'ετr^,   τα   δ'    άκρα   φεκτά.      οΰσης   δε 

1^  8ιττης  της  ευτραπελίας  [η  μεν  γαρ  εν  τώ  χαιρειν 
εστί  τώ  γελοίω,  και*  τώ  εις  αυτόν  εάν  η  τοιονΒί, 
ων  εν  και  το  σκώμμά  εστt^',  η  δ'  εν  τώ  Βυνασθαι 
τοιαύτα  πορίζεσθαι) ,  ετεραι  μεν  είσιν  άλλτ^λωΐ',  α;α- 
φότεραι  μεντοι  μεσότητες•  και  γαρ  6  8υνάμενος^  9 
τοιαύτα    πορίζεσθαι    εφ'     οιοις^    ησθησεται    ο'    εύ 

^0  κρίνων  καν  εις  αύτον  fj  το  γελοΐον,  μέσος  εσται 
του  φορτικού  και  του  φυχροϋ.  6  δ  ορός  ούτος 
βελτίων  η  το  μη^  λυπηρον  εt^'αt  το  λεχθεν  τω  σκω- 
πτομενω  οντι  οποιωοΰν  μάλλον  γαρ  δει  τω  εν 
μεσότητι  οντι  άρεσκειν  ούτος  γαρ  κρίνει  ευ. 

^  Rac. :  ό  &i  φιλοψενδή^. 
»  άλλ'  ij  Rac.  {y  Sp). :  αλλά.  *  ό  add.  Fr. 

*  καΐ  <δη  καΙ>  ?  Rac.  ^  Syl. :  τόν  δυνάμενον. 

•  Rac. :  Sffots.  '  ό  add.  Fr.  *  μη  add,  Cas. 

■  The  term  eorpaveXot  means  literally  '  able  to  turn  easily,' 
versatile ;  it  denotes  both  '  witty '  and  '  easy-going.' 

352 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  III.  vii.  6-9 

of  himself  as  he  is  is  truthful  and  in  Homer's  phrase 
'  sagacious  '  ;  and  in  general  the  one  is  a  lover  of 
truth  and  the  others  lovers  of  falsehood. 

7  Wittiness "  also  is  a  middle  state,  and  the  witty 
man  is  midway  between  the  boorish  or  stiff  man  and 
the  buffoon.  For  just  as  in  the  matter  of  food  the 
squeamish  man  differs  from  the  omnivorous  in  that 
the  former  takes  nothing  or  little,  and  that  reluc- 
tantly, and  the  latter  accepts  everything  readily, 
so  the  boor  stands  in  relation  to  the  vulgar  man 
or  buffoon — the  former  takes  no  joke  except  with 
difficulty,  the  latter  accepts  everything  easily  and 
with  pleasure.  Neither  course  is  right  :  one  should 
allow  some  things  and  not  others,  and  on  principle, 

8  — that  constitutes  the  witty  man.  The  proof  of  the 
formula  is  the  same  as  in  the  other  cases  :  wittiness 
of  this  kind  (not  the  quality  ^  to  which  we  apply  the 
term  in  a  transferred  sense)  is  a  very  becoming  sort 
of  character,  and  also  a  middle  state  is  praiseworthy, 
whereas  extremes  are  blameworthy.  But  as  there 
are  two  kinds  of  wit  (one  consisting  in  liking  a  joke, 
even  one  that  tells  against  oneself  if  it  is  funny,  for 
instance  a  jeer,  the  other  in  the  ability  to  produce 
things  of  this  sort),  these  kinds  of  vnt  differ  from  one 

9  another,  but  both  are  middle  states  ;  for  a  man  who 
can  produce  jokes  of  a  sort  that  will  give  pleasure 
to  a  person  of  good  judgement  even  though  the 
laugh  is  against  himself  will  be  midway  between  the 
vulgar  man  and  the  frigid.  This  is  a  better  definition 
than  that  the  thing  said  must  not  be  painful  to  the 
victim  whatever  sort  of  man  he  may  be — rather,  it 
must  give  pleasure  to  the  man  in  the  middle  position, 
since  his  judgement  is  good. 

"  Viz.  βωμολοχία,  '  bufToonery,'  N.E.  1128  a  15. 

2  A  353 


ARISTOTLE 

1234»  ,         -^  ,  ,  ,  ,  / 

Πασαι    δ     αύται    αί    μεσοτητβς    ετταινβται    μ€ν,  1 
25  ονκ  elat  δ'   aperai,  ού8'   αί  ivavTiat  κακίαι,  avev 
προαψ€σ£ως    yap•   ταΰτα   δε   ττάντ     earlv   iv    ται? 
των  παθημάτων  SiaipeaeoLV,   €καστον  γαρ   αυτών 
πάθος  τι  εστίν,      δια  δε  το  φυσικά  klvai  els  τάς  1 
φυσικάς    συμβάϊΧλεται    άρβτάς'    έ'στι    γάρ,    ωσπ^ρ 
λ€χθΎ}σ€ται    iv   τοις    ύστερον,    ίκάσττ)    πως    άρετη 
30  και  φυσ€ΐ  καΐ  άλλως,  μετά  φρονησεως .     6  μεν  ουν  1 
φθόνος   εΙς  ά8ικίαν  συμβάλλεται   {προς  γάρ  άλλον 
αί  πράζεις  αί  άττ'  αύτοΰ)  καΐ  η  νεμεσις  εΙς  δίκαιο - 
συνην  καΐ^  η  αιδώ?  εις  σωφροσυνην  (διο  και  ορί- 
ζονται iv  τω  γένει  τούτω  την  σωφροσύνην),  ο  δ 
αληθής  και  φευ^ης  ο  μεν  εμφρων  ο  δ'  άφρων. 
1234  b      "Εστί   δ'    ivavτιώτεpov  τοις   άκροις  το   μέσον  η  ] 
iκεΐva  άλλι^λοι?,  διότι  το  μεν  μετ^  ούΒετερου  yii'e- 
ται  αυτών,  τά  Se  ττολλά/ίΐ?  μετ^  αλλήλων,  και  εισιν 
ivίoτε  οι  αύτοι  θρασύδειλοι,  και  τά  μεν  άσωτοι  τα 
δε  ανελεύθεροι,  και  δλως  ανώμαλοι  κακώς•  όταν  μεν  1 
5  yap  καλώς  ανώμαλοι  ωσιν,  μέσοι  γίνονται,  εν  τω 
μέσω  γάρ  iστί  πως  τά  άκρα. 

Αί  δ'  ει^αντιώσει?  ου  Βοκοΰσιν  ύπάρχειν  τοις 
άκροις  προς  το  μέσον  ομοίως  άμφότεραι,  αλλ  οτε 
μεν  καθ^  ύπερβολην  ότε  δε  κατ^  ελλειφιν.  αίτια  ] 
δε  τά  τε  πρώτα  ρηθεντα  8ύο,  ολιγότης  τε,  οίον 
10  τών  προς  τά  ηΒεα  αναίσθητων ,  και  δτι  i^*  ο  άμαρ- 
τάνομεν  μάλλον,  τοΰτο  ivavτιώτεpov  ειι^αι  ΒοκεΖ•  το  ] 

^  καΐ  add.  Rac. 

«  Not  in  E.E.,  but  cf.  N.E.  vi.,  1144  b  1-17. 

*  Truthfulness  and  mendacity  contribute  to  wisdom  and 
folly  as  ν^μεσα  and  φθόνοί  do  to  δικαιοσύνη  and  αδικία,  and 
α/δώ{  (and  άΐ'αιδ(ία)  to  σωφροσύνη  (and  ακολασία). 

'  Cf.  1229  a  22-b  4. 
854 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  III.  vii.  10-16 

10  All  these  middle  states,  though  praiseworthy,  are  Thesepraise- 
not  virtues,  nor  are  the  opposite  states  vices,  for  they  state7of 
do  not  involve  purposive  choice  ;  they  are  all  in  the  Feeling  pro- 
classification  of  the  emotions,  for  each  of  them  is  an  virtues. 

11  emotion.  But  because  they  are  natural  they  con- 
tribute to  the  natural  virtues  ;  for,  as  will  be  said 
in  what  follows,"  each  virtue  exists  both  naturally 
and  otherwise,  that  is,  in  conjunction  with  thought. 

12  Therefore  envy  contributes  to  injustice  (for  the 
actions  that  spring  from  it  affect  another  person), 
and  righteous  indignation  to  justice,  and  modesty  to 
temperance  (owing  to  which  people  even  define  tem- 
perance as  a  species  of  emotion),  and  the  sincere  and 
false  are  respectively  wise  and  foolish.'' 

13  And  the  mean  is  more  opposed  to  the  extremes  Extremes 
than  the  extremes  are  to  one  another,  because  the    '^  ™®*' ' 
mean  does  not  occur  in  combination  with  either  ex- 
treme,   whereas    the    extremes    often    do    occur   in 
combination  with  one  another,  and  sometimes  the 

same  men  are  venturesome  cowards,  or  extravagant 
in  some  things  and  illiberal  in  others,  and  in  general 

14  not  uniform  in  a  bad  way — for  when  men  lack  uni- 
formity in  a  good  way,  this  results  in  men  of  the 
middle  characters,  since  the  mean  contains  both 
extremes. 

The  opposition  existing  between  the  mean  and  Appendix  to 
the  extremes  does  not  seem  to  be  the  same  in  the 
case  of  both  the  extremes,  but  sometimes  the  greater 
opposition  is  by  way  of  excess,  sometimes  by  way 

15  of  deficiency.  The  causes  of  this  are  partly  the  two 
first  mentioned,^  rarity  (for  example,  the  rarity  of 
people  insensitive  to  pleasant  things)  and  the  fact 
that  the  error  to  which  we  are  more  prone  seems 

16  more  opposite  to  the  mean,  and  thirdly  the  fact  that 

§55 


ARISTOTLE 

12S4  b 

8e  τρίτον,  OTL  TO  ομοιότβρον  "ήττον  εναντίον  (jyaive- 

ται,  οίον  ττίττονθζ  το  θράσος  προς  το  θάρσος^  και 

ασωτία  προς  ^λ^νΟβριότ-ητα. 

YVepl  μ€ν  ονν  των  άλλων  αρετών  των  ετταινετων 

€'ίρηταί  σχεδόν",  π€ρΙ  δε  8ικαίοσυνης  -η8η  XcKTeov. 

^  τό  θάρσοί  irpbs  το  θράσος  Μ^  (sed  cf.  1220  b  39) :  τό  θάρσοί 
(potius  θράσοί  Rac.)  wpbs  την  άνδρΐίαν  Βζ. 

"  Or,  '  confidence  '  ;    but  perhaps  the  Greek   should   be 
altered  to  give  '  courage.' 


356 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  III.  vii.  15-16 

the  extreme  that  more  resembles  the  mean  seems 
less  opposite  to  it,  as  is  the  case  with  daring  in 
relation  to  boldness  "  and  extravagance  in  relation 
to  liberality. 

We  have  therefore  sufficiently  discussed  the  other 
praiseworthy  virtues,  and  must  now  speak  about 
Justice. 

(Books  IV,  V,  VI  are  omitted,  as  they  are  identical  with 
Books  V,  VI,  VII  of  the  Nicomachean  Ethics.) 


357 


Η 

1234  b 

I.   YlepL  φίλιας,  τι  iari  καΐ  ποιόν  η,  και  τις  6  1 
φίλος,    καΐ    Trorepov   η    φίλια   μ,οναχώς   Aeyerat    η 

20  ττλβοναχώς ,  καΐ  el  ττλβοναχώς,  πόσα  εστίν ^  ert  8e 
πώς  χρηστεον  τω  φίλω  καΐ  τι  το  Βίκαίον  το  φιλικόν, 
επισκεπτβον  ούθβνός  ήττον  των  περί  τα  ηθη  καλών 
καΐ  αιρετών,  της  τ€  γαρ  πολιτικής  έργον  είναι  2 
^οκεΐ  ]θΐάλιστα  ποιησαι  φιλίαν,  και  την  άρετην  δια 
τοϋτό    φασιν    eti^ai    χρησιμον    ου    γαρ    ενΒεχεσθαι 

25  φίλους  εαυτοΐς  εΐναι  τους  αδικούμενους  υπ*  άλΑτ^- 
λων.  ετι  το  Βίκαιον  και  το  αδικον  περί  τους  φίλους  3 
eti^ai  /χάλιστα  πάντες  φαμεν,  και  ό  αυτός  8οκεΐ 
άνηρ  eti^at  και  aya^o?  και  φίλος,  και  φιλία  ηθική 
τις  eti^at  έξις•  και  εάν  τις  βούληται  ποιησαι^  ώστε 
μη  άΒικεΙν,  άλις^  φίλους  ποιησαι,  οι  γαρ  αληθινοί 

30  φίλοι    ουκ    άΒικοΰσιν.      άλλα   μην  και   εάν  δίκαιοι  4 
ωσιν,  ουκ  ά8ικήσουσιν•  ή  ταυτόΐ'  άρα  ή  εγγύς  τι  ή 
δικαιοσύνη   και  ή   φιλία. 

Προ?  8έ  τούτοις  τών  μεγίστων  aya^cDr  τον  φίλον  5 
eit-ai    ύπολαμβάνομεν,    την    8ε    άφιλίαν    και    την 
ερημιαν  Βεινότατον,  οτι   ό  βίος  άπας  και  ή  εκον- 
1285  a  σιος  ομιλία  μετά  τούτων  μετ*  οΙκείων  γάρ  η  μετά 

^  πύσαι  daiv  Sp. :  ποσαχω^  ?  Rac.  (ττοσαχώ?  (στίν  vel  ττόσα 
έστϊν  <ΐίδη>  Βζ.).  *  πεΐσαι  ?  Ric. 

*  &λΐί  lac. :  άλλ'  είϊ.  {dWovs,  φί\ον$  ποιήσει  Sp.,  dWovs  φίλονί 
ΐΓοιησαι  Se'iv  Fr.) 

358 


BOOK  VII 

1  I.  Friendship— its  nature  and  qualities,  what  con-  pbiendshu 
stitutes  a  friend,  and  whether  the  term  friendship  its  nature 
has  one  or  several  meanings,  and   if  several,  how  *" 
many,  and  also  what  is  our  duty  towards  a  friend 

and  what  are  the  just  claims  of  friendship — is  a 
matter  that  calls  for  investigation  no  less  than  any 
of  the  things  that  are  fine  and  desirable  in  men's 

2  characters.  For  to  promote  friendship  is  thought  to 
be  the  special  task  of  political  science  ;  and  people 
say  that  it  is  on  this  account  that  goodness  is  a 
valuable  thing,  for   persons    wrongfully  treated   by 

3  one  another  cannot  be  each  other's  friends.  Further- 
more we  all  say  that  justice  and  injustice  are  chiefly 
displayed  towards  friends  ;  it  is  thought  that  a 
good  man  is  a  friendly  man,  and  that  friendship  is  a 
state  of  the  moral  character  ;  and  if  one  wishes  to 
make  men  not  act  unjustly,  it  is  enough  to  make  them 
friends,  for  true  friends  do  not  wrong  one  another. 

4  But  neither  will  men  act  unjustly  if  they  are  just  ;    ^.^ 
therefore  justice  and  friendship  are  either  the  same  " 

or  nearly  the  same  thing. 

5  In  addition  to  this,  we  consider  a  friend  to  be  one 
of  the  greatest  goods,  and  friendlessness  and  solitude 
a  very  terrible  thing,  because  the  whole  of  hfe  and 
voluntary  association  is  with  friends  ;    for  we  pass 

359 


ARISTOTLE 

1285  a 

συγγενών  η  μςθ"  εταίρων  συν^ιημβρευομίν ,  η  τέκ- 
νων η  γονέων   η   γυναι,κός.     και  τά  ίδια  δίκαια  τα  ι 
ττρος  τους  φίλους  εστίν  εφ'  ημΐν  μόνον,  τά  δε  προς 
τους  άλλους  νενομοθετηται  καΐ  ουκ  εφ^  ημΐν. 
5       Απορβΐταί  8ε  ττολλα  περί  της  φίλιας,  πρώτον  μεν  ' 
ως    οι    εζωθεν    περιλαμβάνοντες    καΐ    επΙ    πλέον 
λέγοντες.     8οκεΐ  γαρ  τοις  μεν  το  δμοίον  τω  όμοίω 
eit'at  φίλον,  όθεν  εϊρηται 

ως  αΐεΐ  τον  ομοιον  άγει  θεός  ως  τόν  όμοιον 
και  γαρ   κολοιός  πάρα  κολοίόν   .    .    . 
εγνω  8ε  φώρ  τε  φώρα  καΐ  λύκος  λύκον. 

10  OL  8ε  φυσιολόγοι  καΐ  την  όλην  φΰσιν  8ιακοσμοΰσιν  ί 
ο-ρχην  λαβόντες  τό  τό  ομοιον  ίεναι  προς  τό  όμοιον, 
8ιο     Έιμπε8οκλης   και  την  κυν^   εφη   καθησθαι  επΙ 
της  κεραμί8ος  δια  τό  εχειν  πλείστον  όμοιον. 

01  μεν  οΰν  οϋτω  τόν^   φίλον  λεγουσιν  οι  8ε  τό  ί 
εναντίον  τω  εκαι^τιω  φασιν  etvat  φίλον,  τό  μεν  γαρ 

15  ερώμενον  και  επιθυμητόν  ττασιν  είναι  φίλον,  επι- 
θυμεΐν^  8ε  ου  τό  ζηρόν  του  ξηροΰ  άλλα  τοΰ^  ύγροΰ 
[ουεν  ειρηται 

ερα  μεν  όμβρου  γαία, 


μεταβολή  πάντων  γλυκύ' 

^  ν.1.  τό.  *  Fr. :  ένιθνμΐΐ. 

'  του  add,  Μ•>. 

"  Od.  χνϋ.  218. 

*  '  Birds  of  a  feather  flock  together.'     Sc.  ll^avet, '  perches ' : 
an  iambic  verse  quoted  in  full  M.M.  1208  b  9,  and  in  the 
form  KoXoidl•  ποτΐ   κολοών  N.E.  viii.,   1155  a  35,  where  the 
dialect  suggests  that  it  is  from  a  Doric  poet  (unknown). 
360 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  VII.  i.  5-9 

our  days  with  our  family  or  relations  or  comrades, 

6  children,  parents  or  wife.  And  our  private  rights 
in  relation  to  our  friends  depend  only  on  ourselves, 
whereas  our  rights  in  relation  to  the  rest  of  men 
are  established  by  law  and  do  not  depend  on  us. 

7  Many  questions  are  raised  about  friendship — first,  ^^Z'"'^"'^* 
on  the  line  of  those  who  take  in  wider  considera-  on\ikene8s 
tions  and  extend  the  term.     For  some  hold  that  like 

is  friend  to  like,  whence  the  sayings  : 

Mark  how  God  ever  brings  like  men  together  " ; 
For  jackdaw  by  the  side  of  jackdaw  .  .  .* ;  - 
And  thief  knows  thief  and  wolf  his  fellow  wolf."  - 

8  And    the    natural    philosophers    even    arrange    the 
whole  of  nature  in  a  system  by  assuming  as  a  first 
principle   that   like   goes   to   like,   owing   to   which 
Empedocles  '^  said  that  the  dog  sits  on  the  tiling  -; 
because  it  is  most  like  him.* 

9  Some  people  then  give  this  account  of  a  friend  ;  or  on  con- 
but   others   say   that   opposite   is   dear  to   opposite, 

since  it  is  what  is  loved  and  desired  that  is  dear  to 
everybody,  and  the  dry  does  not  desire  the  dry  but 
the  wet  (whence  the  sayings — 

Earth  loveth  rain/     ' 
and 

In  all  things  change  is  sweet — " 

'^  '  Set  a  thief  to  catch  a  thief.'  The  origin  of  the  verse  is 
unknown. 

^  Mystic  philosopher,  man  of  science  and  statesman  of 
Agrigentum  (Girgenti),  fl.  490  b.c. 

*  Presumably,  like  in  colour ;  true  of  Greek  dogs  to-day. 
Empedocles  does  not  appear  to  have  gone  on  to  infer  pro- 
tective mimicry. 

f  Quoted  as  from  Euripides,  N.E.  viii.,  1 155  a  34 ;  the  play 
is  not  known.  "  Euripides,  Orestes  234. 

361 


ARISTOTLE 

1235  a 

η  δε  μ€ταβολ'η  eiV  τουναντίον)'  το  δ'  δμοίον  εχθρον 
τω  όμοίω,  καΐ  γαρ 

Κ€ραμ€νς  Κ€ραμ€Ϊ  κοτ€ζΐ, 

και  τα  αττό  των  αυτών  τρεφόμενα  ττολίμια  άλλτ^λοι? 
20  ζώα.     αύται  μ^ν  ουν    αϊ    ύποληφας    τοσούτον    δι-  10 
€στασιν•  ol•  μεν  γαρ  το  ομοιον  φίλον,^  το  δ'  ivavTLOV 
ττολβμιον — 

τω  nXeovt  δ'   aiet  πολβμων  καθίσταται 
τουλασσον,  βχθρας  θ^  ημέρας  κατάρχ^ται, 

€TL  06  και  οί  τόποι  κ^χωρισμένοι  των  εναντίων,  •η  \\ 
25  he  φιλία  8οκ€Ϊ  συνάγ€ΐν•  οι  δε  τα  εναντία  φίλα,  και 
Ηρακλίΐτος  επίτιμα  τω  ποιησαντι 

ως  €ρις  €Κ  τ€  θβών  κάξ^  ανθρώπων  άπόλοιτο, 

ου  γαρ  αν  eti^at  άρμονίαν  μη  οντος  6ζ€ος  και  βαρ4ος, 
ουθ€  τα  ςωα  άνευ  οηΛ€ος  και  άρρενος  ενάντιων 
όντων. 

Δυο  μεν  οΰν^  αύται  δο^αι  περί  φιλίας  είσί,  λίαν  12 

30  τε  καθόλου  κεχωρισμβναι^  τοσούτον,  άλλαι  δε  η8η 
εγγυτίρω^  και  οικβιότεραι'  τών  φαινομένων,  τοις 
μεν  γαρ  ουκ  εν^εχεσθαι  8οκεΐ  τους  φαύλους  ειΐ'αι 
φίλους,  άλλα  μόνον  τους  αγαθούς•  τοις  δ'  άτοπον 
ει  μη  φιλοΰσιν  at  μητέρες  τα  τέκνα  {φαίνεται  13 
δ    τ^δε*  και  εν  τοις  θηρίοις  ενοΰσα  φιλία•  προαπο- 

35  θνησκειν  γοΰν^  αίροΰνται  τών  τέκνων) .     τοις  δε  το  14 
χρησιμον  Βοκεΐ  φίλον  είναι  μόνον  σημεΐον  δ'   δτι 

^  Fr. :  at.  2  φίλον  <φασΙ>  vel  <οωΐ'ταί>  Ric. 

*  Rac. :  καΐ  {ξκ  τ'  II.  xviii.  107). 

*  ονν  add.  Sus.  *  καΐ  Κΐχωρισμ,έναι  Cas. 

•  iyyvTtpaiM^.  7  οίκεώτίραί  Rac.:  oUdan. 

*  δ*  ^<5e  Rac. :  6k  (yap  Γ),  «  Fr. :  oiV. 
362 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  VII.  i.  9-14 

change  being  transition  to  the  opposite),  whereas 
hke  hates  Uke,  for  ^^ 

Potter  'gainst  potter  hath  a  grudge,"    τ^ 
and  animals  that  hve  on  the  same  food  are  hostile 

10  to  one  another.  These  opinions,  therefore,  are  thus 
widely  variant.  One  party  thinks  that  the  like  is 
friend  and  the  opposite  foe — 

The  less  is  rooted  enemy  to  the  more 
For  ever,  and  begins  the  day  of  hate,*  ' 

11  and  moreover  adversaries  are  separated  in  locality, 
whereas  friendship  seems  to  bring  men  together. 
The  other  party  say  that  opposites  are  friends,  and 
Heracleitus  "  rebukes  the  poet  who  wrote — 

Would  strife  might  perish  out  of  heaven  and  earth,"* 
for,  he  says,  there  would  be  no  harmony  without 
high  and  low  notes,  and  no  animals  without  male 
and  female,  which  are  opposites. 

12  These,  then,  are  two  opinions  about  friendship,  and  or  on 
being   so  widely  separated  they  are  too  general  *  ;  ^"^  "^ ' 
but  there  are  others  that  are  closer  together  and 
more  akin  to  the  facts  of  observation.     Some  persons 
think  that  it  is  not  possible  for  bad  men  to  be  friends,' 

but  only  for  the  good.     Others  think  it  strange  that 

13  mothers  should  not  love  their  own  children  (and 
maternal  affection  we  see  existing  even  among 
animals — at  least,  animals  choose  to  die  for  their 

14  young).     Others   hold  that  only   what  is   useful  is  oio." 
a  friend,  the  proof  being  that  all  men  actually  do 

*"  Hesiod,  Works  and  Days  25  ('  Two  of  a  trade  never  agree '). 

^  Euripides,  Phoenissae  539  f.  (έχθρας  ήμ^ρα?  =  Ιχ^ρα?,  cf. 
δούΧιον  ^/χαρ  =  δουλίία,  Paley). 

'  The  natural  philosopher  of  Ephesus,  β.  end  of  6th  cent. 
B.C.  **  Iliad  xviii.  107. 

»  i.e.  being  so  absolutely  opposite  to  one  another,  they  are 
too  sweeping,  and  do  not  really  correspond  with  the  facts. 

363 


ARISTOTLE 

1235  a         ^  ^  ^ 

KaL  οιώκουσι  ταΰτα  πάντες,  τα  δε  άχρηστα  και 
αντοί  αύτών^  άττοβάΧλουσιν  (ωσπερ  Ίίωκράτης  6 
γέρων  έλεγε  τον  πτνελον  καΐ  τάς  τρίχας  καΐ  τους 
όνυχας  παραβάλλων) ,  καΐ^  τά  μόρια  οτι  ριπτοΰμεν 
1235  b  τά  άχρηστα,  καΐ  τέλος  το  σώμα,  όταν  άποθάντ], 
άχρηστος  γαρ  6  νεκρός•  οΐς  δε  χρησιμον,  φνλάτ- 
τουσιν,  ωσπερ  εν  Αίγύπτω .  ταΰτα  Srj  πάντα  δοκει  ι 
μεν  ύπεναντία  άλληλοις  εΐναι.  τό  τε  γαρ  ομοιον^ 
άχρηστον  τω  ομοίω  καΐ  εναντιότης  ομοιότητας 
5  απέχει  πλείστον ,  και  το  εναντίον  άχρηστότατον  τω 
εναντιω,  φθαρτικόν  γαρ  του  εναντίου  τό  εναντίον, 
ετι  Βοκεΐ  τοις  μεν  paSiov  τό  κτησασθαι  φίλον,  τοις  ι 
δε  σπανιώτατον  ■^/ι^ών'αι,  και  ουκ  εν8έχεσθαι  άνευ 
ατυχίας*,  τοις  γαρ  ευ  πράττουσι  βούλονται  πάντες 
8οκεΐν  φίλοι  είναι-  οι  δ'  ουδέ  τοις  συν^ιαμένουσιν  ] 

10  εν  ταΐ?  ατυ^^ιαι?  ά^ιοΰσι  πιστευειν,  ως  εξαπα- 
τώντας και  προσποιούμενους ,  ίνα  κτήσωνται  δια, 
της  τών  ατυχουντων  ομιλία?  πάλιν  εύτυχούντων 
φιλίαν. 

II.  Αηπτεος   8η    λόγος^    όστις    ημΐν    άμα    τά   τε  1 
δοκτουι^τα  περί  τούτων  μάλιστα  αποδώσει  και  τάς 

15  απορίας  λύσει  και  τάς  εναντιώσεις.  τοΰτο  δ'  εσται 
εάν  ευλόγως  φαίνηται  τά  εναντία  8οκοΰντα.  μάλιστα 
γαρ  όμολογούμενος  ό  τοιούτος  εσται  λόγος  τοις 
φαινομενοις•  συμβαίνει  δε  μενειν  τάς  εναντιώσεις 
εαν  εστί  μεν  ως  αληθές  η  τό  λεγόμενον  εστί  δ' 
ως  ου. 

Εχει  δ    άπορίαν  και  πότερον  τό  η8ύ  η  τό  aya^ol•'  2 

^  ά</)'  έαντων  lac.  *  [και]  ?  Rac. 

'  δμοιον  add.  Fr.  *  Vict. :  ΐΰτνχίαί. 

'  Cas. :  λοίττόί.     (λοιποί  <λ070Γ>  Sp.,  rpoiros  Syl.) 

364 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  VII.  i.  14— ii.  2 

pursue  the  useful,  and  discard  what  is  useless  event 
in  their  own  persons  (as  the  old  Socrates  "  used  to  I 
say,  instancing  spittle,  hair  and  nails),  and  that  wei 
throw  away  even  parts  of  the  body  that  are  of  no* 
use,  and  finally  the  body  itself,  when  it  dies,  as  a 
corpse  is  useless — but  people  that  have  a  use  for  it 

15  keep  it,  as  in  Egypt.  Now  all  these  factors  ^  seem 
to  be  somewhat  opposed  to  one  another.     For  like?i 

is    of   no    use    to    like    and    opposition    is    farthest f         » 
removed  from  likeness,  and  at  the  same  time  oppo-K*'  - 
site   is  most   useless   to   opposite,  since   opposite   is 

16  destructive  of  opposite.     Moreover  some  think  that  i»  it 

to  gain  a  friend  is  easy,  but  others  that  it  is  the  '"®'i"®"  ^ 
rarest  thing  to  recognize  a  friend,  and  not  possible 
without  misfortune,  as  everybody  wants  to  be  thought 

17  a  friend  of  the  prosperous  ;  and  others  maintain 
that  we  must  not  trust  even  those  who  stay  with  us 
in  our  misfortunes,  because  they  are  deceiving  us 
and  pretending,  in  order  that  by  associating  with 
us  when  unfortunate  they  may  gain  our  friendship 
when  we  are  again  prosperous. 

1  II.  Accordingly  a  line  of  argument  must  be  taken 
that  will  best  explain  to  us  the  views  held  on  these 
matters  and  at  the  same  time  solve  the  difficulties 
and  contradictions.  And  this  will  be  secured  if  the 
contradictory  views  are  shown  to  be  held  with  some 
reason.  For  such  a  line  of  argument  will  be  most 
in  agreement  with  the  observed  facts  :  and  in  the 
upshot,  if  what  is  said  is  true  in  one  sense  but  not 
true  in  another,  both  the  contradictory  views  stand 
good. 

2  There  is  also  a  question  as  to  whether  what  is  Friendship 

is  based  on 
"  Cf.  1216  b  3. 
*  i.e.  likeness,  contrariety,  utility  (Solomon). 

365 


ARISTOTLE 

1235  b    ^  ^  ^  ,        X  X  «  i-     > 

20  iaTL  TO  φίλονμ€νον.     el  μ€ν  γαρ  φιΧοϋμ^ν  ov  εττι- 

θυμοΰμ€ν   (/cat    μάλιστα    6    βρως    τοιούτον,   ovBelg 

γαρ 

βραστής  όστις  ουκ  aet  φιλβΐ), 

Ύ)  δ'  eTn^fyLtia  τον  η^βος,  τανττ)  μ€ν  το  φιλουμβνον 
το   rjBv,    €1   8e    ο   βονλόμεθα,   το    aya^of    εστί   δ 
€Tepov  το  rjSv  και  το  aya^or. 

Ilept  8rj^  τούτων  και  των  άλλων  των  συγγενών  3 

25  τούτοι?  7Τ€ΐρατ€ον  Siopioai,  λαβοΰσιν  άρχην  τηνΒζ. 
το  γαρ  όρβκτον  και  βονλητόν  η  το  αγαθόν  η  το 
φαινόμβνον  aya^ov.  διο  και  το  ηΒν  όρεκτόν,  φαι- 
νόμ€νον  γάρ  τι  aya^ot'•  τοΓ?  μβν  γαρ  Βοκβΐ,  τοις 
δε  φαίνεται  καν  μη  SoKjj  (ου  γάρ  ev  ταύτω  της 
φνχης  η  φαντασία  και  η  δό^α).     οτι  μβντοι  φίλον 

30  και  το  αγαθόν  και  το  rjSv  Βηλον. 

Τούτου  δ€  8ιωρισμ€νον  λητττ4ον  ύπόθεσιν  CTcpav.  4 
των  γάρ  aya^cui'  τά  μεν  απλώς  εστίν  aya^ci,  τα  δε 
τινί,  απλώς  δ'  ον•  και  τά  αυτά  απλώς  aya^a  και 
απλώς    rjSea.     τά    μεν    γάρ    τώ    νγιαίνοντί   φαμεν 
σώματι  συμφέροντα  απλώς  efvat  σώ/^ατι  aya^ci,  τα 

35  δε  τώ  κάμνοντι  ου,  οίον  φαρμακείας  και  τομας' 
ομοίως  δε  και  τ^δε'α  απλώς  σώματι  τά  τω  ύγιαίνοντι  5 
και  όλοκληρω,  οίον  το  εν  τώ  φωτί  ζην''  και  ου  το 
εν  τω  σκότει•  καίτοι  τω  οφθαλμιώντι  εναντίως. 
και  οίνος  τβίων  ούχ  6  τω  Βιεφθαρμενω  την  γλώτταν 
υπό  οινοφλυγίας ,  επεί  ενίοτε^  όζος    παρεγχεουσιν , 

1  Sus. :  δέ  ν\  om.  Mb. 

*  lac.  (cf.  Hist.  An.  488  a  26  τά  μ^  ννκτ^ρόβια  .  .  .  τά  δ'  eu 
ΎψφωτΙζ^)'.  όραν.  '  Ric. :  οϋτ€. 

,  "  Euripides,  Troades  1051. 
*  i.e.  are  different  psychological  experiences. 
366 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  VII.  ii.  2-5 

dear  to  us  is  the  pleasant  or  the  good.     If  we  hold  both  good- 
dear  what  we  desire  (and  that  is  specially  character-  pfeasant- 
istic  of  love,  for  "«ss 

(absolute  or 
relative). 
None  is  a  lover  that  holds  not  dear  for  aye  "), 


and  desire  is  for  what  is  pleasant,  on  this  showing 
it  is  the  pleasant  that  is  dear  ;  whereas  if  we  hold 
dear  what  we  wish,  it  is  the  good  ;  but  the  pleasant 
and  the  good  are  different  things. 

3  We  must  therefore  attempt  to  decide  about  these 
matters  and  others  akin  to  them,  taking  as  a  starting- 
point  the  following.  The  thing  desired  and  wished 
is  either  the  good  or  the  apparent  good.  Therefore 
also  the  pleasant  is  desired,  for  it  is  an  apparent 
good,  since  some  people  think  it  good,  and  to  others 
it  appears  good  even  though  they  do  not  think  it  so 
(as  appearance  and  opinion  are  not  in  the  same  part 
of  the  spirit). **  Yet  it  is  clear  that  both  the  good  and 
the  pleasant  are  dear. 

4  This  being  decided,  we  must  make  another  as- 
sumption. Things  good  are  some  of  them  abso- 
lutely good,  others  good  for  someone  but  not  good 
absolutely  ;  and  the  same  things  are  absolutely  good 
and  absolutely  pleasant.  For  things  advantageous 
for  a  healthy  body  we  pronounce  good  for  the  body 
absolutely,  but  things  good  for  a  sick  body  not — for 
example  doses  of  medicine  and  surgical  operations  ; 

5  and  likewise  also  the  things  pleasant  for  a  healthy 
and  perfect  body  are  pleasant  for  the  body  absolutely, 
for  example  to  live  in  the  light  and  not  in  the  dark, 
although  the  reverse  is  the  case  for  a  man  with 
ophthalmia.  And  the  pleasanter  wine  is  not  the 
wine  pleasant  to  a  man  whose  palate  has  been 
corrupted  by  tippling,  since  sometimes  they  pour 

set 


y 


ARISTOTLE 

1236  a  άλλα  τ-η  ά^ίαφθόρω  αΙσθησ€ΐ.  ομοίως  8e  /cat  εττι  6 
φνχης,  καΐ  ούχ  α  τοις  τταώίοις  καΐ  τοΐς  θηρίοις, 
αλλ'  α  τοΐς  καθ^στώσίν  αμφοτέρων  γοΰν  μ€μνη- 
μ€νοι  ταϋ^'  αίρούμ€θα.  ώς  δ'  €χ€ΐ  τταώίον  καΐ  7 
θηρίον  προς  ανθρωττον  καθ€στώτα,  όντως  e^ei  6 
5  φαΰλος  καΐ  άφρων  ττρος  τον  €ΤΓί€ΐκη  καΐ  φρόνιμον 
τούτοις  δε  ήΒβα  τα  κατά  τάς  ef  et?,  ταΰτα  δ'  εστί 
τα  aya^a  καΙ  τα  καλά. 

'Evret  ουν  το  αγαθόν^  πλβοναχώς  {το  μβν  γάρ  τω  8 
TOLOvh^  elvai  λίγομεν  αγαθόν,  το  δε  τω  ωφβΧιμον 
καΐ  χρησιμον),  eVt  δε^  το  ή8ύ  το  μεν  απλώς  καΐ 

10  aya^ov  άττλώ?,  το  δε  τινί  καί^  φαι,νόμενον  aya^oi^, 
ώσπ€ρ  καΐ  €πΙ  των  άφύχων  δι'  €καστον  τούτων 
ενδέχεται  ημάς  αίρεΐσθαί  τι  καΐ  φιλείν,  ούτω*  καΐ 
άνθρωπον  τον  μεν  γάρ  οτι  TOLOohe'  /cat  hi  άρετην, 
τον  δ'  ΟΤΙ  ωφέλιμος  /cat  χρήσιμος ,  τον  δ'  οτι  ■ηΒύς 
και  δι'  Ύ)8ονήν.     φίλος  δε*  yiVeTat  όταν  φιλούμενος 

15  άντιφιλτ]  και  τούτο  μη  λανθάνη  πως  αυτούς. 

^Ανάγκη   άρα   τρία   φιλίας   εϊΒη   είναι,    και  μήτε  9 
καθ*   εν   άπάσας   μη^*^    ώς   ει'δη   ει^ο?   γένους  μήτε 
πάμπαν  λεγεσθαι  ομωνύμως.     προς  μίαν  γάρ  τίνα 
λέγονται  και  πρώτην,  ώσπερ  το  Ιατρικόν,  /cat  φυχην 

20  Ιατρικην  και  σώμα  λεγομεν  και  όργανον  και  έργον, 

1  Sp. :  τα  ayaea.  ^  ίτι  δέ  Βζ. :  ίπύ  δέ  Ρ^,  ^πβΐ  Μ»•. 

^'  καΐ  Beier :  ή  (om.  Γ),  *  οντω  Βζ. :  ώσπερ. 

*   Ric. :  rbf  μέν  yap  τοιόνδε.  •  lac. :   δή. 

»  Sus.:  μήθ'. 

368 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  VII.  π.  5-9 


in  a  dash  of  vinegar,  but  to  the  uncorrupted  taste. 

6  And  similarly  also  in  the  case  of  the  spirit,  the  really 
pleasant  things  are  not  those  pleasant  to  children 
and  animals,  but  those  pleasant  to  the  adult  ;  at 
least  it  is  these  that  we  prefer  when  we  remember 

7  both.  And  as  a  child  or  animal  stands  to  an  adult 
human  being,  so  the  bad  and  foolish  man  stands 
to  the  good  and  wise  man  ;  and  these  take  pleasure 
in  things  that  correspond  to  their  characters,  and 
these  are  things  good  and  fine. 

8  Since  therefore  good  is  a  term  of  more  than  one 
meaning  (for  we  call  one  thing  good  because  that  is^  ./     '^^^i^ 
its  essential  nature,  but  another  because  it  is  service-• 

able  and  useful),  and  furthermore  pleasant  includes 
both    what    is    absolutely    pleasant    and    absolutely 
good  and  what  is  pleasant  for  somebody   and   ap- 
parently good — ,  as  in  the  case  of  inanimate  objects 
we  may  choose  a  thing  and  love  it  for  each  of  these 
reasons,  so  also  in  the  case  of  a  human  being,  one 
man  we  love  because  of  his  character,  and  for  good- 
ness, another  because  he  is  serviceable  and  useful, -- 
another    because    he  is  pleasant,  and    for  pleasure .^-^ 
And  a  man  becomes  a  friend  when  while  receiving  Definition 
affection  he  returns  it,  and  when  he  and  the  other  °^  friend. 
are  in  some  way  aware  of  this. 

9  It  follows,  therefore,  that  there  are  three  sorts  of  Three  kinds 
friendship,  and  that  they  are  not  all  so  termed  in  °^jp"^°*^' 
respect  of  one  thing  or  as  species  of  one  genus,  nor 

yet  have  they  the  same  name  entirely  by  accident. 
For  all  these  uses  of  the  term  are  related  to  one 
particular  sort  of  friendship  which  is  primary,  like 
the  term  '  surgical  '  —  and  we  speak  of  a  surgical 
mind  and  a  surgical  hand  and  a  surgical  instrument 
and  a  surgical  operation,  but  we  apply  the  term 


2b 


3^ 


ARISTOTLE 

1286  a 

αλλά  κυρίως  το  πρώτον,      πρώτον  δ'   ου  ό^  λόγος  Κ 

iv  πάσιν^  υπάρχει,  οίον   όργανον  ιατρικον   ω   αν  ο 

Ιατρός  χρησαιτο,   €V  Se  τώ  του  Ιατρού  λόγω  ουκ 

eoTtv  ό  του  οργάνου.     ζητ€Ϊται  μβν  ουν  πανταχού  1 

το   πρώτον,  δια  δε  τό  το    καθόλου    etvai^  πρώτον 

λαμβάνουσυ    και     τό*    πρώτον    καθόλου•    τοΰτο     ο 

25  ioTL  φίΰ^ος.  ώστ€  καΐ  π^ρΐ  της  φιλίας  ου  δύνανται 
πάντ*  άποΒώόναί  τα  φαινόμενα•  ου  γαρ^  εφ- 
αρμόττοντος  €νός  λόγου  ουκ  οΐονται  τοίς^  άλλα? 
φιλίας  elvai•  at  δ'  eiat  μεν,  αλλ'  ούχ  ομοίως  etatv. 
οΐ  δ'  όταν  η  πρώτη  μη  εφαρμόττη ,  ως  οΰσαν  1' 
καθόλου  αν  etVep  ην  πρώτη,  ουδ'  etvai  φιλίας  τάς 

30  άλλα?  φασίν.     εστί  δε  πολλά  εί,'δτ^  φιλίας•  τών  γάρ  ^ 
ρηθίντων  ην  ηΒη,  €π€ΐ8η  Βιώρισται  τριχώς  λεγεσθαι 
την  φιλίαν,  η  μβν  γάρ  Βιώρισται  δι'  άρετην  η  δε  δια 
τό  χρησιμον  η  δε  δια  τό  ήΒύ. 

Ύουτων  η  μβν  δια.  τό  χρησιμόν  εστί  νη  Δια'  τών  1• 
πλείστων  φιλία•  δια  γάρ  τό  χρήσιμοι  ειι^αι  φιλοϋσιν 

35  αλλτίλου?,  και  μέχρι  τούτου,  ώσπερ  ή  παροιμία 

Τλαΰκ* ,    επίκουρος    άνηρ    τόσσον    φίλος^    ες    κτε* 
μάχηται, 
καΐ 

ούκετι  γιγνώσκουσιν  ^Αθηναίοι  Μεγαρηας. 

η   δε   δι'   ηΒονην  τών   νέων,   τούτου  γάρ   αίσ^τ^σιν» 

εχουσιν    διό     εύμετάβολος     φιλία    η    τών     νέων,  1ί 

μεταβαλλόντων    γάρ    τα    ηθη    κατά    τάς    ηλικίας 

^  6  add.  Ric.  *  πάσιν  Sus. :  ήμΐν. 

*  τό  τό  Λ'α^όλοί'  elfai  Sus. :  τό  καθόλου  fivai  τό. 

*  τό  add.  Sp.  ^  ούκ  οΐιν  ?  Rac. 

•  τάϊ  add.  Βζ.  '  έση  ντ)  Αία  lac. :  ίστικ  η. 

*  τόσσον  φίλοί  Fr. :  τόν  σόφον  φίΧον.  *  ίστε  Sol. 

"  11.  7-17.  "  Α  friend  in  need  is  a  friend  indeed. 

370 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  VII.  ii.  10-15 

10  properly  to  that  which  is  primarily  so  called.  The 
primary  is  that  of  which  the  definition  is  implicit 
in  the  definition  of  all,  for  example  a  surgical  instru- 
ment is  an  instrument  that  a  surgeon  would  use, 
whereas    the    definition    of   the    instrument    is    not 

11  implicit  in  that  of  surgeon.  Therefore  in  every  case 
people  seek  the  primary,  and  because  the  universal 
is  primary  they  assume  that  also  the  primary  is 
universal  ;  but  this  is  untrue.  Hence  in  the  case 
of  friendship,  they  cannot  take  account  of  all  the 
observed  facts.  For  as  one  definition  does  not  fit, 
they  think  that  the  other  kinds  of  friendship  are 
not  friendships  at  all ;  but  really  they  are,  although 

12  not  in  the  same  way,  but  when  they  find  that  the 
primary  friendship  does  not  fit,  assuming  that  it 
would  be  universal  if  it  really  were  primary,  they 

13  say  that  the  others  are  not  friendships  at  all.     But 
in    reality    there    are    many    kinds    of  friendships  : ' 
this  was  among  the  things  said  already,"  as  we  have 
distinguished  three  senses  of  the  term  friendship —  /  jij^  ^ 
one   sort  has   been   defined  as   based  on  goodness,    ' 
another  on  utility,  another  on  pleasure.   '^:TS.'^-i'  ' 

14  Of  these  the  one  based  on  utility  is  assuredly  theNsed  on 
friendship  of  most  people  ;  for  they  love  one  another^ieas^e, 
because  they  are  useful,  and  in  so  far  as  thev  areiP"'^^ 
SO,  as  says  the  proverb — 

Glaucus,  an  ally  is  a  friend 

As  long  as  he  our  battle  fights,''  * 

and 

Athens  no  longer  knoweth  Megara. 

15  On  the  other  hand  friendship  based  on  pleasure  is  ^ 
the  friendship  of  the  young,  for  they  have  a  sense  of  / 
what  is  pleasant ;    hence  young  people's  friendship 
easily  changes,  for  since  their  characters  change  as 

371 


ARISTOTLE 

1236  b  μζταβάλλζΐ   καΐ   το    ηΒν.     η    δε    κατ'    άρβτην   των 
β€λτίστων . 

Φανίρον  δ'  €Κ  τούτων  δτι  ή  πρώτη  φιλία,  η  των  1 
aya^cui^,  βστίν   άντιφιλία   καΐ   αντιττροαίρ^σις  ττρός 
αλλήλους,     φίλον   μέν   γαρ    το    φίλονμ€νον   τω   φι- 
λοΰντι,  φίλος  δε  τω  φιλονμ4νω  καΐ  αύτος  6  φιλών} 
5  αϋτη  μ€ν  οΰν  iv  άνθρώπω^  μόνον  ύττάρχ^ι  rf  φιλία,  1 
μονός*  γαρ    αίσθάν€ται    ττροαιρ€σ€ως•   αϊ  δ'   άλλαι 
και  €v  τοις   θηρίοις.      και    γαρ^    το  χρησιμον    iiri 
μικρόν  τι  φαίνεται  €νυπάρχον  και  ττρος  ανθρωττον 
τοις  ημ€ροις  και  προς  άλληλα,  οΐον  τόν^   τροχίλον 
10  φησιν  'Ηρόδοτο?  τω  κροκοΒβίλω,  και  ώς  οι  μάντεις 
τάς  σννεΒρίας  και  διεδρια?  λέγουσιν.     και  οι  φαύλοι  ^ 
αν  elev  φίλοι  άλληλοις  και  δια  το  χρησιμον  και  8ιά 
το  η8ν•  οι  δ  ,  δτι  η  πρώτη  ονχ  υπάρχει  αύτοΐς,  ου  1 
φασι  φίλους  etvai*  αδικήσει  γαρ  δ  γε  φαύλος  τον 
φαΰλον,  οΐ  δ'  αδικούμενοι  ου  φιλοϋσι  σφας  αυτούς. 
15  οι  δε  φιλοϋσι  μεν,  αλλ'  ου  την  πρώτην  φιλίαν,  επει  2 
τάς    γε     ετέρας    ούθεν    κωλύει•    δι'     τ^δοι^ΐ'    γαρ 
ύπομενουσιν''  αλλτ^λου?  βλαπτόμενοι,  εως^  αν  ώσιν 
ακρατείς,     ου  ^οκοΰσι  δ'  οι5δ'  οι  δι'  ηΒονην  φιλούν-  2 
τες    αλλτ^λου?    φίλοι    eti^at,    όταν    κατ'    άκρίβειαν 
ζητώσιν,  δτι  ούχ  η  πρώτη'  εκείνη  μεν  γαρ  βέβαιος, 

^  αύτοί  6  φίλων  Ross :  άνηφίλών. 

*  άνθρώιτφ  ?  Sp. ;  άνθρώττοΐί. 

'  7]  add.  Ric.  *  Sp. :  μόνον. 

*  yap  add.  Ric.  •  <n-pos>  τόν  ?  Rac. 

'   Bz. :   νπονοοΰσιν.  *  lac. :  ώ?  {fjs  Ric). 

"  Herodotus,  ii.  68,  says  that  the  trochilus  picks  leeches 
out  of  the  crocodile's  throat,  Aristotle,  Hist.  An.  ix.  6.  6, 
that  it  picks  the  crocodile's  teeth.     In  reality  it  picks  gnats 
from  the  crocodile's  open  mouth. 
372 


/gj 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  VII.  ii.  15-21 

they  grow  up,  their  taste  in  pleasure  also  changes. 
But  the  friendship  in  conformity  with  goodness  is 
the  friendship  of  the  best  men. 

16  It  is  clear  from  this  that  the  primary  friendship.  The  last 
that  of  the  good,  is  mutual  reciprgcity  of  affection  vfrTuou^s*" 
and  purpose,     i'or  the  object  of  affection  is  dear  to\men;  the 
the  giver  of  it,  but  also  the  giver  of  affection  is  him- 

17  self  dear  to  the  object.     This  friendship,  therefore. 


two  former 
occur 
among 
,  .  ^11  •  lanimals,  and 

only  occurs  in  man,  tor  tie  alone  perceives  purpose  ;|badmen. 
but  the  other  forms  occur  also  in  the  lower  animals. 


Indeed  mutual  utility  manifestly  exists  to  some  small 
extent  between  the  domestic  animals  and  man,  and 
between  animals  themselves,  for  instance  Hero- 
dotus's  account  of  the  friendship  between  the  croco- 
dile and  the  sandpiper,**  and  the  perching  together 
and  separating  of  birds  of  which  soothsayers  speak. 

18  The  bad  may  be  each  other's  friends  from  motives 

19  both  of  utility  and  of  pleasure  ;  though  some  say 
that  they  are  not  really  friends,  because  the  prim- 
ary kind  of  friendship  does  not  belong  to  them, 
since  obviously  a  bad  man  will  injure  a  bad  man, 
and    those    who    suffer    injury    from    one    another 

20  do  not  feel  affection  for  one  another.  But  as  a 
matter  of  fact  bad  men  do  feel  affection  for  one 
another,  though  not  according  to  the  primary 
form  of  friendship — because  clearly  nothing  hinders! 
their  being  friends  under  the  other  forms,  since  for; 
the  sake  of  pleasure  they  put  up  with  one  another! 
although  they  are  being  harmed,  so  long  as  they  are 

21  lacking  in  self-restraint.  The  view  is  also  held, 
when  people  look  into  the  matter  closely,  that  those 
who  feel  affection  for  each  other  on  account  of 
pleasure  are  not  friends,  because  it  is  not  the  primary 
friendship,  since  that  is  reliable  but  this  is  unreliable. 

373 


ARISTOTLE 

1236  b 

"Ό  αντη  oe  apepaios.     η  ο    eart  μ€ν,  ωσπ€ρ  ειρηται, 
φιλία,  ουκ  €Κ€ίνη  Se  αλλ'  άττ'  €Κ€ίνης,    το  /Aei'  ουν  22 
€Κ€ίνως  μόνον  Xeyetv  τον  φίλον  βιάζ^σθαι  τά  φαι- 
νόμενα βστί,  καΐ  7ταρά8οζα  Xeyeiv  αναγκαΐον  καθ* 
eva    δε    λόγον    πάσας    aSuvarov .^    λβιττεται   τοίνυν  23 
οϋτως,  otl  έ'στι  μεν  ώς  μόνη  η  ττρώτη  φιλία,  eari 

25  δ  ώ$  ττασαι,  οϋτ€  ώς  ομώνυμοι  /cat  ώ?  ετυχεν 
εχουσαι  ττρός  αύτάς,  ούτε  καθ*  ev  ειδο?,  άλλα 
μάλλον  ττρόζ  ev. 

ΈτΓβι  δ'  απλώς  aya^oi'  /cat  απλώς  ηΒύ  το  αυτό  24 
/cat  α/ζα  αν  μη  τι^  εμποΒιζη,  ο  δ'   άλτ^θιρ'ό?  φίλος 
και    απλώς    ό    πρώτος   εστίν,  εστί    8ε   τοιούτος    ό 

30  αυτό?  δt'  αύτόΐ'  αιρετός  {ανάγκη  δ'  etrat  τοιούτον,  ω* 
γαρ  βονλεταί  τις  δι'  αύτον  είναι  τάγαθά,  ανάγκη 
και    δι'*    αυτόν  αίρετόν^  efvat),  ό*   άλτ^^ιι^ό?    φίλος  25 
/cat  τ^δυ?  εστίν  απλώς•  διό  δο/cet  /cat    ό    όπωσοΰν 
φίλος  ή8ύς.     ετι  δε  διοριστεον  περί  τούτου  μάλλον  26 
e^et  ya/)  επίστασιν,  πότερον''    το  γ*  αύτώ  aya^ot' 

35  η  το  άττλώ?  aya^oi'  φίλον,  και  πότερον  το  κατ* 
ενεργειαν  φιλεΐν  μεθ*  ηΒονης,  ώστε  και  το  φιλητόν 
ηΒυ,^  η  ου.  άμφω  γαρ  εις  ταύτό  συνακτεον  τά  τε 
γαρ  μη  απλώς  αγαθά  άλλα  κακά  αν  πως^  '^^Χϊί 
φευκτά,  και  το  μη  αύτώ  αγαθόν  ούθεν  προς  αυτόν, 
άλλα  τοΰτ  εστίν  ο  ζητείται,  τά  απλώς  αγαθά 
ί237  &  οϋτως  εΐναι  aya^a.  εστί  γάρ  αιρετον  μεν^"  το  21 
απλώς   aya^of,   αύτω   8ε  το   αύτώ   αγαθόν   α   8εΐ 

^  Βζ. :  δυνατόν.  *  Γ :  τ«. 

'  Sp. :  ώϊ.  *  δι'  add.  Sp. 

'  Sp. :   αίρΰσθαι.  '  Sp. :  ό  δ'. 

'  Erasmus :  ίχει  ίττίστασιν.     nbrepov  yap. 

*  iaare  το  φιλητόν  καΐ  ηδύ  ?  Rac. 

•  άν  πω$  lac. :  άττλώί  (άττλώ?  ζ,κΆν  ήδία  6vTay  Ric). 

10  μ(ν  <άπλώϊ>  ?  Rac. 

374 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  VII.  π.  21-27 

But  as  a  matter  of  fact  it  is  friendship,  as  has  been 
said,   though   not   that   sort   of  friendship   but   one 

22  derived  from  it.  Therefore  to  confine  the  use  of 
the  term  friend  to  that  form  of  friendship  alone  is 
to  do  violence  to  observed  facts,  and  compels  one  to 
talk  paradoxes  ;    though  it  is  not  possible  to  bring 

23  all  friendship  under  one  definition.  The  only  re- 1 
maining  alternative,  therefore,  is,  that  in  a  sense  the 
primary  sort  of  friendship  alone  is  friendship,  but  in 
a  sense  all  sorts  are,  not  as  having  a  common  name 
by  accident  and  standing  in  a  merely  chance  rela- 
tionship to  one  another,  nor  yet  as  falling  under  one 
species,  but  rather  as  related  to  one  thing. 

24  And  since  the  same  thing  is  absolutely  good  and 'Pleasant• 
absolutely  pleasant  at  the  same  time  if  nothing  goodness. 
interferes,  and  the  true  friend  and  friend  absolutely 

is  the  primary  friend,  and  such  is  a  friend  chosen  in  \ 
and  for  himself  (and  he  must  necessarily  be  such,  for 
he  for  whom  one  wishes  good  for  his  own  sake  must 

25  necessarily  be  desirable  for  his  own  sake),  a  true 
friend  is  also  absolutely  pleasant  ;   owing  to  which  it 

26  is  thought  that  a  friend  of  any  sort  is  pleasant.  But 
we  must  define  this  still  further,  for  it  is  debatable 
whether  what  is  good  merely  for  oneself  is  dear  or 
what  is  absolutely  good,  and  whether  the  actual 
exercise  of  affection  is  accompanied  by  pleasure, 
so  that  an  object  of  affection  is  also  pleasant,  or  not. 
Both  questions  must  be  brought  to  the  same  issue  ; 
for  things  not  absolutely  good  but  possibly  evil  are 
to  be  avoided,  and  also  a  thing  not  good  for  oneself 
is  no  concern  of  oneself,  but  what  is  sought  for  is  that 
things   absolutely   good   shall   be   good   for   oneself. 

27  For  the  absolutely  good  is  absolutely  desirable,  but 
what  is  good  for  oneself  is  desirable  for  oneself ; 

375 


ARISTOTLE 

1237  a 

σνμφωνησαι.     /cat    τοΰτο    rj    aperrj    ttol€l•    /cat    rj 

πολιτική  επΙ  τοντω,  δπως  οΐς  μηττω  earl  yeVT^rat. 

€ΰθ€τος^   δε  /cat  προ  οΒοΰ   ό^  άνθρωπος  ων  {φυσ€ΐ 

5  γαρ  αντω  aya^a  τα  απλώς  aya^a),  ομοίως  he  /cat  28 

ανηρ  αντί   γυναικός   και   βνφνης   άφνονς^'   δια  τοΰ 

ηο€ος  oe  η  οοος•  ανάγκη  etvat  τα  καλά  ηο€α.     όταν 

δε  ταύτα*   Βιαφωνη,  ονπω   σπον^αΐος^  τελε'ω?•  εΐ'- 

δε'χεταt   yap    εyyεvε'σ^αt    άκρασίαν    τω*   yap  δια- 

φωνβΐν  ταγαθόν  τω  τ^δεΓ  ει^  τοΓ?  πάθεσιν  άκρασία 

εστίν. 

10      Ώστ    €π€ΐ8η  η  πρώτη  φιλία   /cot'  άρεττ^ΐ',    'έσον-  2ί1 
Tat    /cat    αύτοι    άττλώ?    αγαθοί,    τοΰτο    δ'    ούχ   οτι 
χρήσιμοι,  αλλ'  αλλοι^  τρόπον.     8ιχώς  γαρ  έχει  το  3C 
τωδί  aya^ol•"  /cat  το'  άττλώ?   a.ya^oi'•   /cat   ομοίως, 
ωσπ€ρ    βπι    τοΰ    ωφελίμου,    και    εττι    των'    έ'^εωι/• 
άλλο  yap    το  άττλώ?    ώφέλιμον    και   το  τοισδι    (οι^ 

15  τρόπον^  το  yu/x^'αζεσ^αt  ττρό?   το   φαρμακ€ν€σθ jli)  • 
ωστ€  και  η  ζζις,  η  ανθρώπου  άρ€τή  (έστω  γαρ  ό  31 
άνθρωπος  των  φύσ€ΐ  σπουδαίων)  •  η  άρα  τοΰ  φυσ€ΐ 
σπουδαίου    άρ€τη    απλώς    aya^oi',    η    δε    τοΰ    μη 
ζΚζίνω. 

'Ομοίως    Srj    €χ€ΐ    και    το    η8ύ.      βνταΰθα    γαρ  32 
ετΓίστατεον  και  σκεπτ^ον  πότερόν  εστίν  avev  ηΒονης 

20  φίλια,   και  τι  δtα^εpεt,   και   iv  ποτέρω   ποτ^   εστί 

^  Rac. :  6νθ4τωί  (ante  quod  lacunam  Sp.,  initium  protaseos 
cuius  apodosis  1.  6  άνά-/κη). 

*  ό  add.  lac.  '  Bus. :  άφυί)ί  eύφυovs. 

*  Bus, :  TovTo.  *  sic  versio  Solomonis :  στΓονδαϊοι>. 
«  Mb  TO.  7  TO  add.  Rac. 

*  TO  .  .  .  τρόπον  lac.  (to  add.  Rac.) :  τό  καλόν  τοιούτον. 
376 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  VII.  ii.  27-32 

and  the  two  ought  to  come  into  agreement.  This 
is  effected  by  goodness  ;  and  the  purpose  of  pohtical 
science  is  to  bring  it  about  in  cases  where  it  does  not 
yet  exist.  And  one  who  is  a  human  being  is  well 
adapted  to  this  and  on  the  way  to  it  (for  by  nature 
things  that  are  absolutely  good  are  good  to  him), 

28  and  similarly  a  man  rather  than  a  woman  and  a 
gifted  man  rather  than  a  dull  one  ;  but  the  road 
is  through  pleasure — it  is  necessary  that  fine  things  •' 
shall  be  pleasant.  When  there  is  discord  between 
them,  a  man  is  not  yet  perfectly  good  ;  for  it  is 
possible  for  unrestraint  to  be  engendered  in  him, 
as  unrestraint  is  caused  by  discord  between  the 
good  and  the  pleasant  in  the  emotions. 

29  Therefore  since  the  primary  sort  of  friendship  is' Friendship 
in  accordance  with  goodness,  friends  of  this  sort  will  vfrt„e°the 
be  absolutely  good  in  themselves  also,  and  this  not  primary 
because   of  being   useful,   but   in   another   manner.: 

30  For  good  for  a  given  person  and  good  absolutely  arej 
twofold  ;  and  the  same  is  the  case  with  states  of' 
character  as  with  profitableness — what  is  profitable 
absolutely  and  what  is  profitable  for  given  persons 
are  different  things  (just  as  taking  exercise  is  a 
different  thing  from  taking  drugs).  So  the  state  of 
character  called  human  goodness  is  of  two  kinds — 

31  for  let  us  assume  that  man  is  one  of  the  things  that 
are  excellent  by  nature  :  consequently  the  goodness 
of  a  thing  excellent  by  nature  is  good  absolutely,  but 
that  of  a  thing  not  excellent  by  nature  is  only  good 
for  that  thing. 

32  The  case  of  the  pleasant  also,  therefore,  is  similar.  Problems- 
For  here  we  must  pause  and  consider  whether  there  fagtor^^of 
is  any  friendship  without  pleasure,  and  how  such  a  pleasant- 
friendship  differs  from  other  friendship,  and  on  which  ^^^^' 

377 


ARISTOTLE 

1237  a      ^  ^  ^  „  ,  ,  «  ,         y      c  Ϊ  / 

TO   φιλ€Ϊν,  TTOTepov^   on   αγαθός   καν   et   μη   ηους, 
αλλ'    ού^    δια    τοΰτο;     8ιχώς    δη     λζγομίνου    του 
φιΧζΙν,  7τότ€ρον  OTL  άγαθον  το  κατ'  evepyeiav  ουκ 
άν€υ   TjSovrjs   φαίνζται;      hrjXov   δ'    οτι   ωσπ€ρ   εττι  3; 
της  ετηστημης  at  πρόσφατοι  θ^ωρίαι  καΐ  μαθήσεις 

25  αίσθηταΐ    μάλιστα    τω    rjSei,    οϋτω    και     at     των 
συνήθων   αναγνωρίσεις,   και   6  λόγος   ο   αύτος   βπ 
άμφοΐν.     φυσ€ΐ  γοΰν  το  απλώς  aya^ov  ηΒύ  απλώς, 
και  οΐς  aya^dr,  τούτοις  η8ύ.     διό  ευθύς  τα  όμοια  34 
άλληλοις  χαίρει,  και  άνθρώπω  ήδιστον  άνθρωπος' 
ώστ    Ιπεί  και  άτελη,  ^ηλον  οτι  και  τελειωθεντα• 

30  ό  Βέ  σπουδαίος  τέλειος,  ει  6έ  το  κτατ'  ενεργειαν 
φιλεΐν  μεθ^  ηδονής  άντιπροαίρεσις  της  άλλτ^λων 
γνωρίσεως,  Βηλον  οτι  και  όλως  ή  φιλία  η  πρώτη 
άντιπροαίρεσις  τών  απλώς  aya^cDi/  και  ηΒεων  οτι 
aya^a   και   η8εα•   eWt   δ'    αυττ7   η   φιλία   εζις   αφ'  3ί 

35  •^s^  η  τοιαύτη  προαίρεσις .  το  γαρ  έργον  αύτης 
ενέργεια,  αύτη  δ'  ουκ  εζω  αλλ'  εν  αύτώ  τω 
φιλοϋντι•  δυνάμεως  δε  πάσης^  ^ζω,  η  γαρ  εν 
ετερω  η  fj*  έτερον.  Sio  το  φιλεΐν  χαίρειν  αλλ' 
ου  το  φιλεΐσθαί  εστίν  το  μεν  γαρ  φιλεΐσθαι  ου  3( 
τοΰ^  φιλητοΰ  ενέργεια,  το  δε  «rat  φιλίας,  και  το 
μεν  εν  εμφύχω,  το  δε  /cat  εν  άφύχω•  φιλεΐται  γαρ 

40  και  τα  άφυχα.     επει  δε  το  φιλεΐν  το  κατ'  ενεργειαν  3' 

^  καΐ  πότερον  Μ•».  ^  άλλ'  ον]  fj  οϋ,  άλλα  Sp. 

'  <,σωματικηί>  πάσηί  ?  Ric.  *  rj  add.  Βζ. 

'  ού  τοΰ  add.  Rac. 

"  Goodness  and  pleasantness. 

''  Perhaps  the  Greek  should  be  altered  to  give  '  or  not, 
but  because  he  is  pleasant.' 

'  Potential  and  actual  (Solomon). 

''  Ross  marks  this  clause  as  corrupted. 
378, 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  VII.  ii.  32-37 

exactly  of  the  two  things  *  the  affection  depends — 
do  we  love  a  man  because  he  is  good  even  if  he 
is  not  pleasant,  but  not  because  he  is  pleasant  ?  '' 
Then,  affection  having  two  meanings,''  does  actual! 
affection  seem  to  involve  pleasure  because  activity! 

33  is  good  ?  It  is  clear  that  as  in  science  recent  studies! 
and  acquirements  are  most  fully  apprehended,  be- 
cause of  their  pleasantness,**  so  with  the  recognition 
of  familiar  things,  and  the  principle  is  the  same  in 
both  cases.  By  nature  at  all  events  the  absolutely 
good  is  absolutely  pleasant,  and  the  relatively  good 

34  is  pleasant  to  those  for  whom  it  is  good.^  Hence 
ipso  facto  like  takes  pleasure  in  like,  and  man  is  the 
thing  most  pleasant  to  man  ;  so  that  as  this  is  so  even 
with  imperfect  things,  it  is  clearly  so  with  things 
when  perfected,  and  a  good  man  is  a  perfect  man. 
And  if  active  affection  is  the  reciprocal  choice,  ac- 
companied by  pleasure,  of  one  another's  acquaint- 
ance, it  is  clear  that  friendship  of  the  primary  kind 
is  in  general  the  reciprocal  choice  of  things  absolutely 
good    and    pleasant    because    they    are    good    and 

35  pleasant  ;  and  friendship  itself  is  a  state  from  which 
such  choice  arises.  For  its  function  is  an  activity, 
but  this  not  external  but  within  the  lover  himself ; 
whereas  the  function  of  every  faculty  is  external, 
for  it  is  either  in  another  or  in  oneself  qua  other. 

36  Hence  to  love  is  to  feel  pleasure  but  to  be  loved  is 
not  ;  for  being  loved  is  not  an  activity  of  the  thing 
loved,  whereas  loving  is  an  activity — the  activity  of 
friendship  ;  and  loving  occurs  only  in  an  animate 
thing,  whereas  being  loved  occurs  with  an  inanimate 
thing    also,   for    even   inanimate    things    are   loved. 

37  And  since  to  love   actively  is   to   treat  the  loved 

*   8c.  (to  TOLaSl  ά7α^όΐ')  oil  ά-γαθόν,  τούτοι%  ηδύ. 

379 


ARISTOTLE 

1237  b  τω  φίλονμενω^  earl  χρησθαι  fj  φίλονμβνον ,  6  8e 
φίλθ9  φιλονμβνον  τώ^  φίλω  fj  φίλος  άλλα  μη  fj 
μουσικός  η  ιατρός,  ηΒονη  τοίνυν  η  άττ'  αντοΰ 
fj  αυτός,  αϋτη  φιλίκη•  αυτόν  γαρ  φιλβΐ,  ούχ  οτι 
5  άλλο.^  ωστ'  αν  μη  χο-ψη  fj  αγαθός,  ούχ  η  ττρώτη 
φίλια.  ούΒβ  Set  €μπο8ίζ€ίν  ούθβν  των  συμβεβηκοτων  38 
μάλλον  η  τό  aya^ov  €ύφραίν€ΐ,*'  τι  γάρ;  σφό8ρα 
ΒυσώΒης  λειττεται^•  άγαπητόν^  γαρ  τό  edvoeiv  συζην'' 
δε   μη. 

Αϋτη  μεν  ουν  η  ττρώτη  φιλία,  ην^  πάντες  ομο- 
λογοΰσιν.  αΐ  δ'  άλλαι  δι'  αύτην  καΐ  Βοκοϋσι  καΐ  39 
10  αμφισβητούνται ,  βέβαιον  γάρ  τι  SoKei  η  φιλία, 
μόνη  δ'  αϋτη  βέβαιος'  τό  γάρ  κεκριμενον  βέβαιον, 
τα  δε  μη  ταχύ  ')/ιν'ό/χ€ν'α  μηΒε  ρα8ίως  ποιεί"  την 
κρίσιν  όρθην.  ουκ  εστί  δ'  άνευ  πίστεως  φιλία  40 
βέβαιος,  η  δε  πίστις  ουκ  άνευ  χρόνου•  δει  γάρ 
πεΐραν  λαβείν,  ώσπερ  λέγει  και  θεογνις' 

15      ού  γαρ  άν  ειδειτ^?  ανΒρος  νόον  ούδε  γυναικός , 
πριν  πειραθείης  ώσπερ  υποζυγίου. 

οι  δ'  άνευ  χρόνου  ού  φίλοι^'*  αλλά  βοϋλονται  είΐ'αι" 
φίλοι,  και  /ιιάλιστα  λαΐ'^άι^ει  η  τοιαύτη  εζις  ώς 
φιλία•  όταν  γάρ  προθύμως  εχωσι  φίλοι  ett'ai,  δια  41 
20  τό  πάνθ*  ύπηρετεΐν  τά  φιλικά  άλλι^λοι?  οΐονται  ού 
βούλεσθαι  ειναι^^  φίλοι  αλλ'  είναι  φίλοι.  τό  δ' 
ώσπερ    επΙ    των    άλλων    συμβαίνει    και    επΙ    της 

^  Fr. :  τό  φίΚούμΐνον  6,  *   Βζ. :  και, 

'  lac. :  ά\λψ,  *  Rac. :  (ύφραίν^ιν. 

*  οίον  d  σφόδρα  δνσωδηί  yiverai  Ric. 

β  Ross :  άγαταταί.  '  Sol. :  (Tv^'jj. 

*  Fr. :  η,  •  Βζ. :  ού  iroui. 

^^  ο£  δ'  .  .   .  φίλοι  Fr. :  ούδ'  Afev  γρονου  φίλοί. 

^*  elvai  add.  I"'r.  ^*  etVat  add.  Rac. 

380 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  VII.  π.  37-41 

object  qua  loved,  and  the  friend  is  an  object  of  love 
to  the  friend  qua  dear  to  him  but  not  qua  musician 
or  medical  man,  the  pleasure  of  friendship  is  the 
pleasure  derived  from  the  person  himself  qua  him- 
self ;  for  the  friend  loves  him  as  himself,  not  because 
he  is  something  else.  Consequently  if  he  does  not 
take  pleasure  in  him  qua  good,  it  is  not  the  primary 

38  friendship.  Nor  ought  any  accidental  quality  to 
cause  more  hindrance  than  the  friend's  goodness 
causes  delight ;  for  surely,  if  a  person  is  very  evil- 
smelling,  people  cut  him — he  must  be  content  with 
our  goodwill,  he  must  not  expect  our  society  ! 

This  then  is  the  primary  friendship,  which  all  people  Permanence 

39  recognize.     It  is  on  account  of  it  that  the  other  sorts  f/jendship. 
are  considered  to  be  friendship,  and  also  that  their 

claim  is  disputed — for  friendship  seems  to  be  some- 
thing stable,  and  only  this  friendship  is  stable  ;  for 
a  formed  judgement  is  stable,  and  not  doing  things 

40  quickly  or  easily  makes  the  judgement  right.  And 
there  is  no  stable  friendship  without  confidence, 
and  confidence  only  comes  with  time  ;  for  it  is 
necessary  to  make  trial,  as  Theognis  says  : 

Thou  canst  not  know  the  mind  of  man  nor  woman 
E'er  thou  hast  tried  them  as  thou  triest  cattle. 

Those  who  become  friends  without  the  test  of  time 
are  not  real  friends  but  only  wish  to  be  friends  ; 
and  such  a  character  very  readily  passes  for  friend- 
^Y  ship,  because  when  eager  to  be  friends  they  think 
that  by  rendering  each  other  all  friendly  services 
they  do  not  merely  wish  to  be  friends  but  actually 
are  friends.  But  as  a  matter  of  fact  it  happens  in 
friendship   as  in  everything   else  ;    people  are  not 

381 


ARISTOTLE 

1237  b 

φιλίας'  ov  γαρ  el  βούλονται  uytaiVetv  ύγιαίνουσιν, 

ώστ*  ούδ'   et   elvaC^  φίλοι  βονλονται  ηΒη  και  φίλοι 

€ΐσίν.     σημ€Ϊον  Se•  €ύΒιάβλητοι  γαρ  οι  διακείμενοι  4* 

25  avev  πείρας  τούτον  τον  τρόπον  περί  ών  μεν  γαρ 
πεΐραν  Βε^ώκασιν  άλλτ^λοι?,  ουκ  εν^ιάβλητοι,  περί 
ών  8e  μη,  πεισθεΐεν  αν  όταν  σύμβολα  λεγωσιν  οι 
8ιαβάλλοντες .  άμα  8e  φανερον  δτι  οι)δ'  εν  τοις  4; 
φαυλοις  αϋτιη  η  φιλία•  άπιστος  γαρ  6  φαύλος  και 
κακοήθης    προς    πάντας•    αύτώ    γαρ    μετρεΐ    τους 

30  άλλου?.  διό  εύεζαπατητότεροί  είσιν  οΐ  αγαθοί, 
αν  μη  δια  πεΐραν  άττιστώσιι^.  οι  δε  φαΰλοι  φ 
αιροΰνται  τα  φύσει  aya^a  άντι  του  φίλου,  και  ούθ- 
εις  φιλεΐ  μάλλον  άνθρωπον  η  πράγματα,  ώστ' 
ου  φίλοι'  ου  γαρ  γίνεται  οϋτω  κοινά  τα  φίλων, 
προσνεμεται  γάρ  6  φίλος  τοις  πράγμασιν,  ου  τά 
πράγματα  τοΐς  φίλοις. 

35      Ου   γίνεται   αρ'    η    φιλία   η    πρώτη    εν   πολλοίς,  ^, 
ότι   χαλεπον   πο?ίλών   πεΐραν   λαβείν   εκάστω   γάρ 
αν  έδβι"   συζτ^σαι.      ούΒέ  8η  αιρετεον  ομοίως  περί 
1/χ.ατιου  και  φίλου'  καίτοι  εν  πάσι  Βοκεΐ  του  νουν  . 
έχοντος  8υοΐν  το  βελτιον  αιρεΐσθαι,  και  ει  μεν  τω 
χείρονι    πάλαι    εχρητο,    τω    βελτίονι    δε    μη^επω, 

40  τοΰθ     αιρετεον,    αλλ'    ουκ    άντι    του    πάλαι    φίλου 
1288  •τόΐ'  tiyvcDTa  ei  βελτίων.     ου  γάρ  εστίν  άνευ  πείρας 

^  elvai.  add.  Rac.  »  Bus. :  hv  δει  (Set  ?  Rac). 

382 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  VII.  π.  41-46 

healthy  merely  if  they  wish  to  be  healthy,  so  that 
even  if  people  wish  to  be  friends  they  are  not  actually 

42  friends  already.  A  proof  of  this  is  that  people  who 
have  come  into  this  position  without  first  testing 
one  another  are  easily  set  at  variance  ;  for  though 
men  are  not  set  at  variance  easily  about  things  in 
which  they  have  allowed  each  other  to  test  them,  in 
cases  where  they  have  not,  whenever  those  who  are 
attempting  to  set  them  at  variance  produce  evidence 

43  they  may  be  convinced.  At  the  same  time  it  is 
manifest  that  this  friendship  does  not  occur  between , 
base  people  either  ;  for  the  base  and  evil-natured  ί 
man  is  distrustful  towards  everybody,  because  hei 
measures  other  people  by  himself.  Hence  good 
men  are  more  easily  cheated,  unless  as  a  result  of 

44  trial  they  are  distrustful.  But  the  base  prefer  the 
goods  of  nature  to  a  friend,  and  none  of  them  love 
people  more  than  things  ;  and  so  they  are  not 
friends,  for  the  proverbial  *  common  property  as 
between  friends  '  is  not  realized  in  this  way — the 
friend  is  made  an  appendage  of  the  things,  not  the 
things  of  the  friends. 

45  Therefore   the   first  kind   of  friendship   does   not  its  rarity. 
occur  between  many  men,  because  it  is  difficult  to 

test  many — one  would  have  to  go  and  live  with  each 
of  them.  Nor  indeed  should  one  exercise  choice 
in  the  case  of  a  friend  in  the  same  way  as  about  a 

46  coat  ;  although  in  all  matters  it  seems  the  mark 
of  a  sensible  man  to  choose  the  better  of  two  things, 
and  if  he  had  been  wearing  his  worse  coat  for  a 
long  time  and  had  not  yet  worn  his  better  one,  the 
better  one  ought  to  be  chosen— but  you  ought  not 
in  place  of  an  old  friend  to  choose  one  whom  you 
do  not  know  to  be  a  better  man.     For  a  friend  is 

383 


ARISTOTLE 

1238  a 

oj)8e  μιας  ημ€ρας  6  φίλος,   αλλά  χρόνου   Sel'   διό 

ets"    τταροιμίαν    eX-qXvdev    ο    μβ^ιμνος    των    άλών. 

άμα   δε   δεΓ^   μη   μόνον   απλώς   αγαθόν   elvai   άλλα  4' 

και  σοι,   61  ό*  φίλος  εσται  σοι  φίλος'  aya^o?  juev 

5  yap  άττλώ?  εστί  τω  ά^α^ό?  elvai,  φίλος  he  τω 
άλλω  aya^os"  άττλώς  re  δ'^  aya^os•  /^αι  φίλος  όταν 
συμφωνήστ)  ταντα  άμφω,  ώστε  ο  eariv  απλώς 
aya^ov,  το  αυτό*  αλλω•  -^  και  μη  απλώς  μβν 
σπουδαίος ,^  άλλω  δ'  aya^o?  οτι  χρήσιμος.  το  4ί 
δε  τΓολλοΐ?  άμα  elvat  φίλον^  καΐ  το  φίλ^ΐν  κώλυα• 

10  ου  γαρ  οΐόν  τε  άμα  προς  πολλούς  ivepyelv. 

Έ/c   8η   τούτων   φαν€ρόν   οτι   ορθώς  λεyεται   ότι  4! 
η    φιλία   τών   βφαίων,    ώσττερ   η    εύδαι/χοη'α   τών 
αυταρκών .   καΐ  ορθώς   ειρηται 

η  γαρ  φύσις  βέβαιον,  ου  τα  χρήματα — 

πολύ  δε  Λτάλλιον  βιπβΐν  οτι  rf  άρβτη  της  φύσεως.  5( 
15  και  ο  τ€  χρόνος  λε'yεται  δει/ίνυναι  τόΐ'  φίλον  και 
αί  άτυχίαι  //,άλλον  τών  ευτυχιών,  τότε  γαρ  δηλον 
ό'τι  κτοιί'ά  τα  τών  φίλων,  ούτοι  γαρ  μόνοι  άντι 
τών  φύσει  o.ya^cDl•'  και  φύσει  κακών,  περί  ά  αί 
εύτυχίαι  και  αί  Βυστυχίαι,  αίροΰνται  μάλλον 
άνθρωπον  η  τούτων  τα  μεν  ειι^αι  τα  δε  μη  είναι• 
20  η  δ'  ατυχία  8ηλοΐ  τους  μη  όντως  οντάς  φίλους  5 
άλλα  διά  το  χρησιμον  τυχόν.^  6  δε  χρόνος  8ηλοΐ 
αμφότερους•    ούδε    yap    ο    χρήσιμος    ταχύ    8ηλος, 

^  Βζ. :  el,  ^  el  6  Bus. :  eicat  {el  δη  et  ίσται  <καΙ>  Ric). 

'  re  δ'  add.  Rac.  (δ'  add.  Γ).  *   Ric. :  τούτου, 

^  Fr. :   σπονδαίφ,  *  Syl. :   φίλον, 

'  [17]  Ric.  *  τνχύνταί  V, 

'  Euripides,  Electra  941. 

'  Or,  emending  the  .ms.  text,  '  that  friendship  is  goodness 
of  nature.' 
384 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  VII.  n.  46-51 

not  to  be  had  without  trial  and  is  not  a  matter  of  a 
single  day,  but  time   is  needed  ;    hence  the  '  peck 

47  of  salt  '  has  come  to  be  proverbial.  At  the  same 
time  if  a  friend  is  really  to  be  your  friend  he  must 
be  not  only  good  absolutely  but  also  good  to  you  ; 
for  a  man  is  good  absolutely  by  being  good,  but 
he  is  a  friend  by  being  good  to  another,  and  he  is 
both  good  absolutely  and  a  friend  when  both  these 
attributes  harmonize  together,  so  that  what  is  good  ' 
absolutely  is  also  good  for  another  person  ;  or  also 
he  may  be  not  good  absolutely  yet  good  to  another 

48  because  useful.  But  being  a  friend  of  many  people 
at  once  is  prevented  even  by  the  factor  of  affection, 
for  it  is  not  possible  for  affection  to  be  active  in 
relation  to  many  at  once. 

49  These  things,  therefore,  show  the  correctness  of  its  trust- 
the  saying  that  friendship  is  a  thing  to  be  relied  on,  ^o^^'^^'ness. 
just  as  happiness  is  a  thing  that  is  self-sufficing.     And 

it  has  been  rightly  said  **  : 

Nature  is  permanent,  but  wealth  is  not — 

although    it   would   be  much   finer  to  say  '  Friend- 

50  ship  '  than  'Nature.'^  And  it  is  proverbial  that 
time  shows  a  friend,  and  also  misfortunes  more 
than  good  fortune.  For  then  the  truth  of  the  saying 
'  friends'  possessions  are  common  property  '  is  clear, 
for  only  friends,  instead  of  the  natural  goods  and 
natural  evils  on  which  good  and  bad  fortune  turn, 
choose  a  human  being  rather  than  the  presence  of 

51  the  former  and  the  absence  of  the  latter  ;  and 
misfortune  shows  those  who  are  not  friends  really 
but  only  because  of  some  casual  utility.  And  both 
are  shown  by  time  ;  for  even  the  useful  friend  is 
not  shown  quickly,  but  rather  the  pleasant  one — 

2  c  385 


ARISTOTLE 

αλλ'  6  η^νς  μα?<λον,  ττλην  ούδ'  ο  απλώς  ηονς 
ταχύς}  όμοιοι  γαρ  οι  άνθρωττοι  τοις  οΐνοις  και 
β^βσμασιν   εκείνων   τ€   γαρ   το    μέν    γλνκύ^    ταχύ 

2δ  8ηλοΐ,  πλβίω  8e  χρόνον  γινόμενον  άηδε?  και  ου 
γλυκύ,  και  inl  των  ανθρώπων  ομοίως,  έ'στι  γαρ 
το  απλώς  ηΒύ  τω  τέλει  όριστεον  και  τω  χρόνω. 
όμολογησαι^ν  δ'  αν  καΐ  οι  πολλοί,  ουκ  εκ  τών  δ'. 
άποβαινόντων  μόνον,  αλλ'  ώσπβρ  €πΙ  του  πόματος 
καλοΰσι  γλύκιον  τοΰτο  γαρ  ου*  δια  το  άποβαΐνον 

30  ούχ  η^ύ  άλλα  δια  το  μη  συνεχές  άλλα  το  πρώτον 
εζαπατάν. 

Ή    μεν   οδν   πρώτη   φιλία   καΐ   δι'    ην   αί   αλλαι  5; 
λε^οι^ται   η   κατ'   άρετήν   εστί   καΐ   δι     ηΒονην  την 
άρετης,    ώσπερ    εΐρηται    πρότερον.      αί    δ'    αλλαι 
εγγίνονται  φιλίαι  και  εν  τταισι  και  θηρίοις  και  τοις 
φαυλοις•   όθεν  λέγεται    "  ηλιζ    ηλικα  τέρπει"    και 

35  "  κακός   κακώ  συντετηκεν   ηΒονη."      ενδέχεται   δε  5- 

και   η^εΐς    άλληλοι?    ε^ι^αι    τους    φαύλους,   ούχ*   fj 

φαύλοι  η   μη^ετεροι,   αλλ'   οίον    ει*    ωδικοί    άμφω, 

η  ό  μεν  φιλωΒός^  6  δ'   ωδικός  εστίν,  και  τ^  πάντες 

εχουσί  tC  αγαθόν  καΐ  ταυττ^  συναρμόττουσιν  άλλτ^- 

λοι?.    έτι  χρήσιμοι  αν  εΐεν  άλλι^λοι?  και  ωφέλιμοι  6ι 

1238  b  (ουχ    απλώς    αλλά    προς    την    προαίρεσιν)    ούχ    fj 

φαύλοι^  η   ουδέτεροι,     ενδέχεται    δε    καί    τω   επι-  6ι 

εικεί*   φαΰλον    είναι    φίλον    και    γαρ    χρήσιμος   αν 

είτ^   προς  την  προαίρεσιν  ο  μεν  φαύλος  προς  την 

^  ταχύ  Guil.  ^  Ric. :  ήδύ. 

8  ον  add.  Rac.  *  ούχ  Γ :  καΐ. 

"  ft  (vel  f))  add.  Ric.  «  Vict. :  φειδωλοί. 

'  ίχοιισΐ  τι  Fr. :  ίχονσίν. 

*  ούχ  §  φανλοι  add.  Rac.  (<φαΰ\οι>  Ric). 

•  Γ  :  TOP  έτΓΐΐίκη. 

S86 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  VII.  π.  51-56 

except  that  one  who  is  absolutely  pleasant  is  also 
not  quick  to  show  himself.  For  men  are  like  wines 
and  foods  ;  the  sweetness  of  those  is  quickly  evident, 
but  when  lasting  longer  it  is  unpleasant  and  not 
sweet,  and  similarly  in  the  case  of  men.  For  ab- 
solute pleasantness  is  a  thing  to  be  defined  by  the 

52  End  it  effects  and  the  time  it  lasts.  And  even  the 
multitude  would  agree,  not  in  consequence  of  results 
only,  but  in  the  same  way  as  in  the  case  of  a  drink 
they  call  it  sweeter — for  a  drink  fails  to  be  pleasant 
not  because  of  its  result,  but  because  its  pleasantness 
is  not  continuous,  although  at  first  it  quite  takes 
one  in. 

53  The  primary  form  of  friendship  therefore,  and  the 
one  that  causes  the  narue  to  be  given  to  the  others, 
is   friendship   based   on   goodness    and   due   to   the 
pleasure  of  goodness,  as  has  been  said  before.     The  The  two 
other   friendships   occur   even   among   children   and  o'fTri/nd""' 
animals  and  wicked  people  :  whence  the  sayings —    ship. 

Two  of  an  age  each  other  gladden    »• 
and 

Pleasure  welds  the  bad  man  to  the  bad." 

54  And  also  the  bad  may  be  pleasant  to  each  other  not 
as  being  bad  or  neutral, **  but  if  for  instance  both  are 
musicians  or  one  fond  of  music  and  the  other  a 
musician,  and  in  the  way  in  which  all  men  have  some 

55  good  in  them  and  so  fit  in  with  one  another.   Further  j 

they  might  be  mutually  useful  and  beneficial  (not  (         ^^^ 

absolutely  but  for  their  purpose)  not  as  being  bad  ^^, 

56  or  neutral.     It  is  also  possible  for  a  bad  man  to  be         '   ^ 
friends  vnth  a  good  man,  for  the  bad  man  may  be         i^'^f 
useful  to  the  good  man  for  his  purpose  at  the  time       -j;2i- 

"  Euripides,  Bellerophontes,  fr.  298  (Nauck). 
''  i.e.  neither  good  nor  bad. 

387 


ARISTOTLE 

1288  b 

ύττάρχουσαν  τω  σττουδαιο),  6  δε  τω  μ^ν  άκρατοι 
5  ττρος  την  ύττάρχουσαν  τω  8e  φανλω  προς  την 
κατά  φύσιν  και  βουλησεται  τά  aya^ct,  άττλώς  μ^ν 
τά  άττλα/  τά  δ'  €κβίνω  βζ  υποθέσεως,  fj  nevia 
συμφβρ€ΐ  η  νόσος — ταύτα  των  άττλών^  αγαθών 
evcKa,  ώσττερ  καΐ  το  φάρμακον  τηεΖν  ου  γαρ  αύτο^ 
βονλΐταο,    άλλα   τοΰδ'    eveKa   βονλβται.      eVt    καθ^  5' 

10  ους  τρόπους  καΐ  άλληλοις  οι  μη  σπουδαίοι  elev  αν 
φιλοί'  €'ί.η  γαρ  αν  η8ύς  ούχ  η  φαύλος,  αλλ'  ^  των 
κοινών  τινός  μβτίχβι,  οΐον  et  μουσικός.  έ'τι  τ^ 
evi  Tt  ττασιρ-  €πιβικ€ς  (διό  evioi  ομιλητικοί  elaiv^ 
αν  και  σπου^αΐοι^) ,  η  fj  προσαρμόττουσιν  ίκάστω• 
€χουσι  γάρ  Tt  πάντες  του  αγαθού. 

15      III.  Ύρία  μ€ν  οΰν  €Ϊ8η  ταΰτα  φιλίας•  iv  ττασι  δε  1 
τούτοις   κατ'    ισότητα   πως   λίγεται   η   φιλία•    και 
γάρ  οι  κατ'   άρβτην  φίλοι  iv  ίσότητί  πως  άρ€της 
€ΐσι  φίλοι  άλλτ^λοι?. 

"Αλλτ^    δε    διαφορά    τούτων    η    καθ*    ύπ^ρβολην ,  2 
ωσττερ  θ€θΰ   [άρετι^]*   προς   άνθρωπον,    τοϋτο    γάρ 

20  €Τ€ρον  ειδο?  φιλίας,  και  όλως  άρχοντος  και  αρχο- 
μένου• καθάπ€ρ  και  το  δίκαιον  €Τ€ρον,  κατ' 
άναλογιαν  γάρ  ίσον,  κατ'  αριθμόν  δ'  ουκ  ίσον.  iv 
τούτω  τω  γίν^ι  πατήρ  προς  υιόν  και  ό  €ύ€ργ€της 

^  άττλώί  Rieckher, 

*  αυτό  hie  Rac. :  ante  τό  φάρμακον. 

'  elev  Aid.  *  Ρ^  :  σπουδαία;  Μ^,  <^αή>  σττουδαΐοι  Βζ. 

*  [άρβτή]  Rac,  (vel  aperrj  vel  κατ'  άρΐτηρ  .subaudito  φιλία), 

"  i.e.  ready  to  associate  with  all  and  sundry,  regardless  of 
moral  inferiority.  But  perhaps  the  Greek  should  be  altered 
to  give  '  some  (bad  men)  might  be  worthy  to  associate  with, 
even  in  the  judgement  of  a  good  man,'  or  '  some  might  be 
worthy  to  associate  with  even  though  not  good.' 

*"  Between  two  unequal  persons  justice  divides  benefits  in 
proportion  to  their  deserts,  so  that  the  two  shares  are  not 
388 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  VII.  ii.  56— iii.  2 

and  the  good  man  to  the  uncontrolled  man  for  his 
purpose  at  the  time  and  to  the  bad  man  for  the  pur- 
pose natural  to  him  ;  and  he  will  wish  his  friend  what 
is  good — wish  absolutely  things  absolutely  good,  and 
under  a  given  condition  things  good  for  him,  as 
poverty  or  disease  may  be  beneficial :  things  good 
for  him  he  will  wish  for  the  sake  of  the  absolute 
goods,  in  the  way  in  which  he  wishes  his  friend  to 
drink  medicine — he  does  not  wish  the  action  in 
57  itself  but  wishes  it  for  the  given  purpose.  Moreover 
a  bad  man  may  also  be  friends  with  a  good  one  in 
the  ways  in  which  men  not  good  may  be  friends 
with  one  another  :  he  may  be  pleasant  to  him  not  as  i^^' 
being  bad  but  as  sharing  some  common  characteristic, 
for  instance  if  he  is  musical.  Again  they  may  be 
friends  in  the  way  in  which  there  is  some  good  in 
everybody  (owing  to  which  some  men  are  sociable  " 
even  though  good),  or  in  the  way  in  which  they  suit 
each  particular  person,  for  all  men  have  something 
of  good. 

1  III.  These   then   are   three   kinds   of  friendship  ;  Friendship 
and  in  all  of  these  the  term  friendship  in  a  manner  between 

τ  Λ•  f  11  unequals. 

mdicates  equality,  tor  even  with  those  who  are 
friends  on  the  ground  of  goodness  the  friendship 
is  in  a  manner  based  on  equality  of  goodness. 

2  But  another  variety  of  these  kinds  is  friendship 
on  a  basis  of  superiority,  as  in  that  of  a  god  for  a 
man,  for  that  is  a  different  kind  of  friendship,  and 
generally  of  a  ruler  and  subject  ;  just  as  the  principle 
of  justice  between  them  is  also  different,  being  one 
of  equality  proportionally  but  not  of  equality  numeric- 
ally.*     The  friendship   of  father  for  son  is  in   this 

equal  to  each  other  but  each  equal  to  its  recipient's  merit. 
The  word  Ισον  itself  connotes  '  fair,'  just,  reasonable. 

389 


ARISTOTLE 

1238  b  ^  ^  ^ 

ττρος     τον     €ύ€ργ€τηθ€ντα.        αυτών     8e     τούτων  3 
οίαφοραι  βίσιν  άλλη^  πατρός  προς  νίον  και  άν8ρ6ς 

25  προς  γυναίκα,  αϋτη  μ€ν  ώς  άρχοντος  καΐ  αρχο- 
μένου, η  Se^  euepyeTou  προς  ζύεργετηθβντα.  iv 
ταύταις  δε  η  ουκ  eveaTtv  η  ούχ  ομοίως  το  άντι- 
φιλεΐσθαι.  γελοΐον  γαρ  et  τις  εγκαλοίη  τω  θεώ  4 
OTt  ούχ  ομοίως  άντιφίλεΐ^  ώς  φιλεΐται,  η  τω 
άρχοντί    6    αρχόμενος*•   φιλεΐσθαι    γάρ,   ου   φίλεΐν, 

30  του  άρχοντος,  η  φιλείν  άλλον  τρόπον.  καΐ  rf  5 
7]hovrj  Βιαφβρει,  ούδ'  ev^  η  re  τοΰ  αυτάρκους  em 
τω  αύτοΰ  κτηματι  η  παώΐ  καΐ  rf  τοΰ  €ν^€θΰς 
€πί  τω  γι,νομενω .  ώς  δ'  αϋτως  και  €πΙ  τών  δια  6 
την  χρησιν  φίλων  καΐ  €πΙ  τών  δι'  rjSovqv,  οι  μ€ν 
κατ  ισότητα  είσίν,  οι  δε  κα^'  ύπεροχήν.  διό  και 
οι    €Κ€ίνως    οίόμενοι    €γκαλοΰσιν    εάν    μη    ομοίως 

35  ώσι'  χρήσιμοι  και  ευ    ποιώσιν  και*  επι  της  ηδο- 
νής.    8ηλον  δ'  iv  τοις  βρωτικοίς•  τοϋτο  γάρ  αίτιον  7 
του    /χά;!^εσ0αι    άλλτ^λοι?    πολλάκις,   αγνοεί    γάρ    6 
€ρών  ΟΤΙ  ούχ  6  αυτός  λόγος  εστί  της  προθυμίας.^ 
διό  είρηκεν  Αΐνικος^^' 

ερωμένος  τοιαΰτ'  άν,  ούκ  ερών  λεγοι. 

οι  δε  νομίζουσι  τον  αυτόν  είναι  λόγον. 

1239  a      IV.   'Ο,σπερ     ούν     εΐρηται     τριών     όντων     ειδών  1 

1  Mb;  άλλην  Pb,  &\\αι  <καΙ>  Sp. 
^  δέ  <ws>  Sp.  *  Γ :  r<j?  άντιφιΧβΐσθαι. 

*  ό  άρχόμβνοί  Βζ. :  και  άρχομένφ.  ^  ή  add.  lac. 

'  οΰδ'  iv  lac. :  ovbiv. 
'  ώσί  add.  Cas.  *  και  <όμοίωί>  vel  <ώ(Γαΐ'τώ5>  ?  Rac 

*  Fr. :  Xoyos  riji  έπ'ι  την  ιτροθνμίαν. 
^*  lac. :  διό  ίΰρηκέναι  vukos  ο. 

"  i.e.  they  complain  if  the  pleasure  or  benefit  they  get 
from  their  friend  is  not  equal  (absolutely,  not  merely  in  pro- 
890 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  VII.  iii.  3— iv.  i 

3  class,  and  that  of  benefactor  for  beneficiary.  And  of 
these  sorts  of  friendship  themselves  there  are  varie- 
ties :  the  friendship  of  father  for  son  is  different  from 
that  of  husband  for  wife — the  former  is  friendship 
as  between  ruler  and  subject,  the  latter  that  of 
benefactor  for  beneficiary.  And  in  these  varieties 
either  there  is  no  return  of  affection  or  it  is  not 

4  returned  in  a  similar  way.  For  it  would  be  ludicrous 
if  one  were  to  accuse  God  because  he  does  not  return 
love  in  the  same  way  as  he  is  loved,  or  for  a  subject 
to  make  this  accusation  against  a  ruler  ;  for  it  is  the 
part  of  a  ruler  to  be  loved,  not  to  love,  or  else  to 

5  love  in  another  way.  And  the  pleasure  differs  ;  the 
pleasure  that  a  man  of  established  position  has  in 
his  own  property  or  son  and  that  which  one  who 
lacks  them  feels  in  an  estate  or  a  child  coming  to  him 

6  are  not  one  and  the  same.  And  in  the  same  way 
also  in  the  case  of  those  who  are  friends  for  utility 
or  for  pleasure — some  are  on  a  footing  of  equality, 
others  one  of  superiority.  Owing  to  this  those  who 
think  they  are  on  the  former  footing  complain  if 
they    are    not    useful    and    beneficial    in    a    similar 

7  manner  ;  and  also  in  the  case  of  pleasure."  This 
is  clear  in  cases  of  passionate  affection,  for  this  is 
often  a  cause  of  combat  between  the  lover  and  his 
beloved  :  the  lover  does  not  see  that  they  have  not 
the  same  reason  for  their  affection.  Hence  Aenicus  ^ 
has  said  : 

A  loved  one  so  would  speak,  but  not  a  lover. 
But  they  think  that  the  reason  is  the  same. 
1      IV.  There  being   then,  as  has  been  said,"  three 

portion  to  a  supposed  difference  of  merit)  to  that  which  they 
give  to  him.  "*  A  dramatist  of  the  Old  Comedy. 

'  See  1236  a  7—1237  b  15. 

391 


ARISTOTLE 

1289  a 

φιλίας,  κατ     άρ^την    καΐ^    κατά    το    χρησιμον    καΐ 

κατά   το    ηΒύ,    αύται    πάλιν   Βι-ηρηνται    et?    δυο*    at 

μβν  γάρ  κατά  το  ΐσον  at  8e  καθ^  νπβροχήν  etVi;^. 

5  ^lAtat   μβν    ονν    άμφότ€ραι,    φίλοι    δ'    οι   κατά   την  2 

ισότητα•  άτοπον  γάρ  άν  ^ΐη  el  άνηρ  τταιδιω  φίλος, 

φιλίΐ   δε    ye    και    φιλίΐται.      ενιαχον    Be    φιλ€Ϊσθαι 

μ€ν  δε?  τον   νπ€ρ€χοντα,   iav  δε   ^tA^,   οι^ειδιζεται 

ώς     άνάζιον     φιλών     τη     γάρ     άζία    των    φίλων^ 

μeτpeΐτaι   καί  τινι   ΐσω.      τά  μίν   ονν   δι'   ηλικίας  3 

10  €λλ€ΐφιν  dvctfta  ομοίως  φιλeΐσθaι,  τά  δε  κατ'  ape- 
την  η  γ€νος  η  κατά  άλλην  τοιαντην  ύπepoχήv•  δει* 
δε  τον  vπepeχovτa  η  ήττον  η  μη  φιλeιv  άζιοΰν, 
και  ev  τω  χρησιμω  και  ev  τω  rjSei  και  κατ'  άρ€τήν. 
ev  μev  ούν  ταΐ?  μικραΐς  vπepoχaΐς  elκότως  γίνονται  4 
aμφισβητησeις     {το     γάρ     μικρόν     βνιαχοΰ     ovSev 

15  ίσχυβι,  ώσπ€ρ  ev  ξύλου  σταθμω,  αλλ'  iv  χρυσίω*• 
αΛλα  το  μικρόν  κακώς  κρίνουσιν,  ^αι^εται  γάρ 
το  μev  oiKelov  αγαθόν  δια  το  €γγνς  μ4γα  το  δ' 
αλλοτριον  δια  το  πόρρω  μικρόν)  •  οται»  δε  νπ€ρβολ'η  5 
η,  ουδ'  αυτοί  €πιζητοΰσιν  ώς  δει  η  άvτιφιλeΐσθaι 
η  ομοίως  αντιφιλ€Ϊσθαι,  οίον  ει  τι?  ά^ιοΓ  τον  θβόν. 

20  φανερόν    Srj    δτι    φίλοι    /χεν    οται^    ev    τω    ΐσω,    το  6 

avτιφιλeΐv  δ'   εστίν  avev  τον  φίλονς  είναι.      Βηλον  7 

δε  και  δια  τι  ζητοΰσι  μάλλον  οι  άνθρωποι  την  καθ' 

νπζροχην     φιλίαν    της     κατ'     ισότητα•     άμα     γάρ 

^  καϊ  add.  Rac. 

*  τφ  φιλ(Ίν  :  τ6  φιλεΐν  Βζ. 

'  Wilson  :  del.  *  χρνσίον  Sp. 

"  i.e.  proportional  equality:  see  note  on  1:338  b  21. 
*  Or  '  one  ought  to  expect  the  superior  to  feel  .  .  .' 
392 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  VII.  iv.  1-7 

/kinds  of  friendship,  based  on  goodness,  utility  and  friendship 
pleasantness,  these   are   again  divided  in  two,  one  unequars 
set'  being  on  a  foQting  of  equahty  and  the  other  on  possible  in 

2  one  of  superiority.     Though  both  sets,  therefore,  are  formsT*' 
friendships,  only^vKen  they  are  on  an  equahty  are 

the  parties  friHmJs  ;  for  it  would"  "be  absurd'Tor'  a 
man  to  be  a  friend  of  a  child,  though  he  does  feel 
affection  for  him  and  receive  it  from  him.  In  some 
cases,  while  the  superior  partner  ought  to  receive 
affection,  if  he  gives  it  he  is  reproached  as  loving  an 
unworthy  object  ;  for  affection  is  measured  by  the 
worth  of  the  friends  and  by  one  sort  of  equalityj* 

3  So  in  some  cases  there  is  properly  a  dissimilarity 
of  affection  because  of  inferiority  of  age,  in  others 
on  the  ground  of  goodness  or  birth  or  some  other 
such  superiority ;  it  is  right  for  the  superior  to 
claim  to  feel  **  either  less  affection  or  none,  alike  in 
a  friendship  of  utility  and  in   one  of  pleasure  and 

4  one  based  on  goodness.     So  in  cases  of  small  degrees 
of  superiority  disputes  naturally  occur  (for  a  small 
amount  is  not  of  importance  in  some  matters,  as  in 
weighing  timber,  though  in  gold  plate   it  is  ;    but  but  these 
people  judge  smallness  of  amount  badly,  since  one's  frTends. ^'^"^ 
own  good  because  of  its  nearness  appears  big  and 

that  of  others   because   of  its   remoteness    small)  ; 

5  but  when  there  is  an  excessive  amount  of  difference, 
then  even  the  parties  themselves  do  not  demand 
that  they  ought  to  be  loved  in  return,  or  not  loved 

alike — for  example,  if  one  were   claiming   a  return  ^ 

6  of  love  from  God.  It  is  manifest,  therefore,  that 
men  are  friends  when  they  are  on  an  equality,  but 
that  a  return  of  affection  is  possible  without  their 

7  being  friends.  And  it  is  clear  why  men  seek  friend- 
ship on  a  basis  of  superiority  more  than  that  on  one 

393 


ARISTOTLE 

1239  a 

ύπαρχβι    ούτως    avrols    τό    re    φίλ€Ϊσθαί    και    η 
νπβροχη.     διό  6  κόΧαζ  τταρ    Ivlois  €νημότ€ρος  χοΰ 

25  φίλου  •  αμφω  γαρ  φαίνβσθαι  7Τοΐ€Ϊ  ύπάρχαν  τω 
κολακ€υομ€νω.  μάλιστα  δ'  οι  φιλότιμοι  τοιούτοι' 
το  γαρ  ^αυ^αάζεσ^αι  iv  νπβροχγΙ.  φύσ€ΐ  be  8 
γίνονται  οι  μβν  φιλητικοι  οι  Se  φιλότιμοι'  φιλητικος 
he  6  τω  φιλΐΐν  χαίρων  μάλλον  η  τω  φιλ€Ϊσθαι, 
€κβΐνος  he  φιλoυμevoς^  /χαλλον.     6  μ€ν  ονν  χαίρων 

30  τω  θαυ/χάζεσ^αι  και  φιλζΐσθαι  της  vnepoxrjg  φίλος, 
6  he  της  ev  τω  φιλ€Ϊν  ηhovης^  ο  φιλητικός .  eveaTi 
γαρ  άνάγκΎ}  €ν€ργοΰντι^•  το  μ€ν  γαρ  φιλ€Ϊσθαι 
συμβ€βηκός,  εστί  γαρ  λavθάveιv  φιλονμ€νον, 
φιλονντα  δ'   ου.      έ'στι  he  και  κατά  την  φιλίαν  τό  9 

3ϋ  φιλ€Ϊν  μάλλον  η  τό  φιλeΐσθaι*  τό  he  φιλ€Ϊσθαι 
κατά  τό  φιλητόν.  σημeΐov  he•  eAotr'  αι^  ό  φίλος 
μά?^ον,  ei  μη  evhe^oiT'  άμφω,  γιvώσκeιv  η 
γιvώσκeσθaι,  οίον  ev  ταΐς  ύποβολαΐς^  αϊ  γυναΐκ€ς 
ττοιοΰσι,  και  η  *Avhpoμάχη  η  ^Αντιφώντος,  και 
γάρ  eoiKe  τό  μ€ν  e^eAetl•-  γινώσκ€σθαι  αύτοΰ  eveKa, 

40  και  του  Trdaxeiv  τι  aya^ov  άλλα  μη  iroielv,  τό   he 

γιvώσκeιv   του   TToieXv   και   του   φιλeΐv   eveKa.      διό  1 

1239  b  και  τους  €μμ€νοντας  τω  φιλ€Ϊν  προς  τους  τ€θν€ώτας 

€παινοΰμ€ν•  γινώσκουσι  γάρ,  αλλ'  ου  γινώσκονται. 

"Οτι  μ€.ν  ουν  7τλeίoveς  τρόποι  φιλίας,  καΐ  πόσοι 

^  Rac. :  φιλότιμοι. 

^  rfj  .  .  .  ήδον^  Sp.  (et  Ric.  om.  ό). 

'  Ric.  et  Sol. :   άνά-γκη  ivepyovvra. 

*  [^  TO  φιΚΐΙσθαι]  ?  Rac.  ^  Vict. :  ΰν(ρβο\αΐί. 

"  This  poet  lived  at  Syracuse  at  the  court  of  Dionysius 
the  elder  (who  came  into  power  406  b.c).  He  is  said  to  have 
written  tragedies  in  collaboration  with  the  tyrant ;  and  he 
was  sentenced  by  him  to  death  by  flogging  {Khet,  1384  a  9). 
394 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  VII.  iv.  7-10 

of  equality  ;  for  in  the  former  case  they  score  both 
affection  and  a  sense  of  superiority  at  the  same  time. 
Hence  with  some  men  the  flatterer  is  more  esteemed 
than  the  friend,  for  he  makes  the  person  flattered 
appear  to  score  both  advantages.  And  this  most 
of  all  characterizes  men  ambitious  of  honours,  since 

8  to   be   admired  implies   superiority.     Some  jpersons 
grow  up  by  nature  affectionate  and  others  ambitious "; 

"^orie   who    enjoys   loving   more   than   being   loved_  is. 

affectionate,  whereas  the  other  enjoys  being  loved 

"more.     So  the  man  who  enjoys  being  admired  and 

"loved  is  a  lover  of  superiority,  whereas  the  other, 

the  affectionate  man,  loves  the  pleasure  of  loving. 

For  this  he  necessarily  possesses  by  the  mere  activity 

of  loving  ;   for  being  loved  is  an  accident,  as  one  can 

be  loved  without  knowing  it,  but  one  cannot  love 

9  without   knowing   it.     Loving   depends,  more   than 
being  loved,  on  the  actual  feeling,  whereas  being 

Joved  corresponds  with  the  nature  of  the  object. 
A  sign  of  this  is  that  a  friend,  if  both  things  were 
not  possible,  would  choose  to  know  the  other  person 
rather  than  to  be  known  by  him,  as  for  example 
women  do  when  they  allow  others  to  adopt  their 
children,  and  Andromache  in  the  tragedy  of  Anti- 
phon."  Indeed  the  wish  to  be  known  seems  to  be 
selfish,  and  its  motive  a  desire  to  receive  and  not 
to  confer  some  benefit,  whereas  to  wish  to  know 
a  person  is  for  the  sake  of  conferring  benefit  and 
10  bestowdng  affection.  For  this  reason  we  praise 
those  who  remain  constant  in  affection  towards  the 
dead  ;  for  they  know,  but  are  not  known. 

It  has,  then,  been  stated  that  there  are  several 
modes  of  friendship,  and   how  many  modes  there 


395 


ARISTOTLE 

1239  b 

τροποί,  OTL  τρ€Ϊς,  καΐ  δτί  το  φίλίΐσθαί  καΐ  άντι- 
5  φΐΛ€Ϊσθαι    καΐ    οι    φίλοι    ^ιαφ^ρονσι,ν    61    τε    κατ' 
ισότητα  και  οι  καθ    υπεροχην,  ειρηται. 

V.     ΕτΓβι     δ€     το     φίλον    λέγεται     και     καθόλου  ι 
μάλλον,   ωσπερ   και   κατ'   αρχάς   ελέχθη,   ύττο   των 
εζωθεν     συμπαραλαμβανόντων^     {οΐ    μεν     γαρ     το 
όμοιον    φασιν    etv-at    φίλον,    οι    8ε    το    εναντίον), 
λεκτεον    και     ττερι    τούτων    ττώς     είσι    προς    τάς 

10  ειρημενας  φιλίας.     ai^ayeTai  δε  το  μεν  δμοιον  και  2 
εις  το  η8ύ  και  εΙς  το  aya^ov.     το  τε  γαρ  αγαθόν 
αττλοΰν   το    8έ    κακόν   πολνμορφον    και   ό    αγαθός 
μεν   όμοιος   άει   και   ου   μεταβάλλεται   το   ήθος,   ό 
δε   φαύλος   και   6   άφρων   ονθεν   εοικεν   εωθεν   και 

15  εσπέρας,  διό  εάν  μη  συμβάλλωσιν  οι  φαύλοι,  ου  3 
φίλοι  εαυτοΐς  αλλά  διίστανται•  η  δ'  ου  βέβαιος 
φίλια  ου  φιλία,  ώστε  οϋτω  μεν  το  ομοιον  φίλον, 
ΟΤΙ  το*  αγαθόν  δμοιον.  εστί  8ε  ώς  και  κατά  το 
η8ύ•  τοις  γάρ  ομοίοις  ταΰθ'  ή8εα,  και  εκαστον  8ε 
φύσει  αυτό   αύτω  η8ύ.      8ιό   και  φωναι   και   εζεις^  4 

20  και  συνημερευσεις  τοις  ομογενεσιν  ηδισται  άλλτ^λοι?, 
και  τοΓ?  άλλοι?  ζωοις•  και  ταύτη  εν8εχεται  και 
τους  φαύλους  αλλήλους  φιλεΐν 

κακός  κακω  8ε  συντετηκεν  η8ονη. 

Το    δ'     εναντίον    τω    εναντίω    φίλον    κατά*    το  5 
χρησιμον.      αυτό    γάρ    αύτω   το   δμοιον  άχρηστον, 
25  διό   8εσπότης   8ουλου   8εΐται   και  8οΰλος   8εσπότου 
και    γυνή    και    άνηρ    άλλτ^λωΐ'•    και    η8ύ    και    επι- 

^  Sp. :   συμΐΓ€ρί\αμβανόΐ'των.  *  τό  add.  Βζ. 

*  ν.1.  αϊ  ^ξ«ϊ:  νράξείί  ?  Rac.  {diaXi^ets  vel  διάλεξα  Ric,  sed 
cf.  1.  20).  *  Rac. :  ώί. 

"  1235  a  4  fF.  *  C/.  1238  a  34  note. 

396 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  VII.  iv.  10— v.  5 

are,  namely  three,  and  that  receiving  aiFection  and 
having  one's  aiFection  returned,  and  friends  on  an 
equaUty  and  those  on  a  footing  of  superiority,  are 
different. 

1  V.  But  as  the   term  '  friend  '  is   used  in   a  more  Friendship 
universal  sense  as  well,  as  was  also  said  at  the  begin-  "^^^of^'''^ 
ning,"  by   those   who  take  in  wider  considerations  opposites 
(some  saying  that  what  is  like  is  dear,  others  what  is  §§^7,%! 
opposite),  we  must  also  speak  about  these  forms  of 
friendship  and  their  relation  to  the  kinds  that  have 

2  been  discussed.  As  for  likeness,  it  connects  with 
pleasantness  and  also  with  goodness.  For  the  good 
is  simple,  whereas  the  bad  is  multiform  ;  and  also 
the  good  man  is  always  alike  and  does  not  change 
in  character,  whereas  the  wicked  and  the  foolish  are 
quite  different  in  the  evening  from  what  they  were 

3  in  the  morning.  Hence  if  wicked  men  do  not  hit  it 
off  together,  they  are  not  friends  with  one  another 
but  they  separate  ;  yet  an  insecure  friendship  is 
not  friendship  at  all.  So  the  like  is  dear  to  us  in 
this  way,  because  the  good  is  like.  But  in  a  way 
it  is  also  dear  on  the  score  of  pleasantness  ;  for  to 
those  who  are  alike  the  same  things  are  pleasant, 
and  also  everything  is  by  nature  pleasant  to  itself. 

4  Owing  to  this  relations  find  one  another's  voices  and 
characters  and  society  pleasantest,  and  so  with  the 
lower  animals  ;  and  in  this  way  it  is  possible  even 
for  bad  men  to  feel  affection  for  each  other : 

But  pleasure  welds  the  bad  man  to  the  bad.*" 

5  But  opposite  is  dear  to  opposite  on  the  score  ofy 
utility.     For  the  like  is  useless  to  itself,  and  therefore  I 
master  needs  slave  and  slave  master,  man  and  wife 
need  one   another  ;    and  the   opposite   is   pleasant 

397 


ARISTOTLE 

θνμητόν  το  εναντίον  ώς  χρήσιμον,  και  ούχ  ώς  ev 
τω^  re'Aei  αλλ'  ώς  προς  το  τέλος-  όταν  γαρ  τνχτ} 
ου  επίθνμ,βΐ,  εν  τω  τέλει  μεν  εστίν  ουκ  ορέγεται 
δε  του  εναντίου,  οίον  το  θερμον  του  φυχροΰ  και 
το  ζτ]ρ6ν  του  ύγροΰ. 

30      "Εστί    8e    ττως    καΧ    "η    του    εναντίου    φίλια    του  6 
άγαθοΰ.     ορέγεται  γαρ  άλλτ^λω^  δια  το  μέσον  ως 
σύμβολα    γαρ    ορέγεται    άλλτ^λων,    δια    το    ούτω^ 
ytVea^at   εζ   άμφοΐν   εν  μέσον,      ώστε'   κατά   συ  μ-  η 
βεβηκός  εστί  τοΰ  εναντίου,  καθ^  αυτό  δε  της  μεσο- 
τητος,  ορέγονται  γαρ  ουκ  αλλήλων  τάναντία  αλλά 

35  τοΰ  μέσου,  ύττερφυχθεντες  γαρ  εάν  θερμανθώσιν  εις 
το  μέσον  καθίστανται,  και  ύττερθερμανθεντες  εάν 
φυχθώσιν,  ομοίως  δε  και  επΙ  των  άλλων  ει  δε  μη, 
άει  εν  εττιθυμία,  δτι*  ουκ  εν  τοις  μεσοις.  άλλα  8 
χαίρει  ό  εν  τω  μέσω  άνευ  επιθυμίας  τοις  φύσει 
ήΒεσιν,  οι  δε  ττασι   τοις   εζιστασι   της  φύσει  εζεως. 

40  τοΰτο  μεν  οΰν  το  εΐ8ος  και  επι  των  άφύχων  εστίν  9 
1240  a  το    φιλεΐν    δε    γίνεται    όταν   fj    επι    των    εμφυχων. 
διό   ενίοτε^  άνομοίοις  χαίρουσιν,  οΐον  αυστηροί  εύ- 
τραπελοις   και   οζεΐς   ραθύμοις•   εις  το    μέσον    γαρ 
καθίστανται  ι5π'   αλλήλων,      κατά  συμβεβηκος  ο^ν,  κ 
ώσπερ  ελέχθη,  τα  εναντία  φίλα  και  δια  το  aya^oi^. 
5      Πόσα   μεν   οΰν   εϊΒη   φιλίας,   και   τίνες   ^ιαφοραι 
καθ^  άς  λέγονται  οι  τε  φίλοι  και  οι  φιλοΰντες  και 

1  τφ  add.  Rac.  (cf.  1333  a  10). 
^  Sp. :  διό  ού  τφ.  '  Sus. :  ίτι. 

*  δτι  add.  Sp.  *  ivioL  rols  Fr. 

"  The  two  halves  of  a  bone  or  coin  broken  in  half  by  two 
contracting  parties  and  one  kept  by  each,  to  serve  as  a 
token  of  identification  μ  hen  found  to  fit  together. 

398 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  VII.  v.  5-10  ^  *^^ 

and  desirable  as  useful,  not  as  contained  in  the  End  j 
but  as  a  means  to  the  End — for  when  a  thing  has  | 
got  what  it  desires  it  has  arrived  at  its  End,  and  does  ] 
not  strive  to  get  its  opposite,  for  example  the  hot  the 
cold  and  the  wet  the  dry.^ 

6  But  in  a  way  love  of  the  opposite  is  also  love  of  the 
good.     For  opposites   strive   to  reach   one   another  i 
through  the  middle  point,  for  they  strive  after  each  | 
other  as  tallies,"  because  in  that  way  one  middle  | 

7  thing  results  from  the  two.     Hence  accidentally  love  ', 
•of  the  good  is  love  of  the  opposite,  but  essentially 

it  is  love  of  the  middle,  for  opposites  do  not  strive 
to  reach  one  another  but  the  middle.  If  when 
people  have  got  too  cold  they  are  subjected  to  heat, 
and  when  they  have  got  too  hot  to  cold,  they  reach 
a  mean  temperature,  and  similarly  in  other  matters  ; 
but  without  such  treatment  they  are  always  in  a 
state  of  desire,  because  they  are  not  at  the  middle 

8  points.  But  a  man  in  the  middle  enjoys  without 
passionate  desire  things  by  nature  pleasant,  whereas 
the  others  enjoy  everything  that  takes  them  outside 

9  their  natural  state.  This  kind  of  relationship,  then, 
exists  even  between  inanimate  things  ;  but  when  it 
occurs  in  the  case  of  living  things  it  becomes  affec- 
tion. Hence  sometimes  people  take  delight  in 
persons  unlike  themselves,  the  stiff  for  instance  in 
the  witty  and  the  active  in  the  lazy,  for  they  are 
brought    by    one    another    into    the    middle    state. 

10  Hence  accidentally,  as  was  said,^  opposites  are  dear 
to  opposites  also  on  account  of  the  good. 

It  has,  then,  been  said  how  many  kinds  of  friend-  Seif-iove 
ship  there  are,  and  what  are  the  different  senses  in 
which  people   are   termed  friends,   and   also   givers 

"  1239  b  32. 

399 


ARISTOTLE 

1240  a 

ol    φιλούμβνοι,,    καί    όντως    toarc    φίλοι    elvai    και 

avev  τούτου,  €Ϊρηται. 

VI.    Ilept  8e  του  αντον  αύτω  φίΧον    elvai  -η  μ,η  1 

ττολλην  €χ€ΐ  βπίσκβφιν.     So/cet  γαρ  eviois  μάλιστα 

10  'έκαστος  αύτος  αύτω  φίλος  eti^ai,  και  τούτω 
χρώμβνοι  κανόνι  κρίνουσι  την  προς  τους  άλλους 
φίλους  φιλίαν.  κατά  δε  τους  λόγους  και  τα 
Βοκοΰνθ^  ύττάρχ^ειν  τοις  φίλοις  τα  μ€ν  ΰττ€ναντιοϋται, 
τά  δ'  όμοια  φαίνεται  οντά.  έ'στι  γάρ  πως  κατ  2 
άναλογίαν  αϋτη^  φιλία  απλώς  δ'  ου.     εν  hυσι  γαρ 

15  ΒΐΎ)ρημ€νοις  το  φιλεΐσθαι  και  φιλεΐν  hi  α  μάλλον 
οϋτως^  αύτος  αύτω  φίλος  ώς^  επι  του  άκρατους 
και  εγκρατούς  εϊρηται  πώς  εκών  η  άκων,  τω  τά 
μέρη  εχειν  πως  προς  άλληλα  τά  της  φυχης.  και 
ομοιον*  τά  τοιαύτα  πάντα,  ει  φίλος  αύτος  αύτω 
και   εχθρός,  και   ει   ά^ικεΐ  τις  αυτός   αυτόν   πάντα 

20  γάρ     εν    δυσι    ταύτα    και   Βιηρημενοις^•  fj^    hrf   δυο  3 
πως   και   η   φυχη,    υπάρχει   πως   ταύτα,   ff   δ'    ου 
Βιηρημενα,   ούχ   υπάρχει. 

ΑτΓΟ  δε  της  προς  αυτόν  εζεώς  είσιν*  οΐ  λοιποί 
τρόποι  του  φιλον  eivai  ωρισμενοι  καν  ους  εν 
τοις  λογοις  επισκοπεΐν  είώθαμεν.  Βοκεΐ  γάρ  φίλος 
etvai    ό    βουλόμενός    τινι    τάγα^ά,    η    οία    ο'ίεται 

25  αγαθά,  μη  δι'  αυτόν  αλλ'  εκείνου  ένεκα•  άλλον  δε  4 

^  Ric. :  αϋτη  η.                  ^  oCros  Μ*».  3  ώ?  add.  Γ. 

*  όμοια  Sp.           ^  Βζ. :   δίτιρημένωί.  *  Fr. :  et  Ρ*",  ή  Μ". 
'  Sp.  (enim  Guil.):  bi.  *  ή  codd,  ti  Bk. 

•  Sp. :   ws  {καϊ  Ric).                     ^^  lac. :  φιλβΐσθαι  διωρισμίνοι. 

-  Cf.  1223  a  36-b  17.  Self-rostraint  (or  the  lack  of  it) 
indicates  that  a  man's  personality  has  in  a  sense  two  parts, 
one  of  which  may  control  the  other;  and  similarly  self-love 
implies  that  one  part  of  the  personality  can  ha\'e  a  certain 
feeling  in  regard  to  another  part. 
400 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  VII.  v.  10— vi.  3 

and  objects  of  afFection,  both  in  a  manner  that  makes 
them  actually  friends  and  without  being  friends. 

1  VI.  The  question  whether  one  is  one's  own  friend 
or  not  involves  much  consideration.  Some  think 
that  every  man  is  his  own  best  friend,  and  they 
use  this  friendship  as  a  standard  by  which  to  judge 
his  friendship  for  his  other  friends.  On  theoretical 
grounds,  and  in  view  of  the  accepted  attributes  of 
friends,  self-love  and  love  of  others  are  in  some 
respects  opposed  but  in  others  manifestly  similar. 

2  For  in  a  way  self-love  is  friendship  by  analogy,  but  only  met»• 
not  absolutely.  For  being  loved  and  loving  involve  friendahip ; 
two  separate  factors  ;    owing  to  which  a  man  is  his 

own  friend  rather  in  the  way  in  which,  in  the  case 
of  the  unrestrained  and  the  self-restrained  man,  we 
have  said  **  how  one  has  those  qualities  voluntarily 
or  involuntarily — namely  by  the  parts  of  one's  spirit 
being  related  to  each  other  in  a  certain  way  ;  and 
all  such  matters  are  a  similar  thing, — whether  a  man 
can  be  his  own  friend  or  foe,  and  whether  a  man 
can  treat  himself  unjustly.     For  all  these  relations 

3  involve  two  separate  factors  ;  in  so  far  then  as  the 
spirit  is  in  a  manner  two,  these  relations  do  in  a 
manner  belong  to  it,  but  in  so  far  as  the  two  are  not 
separate,  they  do  not. 

From  the  state  of  friendship  for  oneself  are  de-  but  the 
termined  the  remaining  modes  of  friendship  under  onrue°  ^^ 
which  we  usually  study  it  in  our  discourses.^     For  friendship 
a  man  is  thought  to  be  a  friend  who  wishes  for  some- 
body things  that  are  good,  or  that  he  believes  to  be 
good,  not  on  his  own  account  but  for  the  other's  sake  ; 

''  Cf.    1244    a   20.     Perhaps    a    reference    to   Aristotle's 
lectures  (Stock). 

2d  401 


ARISTOTLE 

1240  a 

τροττον  ώ  το  etvaL  βουλ^ται  δι'  €Κ€Ϊνον  /cat  μη  δι' 
αυτόν,  καν  €l  μη  διανε/χωι^  τάγαθά,  μητοι^  το 
€Ϊναι,  τούτω  αν  So^eie  μάλιστα  φίλος  βΐναι^• 
άλλον  Se  τρόπον  ω   σνζην  αίρεΓται   δι'   αντην  την  5 

30  ομιλίαν  κάΙ  μη  δι'  eTepov  τι,  οΐον  οί  πατέρες  το 
μεν  etvaL  tols  τέκνοις,  συζώσι  δ'  €Τ€ροις.  /χά;(6ται  6 
8e^  ταύτα  πάντα  προς  άλληλα•  οΐ  μεν  γαρ  αν  μη 
ι  αυτοί?,  οι  ο€  αν  μη  το  eii/ai,  οι  oe  το  σνζην, 
ουκ  οιονται  ^lAeiq^ai.  έτι  το  τω*  aAyowTi  συν-  7 
αλγείν  μη  δι'  eTepov  τι  ayaTrat'  θησομεν — οΓοι^  οί 
δοΰλοι  προς  τους  δέσποτας  οτι  χαλεποί  άλγοΰντες , 

35  αλλ    ου  δι    αυτού?,  ωσπερ  αι  μητέρες  τοις  τέκνοις 
και  οί  συνωδίνοντες  όρνιθες,    βούλεται  γαρ  μάλιστα  8 
τε  ου  μόνον  συλλυπεΐσθαι  6  φίλος  τω  φίλω  άλλα 
και   την   αύτην   λύπην   {οίον   8ιφώντι   συνΒιφην)    ει 
ενε8εχετο,    είτε    μη,   οτι*    εγγύτατα.      6    δ'    αυτό?  9 
λόγος  και  επι  του  χαίρειν   το  γαρ  χαίρειν''  μη  δι' 
1240  b  έτερον  τι  άλλα  δι'  εκείνον  οτι  χαίρει  φιλικόν.     ετι 
τα  τοιάΒε  λέγεται  περί  φιλίας,  ώς  Ισότης  φιλότης, 
και  μίαν  φυχην^  eivai  τοΓ?  άλτ^^ώ?  φίλοις.^     άπαντα  1( 
ταύτα  επαναφέρεται  προς  τον  ενα•  και  γαρ  βούλεται 

5  ταγαθά  αυτω^"  τούτον  τον  τρόπον,  ούθεις  γαρ 
αυτός  αντον  ευ  ποιεί  δια  τι  έτερον,  ούΖε  χάριν 
TOOovSi  eu"  λέγει,  οτι  εποίησεν  fj  εις•  δοκεΐν^^  γαρ 

^  lac. :  /ιη  τφ. 

^  lac. :  μάλιστα  φιλ^ΐν.  »  Sp.  δ»;. 

*  lac. :  μη  τό  eavroh.  ^  τό  τω  Fr. :   τφ. 

*  eire  μή,  6τί  Rac, :  δτι  μη  (etre  μiJ  lac). 

'  τό  yap  xaLpetv  add.  Γ. 

*  Cas, :  καΐ  μη  μίαν  φιλίαν.  •  Rac. :  τούί  .  .  .  φίλους. 

^^  Bek. :  αύτφ. 

^^  χάριν  τοσουδί  e5  Rac. :  χάριτοί  ονδέ  {χάριν  τοσοΰδΐ  lac). 

^*   lac. :   δοκ€ΐ. 

402 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  VII.  vi.  4-10 

4  and  in  another  way  when  a  man  wishes  another's 
existence  —  even  though  not  bestowing  goods  on 
him,  let  alone  existence — for  that  other's  sake  and 
not  for  his  own,  he  would  be  thought  to  be  in  a  high 

5  degree  the  friend  of  that  other  ;  and  in  another 
way  a  man  is  a  friend  of  one  whose  society  he  desires 

,  I  merely  for  the  sake  of  his  company  and  not  for  some- 
thing else,  as  fathers  desire  their  children's  exist- 
ience,  though  they  associate  with  other  people.    All 

6  these  cases  conflict  with  one  another  ;  some  men 
do  not  think  they  are  loved  unless  the  friend  wishes 
them  this  or  that  particular  good,  others  unless  their 
existence    is    desired,    others    unless    their   society. 

7  Again  we  shall  reckon  it  affection  to  grieve  with 
one  who  grieves  not  for  some  ulterior  motive — as 
for  instance  slaves  in  relation  to  their  masters  share 
their  grief  because  when  in  grief  they  are  harsh,  and 
not  for  their  masters'  own  sake,  as  mothers  grieve 
with  their  children,  and  birds  that  share  each  other's 

8  pain.  For  a  friend  wishes  most  of  all  that  he  might 
not  only  feel  pain  when  his  friend  is  in  pain  but  feel 
actually  the  same  pain — for  example  when  he  is 
thirsty,  share  his  thirst — if  this  were  possible,  and 

9  if  not,  as  nearly  the  same  as  may  be.  The  same 
principle  applies  also  in  the  case  of  joy  ;  it  is  char- 
acteristic of  a  friend  to  rejoice  for  no  other  reason 
than  because  the  other  is  rejoicing.  Again  there 
are    sayings    about    friendship    such    as    '  Amity    is 

10  equality  '  and  '  True  friends  have  one  spirit.'  All 
these  sayings  refer  back  to  the  single  individual  ; 
for  that  is  the  way  in  which  the  individual  wishes 
good  to  himself,  as  nobody  benefits  himself  for  some 
ulterior  motive,  nor  speaks  well  of  himself  for  such 
and  such  a  consideration,  because  he  acted  as  an 

403 


ARISTOTLE 

φίλ^ΐν    βουλ€ταί    6    SrjXov    ποιών     otl    φιλίΐ,    αλλ 
ου  φιλβΐν}     και  το   etvai  βούλ^σθαι^  και  ro  συζ'ην  \ 
καΐ   το   σνγχαίραν   και  το   συναλγ€Ϊν,   καΐ  μια  δη 

10  φνχη,  κται  το  μ,η  δυνασ^αι  av€V  αλλήλων  μηΒε 
ζην,  άλλα  συναττοθνησκΐΐν — οντω  γαρ  βχ€ΐ  ο  €ΐς, 
και  οντως^  6μιλ€Ϊ  αύτος  αύτω — πάντα  8η*  ταύτα 
τω  άγαθώ  νπάρχ€ΐ  προς  αυτόν,  ev  δε  τω  πονηρω  1! 
Βιαφωνβΐ,  οίον  ev  τω  άκρατ€Ϊ,  καΐ  δια  τούτο  δο/cet 
και  βχθρον  Ιν^έχεσθαι  αυτόν  αύτω  είναι*  ^  δ     ει? 

15  και   αδιαίρετο?,   ορεκτος  αντος  αυτω.      τοιούτο?  ο  ΐ; 
aya^o?  και  ό  κατ'  άρ€την  φίλος  Ιπα,  6  ye  μοχθηρός 
ούχ  €ΐς  άλλα  πολλοί,  και  τί^?  αύτης  ημέρας  έτερος 
και    εμπληκτος.      ώστε    και   η    αυτού    προς    αύτον 
φιλία  ανάγεται  προς  την  του  αγαθού•  οτι  γαρ  πη 

20  όμοιος^  και  εις  και  αύτος  αύτω  αγαθός,  ταύτη 
αύτος  αύτω  φίλος  και  όρεκτός.  φύσει  δε  τοιούτος, 
αλλ'  ό  πονηρός  παρά  φύσιν.  6  δ'®  dya^o?  οϋθ  1• 
άμα  λοώορεΐται  εαυτω,  ώσπερ  6  άκρατης,  ούθ  ο 
ύστερος  τω  πρότερον,  ώσπερ  6  μεταμελητικος ^ 
ούτε  6  έμπροσθεν  τω  ύστερον,  ώσπερ  6  φεύστης 
{όλως  τε    ει    δει    ώσπερ    οι    σοφισται  διοριζουσιν,  1 

25  ώσπερ  το  Κορισκο?  και  Κορισκο?  σττουδαιο?, 
8ηλον  γαρ  ώς  το  αύτο  πόσον  σπουΒαΐον  αυτών*)• 
επει  όταν  εγκαλεσωσιν  αύτοΓ?,'  άττοκτιννυασιν 
αι5του?/**    άλλα    δοκει    πας    αυτός    αύτω    αγαθός. 

^  φιλί!  ?  Rac.  ■^  Kac. :  μάλιστα. 
'  Rac. :  ro-ws.  *  lac. :  yap  (δέ  Γ). 

*   Bk. :  όμοιοι.  *  Syl. :  ούδί. 

'  Cas, :  μΐταληπτικόί.  *  Fr. :  αυτόν. 

•  Fr. :  avTois.  ^''  Fr. :  aurous. 

"  Cf.  1.  3  :  δτ)  marks  a  quotation. 

^  See  Sophistici  Elenchi,  175  b  15  fF.     'Coriscus'  is  used 
for  any  imaginary  person,  cf.  1220  a  19  f. 
404 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  VII.  vi.  10-15 

individual ;  for  one  who  displays  his  affection  wishes 

11  not  to  be  but  to  be  thought  affectionate.  And 
wishing  for  the  other  to  exist,  and  associating 
together,  and  sharing  joy  and  grief,  and  '  being 
one  spirit  '  "  and  being  unable  even  to  live  without 
one  another  but  dying  together — for  this  is  the  case 
with  the  single  individual,  and  he  associates  with 
himself  in  this  way, — all  these  characteristics  then  aii  apply  to 
belong   to   the   good   man   in   relation   to   himself.  man^s°iove 

12  In  a  wicked  man  on  the  other  hand,  for  instance  in  of  self. 
one  who  lacks  self-control,  there  is  discord,  and  be- 
cause of  this  it  is  thought  to  be  possible  for  a  man 
actually  to  be  his  own  enemy  ;   but  as  being  one  and 

13  indivisible  he  is  desirable  to  himself.  This  is  the  case 
with  a  good  man  and  one  whose  friendship  is  based 
on  goodness,  because  assuredly  an  evil  man  is  not  a 
single  individual  but  many,  and  a  different  person 
in  the  same  day,  and  full  of  caprice.  Hence  a  man's 
affection  for  himself  carries  back  to  love  of  the  good  ; 
for  because  in  a  way  a  man  is  like  himself  and  a 
single  person  and  good  to  himself,  in  this  way  he  is 
dear  and  desirable  to  himself.  And  a  man  is  like 
that  by  nature,  but  a  wicked  man  is  contrary  to 

14  nature.  But  a  good  man  does  not  rebuke  himself 
either  at  the  time,  like  the  uncontrolled,  nor  yet  his 
former  self  his  later,  hke  the  penitent,  nor  his  later 

15  self  his  former,  like  the  liar — (and  generally,  if  it  is 
necessary  to  distinguish  as  the  sophists  do,  he  is 
related  to  himself  as  '  John  Styles  '  is  related  to 
'  good  John  Styles  '  ^  ;  for  it  is  clear  that  the  same 
amount  of  '  John  Styles  '  is  good  as  of  '  good 
John  Styles  ') — because  when  men  blame  themselves 
they  are  murdering  their  own  personalities,  whereas 
everybody  seems  to  himself  good.     And  he  who  is 

405 


ARISTOTLE 

1240  b 

ζητ€Ϊ  Se  6  άττλώς  ών  αγαθός  elvai  καΐ  αύτος  αύτω 
φίλος,    ώσπ€ρ    €ίρηται,    οτί    δυ'    €χ€ΐ    iv    αύτώ    α 

30  φυσ^ι  βονλ€ται  etvai  φίλα  καΐ  διασττάσαι  αδύνατον. 
διό  €7γ'  ανθρώπου  μέν  8οκ€Ϊ  έκαστος  αύτος  αντώ  h 
φίλος,  €7Γΐ  δε  των  άλλων  ζωών  ον,^  οίον  ΐτητος 
αύτος  αύτω  .  .  .  ^  ούκ  άρα  φίλος,  αλλ'  ούδε  τα 
τταιδια,  αλλ  όταν  ηΒη  έ'χτ^  προαίρζσιν  η^η  γαρ 
τοτβ   Βιαφωνβΐ  6  νοΰς^  προς  την  Ιττιθυμίαν.      eoiKe  Γ 

35  δ  Tj  φίλια  Ύ]  προς  αύτον*  τη  κατά  σνγγ€ν€ίαν' 
ούθέτερον  γαρ  έφ'  αύτοΐς  λνσαι,  άλλα  καν  δια- 
φίρωνταί  όμως  ούτοι  μβν  συγγενβΐς  en,*  ό  δε 
€τι  €ίς  βως  αν  ί,η. 

ΐίοσαχώς  μβν  ονν  το  φιλζΐν  λβγβταί,  καΐ  οτι 
77ασαι  at  φιλίαί  ανάγονται  προς  την  πρώτην,  8ηλον 
€Κ  των  βίρημ4νων . 
1241  a  VII.  Οίκεΐον  δέ  τη  σκέφ€ΐ  θεωρησαι  καΐ  π€ρΙ  1 
ομονοίας  καΐ  εύνοιας•  Sokcl  γάρ  τοις  μεν  etvai 
ταυτό,*  τοις  δ'  ούκ  άνευ  άλλι^λα;^.  εστί  δ'  η  εύ- 
νοια της  φιλίας  ούτε  πάμπαν  έτερον  ούτε  ταύτόν. 
Βιηρημενης   γάρ   της    φιλίας    κατά   τρεις   τρόπους,  2 

5  ού'τ'  εν  τη  χρήσιμη  οϋτ*  εν  τη  καθ'  ηΒονην  εστιι^. 
εϊτε  γάρ  οτι  χρήσιμος^  βούλεται  αύτω  τάγαθά,  ού 
δι  εκείνον  αλλά  δι'  αύτον  βούλοιτ  αν,  Βοκεΐ  δ' 
ώσπερ   .   .   .^  και   η    εύνοια   ούκ   αύτοϋ   ένεκα*   του 

^  ού  add.  Sp.  *  lacunam  Sus.  '  P>. :  τταΐϊ. 

*  Syl. :  αυτόν.  ^  είσί  Sp. 

•  Rac. :  ταύτα.  '  Sp. :  χρ•/ισιμον. 

*  lacunam  edd. :  <καΙ  ή  κατ'  άρΐτην  φιλία>  Sus. 

*  lac. :  βϋνοια. 

"  11.  13-21. 
''  Some  words  seem  to  have  been  lost  here. 
406 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  VII.  vi.  15— vii.  2 

absolutely  good  seeks  to  be  dear  even  to  himself, 
as  has  been  said,*  because  he  has  two  factors  within 
him  which  by  nature  desire  to  be  friendly  and  which 

16  it  is  impossible  to  draw  asunder.  Therefore  in  the 
case  of  man  each  individual  seems  dear  to  himself, 
although  in  the  case  of  other  animals  it  is  not  so,  for 
example  a  horse  to  itself  .  .  .''  so  it  is  not  dear  to 
itself.  But  neither  are  children,  but  only  when  they 
have  come  to  possess  purposive  choice  ;  for  when 
that  point  is  reached  the  mind  is  at  variance  with 

17  the  appetite.  And  affection  for  oneself  resembles 
the  affection  of  relationship  :  neither  connexion  is 
in  people's  own  power  to  dissolve,  but  even  if  the 
parties  quarrel,  nevertheless  relatives  are  still  rela- 
tives and  the  individual  is  still  one  as  long  as  he  lives. 

From  what  has  been  said,  then,  it  is  clear  how 
many  meanings  there  are  of  the  term  '  affection,'  and 
that  all  the  forms  of  friendship  carry  back  to  the 
first  one. 

1  VII.  It  is  relative  to  our  inquiry  to  consider  also  Goodwin 
the    subject    of   agreement    of   feeling    and    kindly  Memuhlp*^ 
feeling  ^  ;    for  some  people  think  that  they  are  the  fo"nfiefi  on 
same  thing,  and  others  that  they  cannot  exist  apart. 
Kindly  feeling  is  neither  entirely  distinct  from  friend- 

2  ship  nor  yet  identical  with  it.  If  friendship  isj 
divided  into  three  modes,  kindly  feeling  is  not 
found  in  the  friendship  of  utility  nor  in  friendshit 
for  pleasure.  If  A  wishes  Β  prosperity  because  he 
is  useful,  the  motive  of  his  wish  would  be  not  B's 
interest  but  his  own,  whereas  it  is  thought  that  kindly 
feeling  like  .  .  .  <*  is  not  for  the  sake  of  the  person 

"  These  are  Solomon's  versions  of  tlie  terms  usually 
rendered  '  concord  and  goodwill.' 

<*  Perhaps  '  virtuous  friendship  '  should  be  supplied. 

407 


ARISTOTLE 

1241  a 

€ννοϊζο[Μ€νον  eivat  άλλα  του  ω  evvoeZ'  elr  ^  ev  rfj 

του  rjbeos  φιλία,  καν  τοις  άφνχοις  ηννόουν  ώστ€ 

10  hrjXov  OTL  π€ρΙ  την  ηθίκην  φιλίαν  η  evvoid  εστίν, 
άλλα  του  μ€ν  €ύνοοΰντος  βουλ^σθαι  μόνον  εστί,  του  3 
δε    φίλου    καΐ    ττράττβιν    α   βούλ^ται•    eoTL    γαρ    η 
εύνοια  άρχη  φιλίας,    ό  /χεν  γαρ  φίλος  πας  €ϋνους,  ό 
δ'    ΐϋνους   ου   ττας   φίλος,   άργομένω   γαρ   eoiKev   6 

15  ευνοών  μόνον,     διό  άρχη  φιλίας,  αλλ'  ου  φιλία. 

Δοκουσι  γαρ  οι  τε  φίλοι  6μονο€Ϊν  και  οι  ομονοοϋν- 
Τ€ς  φίλοι  είναι,     εστί  δ'  ου  περί  πάντα  η  ομόνοια  * 
η  φιλική,  άλλα  ττερι  τα  πρακτά  τοις  όμονοοϋσι  και 
δσα  ει?  το  συζην  συντείνει,     ούδε**  μόνον  κατά  διά- 
νοιαν  η  κατά  ορζξιν  εστί  γάρ  τάναντία  νοεΐν  κται* 

20  ζπιθυμβΐν,   ωσττερ   εν  τω   άκρατ€Ϊ  δια0α>νεΓ  τοΰτο* 
ουδ'   ει*   κατά   τι^ν   ττροαίρεσιν   ό/χονοει/    και  κατά 
την  ετΓΐ^υ/χιαν.     εττι  δε   των  aya^cuv  tJ  ομόνοια'  οι  ^ 
γ€   φαύλοι   ταύτα   προαιρούμ€νοι  και  επιθυμοΰντβς 
βλαπτουσιν  αλλήλους,     εοικε  δε  και  ή  ομόνοια  ούχ  6 
απλώς  λέγβσθαι,  ωσπ^ρ  ούδ'  ή  φιλία,  αλλ*  ή  μβν 

25  πρώτη    και    φύσ^ι    σπουΒαία,   διο    ουκ    εστί    τους 
φαύλους  ούτω?"  όμονο€Ϊν,  CTepa  δε  κα^'  ην  και  οι 
φαύλοι  όμονοοΰσιν,  όταν  των  αυτών  την  προαίρεσιν 
και  την  ^πιθυμίαν  εχωσιν.     ούτω  δε  δει  τών  αυτών  7 
ορ€γ€σθαι    ώστ'    ivhi^eadai    άμφοτ4ροις    ύπάργ^ιν 

•  Sp. :  d  δ'  aut  ei  δη.  «  Sus. :  οΰτί 

'  «ΌεΣΊ»  και  Sol. :  τό  κινούν,  *  ου  δ(ί  Μ^ 

*  όμονοεϊν  Ρ>>.  β  <οβτω5>  add.  Rac. 

408 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  VII.  vii.  2-7 

who  feels  it  himself  but  for  the  sake  of  him  for 
whom  he  feels  kindly  ;  and  if  kindly  feeling  were 
found  in  friendship  for  the  pleasant,  men  would 
feel  kindly  even  towards  inanimate  objects.  So  that 
it  is   clear  that  kindly  feeling  has   to  do  with  the 

3  friendship  that  is  based  on  character.  But  it  is 
the  mark  of  one  who  feels  kindly  only  to  wish  good, 
whereas  it  is  the  mark  of  the  friend  also  to  do  the 
good  that  he  wishes  ;  for  kindly  feeling  is  the  begin- 
ning of  friendship,  as  every  friend  feels  kindly,  but 
not  everyone  who  feels  kindly  is  a  friend,  since  the 
kindly  man  is  only  as  it  were  making  a  beginning. 
Therefore  kindly  feeling  is  the  beginning  of  friend- 
ship, but  it  is  not  friendship. 

For  it  is  thought  that  friends  agree  in  feeling,  Concord 

4  and  that  those  who  agree  in  feeling  are  friends.     But  c"nduc\  is 
the  agreement  of  friendship  is  not  in  regard  to  every-  °°""°^^  ^° 
thing,  but  to  things  practicable  for  the  parties,  and     ^^°°  ' 
to  all  that  contributes  to  their  association.     Nor  is 

it  only  agreement  in  thought  or  in  appetition,  for  it 
is  possible  to  think  and  to  desire  opposite  things,  as 
in  the  man  lacking  self-control  this  discord  occurs  ; 
if  a  man  agrees  with  another  in  purposive  choice  he 
does  not  necessarily  agree  with  him  in  desire  also. 

5  Agreement  occurs  in  the  case  of  good  men — at  all 
events  when  bad  men  purpose  and  desire  the  same 

6  things  they  harm  one  another.  And  it  appears  that 
agreement,  like  friendship,  is  not  a  term  of  single 
meaning,  but  whereas  the  primary  and  natural  form 
of  it  is  good,  so  that  it  is  not  possible  for  bad  men  to 
agree  in  this  way,  there  is  another  sort  of  agreement 
shown  even  by  bad  men  when  their  purpose  and 

7  desire  are  for  the  same  objects.  But  it  is  only  proper 
for  them  to  aim  at  the  same  objects  in  cases  when 

409 


ARISTOTLE 

1241  a  ^     ^ 

ov   ορίγονταΐ'  αν    yap    τοιούτου    ορίγωνται    ο    μη 

30  €ν^€χ€ται    άμ,φοΐν,   μαχοΰνται.     οΐ    όμονοοΰντ^ς    δ' 
ου  μάχονται} 

"Εστί    δτ^^    ομόνοια    όταν   περί    του    άρχ€ΐν    και  8 
άρχ€σθαι^  η  αιϊτη  προαίρ€σις  ^,  μη  του  ίκάτ^ρον, 
άλλα   του   τον   αυτόν,     και   έ'στιι^  η   ομόνοια  φιλία 
πολιτική . 

Uepi    μεν     οΰν    ομονοίας    και    ζύνοίαξ    ειρήσθω 
τοσαΰτα. 
35      VIII.   Άττορεΐται   δέ   δια   τί  μάλλον  φιλοϋσιν  οι  1 
ττοιησαντες  ευ  τους  παθόντας  η  οι  παθόντες  ευ  τους 
ποιησαντας•    δο/cet    δε    δίκαιον    etvat    τουναντίον. 
τοΰτο    δ'    ύπολάβοι   μεν    αν   τις    δια    το    χρήσιμον  2 
και     το     αύτω     ώφελιμον     συμβαίνειν     τω*     μεν 
γαρ  οφείλεται^  τον  δ'   άπο^οΰναι  8εΐ.     ουκ  εστί  δε 
40  τοΰτο   μόνον,    άλλα    και   φυσικόν   η   γαρ    ενέργεια  3 
1241  b  αιρετώτερον,  τον  αυτόν  δε*  λόγον  έχει  το  έργον  και 
η   ενέργεια,   6   δ'    ευ   παθών   ώσπερ   έργον  του   ευ 
ποιησαντος .     διό  και  εν  τοις  ζωοις  η  περί  τα  τέκνα 
σπουδή  εστί  και  του  γει^νί^σαι  και  τοίΡ  τα*  γεννώ- 
μενα  σώζειν.     και  φιλοϋσι   8η   μάλλον  οι  πατέρες  4 
5  τα    τέκνα    {και   at   μητέρες   των   πάτερων)^   η    φι- 
λοΰνται,  και  ούτοι  πάλιν  τά  αύτώΐ'  η  τους  γεννη- 
σαντας,  δια  το  την  ενεργειαν  εΐναι  το  άριστον,     και 
at  μητέρες  των  πάτερων,  οτι  μάλλον  οΐονται  αυτών 
ε?ι/αι   έργον   τά  τέκνα'   το   γάρ   έργον  τω   χαλεπώ  5 

^  Κααμαχοΰΐ'ται.  Sp. :  δ' η. 

8  \καΙ  άρχΐσθαι]  ?  Rac. 

*  Fr. :  τό  (top  edd.).  ^  Fr. :  ώφΐΧΰται. 

•  Sp. :  δη.  '  τον  add.  Rac. 

*  τα  add.  Sp.  »  [καΐ  .  .  .  πατέρων]  Sp. 
4.10 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  VII.  vii.  7— vni.  5 

it  is  possible  for  both  to  have  the  things  aimed  at, 
since  if  they  aim  at  a  thing  of  a  kind  that  it  is  not 
possible  for  both  to  have,  they  will  quarrel  ;  but  those 
who  agree  in  mind  do  not  quarrel. 
8  Therefore  agreement  exists  when  there  is  the 
same  purposive  choice  as  to  ruling  and  being  ruled — 
not  each  choosing  himself  to  rule  but  both  the  same 
one.     Agreement  is  civic  friendship. 

So  much  for  the  subject  of  agreement  in  feeling 
and  kindly  feeling. 

1  VIII.  The  question  is  raised,  why  those  who  have  \Love  of 
conferred  a  benefit  feel  more  affection  for  those  who /fQ®°^g^^g*f '' 
have  received  it  than  those  who  have  received  it',ficiary. 
feel  for  those  who  have  conferred  it  ;  whereas  justice  . 

2  seems  to  require  the  opposite.    One  might  conceive  i 
that  it  occurs  for  reasons  of  utility  and  personal  bene- 
fit ;    for  benefit  is  owing  to  one  party  and  it  is  the 
other  party's  duty  to  repay  it.     But  really  it  is  not 

3  this  alone  ;  it  is  also  a  law  of  nature — activity  is  a 
more  desirable  thing,  and  there  is  the  same  relation 
between  effect  and  activity  as  between  the  parties 
here  :  the  person  benefited  is  as  it  were  the  product 
of  the  benefactor.  This  is  why  even  animals  have  " 
the  philoprogenitive  instinct,  which  urges  them  to 
produce  offspring  and  also  to  protect  the  offspring 

4  produced.  And  in  fact  fathers  love  their  children 
more  than  they  are  loved  by  them  (mothers  more 
so  than  fathers)  "  and  these  in  their  turn  love  their 
children  more  than  their  parents,  because  activity 
is  the  greatest  good.  And  mothers  love  their  chil- 
dren more  than  fathers,  because  they  think  that  the 

5  children  are  more  their  work  ;    for  people  estimate 

"  This  clause  is  probably  an  interpolation  in  the  Greek. 

411 


ARISTOTLE 

Βίορίζουσιν,    πλβίω    δε   λυττειται    nepl   την   yeveatv 
rf  μητηρ. 

10  Και  π€ρΙ  μεν  φιλίας  της  προς  αύτον  καΐ  της  iv 
πλΐίοσι  ^ίωρίσθω  τον  τρόπον  τούτον. 

IX.   Δο/cet  δε  τό  τε   δίκαιον   elvat  Ισον  τι  καΐ  η  1 
φιλία   iv    Ισότητι,    el   μη   μάτην   Aeyerat    Ισότης   η 
φιλότης.     αϊ  δε  ττολιτειαι  ττασαι  δίκαιου  τι  €Ϊ8ος• 

15  κοννωνίαϊ^  Ύ^Ρ»  '''^  δε  κοιι^όι^  παν  δια  του  δικαίου 
συνβστηκβν,  ώστε  οσα  ει'δτ^^  φιλίας,  τοσαυτα*  και 
δίκαιου  και  κοινωνίας,  και  πάντα  ταντα  σύνορα 
άλληλοις  και  εγγύς  έχει  τάς  διαφοράς,  ε'ττει  δ'*  2 
ό^Μοιω?  έχει  φνχη  προς  σώμα  και  τεχνίτης  προς 
όργανον    και    Ββσπότης    προς    Βοϋλον,    τούτων   μεν 

20  ουκ  εστί  κοινωνία'  ου  γαρ  δυ'  εστίν,  άλλα  το  μεν 
εν,  το  δε  του  ενός  ούδ'  έν*•  ουδέ  διαιρετόν  το 
aya^oj/  εκατερω,  άλλα  το  αμφοτέρων  του  ενός  ου 
ένεκα  εστίν,  το  τε  γαρ  σώμα  εστιΐ'  όργανον  σύμ- 
φυτον,  και  του  οεσποτου  ό  Βοΰλος  ώσπερ  μόριον 
και  όργανον''  άφαιρετόν,  το  δ'  όργανον  ώσπερ 
Βοΰλος  άφυχος. 

25      Αι    δ     αλλαι    κοινωνιαι    εισιν»*    μόριον    τών    της  3 
πόλεως   κοινωνιών,   οίον   η   τών   φρατερων   η   τών 
όργεων^  η  αϊ  χρτ^/Αατιστικαι   [έτι   ττολιτειαι].'"      αί 
δε  ττολιτειαι  ττασαι  iv  ταΐς  οικίαις^^  συνυπάρχουσι, 
και    αϊ   ορθαι    και    αϊ   παρεκβάσεις     [εστί   γαρ   το 

^  ή  add.  Rac.  (et  olim  Fr.).  ^  Bz. :  κοινωνία. 

*  ώστ(  δσα  είδη  Bz. :  βστυ  del  δη  (δια  Μ*'). 

*  τοσαΟτα  add.  llac.  (cf.  Μ. 31.  1211  a). 

*  δ'  <οι'χ>  ?  Rac.  «  lac. :   ουδέν. 

'  [καΐ  6pyavov]  ?  Rac.  *  Bz. :  ΐΐσΐν  ή. 

'  Sol.  (et  ν,  L.  &  S.) :  όρ-γίων  {όρ-γςώνων  Dietsche). 

"  Fr. 
11  <Tats>  οίκίαΐ!  (cf.  N.E.  1160  b  24)  Fr. :  okeiois. 

412 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  VII.  viii.  5— ix.  3 

work  by  its  difficulty,  and  in  the  production  of  a  child 
the  mother  has  more  pain. 

Such  may  be  our  decision  on  the  subject  of  friend- 
ship for  oneself  and  of  friendship  among  more  than 
one. 

1  IX.  It  is  thought  that  what  is  just  is  something  Forms  of 
that  is  equal,  and  also  that  friendship  is  based  on  ^fpg.^'^" 
equality,   if  there    is   truth    in   the   saying   '  Amity 

is  equality.'  And  all  constitutions  are  some  species 
of  justice  ;  for  they  are  partnerships,  and  every 
partnership  is  founded  on  justice,  so  that  there  are 
as  many  species  of  justice  and  of  partnership  as  there 
are  of  friendship,  and  all  these  species  border  on  each 

2  other  and  have  their  diiferentia  closely  related.  But 
since  the  relations  of  soul  and  body,  craftsman  and 
tool,  and  master  and  slave  are  similar,"  between 
the  two  terms  of  each  of  these  pairs  there  is  no 
partnership  ;  for  they  are  not  two,  but  the  former  is 
one  and  the  latter  a  part  of  that  one,  not  one  itself ; 
nor  is  the  good  divisible  between  them,  but  that  of 
both  belongs  to  the  one  for  whose  sake  they  exist. 
For  the  body  is  the  soul's  tool  born  with  it,  a  slave 
is  as  it  were  a  member  or  tool  of  his  master,  a  tool  is 
a  sort  of  inanimate  slave. 

3  The  other  partnerships  are  a  constituent  part  of  Analogy  of 
the  partnerships  of  the  state — for  example  that  of  fa"k)nsWp8 
the  members  of  a  brotherhood  or  a  priesthood,  or  ^'''th  con- 
business  partnerships.     All  forms  of  constitution  exist 
together  in  the  household,  both  the  correct  forms 

and  the  deviations  (for  the  same  thing  is  found  in 

"  i.e.  to  one  another.  Perhaps  the  Greek  should  be 
emended  to  give  '  not  similar  '  (to  those  just  mentioned). 

413 


ARISTOTLE 

1241b 

avTo,  ωσπ€ρ  errl  των  αρμονιών,  /cat  iv^  ταΐς  ττο- 

30  Aire  tats•),  βασιλική  p,kv  ή  του  yevvriaavros ,  άριστο-  4 
κρατική  δ'  ή  avSpos  και  γυναικός,  ττολιτβία  δ'  η  των 
α^βλφών,  7ταρ€κβασις  δε  τούτων  τυραννίς,  ολιγαρχία, 
Βημος•  και  τά  δίκαια  Βη  τοσαΰτα. 

Έττβι  δε  το  'ίσον  το  μ€ν  κατ*  αριθμόν  το  δε  κατ'  5 
αναλογίαν,   και    του    δικαίου    €Ϊ8η    έσται    και    της 

35  φιλίας  και  της  κοινωνίας,  κατ*  αριθμόν  μεν  γαρ 
η  {ΒημοκρατικηΥ  κοινωνία,  και  η  εταιρική  φιλία 
[τω  γαρ  αύτω  δρω  μετρείται) ,  κατ*  αναλογίαν  δε 
η  αριστοκρατική  rf  αρίστη  και  η*  βασιλική  {ου 
γαρ  ταύτον  Βικαιον  τω  ύπερεχοντι  και  ύπερεχο- 
μ€νω   αλλά  το   άνάλογον)  •   και  η   φιλία  δε   ομοίως  6 

40  πατρός  και  τταιΒός,  και  εν  ταΐς  κοινωνίαις  6  αύτος 
τρόπος. 
1242  a      Χ.  Αεγονται  8η^  φιλίαι  συγγενική,  εταιρική,  κοι-  1 
νωνικη,    ή  λεγομένη  πολιτική,     εστι  μεν  συγγενι- 
κή   πολλά    έχουσα    εΐ8η,    ή    μεν    ως    αδελφών,    ή 
δ    ως  πατρός  και  υίών^'  και  γάρ  κατ*  αναλογίαν, 
5  οίον    η    πατρική,    και    κατ*    αριθμόν,    οίον    ή    των 
αοελφών.      εγγύς    γάρ    αύτη    της   εταιρικής•   επι- 
λαμβάνουσι     γάρ    και     ενταύθα    πρεσβειών,     ή    8ε  2 
πολιτική    συνεστηκε    μεν    κατά    το    χρήσιμον    καΐ 
μάλιστα'  δια  γάρ   το   μη   αύταρκες''  Βοκοΰσι   συμ- 

^  Sp. :  των  iv,  *  Sus. 

'  ή  add.  Ross.  *  ή  add.  Rac. 

'  Sp. :   δέ.  «  [i7  μ^ν  ώί  .   .   .   υΙων]  ?  Rac. 

'  Rac. :  αυτάρκη, 

"  Cf.  Politics  viii.,  1342  a  24  των  αρμονίων  παρ(κβάσ(ΐί  (ΙσΙ 
414 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  VII.  ix.  3— x.  2 

constitutions  as  in  the  case  of  musical  modes  ") — 

4  paternal  authority  being  royal,  the  relationship  of 
man  and  wife  aristocratic,  that  of  brothers  a  republic, 
while  the  deviation  -  forms  of  these  are  tyranny, 
oligarchy  and  democracy  ;  and  there  are  therefore 
as  many  varieties  of  justice. 

5  And  since  there  are  two  sorts  of  equality,  numerical 
and  proportional,  there  will  also  be  various  species 
of  justice  and  of  partnership  and  friendship.  The 
partnership  of  democracy  is  based  on  numerical 
equality,  and  so  is  the  friendship  of  comrades,  as  it 
is  measured  by  the  same  standard  ;  whereas  the 
aristocratic  partnership  (which  is  the  best)  and  the 
royal  are  proportional,  for  it  is  just  for  superior  and 
inferior  to  have  not  the  same  share  but  proportional 

6  shares  ;  and  similarly  also  the  friendship  of  father  and 
son,  and  the  same  way  in  partnerships. 

1  X.  Specified  sorts  of  friendship  are  therefore  the  Friendships 
friendship   of  relatives,  that  of  comrades,  that  of  ij^^e  cialmr" 
partners  and  what  is  termed  civic  friendship.     Really  of  various 
friendship  of  relatives  has  more  than  one  species,  d?ffer.*^  '^^ 
one  as  between  brothers,  another  as  of  father  and         >Γ 
son  *  :  it  may  be  proportional,  for  example  paternal  >  /ji- 
friendship,   or   based  on  number,  for   example   the       ■  ^  ^ 
friendship  of  brothers — for  this  is  near  the  friendship  ...^.v•^ 
of  comrades,  as  in  this  also  they  claim  privileges  of 

2  seniority.   (jCivic   friendship    on    the    other   hand   is/     .  •  ι  . 
constituted  in  the  fullest  degree  on  the  principle'    ffi^^^ 
of  utility,  for  it  seems  to  be  the  individual's  lack  ofl 
self-sufficiency  that  makes  these  unions  permanent-^ 

καΐ  των  μΐλών  τα  σύντονα  καΐ  τταρακεχρωσμένα, '  those  harmonies 
and  melodies  that  are  highly  strung  and  irregular  in  colora- 
tion {i.e.  divergent  from  the  regular  scale  in  having  smaller 
intervals)  are  deviations.' 

^  These  two  clauses  look  like  an  interpolation. 

415 


ARISTOTLE 

1242  a 

μάνβιν^  iirel  συνηλθόν  y    αν  καΐ  του  σνζην  χάριν. 

10  μόνη  δ'  η  πολιτική  και  η  παρ*  αύτην  παρ4κβασις 
ου  μόνον  φιλίαι,  άλλα  και  ώς  φίλοι  κοινωνοΰσιν , 
at  δ  αλλαι  καθ*  ύπ€ροχ'ήν.  μάλιστα  Se  δίκαιον  το  ! 
iv  TTJ  των  χρησίμων  φιλία,  δια  το  tout'  eii^at  το 
πολιτικον  δίκαιον,  άλλον  γαρ  τρόπον  συνηλθον 
πριων  και  τ€χνη,  ούχ  evcKa  κοινού  τινό?  {οΐον'^  γαρ 

15  όργανον  και  φυχή)  άλλα  του  χρωμένου  ev€K€v. 
συμβαίν€ΐ  δε  και  αυτό  τό^  όργανον  ^πιμ^λ^ίας  ^ 
τυγχαν€ΐν  ης  δίκαιον  προς  το  ^ργον  εκείνου  γαρ 
€V€K€v  €στι,  και  το  τρυπάνω  etvat  διττόν,  ών  το 
κυριώτ€ρον  €ν€ργ€ΐα,  ή  τρύπησις.  και  iv  τούτω  τω 
elhei  σώμα  και  δούλος,  ωσπ€ρ  βΐρηται  πρότ€ρον. 

20  Το  Srj  ζητ€Ϊν  πώς  δβι  τω  φίλω  όμιλ^ΐν,  το  ζητ€Ϊν  Ι 
8ικαιον  τι  βστίν.  και  γαρ  όλως  το  δίκαιον  ατταν 
προς  φίλον  τό  τ€  γαρ  δίκαιον  τισι  και  κοινωνοΐς, 
και  ο  φίλος  κοινωνός,  ό  μ€ν  γάνους,  ό  he  βίου.  ό 
γαρ  άνθρωπος  ου  μόνον  πολιτικον*  άλλα  και 
οίκονομικόν    ζωον,    και    ούχ    ωσπ€ρ    τάλλά    ποτ€ 

25  συνδυάζεται  και  τώ  τυχόντι  και  θηλ^ι  καΐ  appevi, 
άλλ'  ίδια  ου  μοναυλικόν^  άλλα  κοινωνικόν  άνθρωπος  ( 
ζωον  προς  ους  φύσ^ι  συγγένεια  εστίν  και  κοινωνία 
τοίνυν  και  δίκαιον  τι   και  ei  μη  πόλις  €Ϊη.     οικία  ' 
δ     εστί   τι?   φιλία•    δεσττότου    μ€ν   ουν   και  δούλου 

^  Sus. :  (TVfeXeuv.  *  Γ :  δλον.  '  αυτό  τό  Βζ. :  τοΰτο, 

*  Cas. :  ά,νθρώττον  μόνον  ου  πολιτίκόί  {β,νθρωτΓΟί  οΰ  μόνον  ττολι- 
τ^κbs  Γ). 

'  Sp. :  άλλ'  αί  διάδυμον  αύλικόν. 


4.16 


"  Not  its  ^ζΐί,  its  shape,  hardness,  etc. 

*  1241  b  17-24. 
"  i.e.  '  friend  '  in  the  sense  of  '  relation.' 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  VII.  χ.  2-7 

since  they  would  have  been  formed  in  any  case  merely 
for  the  sake  of  society.  Only  civic  friendship  and 
the  deviation  from  it  are  not  merely  friendships 
but   also   partnerships   on   a   friendly   footing  ;     the 

3  others  are  on  a  basis  of  superiority,  ^^he  justice 
that  underlies  a  friendship  of  utility  is  in  the  highest 
degree  just,  because  this  is  the  civic  principle  of 
justice.  <  The  coming  together  of  a  saw  vv^ith  the 
craft  tmit  uses  it  is  on  different  lines — it  is  not  for 
the  sake  of  some  common  object,  for  saw  and  craft 
are  like  instrument  and  spirit,  but  for  the  sake  of 

4  the  man  who  employs  them.  It  does  indeed  come 
about  that  even  the  tool  itself  receives  attention 
which  it  deserves  with  a  view  to  its  work,  since 
it  exists  for  the  sake  of  its  work,  and  the  essential 
nature  of  a  gimlet  is  twofold,  the  more  important 
half  being  its  activity,  boring."  And  the  body  and 
the  slave  are  in  the  class  of  tool,  as  has  been  said 
before.'' 

5  Therefore  to  seek  the  proper  way  of  associating  Domestic 
with  a  friend  is  to  seek  for  a  particular  kind  of  justice,  relations. 
In  fact  the  whole  of  justice  in  general  is  in  relation 

to  a  friend,  for  what  is  just  is  just  for  certain  persons,  ,  ■ 
and  persons  who  are  partners,  and  a  friend  is  a 
partner,  either  in  one's  family  "  or  in  one's  life.  For 
man  is  not  only  a  political  but  also  a  house-holding 
animal,  and  does  not,  like  the  other  animals,  couple 
occasionally  and  with  any  chance  female  or  male, 

6  but  man  is  in  a  special  way  not  a  solitary  but  a 
gregarious  animal,  associating  with  the  persons  with 
whom  he  has  a  natural  kinship  ;  accordingly  there 
would  be  partnership,  and  justice  of  a  sort,  even  if 

7  there  were  no  state.  And  a  household  is  a  sort  of 
friendship — or  rather  the  relationship  of  master  and 

2  Ε  417 


ARISTOTLE 

1242  a  „  ^         ^ 

TjTrep    και    τβχνης    /cat    οργάνων    καΐ    φυχης    καΐ 

30  σώματος,  αϊ  δβ  τοιαυται  οϋτ€  φιλίαι  οϋτ€  δίκαιο - 
σνναι  αλλ•'  άνάλογον,  ωσττερ  και  ro  vyieivov^  ου 
δίκαιον  αλλ'  άνάλογον.  γυναικός  δε  και  άν8ρ6ς  8 
φιλία  ώς  χρησιμον  καΐ  κοινωνία•  πατρός  δε  και 
υιοϋ  η  αύτη  ηπβρ  θβοΰ  προς  άνθρωπον  και  του  βυ 
ποιησαντος  προς  τον  παθόντα  και  δλως  του  φύσβι 

35  άρχοντος    προς    τον    φύσ€ΐ    άρχόμ€νον.     ή    δέ    των  9 
αο^λφών  προς  αλλτ^λου?  εταιρική  μάλιστα,  ι^^  κατ' 
ισότητα — 

ου  γάρ  τι  νόθος  τωδ'   άπε^είχθην,^ 
άμφοΐν  he   πατήρ*  αύτος^   €κληθη 
Zeu?  €μ6ς  άρχων — 
40  ταΰτα  γαρ  ως  το  ίσον  ζητούντων  λέγεται,     διό  iv 
1242  b  οικία  πρώτον  άρχαι  και  πηγαΐ  φιλίας  και  πολιτείας 
και  δίκαιοι». 

Εττει  δε  φιλίαι  τρεις,  κατ  άρετην,  κατά  το  Κ 
χρησιμον,  κατά  το  η8ύ,  τούτων  δε  εκάστης  δυο 
8ιαφοραί  {η  μεν  γάρ  καθ*  ύπεροχην  ή  δε  κατ' 
5  ισότητα  εστίν  εκάστη  αυτών),  το  δε  δίκαιον  το  ττερι 
αυτά?  εκ  τών  αμφισβητήσεων^  ^ηλον,  εν  μεν  ττ^ 
καθ  ύπεροχην  άζιοΰται  το  άνάλογον  ούχ  ωσαύτως, 
αΛΛ  ο  μεν  υπερέχων  ανεστραμμενως  το  αναλογον, 
ως  αυτός  προς  τον  ελάττω,  ούτω  το  παρά  του  ελάτ- 
τονοςγινομενον  προς  το  παρ*  αύτοϋ, ^  διακείμενος*  ώσ- 
10  περ  άρχων  προς  άρχόμενον  ει  δε  μη  τούτο,  αλλά  11 
το    ίσον  κατ     αριθμόν  άξιοι  {και   γάρ   ^η    και   επι 

^  vyieivof  corruptum  edd. :  (irieiK^t  ?  Sus. 

*^  lac. :  ή.  3  Cas. :  άττΐΜχθη. 

*  Γ:  πατρ6ί.  β  Nauck:  atVos. 

®  Fr. :  άμ,φισβψ-ησάντων  {άμψισβητιηθέντων  Bz.). 

'  Fr. :  τψ.  8  liac. :  αύτοΰ. 

*   Bz. :   διακΐίμ^νον. 

418 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  VII.  x.  7-11 

slave  is  that  of  craft  and  tools,  and  of  spirit  and 
body,  and  such  relationships  are  not  friendships  or 
forms  of  justice  but  something  analogous,  just  as 

8  health  <*  is  not  justice  but  analogous  to  it.  But 
the  friendship  of  man  and  wife  is  one  of  utility,  a 
partnership  ;  that  of  father  and  son  is  the  same  as 
that  between  god  and  man  and  between  benefactor 
and    beneficiary,    and    generally    between    natural 

9  ruler  and  natural  subject.  That  between  brothers 
is  principally  the  friendship  of  comrades,  as  being 
on  a  footing  of  equality — 

For  never  did  he  make  me  out  a  bastard. 

But  the  same  Zeus,  my  lord,  was  called  the  sire 

Of  both— ," 

for  these  are  the  words  of  men  seeking  equality. 
Hence  in  the  household  are  first  found  the  origins 
and  springs  of  friendship,  of  political  organization 
and  of  justice. 

10  And   since   there    are   three   sorts   of  friendship,  unequal 
based  on  goodness,  on  utility  and  on  pleasure,  and  fr'enfisiiips 
two  varieties  of  each  sort  (for  each  of  them  is  either  forms. 

on  a  basis  of  superiority  or  of  equality),  and  what  is 
just  in  relation  to  them  is  clear  from  our  discussions, 
in  the  variety  based  on  superiority  the  proportionate 
claims  are  not  on  the  same  lines,  but  the  superior 
party  claims  by  inverse  proportion — the  contribution 
of  the  inferior  to  stand  in  the  same  ratio  to  his  own 
as  he  himself  stands  in  to  the  inferior,  his  attitude 

11  being  that  of  ruler  to  subject  ;   or  if  not  that,  at  all 
•events  he  claims  a  numerically  equal  share  (for  in 

"  Perhaps  the  text  is  corrupt. 

''  Sophocles  fr.  735  Jebb  and  Pearson  (684  Nauck). 
The  third  Hne  is  completed  in  a  quotation  by  Philo,  θνητών 
δ'  ούδείί.    (For  τφδε  dative  of  agent  see  Kuhner-Gerth,  i.  422). 

419 


ARISTOTLE 

1242  b 

των  άλ  .  χοίνωνιών  ούτω  συμβαίνει,  6τ€  μεν  γαρ 
αριθμώ  το  ΐσον^  μετεχουσιν,  6τ€  δε  λόγω•  el  μεν 
γαρ  Ίσον  αριθμώ  είσήνεγκον  άργνριον.  Ισον  και  τω 

15  ισω  αριθμώ  ^ιαλαμβάνουσιν ,  ει  δε  μτ]  ϊσον,  άνά- 
λογον),  ό  δ'  ύττερεχόμενος  τουναντίον  στρέφει  το 
αναλογον  και  κατά,  ^ιάμετρον  συζεύγννσιν  ^όζειε  1 
δ  αν  οΰτως  ελαττοΰσθαι  6  υπερέχων,  και  λειτουρ- 
γία η  φίλια  και  rf  κοινωνία,  δει  αρα  τινί  ετερω 
ανισασαι  και  ττοιησαι  άνάλογον  τοϋτο  δ'   εστίν  η  1; 

20  τιμή,  όπερ  και  τω  άρχοντι  φύσει  και  θεώ  προς  το 
αρχομενον.  δει  δε  Ισασθτιναι  το  κέρδος  προς  την 
τιμήν. 

Η    δε   κτατ'    ΐσα   φιλία  εστίν  ή  πολιτική.      ή  δε  1- 
πολιτική  εστί  μεν  κατά  το  χρήσιμον,  καΐ  ωσπερ  αί 
πόλεις   άλλί^λαΐδ"   φίλαι,   ούτω   και   οι  πολΐται,   και 
ομοίως 

25  ούκετι  γιγνώσκουσιν  ^Αθηναίοι  Μεγαρήας 

και  οι  πολΐται,  όταν  μή  χρήσιμοι  αΧλήλοις,  αλλ'  εκ 

1  Rac. :  του  ίσου.  ^  ή]  οΰ  Fr.  (cf.  Ν.Ε.  1163  a  29). 

"  The  inferior  party  ρ  claims  to  draw  a  larger  share  of 
benefit  Β  and  to  leave  the  smaller  share  b  to  the  superior 
party  P,  the  result  of  which  would  be  ρ  +  Β  and  Ρ  +  b.  The 
superior  party  Ρ  also  invokes  the  principle  of  inverse  pro- 
portion (line  7),  but  applies  it  to  their  contributions  to  the 
common  cause,  not  to  the  benefits  drawn  from  it :  he  claims 
to  make  a  smaller  contribution  c,  while  the  inferior  party 
makes  a  larger  one  C,  the  result  of  which  would  be  Ρ  -c 
and  ρ  -  C.  The  proposed  conjunctions  are  in  fact  both  of 
420 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  VII.  χ.  11-14 

fact  it  happens  in  this  way  in  other  »  iations 
too — sometimes  the  shares  are  numerically  equal, 
sometimes  proportionally  :  if  the  parties  contributed 
a  numerically  equal  sum  of  money,  they  also  take 
a  share  equal  by  numerical  equality,  if  an  unequal 
sum,  a  share  proportionally  equal).  The  inferior 
party  on  the  contrary  inverts  the  proportion,  and 

12  makes  a  diagonal  conjunction"  ;  but  it  would  seem 
that  in  this  way  the  superior  comes  off  worse,  and 
the  friendship  or  partnership  is  a  charitable  service.'' 
Therefore  equality  must  be  restored  and  proportion 

13  secured  by  some  other  means  ;  and  this  means  is 
honour,  which  belongs  by  nature  to  a  ruler  and  god 
in  relation  to  a  subject.  But  the  profit "  must  be 
made  equal  to  the  honour. 

14  Friendship  on  a  footing  of  equality  is  civic  friend-  Political 
ship.     Civic  friendship  is,  it  is  true,  based  on  utility,  ™°  ^  '^' 
and  fellow-citizens  are  one  another's  friends  in  the 

same  way  as  different  cities  are,  and 

Athens  no  longer  knoweth  Megara,** 
nor  similarly  do  citizens  know  one  another,  when^,-^ 
they  are  not  useful  to  one  another  ;    their  friend- 

them  diagonal,  connecting  the  larger  person  with  the  smaller 
thing  and  vice  versa  : 

Ρ         Β  PC 


ρ  b  ρ  c 

''  Perhaps  the  Greek  should  be  altered  to  give  '  friendship 
is  a  charity  and  not  a  partnership.' 

"  i.e.  the  advantage  in  the  shape  of  protection,  guidance, 
etc.,  that  the  inferior  party  derives  from  the  friendship. 

^  Lit.  '  the  Athenians  no  longer  recognize  the  Megarians.' 
Author  unknown  (Bergk,  Fr.  Eleg.,  Adespota  6). 

4.21 


ARISTOTLE 

1242  •>  ,  ,  ^  ^  ,  ,, 

χ€ίρ6ς  els  Χ^ίρα  'ή  φίλια.  έ'στι  δε  ενταύθα  και  1 
άρχον  καΐ  άρχόμ€νον,  οντ€  το  φυσικον  ovre  το 
βασιΧικόν,  άλλα  το  iv  τω  /xepet,  ovSe  τούτου 
30  eveKa  όπως  ev  ttoitj  ως  6  θζός,  άλλα  ίνα  ίσον  rj^ 
του  άγαθοΰ  καΐ^  της  λβιτουργίας.  κατ'  ισότητα  δη 
βούλ€ται  etvat  η  ττολίΤίκη  φιλία,  βστι  δέ  της  1 
χρησίμου  φιλίας  βϊΒη  δυο,  η  μεν  νομική  η  δ'  ηθική. 
βλ€π€ΐ  δ'  ή  μεν  πολιτική  €ΐς  το  'ίσον  και  βις  το 
πράγμα,  ωσπερ  οι  πωλοΰντες  και  oi  ώνούμενοι• 
διό  €Ϊρηται 

μισθός  avSpi  φίλω. 

35  όταν   μ€ν   ουν    καθ^    όμολογίαν   fj,^   πολιτική    αυτή  1 
φιλία    και    νομική'    όταν    δ'    επιτρίπωσιν   αύτοΐς* 
ηθική     βουλΐται     etvat     φιλία     και     εταιρική,     διό 
/ιιάλιστα  τα  εγκλήματα^  iv  ταύτη  τή  φιλία•  αίτιον 
δ'   ότι  παρά,  φυσιν   eVepat  yap   φιλίαι  ή   κατά  το 

40  χρήσιμον  και  ή  κατά  τήν  άρετήν,  οι  δ'  αμφότερα^ 
βουλονται  άμα  εχειν,  και  όμιλοΰσι  μεν  του  χρησίμου 

1243  a  ένεκα,    ήθικήν    δε    ποιοϋσιν    ώς    επιεικείς,    διό    ώς 

πιστεύοντες  ου  νομικήν  ποιοϋσιν. 

"Ολω?  μεν  γαρ  εν  τή  χρήσιμη  των  τριών  πλείστα^  1 

εγκλήματα    (ή   μεν   γαρ    αρετή    άνεγκλητος^   οΐ   δ 

ή^εΐς    έχοντες    και    Βόντες    άπαλλάττονται,    οΐ    δε 

5  χρήσιμοι    ουκ    ευθύς    διαλύονται,    αν    μή    νομικώς 

και'     εταιρικώς     προσφερωνται)'     όμως     δε     της  1 

1  ίχτι  ?  Rac. 

*  καΐ  Γ :  ■))  {ίσον  g  τό  ά-γαθόν  rrj  Xeirovpyiif.  ?  Rac). 

'  Fr.  (et  Γ) :  ή.  *  Rac. :  aurois. 

*  τά  έ-γκλήματα  Sp.  :  ?Ύκ\ημα. 

•  άμφοτέραί  ?  Rac.  '  πλείστα  τά  Sp. 

*  Sp. :   άνέ-'/κλητον.  '  και :  ά\\'  ?  Rac. 

«  C/.  Ν. Ε.  1262  b  26. 

*  iV^.Z?.  1164  a  28.     Hesiod,  W.D.  371  /Λίσί^ό?  δ'  avipi  φίλφ 

422 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  VII.  χ.  15-19 

15  ship  is  a  ready -money  transaction. *  Nevertheless 
there  is  present  here  a  ruhng  factor  and  a  ruled — not 
a  natural  ruler  or  a  royal  one,  but  one  that  rules  in 
his  turn,  and  not  for  the  purpose  of  conferring  benefit, 
as  God  rules,  but  in  order  that  he  may  have  an  equal 
share  of  the  benefit  and  of  the  burden.  Therefore 
civic  friendship  aims  at  being  on  a  footing  of  equality. 

16  But  useful  friendship  is  of  two  kinds,  the  merely 
legal  and  the  moral.  Civic  friendship  looks  to 
equality  and  to  the  object,  as  buyers  and  sellers  do 
— hence  the  saying 

Unto  a  friend  his  wage — .* 

17  When,  therefore,  it  is  based  on  a  definite  agreement.  Complaints 
this  is  civic  and  legal  friendship  ;    but  when  they  frfemiThips 
trust  each  other  for  repayment,  it  tends  to  be  moral  of  utility 
friendship,   that   of  comrades.     Hence   this   is   the  basis. 
kind    of   friendship    in    which    recriminations    most 

occur,  the  reason  being  that  it  is  contrary  to  nature  ; 

for  friendship  based  on  utility  and  friendship  based 

on  goodness  are  different,  but  these  people  wish  to 

have  it  both  ways  at  once — they  associate  together      .  ,  -^  I  ' 

for  the  sake  of  utility  but  make  it  out  to  be  a  morai.  '' 

friendship  as  between  good  men,  and  so  represent 

it  as  not  merely  legal,  pretending  that  it  is  a  matter 

of  trust. 

18  For  in  general,  of  the  three  kinds  of  friendship,  it 
is  in  useful  friendship  that  most  recriminations  occur 
(for  goodness  is  not  given  to  recrimination,  and  pleas- 
ant friends  having  got  and  given  their  share  break 
it  off,  but  useful  friends  do  not  dissolve  the  association 
at  once,  if  their  intercourse  is  on  comradely  and  not 

19  merely  legal  lines)  ;  nevertheless  the  legal  sort  of 

eip-ημένο^  apKios  'έστω,  '  let  the  wage  stated  for  a  friend  stand 
good.' 

423 


ARISTOTLE 

1243  a  ^  ^ 

χρησίμου    η    νομική    άν€γκλητος.      eWt    δ'    ή    μβν 

νομική     διάλυσι?     ττρος     νόμισμα     {μ€τρ€Ϊται     γαρ 

τοντω  το  Ίσον),  η  δ    ηθική  ακούσιος,     διο  Ινιαχοΰ 

νομός  eon  τοις  όντως  ομιλονσι  φιλικώς  μη   eti'at 

10  Βικας  των  ακουσίων  συναλλαγμάτων,  ορθώς•  τοις 
γαρ  άγαθοΐς  ου  ττέφυκζ  ^ίκη^  elvai,  οι  δ'  ως 
αγαθοί  και  πιστοΐς^  συνα?^άττουσιν .  έ'στι  δ'  iv  2 
ταύτη  τη  φίλια  τα  ίγκληματα  αμφιβάλλοντα  αύτοΐς 
άμφότ€ρα,  πώς  ίκάτερος  ey/caAet/  όταν  ηθικώς 
άλλα  μη  νομικώς  πιστ€νσωσιν. 

15      Και    €χ€ΐ    Srj    άπορίαν   ποτ^ρως    δει    κρίνειν   το*  2 
hiKaiov,    πότ€ρα    προς    το    πράγμα    βλέποντα    το 
υπηρβτηθζν   ποσόν   η  ποιον,  η^  τω  πβπονθότι•  ev- 
δ€;^€ται  yap*  etvai  όπερ  Aeyei  ©eoyt'i? — 

σοι  μζ,ν  τοϋτο,   θ^ά,  σμικρόν,  €μοι  he  μέγα, 

εΐ'δεχβται  δε'  και  τουναντίον  γενέσθαι,  ωσπζρ  iv 
20  τω  λόγω,  σοι  μεν  τταιδιάρ'  tout'  elvai,  €μοι  δε 
θάνατον.  €ντ€ΰθ€ν  δ'  ώσπερ^  είρηται^  εγκλήματα'  2 
ό  μεν  γαρ  άξιοι  άντιπαθεΐν  ως  μέγα  ύπηρετησας 
OTL  6εομενω  εποίησεν,  η  τι  άλλο  τοιούτο  λέγων 
προς  την  εκείνου  ώφελειαν  πόσον  εΒύνατο  αλλ'  ου 
Tt   ην   αυτω,      ο   οε   τουναντίον   όσον   εκεινω   αλλ 

^  Sol. :  δίκαιον  {ayaOoh  αύτοΐί  ττέφυκΐ  δικαίου  Sp.). 

*  lac. :  Toh. 

'  [ttws  .  .  .  εγκαλεί]  ?  gloss,  (an  lege  ^7καλ^σ«  ?)  Rac. 

*  Sp. :  τον.  6  7)v  Fr.  •  Γ :  5i. 

''  Fr. :  yap.  *  ώστηρ  add.  Fr. 

'  Rac. :  εϊρηται  το.  '••'  Rac. :  αύτφ. 

"  Or,  adopting  another  conjectural  emendation,  '  since  it 
is  natural  for  good  men  to  be  just  of  their  own  accord.' 

*■  Solomon  renders  '  It  is  uncertain  how  either  will  re- 
criminate on  the  other,  seeing  that  they  trust  each  other,  not 
424 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  VII.  χ.  19-22 

useful  friendship  is  not  given  to  recrimination.  The 
legal  method  of  discharging  the  obligation  is  a  matter 
of  money,  for  that  serves  as  a  measure  of  equality  ; 
but  the  moral  method  is  voluntary.  Hence  in  some 
places  there  is  a  law  prohibiting  friendly  associates  of 
this  sort  from  actions  as  to  their  voluntary  contracts — 
rightly,  since  it  is  not  natural  for  good  men  to  go  to 
law,*  and  these  men  make  their  contracts  as  good 

20  men  and  as  dealing  with  trustworthy  people.  And 
in  fact  in  this  sort  of  friendship  the  recriminations  are 
doubtful  on  both  sides — what  line  of  accusation  each 
party  will  take,  inasmuch  as  their  confidence  was  of 
a  moral  kind  and  not  merely  legal. ^ 

21  Indeed  it  is  a  question  in  which  of  two  ways  one  Estimate  of 
ought  to  judge  what  is  a  just  return,  whether  by  "  ^™^' 
looking  at  the  actual  amount  or  quality  of  the  ser- 
vice rendered,  or  by  its  amount  or  quality  for  the 
recipient ;  for  it  may  be  as  Theognis  says — 

Goddess,  'tis  small  to  thee,  but  great  to  me," 

and  also  the  result  may  be  opposite,  as  in  the  saying 

22  '  This  is  sport  to  you  but  death  to  me.'  Hence 
recriminations,  as  has  been  said  **  ;  for  one  party 
claims  recompense  as  having  rendered  a  great  service, 
because  he  did  it  for  his  friend  in  need,  or  saying 
something  else  of  the  sort  as  to  how  much  it  was 
worth  in  relation  to  the  benefit  given  to  the  recipient 
and  not  what  it  was  to  himself,  while  the  other  party 
on  the  contrary  speaks  of  how  much  it  was  to  the 

in  a  limited  legal  way  but  on  the  basis  of  their  characters.' 
But  the  Greek  text  may  be  questioned. 

"  Theognis  14.  This  quotation  illustrates  that  the  amount 
of  a  service  is  '  subjective,'  the  next  quotation  shows  that 
its  quality  is. 

"  1242  b  37. 

425 


ARISTOTLE 

1243  a 

25  ούχ  όσον  αύτω}     ore  8e   και   /xera^ctAAei^•   ο    μ^ν  23 
γαρ    όσον    αύτω^    μικρόν    άπββη,   ο   δ'    δσον    αντώ^ 
μβγα^  εΒννατο,  οίον,  el  κιν8νν€νσας   8ραχμης   αζιον 
ωφίλησζν,  6  μ€ν  το  του  κινδύνου  μ^γ^θος  ό  8e  το 
του  αργυρίου,  ωσπ€ρ  iv  tjj  των  νομισμάτων  άττοδόσβι 

30  — και  γαρ  ει^ταυ^α  πepl  τούτων  η  άμφισβητησις' 
ο  μ€ν  γαρ  άζιοΐ  πώς  τότ  -ην,  6  8e  ττώ?  νυν,  αν 
μη  διβι'ττωνται. 

Η   μβν  ουν  ττολίτικη  βλέττ^ι   els  την  ομολογίαν  24 
και  €Ls  το  πράγμα,  η  δ'  ηθική  els  την  πpoaίpeσιv' 
ωστ€  καΐ   Βίκαιον  τοϋτο   μαλλόν   εστί,  και  δικαιο- 
σύνη φιλική,     αίτιον  δε  του  jU,ci;^eCT^at  διότι  κιαλλιωι^  25 

35  juev  η  ηθική  φιλία  άναγκαιοτ€ρα  Se  ή  χρησίμη•  οι 
δ  άρχονται'^  μ€ν  ως  ήθικοΙ  φίλοι  και  δι'  άρετήν 
ovTes,  όταν  δ'  αντίκρουση^  τι  των  ιδίων,  δήλοι  γί- 
νονται ότι  eTepoi  ήσαν.  €κ  π€ριουσίας  γαρ  διώ- 
1248  b  κονσιν  οι  πολλοί  το  καλόν,  διό  και  την  κάλλια» 
φιλιαν.  ωστ€  φαν€ρόν  πώς  Siaipereov  πepι  τούτων.  26 
61  μεν  γαρ  ηθικοί  φίλοι,  els  την  προαίρεσιν. 
βλεπτέον  el  'ίση,  και  ούθεν  άλλο  άξιωτ€ον  Θατ4ρω 
πάρα  Θατάρου•  el  δ'  ως  χρήσιμοι  και  πολιτικοί, 
5  ως  αν  ελυσιτελει*  ό/Μθλο•)/οίισΐΓ.  αν  δ'  ο  μεν 
φη  ωδε  6  δ'  εκείνως,  ου  καλόΐ','  άντιποιήσαι 
Seov,  τους   καλούς   λέγειν   λόγους,   ομοίως   Se   και 

^  (bis)  Rac. :  αντφ. 

*  μεταβά'\λ€ΐ    (vel    μεταλαμβάνει)  Rac. :     μεταλαμβάνων    και 
αμφιβάλλει.  3   μ^γ^ι]  Soi_ 

*  Bus. :  άρχονται.  ^  lac. :   άντικρυί  tj. 

*  'έωί  Άν  λικτιτελ-η  ?  Rac,  (tus  άν  λικτίτελί/  Sp.). 
'   Rac. :   καλύν  μίν. 

"  Or,  altering  the  Greek,  '  they  agree  for  as  long  as  it 
profits  them.' 

426 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  VII.  χ.  23-26 

23  donor  and  not  how  much  it  was  to  himself.  And 
at  other  times  the  position  is  reversed  ;  the  one 
says  how  little  he  got  out  of  it,  the  other  how  much 
the  service  was  worth  to  him — for  instance,  if  by 
taking  a  risk  he  did  the  other  a  shilling's  worth  of 
benefit,  the  one  talks  about  the  amount  of  the  risk 
and  the  other  about  the  amount  of  the  cash  ;  just 
as  in  the  repayment  of  a  money  loan,  for  there  too 
the  dispute  turns  on  this — one  claims  to  be  repaid 
the  value  that  the  money  had  when  lent,  the  other 
claims  to  repay  it  at  the  present  value,  unless  they 
have  put  a  proviso  in  the  contract. 

24  Civic  friendship,  then,  looks  at  the  agreement  and 
to  the  thing,  but  moral  friendship  at  the  intention. ; 
hence  the  latter  is  more  just — it  is  friendly  justice. 

25  The  cause  of  conflict  is  that  moral  friendship  is 
nobler  but  friendship  of  utility  more  necessary  ; 
and  men  begin  as  being  moral  friends  and  friends 
on  grounds  of  goodness,  but  when  some  private 
interest  comes  into  collision  it  becomes  clear  that 
really  they  were  different.  For  most  men  pursue 
what  is  fine  only  when  they  have  a  good  margin  in 
hand,  and  so  Avith  the  finer  sort  of  friendship  too. 

26  Hence  it  is  clear  how  these  cases  must  be  decided. 
If  they  are  moral  friends,  we  must  consider  if  their 
intentions  are  equal,  and  nothing  else  must  be 
claimed  by  either  from  the  other  ;  and  if  they  are 
friends  on  the  ground  of  utility  or  civic  friends,  we 
must  consider  what  form  of  agreement  would  have 
been  profitable  for  them.*"  But  if  one  says  they  are 
friends  on  one  footing  and  the  other  on  another, 
it  is  not  honourable,  when  an  active  return  is  due, 
merely  to  make  fine  speeches,  and  similarly  also  in 


427 


ARISTOTLE 

1243  b 

€771  θατβρον  αλλ'   εττβιδη   ον  Βιβίποντο  ώς  ηθικώς,  2' 
8et    Kpivetv    ηνά,   μ'ηΒ^    ύποκρινόμ^νον   μ•φξ.τ€ρον^ 
αυτών  βζατταταν•  ώστε  δει  στίργειν  ίκάτερον  την 

10  τνχ-ην.      ΟΤΙ    δ'    εστίν    η    ήθικη    κατά    προαίρεσιν  2ΐ 
8ηλον,  eVet  καν  el  μεγάλα  παθών  μη  άττοΒωη  δι' 
ά^υναμίαν   αλλ'    οσ'"   εδυνατο,    καλώ?•   και   yap'   6 
θεός  άν'εχεται  κατά  δυν'α/Αΐν'  λαμβάνων  τάς  θυσίας, 
αλλά  τω   ττωλοΰντί   ούχ   ίκανώς   βζβι   αν  μη   φηστ]  2'. 
δυνασ^αι  πλέον  δούναι,  ούδε  τω  Βανείσαντι. 

15      Πολλά  εγκλήματα  ytVeTai  εν  ταΐς  φιλίαις  ταΓ?*  3ι 
μη  κατ    εύθυωρίαν ,  και  το  δίκαιον  ΐδειν  ου  pahiov 
χαλεπον  γάρ^  μετρησαι  ενί  τώδε  τά*  /χτ)  κατ'  εύθυ- 
ωρίαν  οίον   συμβαίνει,    επΙ    τών    ερωτικών,   6  μεν  3 
γαρ    8ιώκει    ώς    τον'    ή8ύν    επι    το    συζην,    6    δ' 
εκείνον  ενίοτε  ώς  χρησιμον ,  όταν  δε  παύσηται  του 

20  εράν,  άλλου  γενομένου^  άλλος  γίνεται,  και  τότε 
λογίζονται  τι  άντι*  tiVos,  και  ώς  ΥΙύθων  και 
ria/MjMeVTys•  ^ιεφεροντο,  και  όλως  διδάσκαλο?  και 
μαθητής  {επιστήμη  γαρ  και  χρήματα  ούχ  ενΙ 
μετρείται),  και  ως  ηροοικος  ο  ιατρός  προς  τον 
αποδίδοντα  μικρόν  τον  μισθόν,  και  ώς  ό  κιθαρωδός 

25  και    ο   βασιλεύς.      6   μεν   γαρ    ώς    ήΒεΐ   ό    δ'    ώς  31 

^  Syl. :   ύίΓοκρινόμενοί  μηδέτ€ρο%.  *  Rac. :  ώϊ. 

'  καΐ  yap  Fr. :  καΐ.  *  Βζ. :  roh. 

'  Γ  :  yip  χαλεττόΐ'.  *  Γ  :  τφ. 

'  [τόν]  Sp.  *  Rac. :  yι^>oμέvoυ. 

'  τι  άντΙ  lac. :   τταντί.  ^"  Sp. :  Πρόδικοί. 

"  i.e.  in  a  moral  friendship  it  is  not  honourable  to  insist 
on  a  return  on  a  business  footing. 

*  '  Dissimilar  friendships,  where  action  and  reaction  are 
not  in  the  same  straight  line  '  (Solomon). 

"  The  distinguished  Theban  general,  friend  of  Epa- 
minondas.  Pytho  may  be  a  dramatist  of  Catana,  or  a 
Byzantine  rhetorician  of  the  period. 

428 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  VII.  χ.  27-32 

27  the  other  case  ** ; — but  since  they  did  not  provide  for 
this  in  the  contract,  on  the  ground  that  it  was  a 
moral  friendship,  somebody  must  judge,  and  neither 
party  must  cheat  by  pretending  ;  so  that  each  must 

28  be  content  with  his  luck.  But  it  is  clear  that  moral 
friendship  is  a  matter  of  intention,  since  even  if  a 
man  after  having  received  great  benefits  owing  to 
inability  did  not  repay  them,  but  only  repaid  as 
much  as  he  was  able,  he  acts  honourably  ;  for  even 
God  is  content  with  getting  sacrifices  in  accordance 

29  with  our  ability.  But  a  seller  will  not  be  satisfied 
if  a  man  says  he  cannot  pay  more,  nor  will  one  who 
has  made  a  loan. 

30  In  friendships  not  based  on  direct  reciprocity  ^  Causes  and 
many  causes  of  recrimination  occur,  and  it  is  not  οΓάίκριΓίΜ. 
easy  to  see  what  is  just ;  for  it  is  difficult  to  measure 

by  one  given  thing  relations  that  are  not  directly 

31  reciprocal.     This  is  how  it  happens  in  love  affairs, 
since   in   them   one   party   pursues   the   other   as   a 
pleasant  person  to  live  with,  but  sometimes  the  other  ■ 
the  one  as  useful,  and  when  the  lover  ceases  to  love, 
he  having  changed  the  other  changes,  and  then  they, 
calculate   the   quid  pro   quo,   and  quarrel  as   Pythoi 
and    Pammenes  "    used,    and    as    teacher  and  pupil  ,^,^ 
do  in  general  (for  knowledge  and  money  have  no     — 
common  measure),    and    as   Herodicus  '^  the  doctor 

did  with  the  patient  who  offered  to  pay  his  fee  with 
a  discount,  and  as  the  harpist  and  the  king  fell  out. 

32  The   king   associated  with   the   harpist   as   pleasant  ■ 
and  the  harpist  with  the  king  as  useful ;    but  the 

"*  Born  in  Thrace,  practised  in  Athens  fifth  cent.  b.c.  ;  tutor 
of  Hippocrates.  The  mss.  give  '  Prodicus  '  (the  sophist, 
who  figures  frequently  in  Plato),  and  possibly  the  text  has 
suffered  haplography,  and  both  names  should  be  read. 

429 


ARISTOTLE 

1243  b 

χρησιμω  ώμίλζ,ι•-  6  δ',  βπβώη'^  έ'δβι  άττοδιδόναι, 
αυτόν  αύτον  ώς  η^ύν  €7Τοίησ€ν,  και  €φη,  ώσττβρ 
€Κ€Ϊνον  ασαντα  βύφραναι,  οϋτω  καΐ  αύτος  υπο- 
σχόμενος €K€LVii).  όμως  δε  φανερόν  καΐ  ενταύθα  33 
ττώς  γνωριστεον  evl  γαρ  μ€τρητ€ον  καΐ  €νταΰθ\ 
αλλ  ουκ  αριθμώ^  άλλα  λόγω.  τω'  άνάλογον 
30  γαρ  μ€τρητ€ον,  ωσπερ  καΐ  η  ττολίτικη  μετρείται 
κοινωνία'  ττώς  γαρ  κοινωνήσει  γεωργω  σκυτο- 
τόμος,  ει  μη  τω  άνάλογον  ίσασθησεται  τα  έργα; 
ται?  δ•)^*  μη  κατ'  εύθυωρίαν  το  άνάλογον  μετρον,  34 
οίον  ει  ο  μεν  σοφιαν  Sovvai  εγκαλεί,  ό  δ'  εκείνω 
άργυριον,  τί^  σοφία^  ττρός  το  πλούσιον  εΙναί' ; 
35  €ΐτα  τι  Βοθεν  προς  εκάτερον^ ;  ει  γαρ  ό  μεν  του 
ελάττονος  ήμισυ  ε8ωκεν,  6  Βε  του  μείζονος  μη 
πολλοστόν  μέρος,  8ηλον  ότι  οΰτος  ά8ικεΐ.  εστί  35 
Βε  κάνταΰθα  εν  άρχη  άμφισβητησις,  αν  φη  ό  μεν* 
ώς  χρησίμους  συνελθεΖν  αυτούς,  ό  Βε  μη,  αλλ'  ώς 
κατ    άλλην  Tti^o.  φιλίαν. 

1244a      XI.    ϋερι  Βε  του  άγαθοΰ  και  κατ    άρετην  φίλου,  \ 
σκεπτεον  ποτερον  Βεΐ  εκείνω  τα  χρήσιμα  ύπηρετεΐν 
και  βοηθεΐν  η  τω  άντιποιεΐν  τα  ΐσα^"  Βυναμενω .    τού- 
το Βε  το  αυτό   πρόβλημα  εστί,  πότερον  τον  φίλον 
5  η    τον    σπουΒαΐον    ευ    ποιητεον    μάλλον.       άν    μεν  2 
γαρ  φιλος^^  και  σπουΒαΐος,  ΐσως  ου  λίαν  χαλεπόν, 

^  Rao. :  eirel. 

*  lac. :  ούχ  δρψ.  '•  Fr. :  τ6. 

*  Rac. :  Toh  δέ  {δη  ?  Sus.).  «  Βζ. :  τ^. 

*  Sol. :  σoφίq..  '  dvai  add.  Rac. 

*  πρόί  έκατίρου  Fr. :  Κ,έκατέρον^  wp6s  ϊκάτΐρον  ?  Rac. 

•  Bk. :  φήσωμεν.  ίο  lac. :  άντιποιοΰντι  και. 

"  <καΙ>  <pi\os  ?  Rac. :  <ό>  φίλοί  Rieckher. 

"  The  story  (also  told  N.E.  ix.,  1164  a  16)  is  related  by 
430 


■      EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  VII.  χ.  32— χτ.  2 

king,  when  the  time  came  for  him  to  pay,  made  out 
that  he  was  himself  of  the  pleasant  sort,  and  said 
that  just  as  the  harpist  had  given  him  pleasure  by 
his  singing,  so  he  had  given  the  harpist  pleasure  by 

33  his  promises  to  him."  Nevertheless  here  too  it  is 
clear  how  we  must  decide  :  here  too  we  must  measure 
by  one  standard,  but  by  a  ratio,  not  a  number. 
For  we  must  measure  by  proportion,  as  also  the 
civic  partnership  is  measured.  For  how  is  a  shoe- 
maker   to   be   partner   with   a   farmer   unless    their  ^ 

34  products  are  equalized  by  proportion  ?  Therefore 
the  measure  for  partnerships  not  directly  reciprocal 
is  proportion — for  example  if  one  party  complains 
that  he  has  given  wisdom  and  the  other  says  he  has 
given  the  former  money,  what  is  the  ratio  of  wisdom 
to  being  rich  ?  and  then,  what  is  the  amount  given 
for  each  ?  for  if  one  party  has  given  half  of  the 
smaller  amount  but  the  other  not  even  a  small 
fraction  of  the  larger,  it  is  clear  that  the  latter  is 

35  cheating.  But  here  too  there  is  a  dispute  at  the 
outset,  if  one  says  that  they  came  together  on 
grounds  of  utility  and  the  other  denies  it  and  says 
it  was  on  the  basis  of  some  other  kind  of  friendship. 

1  XI.  About  the  good  friend  and  the  friend  on  the  casuistry  of 
basis   of  goodness,  we  must  consider  whether  one  friendship. 
ought   to  render  useful  services  and  assistance  to 

him  or  to  the  friend  who  is  able  to  make  an  equal 
return.  This  is  the  same  problem  as  whether  it 
is  more  one's  duty  to  benefit  a  friend  or  a  virtuous 

2  man.     If  a  man  is  a  friend  and  virtuous,  perhaps  ^ 

Plutarch,  T)e  Alexandri  fortuna  ii.  1,  of  the  tyrant 
Dionysius  of  Syracuse. 

*  Or,  altering  the  punctuation  with  Fritsche,  '  is  a  friend 
and  virtuous  equally.' 

43! 


ARISTOTLE 

1244  a 

άν  μη  τι,ς  το  μ€ν  αύξηστ)  το  Se  ταπβινώσΎ],  φίλον 

μ€ν  σφόΒρα  €v^  ποιών,  €7η€ΐκη  δε  -ηρίμα.     el  8e  μη, 

πολλά  προβλήματα  γίνεται,  οΐον  el   6  peev  ην  ουκ 

ίσται  he,  6  he  εσται  οϋπω  he,  η  6  μέν  eyeveTo  έ'στι 

ου,   ο    ο      eoTLV  ουκ  ην  oe    oυoe   εσται.       αΛΛ 

CKetvo  epywheoTepov .     μη  γάρ  τι  Aeyet  Έιύριπί8ης  3 

ποιησας 

λόγων'   hiKaiov  μισθον  αν  λόγους  φίροΐζ,*^ 
epyov  δ'  eKelvos^  epyov  δς"  παρ4σχ€το• 

και  ου  πάντα  δει  τω  πατρί,  αλλ'  έ'στιν  αλλ'  α  heV 
τη  μητρί,   καίτοι  βeλτίωv  6  πατήρ '   oiihe  γάρ  τω 

Ιό  Διι  πάντα  λύεται,  ουδ'  έχει  πάσας  τάς  τι/χά?  άλλα 
τιΐ'ά?.  ίσως  οΰν  εστίν  ά  δει  τω  χρησίμω,  άλλα  4 
δε  τω  άγαθώ•  οΐον  ουκ  el  σΐτον  hίhωσι  και  Tavay- 
καία,  και  συζην  τούτω  δεΓ•  ουδ'  ω  τοίνυν  το  συζην,^ 
τούτω  ά  μη  ούτος  hίhωσιv  αλλ'  ό*  χρήσιμος' 
αλλ'  οι  τοΰτο  πoιoϋvτeς  [τουτω]^"  πάντα  τω  ερω- 
μ€νω  hιhόaσιv  ου  heov,  oύh€vός^^  elaiv  άζιοι. 

20      Και    οι   ev   τοις   λόγοις   οροί   της   φιλίας   πάντ€ς 
μ4ν  πώς  elσι  φιλίας,  αλλ'   ου  της  αυτής,     τω  μ€ν  5 
yap    χρησιμω    το    βoύλeσθaι   τάκβίνω    aya^a,    και 
τω    ευ    ποιήσαντι,    και    τω    οποίω    δτ^^^    [ου    γάρ 
€πισημαίν€ΐ  οΰτος  6  ορισμός  της  φιλίας),  άίλλω  δε 

ϊ  εΰ  add.  Rac.  2  ^  §'  gy], ,  5,^_ 

^  Bus. :  λόγο»'. 

*  Bus. :  λόγου  ΐίσφέροα  (λόγου  φέροι%  Bk.). 

*  Musgrave:  εκείνοι^.  '  ί'ργοί' δ»^  Meineke :  ^ργο. 

'  Λλλ'  a  δίί  Sus. :  άλλα  bL  »   βζ. :  τό  «5  f^;-. 

»  Sus. :  άλλα.  10  Rac.  "  Fr. :  ούδ'. 

1^  lac. :   OTTOiOs  δβΐ. 

"  See  the  first  sentence  of  the  chapter. 
"  Fr.  882  Nauck. 
432 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  VII.  xi.  2-5 

it  is  not  over-difficult,  provided  one  does  not  ex- 
aggerate the  one  factor  and  underrate  the  other, 
benefiting  him  greatly  as  friend  but  only  slightly  as 
good.  But  in  other  cases  many  problems  arise,  for 
instance,  if  A  was  a  friend  but  is  going  not  to  be  and 
Β  is  going  to  be  but  is  not  now,  or  if  A  became  one 
but  is  not  one  now  and  Β  is  one  now  but  was  not 
and  is  going  not  to  be.     But  the  former  problem  " 

3  is  more  difficult.  For  possibly  there  is  something 
in  the  lines  of  Euripides  *  : 

Prithee  take  words  as  thy  just  pay  for  words, 
But  he,  that  gave  a  deed,  a  deed  shall  have  ; 

and  it  is  not  one's  duty  to  give  everything  to  one's 
father,  but  there  are  other  things  that  one  ought 
to  give  to  one's  mother,  although  the  father  is  the 
superior  ;  for  even  to  Zeus  not  all  the  sacrifices  are 
offered,  nor  does  he  have  all  the  honours  but  some 

4  particular  ones.  Perhaps,  therefore,  there  are  som.e 
services  that  ought  to  be  rendered  to  the  useful 
friend  and  others  to  the  good  friend  :  for  instance, 
if  a  friend  gives  you  food  and  necessaries  you  are 
not  therefore  bound  to  give  him  your  society,  and 
accordingly  also  you  are  not  bound  to  render  to  the 
friend  to  whom  you  give  your  society  the  things  that 
you  do  not  get  from  him  but  from  the  useful  friend  ; 
hut  those  who  by  so  doing  vnrongly  give  everything 
to  one  whom  they  love  are  good-for-nothing  people. 

'     And  the  defining  marks  of  friendship  stated  in  the  Different 
discourses   all  belong  to  friendship  in  some  sense, .j?.\"^^,°j[. 

5  but  not  to  the  same  kind  of  friendship.  It  is  a  marklhave  difter- 
of  the  useful  friend  that  one  wishes  the  things  ^"'^  ^  *'"''^' 
good  for  him,  and  so  of  the  benefactor,  and  in  fact 

a  friend  of  any  sort  (for  this  definition  of  friend- 
ship is  not  distinctive)  ;  of  another  friend,  that  one 

2f  433 


ARISTOTLE 

1244  a      ^      ^ 

25  TO  eivac  και  άλλω  το  συζην,  τω  8e  καθ^  η8ονην 
το  συναλγ€Ϊν  καΐ  συγχαίρβιν.  πάντβς  δ'  ούτοι  οΙ  6 
opot  κατά  φίλίαν  μβν  Χίγονταί  τιι^α,  ου  προς  μίαν 
δ  ovSeig.  διό  πολλοί  elai,  και  βκαστος  /χια? 
eiv-ai  δοκεΐ  φιλίας,  ουκ  ών,  οίον  η  τοΰ  eti^ai  ττρο- 
αιρεσι?•  και  ya/)  ό  καθ'  νπ^ροχην  και  ποιήσας  ev 
βούλβται   τω    €ργω    τω    αύτοΰ    ύπάρχβιν    {και    τω 

30  δόντι  το  eti'ai  δει  και  άι^ταποδιδόί^αι) ,  άλλα  συΖ/ψ 
ου  τούτω  αλλά  τω  ηΒεΐ. 

Α8ικοΰσιν     οι     φίλοι     evioi     αλλήλους,     τα     γαρ  7 
πράγματα   μάλλον,   αλλ'    ου    φιλοΰσι    τον^    €χοντα• 
διό     φίλοι^     κακ^ίνω^    {οίον    διότι    ή^ύς    τον    οΐνον 
βΐλβτο  και  ΟΤΙ  χρήσιμος  τον  πλοΰτον  eiAeTo),  χρησι- 
μωτβρος   γαρ.      διό    δτ)   άγανακτ€Ϊ,*   ωσπβρ    αν    el 

35  μάλλον   €ΐλοντο^    άντι    ήττονος•    οι   δ'^   €}/καλοί?σιν, 
€Κ€Ϊνον  γαρ  νυν  ζητοΰσι  τον  aya^ov,  πρότ€ρον  ζητή- 
σαντ€ς  τον  ήΒύν  ή  τον  χρήσιμον . 
1244  b      XII.    Σικβπτ€ον     δε     και     π^ρι     αυτάρκεια?     και  1 
φίλιας,    πώς   βχουσι   προς   τάς   άλλτ^λων   8υνάμ€ΐς. 
απορησειβ    γαρ    αν    τι?    πότβρον,    ei    τις    (ΐη    κατά 
πάντα     αυτάρκης,    έ'σται     τούτω     φίλος,     ή^     κατ' 
ένδειαι^    ζητείται    φίλος    και*    έ'σται    άγαθος^    αύτ- 
5  αρκζστατος .       ei    6    μετ     αρετής   βίος^^    ευδαίμων, 
τι  αν   δεοι   φίλου;     ούτε    γαρ    των  χρησίμων  δει- 
σσαι  αυτάρκους ,  ούτε  των  εύφρανούντων^^  ούτε  τοΰ 
^  Βζ. :  τα.  "  edd. :  φιλεϊ.  «  Rac. :  κάκείνοΐί.       • 

*  rec,  Pb :   8ei.  »  β^β. :  el'Xe7-o.  «  Vict. :  ό  δ'. 
">  Aid. :   el.                 *  Fr. :  ή.                 »  Ross :  ayaObs. 

^•  βίοί  add.  Syl.  ^^  Sp. :  eC  φρονούντων. 

"  i.«.  the  beneficiary. 

*  This  also  means  the  beneficiary,  who  is  the  cause  of 
the  benefactor's  being  a  benefactor  ;  so  the  benefactor  ought 
to  repay  him  in  kind  by  wishing  his  existence  (as  he  does 
also  for  the  reason  that  he  is  his  own  product). 

434 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  VII.  xi.  5— xii.  1 

wishes  his  existence,  of  another  that  one  wishes  his 
society  ;  of  the  friend  on  the  ground  of  pleasure,  that 

6  one  shares  his  gi*ief  and  his  joy.  All  these  defining 
marks  are  predicated  in  the  case  of  some  friendship, 
but  none  of  them  with  reference  to  friendship  as  a 
single  thing.  Hence  there  are  many  of  them,  and 
each  is  thought  to  belong  to  friendship  as  one,  though 
it  does  not :  for  instance,  the  desire  for  the  friend's 
existence — for  the  superior  friend  and  benefactor 
wishes  existence  to  belong  to  his  own  work'* — and 
to  him  who  gave  one  existence  ^  it  is  one's  duty  to 
give  existence  in  return  ;  but  he  wishes  the  society 
not  of  this  friend  but  of  the  pleasant  one. 

7  Friends  in  some  cases  wrong  each  other,  because 
they  love  things  more,  not  the  possessor  of  them, 
and  are  friends  of  the  possessor  too  on  this  account 
(just  as  a  man  chose  his  wine  because  it  was  sweet 
and  chose  his  wealth  because  it  was  useful),  for  he  is 
more  useful."  Hence  naturally  he  is  annoyed,  just 
as  if  they  had  preferred  his  possessions  to  himself 
as  being  inferior  ;  and  they  complain,  for  now  they 
look  to  find  in  him  the  good  man,  having  previously 
looked  for  the  pleasant  or  the  useful  man. 

1       XII.  We   must   also   consider   self-sufficiency   and  Seif-sufflci- 
friendship,  and  the  interrelationship  of  their  poten- ^"°^  f|]ji  *'*^ 
tialities.     For  one  may  raise  the  question  whether  friends. 
if  a  person  be  self-sufficing  in  every  respect  he  will 
have  a  friend,  or  whether  on  the  contrary  a  friend 
is  sought  for  in  need,   and  the   good  man  will  be 
most  self-sufficing.     If  the  life  that  is  combined  with 
goodness  is  happy,  what  need  would  there  be  of  a 
friend  ?     For  it  does  not  belong  to  the  self-sufficing 
man  to  need  either  useful  friends  or  friends  to  amuse 

"  Sc,  on  account  of  his  possessions. 

435 


ARISTOTLE 

1244  b 

συζ'ήν,  αύτος^  γαρ  αντω  Ικανός  avveivai.  μάλιστα  2 
θ6  Ύοϋτο  φαν€ρόν  εττι  deov•  SrjXov  γαρ  ώς  ovbe- 
νος  ττροσ^ζομ^νος  ουδέ  φίλου  δβησεταί,  ουδ'  έ'σται 
10  αύτω  e\  ye  μηθβν  Seoiro  του.''  ωστ€  καΐ  άνθρωπος 
ο  ζύ^αιμονέστατος  ηκι,στα  Se-qaeraL  φίλου,  αλλ'  η 
καθ  όσον  αδύνατον  elvai  αυτάρκη.  ανάγκη  άρα  3 
ελαχίστους  elvai  φίλους  τω  άριστα  ζώντι,  και 
aet'  ελάττους  γίνεσθαι,  και  μη  σπου8άζ€ΐν  δπως 
ώσι  φίλοι,  αλλ'  ολιγωρ€Ϊν  μη  μόνον  των  χρησίμων 
15  αλλά  και  των*  €ΐς  το  συζην  αιρετών,  άλλα  μην 
και  τοτβ^  φανερον  άν  eti^at  So^eiev  ώς  ου  χρήσεως 
ένεκα  6  φίλος  ούδ'  ωφελείας,  άλλ'  ο*  δι'  άρετην 
φίλος  μόνος.  όταν  γαρ  μηθενος  ενδεείς  ώμεν,  4 
τότε  τους  σνναττολαυσο μένους  ζητοΰμεν^  ττάντες, 
και  τους  εδ  ττεισομενους  μάλλον  η  τους  ποιήσοντας^• 
20  ayMetva»  δ  εχομεν  κρίσιν  αυτάρκεις  οντες  η  μετ* 
ενΒείας,  μάλιστα  re*  τών  συζην  άζίων  Βεόμεθα 
φίλων. 

ΤΙερι  Βε  της  απορίας  ταύτης  σκεπτεον  μη  ποτέ  5 
το  μεν  τι  λέγεται  καλώς  το  δε  λαι^^άνβι  δια  την 
παραβολην.  8ηλον  δε  λαβοΰσι  τι  το  ζην  το  κατ* 
ενεργειαν  και  ώς  τέλος.  φανερόν  οΰν  οτι  το  6 
25  αισ^αν-εσ^αι  και  το  γνωρίζειν ,  ώστε  και  το  συζην 
το  συΐ'αισ^αΐ'εσ^αί.  και  το  συγγνωρίζειν  εστίν, 
εστί  δε  αυτό  τ6^°  αισθάνεσθαι  και  αυτό  το'"  γνω- 
ρίζειν αιρετώτατον  εκάστω  {και  διά  τοΰτο  του  ζην 
ττάσιν  έμφυτος  η  ορεξις,  το  γαρ  ζην  8ει  τιθεναι^^ 

^  Sp. :   of'Toj.  2  lac. :   αύτφ  οϋτί  μηθίν  δΐσιτότον. 

'  Sp. :  δ€Ϊ.  *  των  add.  Sp. 

*  τψδ(  Rieckher,  τούτφ  Sus.  •  ό  add.  Aid. 

'  Rac. :    ί;-ητοΰσί.  *  Syl. :   ττοιήσαντα^. 

•  Syl. :  τ€  μάλιστα.  ι»  (bis)  Sol. :  τό  αυτό  (τό  αύτοΰ  Βζ.). 

^^  Βζ. :   δίατιθέναί. 

436 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  VII.  xii.  1-6  >«^^ 

him  and  society,  for  he  is  sufficient  society  for  him- 

2  self.  This  is  most  manifest  in  the  case  of  God  ; 
for  it  is  clear  that  as  he  needs  nothing  more  he  will 

not   need  a  friend,  and  that  supposing  he  has  no      \         y 
need  of  one   he  will  not  have   one.     Consequently        ''*y 
the  happiest  human  being  also  will  very  little  need 
a   friend,  except  in  so  far  as  to  be  self-sufficing  is  ι 

3  impossible.      Of  necessity,  therefore,  he   who  lives  1 
the  best  life  will  have  fewest  friends,  and  they  will  \ 
constantly  become  fewer,  and  he  will  not  be  eager 
to  have  friends  but  will  think  lightly  not  only  of 
useful  friends  but  also  of  those  desirable  for  society. 
But  assuredly  even  his  case  would  seem  to  show  that 

a  friend  is  not  for  the  sake  of  utility  or  benefit  but 

that  one  loved  on  account  of  goodness  is  the  only    >    ^^ 

4  real  friend.     For  when  we  are  not  in  need  of  some-      '/"^-^ 
thing,  then  we  all  seek  people  to  share  our  enjoy- 
ments,  and   beneficiaries   rather   than   benefactors  ; 

and  we  can  judge  them  better  when  we  are  selft 
sufficing  than  when  in  need,  and  we  most  need 
friends  who  are  worthy  of  our  society. 

5  But  about  this  question  we  must  consider  whether 
perhaps,  although  the  view  stated  is  partly  sound, 
in  part  the  truth  escapes  us  because  of  the  compari- 
son."    The  matter  is  clear  if  we  ascertain  what  life 

6  in  the  active  sense  and  as  an  End  is.     It  is  manifest  Psychology 
that  life  is  perception  and  knowledge,  and  that  con-  ufe"'"*^ 
sequently   social   life  is   perception   and  knowledge 

in  common.  But  perception  and  knowledge  them- 
selves are  the  thing  most  desirable  for  each  indi- 
vidually (and  it  is  owing  to  this  that  the  appetition 
for  life  is  implanted  by  nature  in  all,  for  living  must 

«  i.e.  of  man  with  God,  1.  8  above  ;  cf.  1245  b  13. 

437 


ARISTOTLE 

1244  b         ^     ^  ^       ^  ^  ^  ^  ^ 

γνώσιν  τίνα),  el  ovv  ης  άττοτ€.μοι  και  ποιησ€ΐ€  ^ 
30  το  γι,νώσκ^ιν  αυτό  καθ^  αυτό  και  τό^  μιη  (άλλα 
τοντο  μ€ν  λάνθανα  ώσττ^ρ  iv  τω  Χόγω  γβγραπται, 
τω  μβντοι  ττράγματι  βστί  μη  λανθάνειν),  ονθβν 
αν  Βιαφβροι  η  το  γινώσκαν  άλλον  ανθ  αύτοΰ•  το 
δ'  ομοίον  τω^  ζην  άνθ^  αΰτου  άλλον,  ευλόγα»?  δέ 
το  iavTov  αίσθάνεσθαι  καΐ^  γνώριζαν  αίρ^τώτ^ρον . 
35  δεΓ  γαρ  άμα  avvdelvaL  δυο  iv  τω  λόγω,  ότι  τ€  το 
ζην   αίρ€τόν*   καΐ    οτι   το    αγαθόν,   και    βκ   τούτων 

1245  a  ΟΤΙ    το    αύτοΐς^  νττάρχαν   την   τοιαύτην  φύσιν.     et  8 

ουν  ioTLV  ael  της  τοιαύτης  συστοιχίας  η  €Τ€ρα 
iv  τη  τον  αΙρ€τοΰ  τάζει,  καΐ  το  γνωστόν  και  το 
αίσθητόν^  iστLV  ώς  όλως  είτταν  τω'  κοινωνείν  της 
ώρισμίνης  φύσεως,^  ώστε  το  αύτοΰ  βουλεσθαι 
5  αΙσθάν€σθαι  το  αύτον  etvai  tolovSl  βονλεσθαι 
iστίv,  eTTet  ουν  ου  κατ  αυτούς  iσμ€v  εκαστον 
τούτων  άλλα  κατά  μβτάληφιν  των  δυνάμεων  iv 
τω  αίσθάνεσθαι  η  γνώριζαν  {αίσθανόμενος  γάρ 
αισθητός  ytVeTat  τούτω  και*  ταύτη  και  κατά 
τοΰτο  καθ^  ο^"  πρότερον  αισθάνεται  και  fj  και  ου, 
γνωστός  δε  γινώσκων) — ώστε  δια  τοΰτο  και  ζην 
10  άει  βούλεται  οτι  βούλεται  άει  γνωρίζειν,  τοΰτο  δε 
ΟΤΙ  αυτό?  είναι  το  γνωστόν,  το  8η  συζην  αιρεΐσθαι  9 
δάνειε    μέν    αν    είναι    σκοττουμένοις    πως    εϋηθες — 

^  τό  add.  Wilson.  ^  Sol. :  τοΰ. 

*  καΐ  <ίαντόν>  Sp.  *  Fr. :   καΐ  aiperbv. 

*  Brandis :  τό  αύτ6  roh.  *  corr.  Ρ*» :  aifxrov. 

'  Fr. :  τό.  *  hie  laciinam  Sus. 

•  τούτφ  καΐ  add.  Rac.  ^°  Fr. :  καθά. 

"  τοιαύτην  =  dyaO^v. 

*  e.g.   the  Pythagorean   pair  of  series.   One,  Good,  etc. 
opposed  to  Many,  Bad,  etc.  (Solomon).     '  The  Determined  ' 

438 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  VII.  xii.  7-9 

7  be  deemed  a  mode  of  knowing).  If  therefore  one 
were  to  abstract  and  posit  absolute  knowledge  and 
its  negation  (though  this,  it  is  true,  is  obscure  in  the 
argument  as  we  have  written  it,  but  it  may  be 
observed  in  experience),  there  would  be  no  diiFerence 
between  absolute  knowledge  and  another  person's 
knowing  instead  of  oneself  ;  but  that  is  like  another 
person's  living  instead  of  oneself,  whereas  perceiving 
and  knowing  oneself  is  reasonably  more  desirable. 
For  two  things  must  be  taken  into  consideration 
together,  that  life  is  desirable  and  that  good  is  de- 
sirable, and  as  a  consequence  that  it  is  desirable  for 

8  ourselves  to  possess  a  nature  of  that  quality .<*  If, 
therefore,  of  the  pair  of  corresponding  series  ''  of  this 
kind  one  is  always  in  the  class  of  the  desirable,  and 
the  known  and  the  perceived  are  generally  speaking 
constituted  by  their  participation  in  the  '  determined  ' 
nature,  so  that  to  wish  to  perceive  oneself  is  to  wish 
oneself  to  be  of  a  certain  character, — since,  then,  we 
are  not  each  of  these  things  in  ourselves  but  only  by 
participating  in  these  faculties  in  the  process  of  per- 
ceiving or  knowing  (for  when  perceiving  one  becomes 
perceived  by  means  of  what  one  previously  per- 
ceives," in  the  manner  and  in  the  respect  in  which  one 
perceives  it,  and  when  knowing  one  becomes  known) 
— hence  owing  to  this  one  wishes  always  to  live 
because  one  wishes  always  to  know  ;  and  this  is 
because  one  wishes  to  be  oneself  the  object  known. 

9  To  choose  to  live   in  the   society  of  others  might.  Reasons  for 
therefore,  from  a  certain  point  of  view  seem  foolish  of^sodetyT" 

(opposed  to  '  the  Indeterminate  ')  belonged  to  the  '  desirable ' 
series. 

"  i.e.  perception  of  sonaething  outside  oneself  causes  con- 
sciousness of  self. 

439 


ARISTOTLE 

1245  a 

(eTTt  των  κοινών^  πρώτον  καΐ  τοις  άλλοις  ζωοις, 
οίον  του  avveadUiv  r)  τοϋ^  συμπίν^ιν  τι  γαρ  δια- 
φ€ρ€ί  το  πλησίον  ουσι    ταΰτα  συμ,βαίν€ίν  η  χωρίς 

15  αν  άφ€λΎ)ς  τον  λόγον ;  άλλα  μην^  καΐ  τον  λογον 
κοινων€Ϊν  του  τυχόντος  βτβρον  τοιούτον,  άμα  τ 
οϋτ€  διδάσκειν  οϋτ€  μανθάνειν  τοις  αύταρκίσι 
φίλοίς  οΙόν  τ€,  μανθάνων  μ^ν  yap  αύτος  ουκ  εχ€ΐ 
ως  Set,  διδάσκοντα?  δ'  ό*  φίλος,  η  δ  όμοιοτης 
φιλία)  —  άλλα    μην    φαίνεται   ye    οτι^    και    πάντες  Κ 

20  rjbiov  των  aya^tui'  μετά  των  φίλων  κοινωνοΰμεν, 
καθ^  όσον  επιβάλλει  εκάστω^  και  ου  δύναται 
άριστου,  άλλα  τούτων  τω  μεν  η8ονης  σωματικής  Ι. 
τω  δε  θεωρίας  μουσικής  τω  δε  φιλοσοφίας'  και 
το  άμα  8η^  e^vat  τω  φίλω  (διο  φησι  '  μόχθος  οΐ 
τηλοΰ  φίλοι '),  ώστ^^  ου  Βεΐ  yei'ea^at  άττ'  άλλτ^λων' 

25  τούτου  γινομένου,  όθεν  και  ό  έρως  δο/cet  φίλια 
ομοιον  etvai•  του  yap  συζην  ορέγεται  6  ερών,  άλλ' 
ούχ  ^  /ζάλιστα  Βεΐ,  άλλα  κατ'  αϊσθησιν. 

Ό   μεν  τοίνυν  λόγος  εκεΐνά  φησι  ^ιαπορών,  το  1! 
δ    έργον  οΰτω  φαίνεται  γινόμενον ,  ώστε  δηλοΓ  οτι 
παρακρούεται    πως    ημάς    ό    ^ιαπορών.     σκεπτεον  Γ, 
οΰν"  εντεύθεν^''  τάληθες•  6  γάρ  φίλος  βούλεται  eiv-at, 

30  ώσπερ  η  παροιμία  φησίν,  '  άΧλος  'Υϊρακλης,'  άλλος 

^   Βζ. :   κοινωνών,  ^   Βζ. :  οίον  τό  .   .   .   ^  τό. 

'   Bk. :  μη.  *  Βζ. :  οι). 

*  δτι  add.  (et  καΐ  om.)  Fr.  '  Ross:  ϊκαστον. 

'  Rac.  {καΐ  το  άμα  δ€Ϊ  Camerarius) :  καΐ  τολμφ  δη  (δίΐ  Γ). 

*  Fr. :  ws.  •  οϋν  add.  Fr. 

ϊ"  Sp. :  ?νθ(ν. 

"  This  proverb  looks  like  a  quotation,  being  half  a  line  of 
verse 

*  See  1244  b  2  ff.,  1245  a  27.  "  lb.  22  if. 

440 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  VII.  xii.  9-13 

(first  in  the  case  of  the  things  common  to  the  other 
animals  also,  for  instance  eating  together  or  drinking 
together,  for  what  difference  does  it  make  whether 
these  things  take  place  when  we  are  near  together 
or  apart,  if  you  take  away  speech  ?  but  even  to 
share  in  speech  that  is  merely  casual  is  a  thing 
indifferent,  and  also  neither  to  impart  nor  to  receive 
information  is  possible  for  friends  who  are  self- 
sufficing,  since  receiving  information  implies  a  de- 
ficiency in  oneself  and  imparting  it  a  deficiency  in 

10  one's  friend,  and  likeness  is  friendship) — but  never- 
theless it  surely  seems  that  we  all  find  it  pleas- 
anter  to  share  good  things  with  our  friends,  as  far 
as  these  fall  to  each,  and  the  best  that  each  can — 

11  but  among  these,  it  falls  to  one  to  share  bodily 
pleasure,  to  another  artistic  study,  to  another 
philosophy —  ;  and  so  it  is  pleasanter  to  be  with  one's 
friend  (whence  the  saying  '  Distant  friends  a  burden 
are  '  "),  so  that  they  must  not  be  separated  when 
this  is  taking  place.  Hence  also  love  seems  to 
resemble  friendship,  for  the  lover  is  eager  to  share 
the  life  of  the  loved  one,  although  not  in  the  most 
proper  way  but  in  a  sensuous  manner. 

12  Therefore  the   argument  in  raising  the  question  The  Alter 
asserts  the  former  position,*"  but  the  facts  of  experi-  ^^*'' 
ence  are  obviously  on  the  latter  lines,"  so  that  it  is 

clear  that  the  raiser  of  the  question  in  a  way  mis- 

13  leads   us.     We   must   therefore   examine   the   truth      o>^  ** 
from   the   following  consideration  :     '  friend  '   reallj'  ^ 
denotes,  in  the  language  of  the  proverb ,**  '  anothei 
Hercules  ' — another  self ;  but  the  characteristics  are^ 

<*  Quoted  elsewfiere  in  the  same  connexion,  but  one  may 
conjecture  that  the  phrase  originally  meant  '  as  strong  as 
Hercjiles.' 

441 


ARISTOTLE 

1245  a 

αύτος•  διεσττασται  8e,  /cat  χαλίττον  ττάντα^  €0' 
€νος  yeveadat,  άλλα  κατά  μ€ν  την  φνσιν  δ  σνγ- 
γβνβστατον,  κατά  8e  το  σώμα  όμοιος  €Τ€ρος,  άλλο? 
e  κατά  την  ψνχην,  και  τούτων  κατά  μοριον  €Τ€ρος 
€Τ€ρον.  αλλ  ovdev  ye"  'ήττον  βονλβταυ  ωσττερ 
35  αντος  διαιρετό?  eit'at  ό  φίλος,  το  ουν  του  φίλου  1^ 
αίσθάν^σθαί  {και  το  του  φίλου  γνωρίζ^ιν^^  το 
αυτοϋ  ττως  ανάγκη  αίσθάνεσθαι  elvaL  και  το  αυτόν 
ττως  γνώριζαν.  ώστ€  και  τα  φορτικά  μέν  συνηΒβσ- 
θαι  και  συζην  τω  φίλω  ηδύ  βύλόγως  {συμβαίνβι  γάρ 
€Κ€ίνου  άμα  α'ίσθησις  aei),  μάλλον  δε  τάς  θβιοτερας 

1245  b  ηοονάς•  αίτιον  δ'  οτι  aei  rjhiov  ίαυτον  θβωρ^ΐν  iv 
τω  βζλτίονι  άγαθω,  τοΰτο  δ'  ioTiv  ότβ  μ€ν  πάθος, 
οτ€  δε  πράζις,  6τ€  δε  €Τ€ρόν  τι.  ει  δ'  αυτόν*  ευ  ^ryv» 
και  οϋτω  και  τόν  φίλον,  εν  δε  τώ*  συζην  συν€ργ€Ϊν, 
ή  κοινωνία  των  iv  τε'λει  μάλιστα  γ€.  διό  δει* 
5  συνθβωρεΐν  και  συν€υωχ€Ϊσθαι,  ου  τά  δια  τροφην 
και  τα  avayKaia  (αι  τοιαυται  yap  κοιι^ωνιαι  ού;\;' 
όμιλίαι  δοκοΰσιν  είναι  αλλ'  άττολαυσει?),  αλλ' 
έκαστο?  ου  δύναται  τυγχάν€ΐν  τ€λους,  iv  τούτω  15 
βούλίται  συζην,  ει  δε  ρ,τ^,  και  ττοιειν  ευ  και  7Γ(χσ;^ειν 
υτΓΟ  των  φίλων  αίροΰνται  μάλιστα,  οτι  μβν  τοίνυν 
10  και  δει  συζην,  και  οτι  μάλιστα  βούλονται  ττάντζς, 
και  οτι  ο  εύδαιρ,ονε'στατο?  και  άριστος  μάλιστα 
τοιούτος,  φαν€ρόν.  οτι  δε  κατά  τόν  λόγον  ουκ 
€φαιν€το,    και   τοΰτ'    ευλόγως   συνεβαινβ,   λέγοντος 

ϊ  Rac:  τά.  2  Syl. :  re.  »  Rac. 

*  V.l.  ΐΐ  δυνατό»  (el  δ'  αυτόν  δυνατόν  ed  ξ'ην  οϋτω  και  τόν  φίλον 
Sus.). 

»  ei  δέ  τό  Fr.  β  Set  add.  Fr. 

'  yap  κοινωνίαι  ούχ  add.  Rac.  (ομιλΙαι  yap  οΰχ  Sus.). 

"  C/.  1244  b  2  fF.,  1245  a  27. 
44.2 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  VII.  xii.  13-15 

scattered,  and  it  is  difficult  for  all  to  be  realized  in 
the  case  of  one  person  ;  though  by  nature  a  friend 
is  what  is  most  akin,  yet  one  resembles  his  friend  ^ 
in  body  and  another  in  spirit,  and  one  in  one  part 
of  the  body  or  spirit,  another  in  another.  But  still 
none   the  less   a  friend  really  means   as  it  were   a 

14  separate  self.  To  perceive  and  to  know  a  friend, 
therefore,  is  necessarily  in  a  manner  to  perceive 
and  in  a  manner  to  know  oneself.  Consequently 
to  share  even  vulgar  pleasures  and  ordinary  life 
with  a  friend  is  naturally  pleasant  (for  it  always 
involves  our  simultaneously  perceiving  the  friend), 
but  more  so  to  share  the  more  divine  pleasures  ; 
the  reason  of  which  is  that  it  is  always  more  pleas- 
ant to  behold  oneself  enjoying  the  superior  good, 
and  this  is  sometimes  a  passive,  sometimes  an  active 
experience,  sometimes  something  else.  But  if  it  is 
pleasant  to  live  well  oneself  and  for  one's  friend 
also  to  live  well,  and  if  living  together  involves 
working  together,  surely  their  partnership  will  be  pre- 
eminently in  things  included  in  the  End.  Hence  we 
should  study  together,  and  feast  together — not  on 
the  pleasures  of  food  and  the  necessary  pleasures 
(for  such  partnerships  do  not  seem  to  be  real  social 

15  intercourse  but  mere  enjoyment),  but  each  really 
wishes  to  share  with  his  friends  the  End  that  he 
is  capable  of  attaining,  or  failing  this,  men  choose 
most  of  all  to  benefit  their  friends  and  to  be  bene- 
fited by  them.  It  is  therefore  manifest  that  to  live 
together  is  actually  a  duty,  and  that  all  people  wish 
it  very  much,  and  that  this  is  most  the  case  with 
the  man  that  is  the  happiest  and  best.  But  that  the 
contrary  appeared  to  be  the  conclusion  of  the  argu- 
ment "   was   also   reasonable,   the   statement  being 

443 


ARISTOTLE 

1245  b 

άληθη.       κατά   rrjv   σύνθβσιν   γαρ    της    παραβολής 
αληθούς  ούσης  η   λύσις  Ιστίν  οτι   yap   6   ^eo?  ου 

15  Ύοίοϋτος  οίος  δεΓσ^αι  φίλου,  /cat  τον  ομοιον  a^Lol} 
καίτοι  κατά  τούτον  τον  λόγον  ουδεν^  vorjaei,  ο  1 
σπουδαίος'  ου  γάρ  ούτως  6  θζός  ed  €χ€ί,  αλλά 
βζλτιον  η  ωστ€  άλλο  τι  voelv  τταρ'  αυτό?  αυτόν, 
αίτιον  δ'  ΟΤΙ  ημΐν  μεν  το  eu  καθ^  έτερον,  εκείνω^ 
δε  αυτό?  αύτοΰ  το  ευ  εστίν. 

20  Και  το  ζητεΐν  ημΐν  καΐ  εϋχεσθαι  πολλούς  φίλους,  1 
άμα  δε  λέγειν  ώς  ούθεις  φίλος  ω  πολλοί  φίλοι, 
άμφω  λέγεται  ορθώς,  εν^εχόμενον*  γάρ  πολλοίς 
συζην  άμα  και  συρ-αισ^άνεσ^αι,  ώς  πλείστοις^ 
αίρετώτατον  επει  δε  χαλεπώτατον,  εν  ελάττοσιν 
ανάγκη  την  ενεργειαν  της  συναισθησεως  ειν-αι,  ώστ'  1 

25  ού   μόνον   χαλεπον   το   πολλούς   κτησασθαι    {πείρας 
γάρ  δει*),  άλλα  και  ουσι  χρήσασθαι. 

Και  ότε  μεν  άπείναι  ευ  πράττοντα  τον  φιλούμενον 
βουλόμεθα,  6τέ  δε  μετεχειν  τών  αυτών,  και  το 
άμα  βούλεσθαι  είναι  φιλικόν  εν^εγόμενον*'  μεν  γάρ 
α/Μα   και   εύ,  τούτο   πάντες   αίροΰνται'  μη   εν^εχό- 

S0  μενον*   δε    άμα,''   ώσπερ   τον  '  Ηρακλή^    ίσως  αν  ή 
μητηρ  εΐλετο  θεόν  είναι  μάλλον  η  μετ    αύτης  οντά 
τω  Έιύρυσθεΐ  θητεύειν.     ομοίως  γάρ  αν  εΐποιεν  και  1 
ο*    6    Αάκων   εσκωφεν,   επεί   τις  εκελευσεν    αυτόν 
χειμαζόμενον  επικαλεσασθαι  τους  Αιοσκούρους. 

'  Βζ. :  άξιον.  *  Rac. :  ονδ(.  ^  iKeiuos  ?  Rac. 

*  Rac. :  (νδεχομένου.  *  Sp. :  νλ^ίστονί. 

*  Syl. :  aet.  '  lae. :  άλλα. 

*  Γ:  τφ  Ήρακλΐϊ.  •  lac. :  tu, 

"  i.e.  of  man  with  God,  1241•  b  7. 

*  He  doubtless  said  that  being  in  trouble  himself  he  did 
not  wish  to  involve  the  Dioscuri  in  it  (Solomon). 

444 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  VII.  xn.  15-19 

true.     For  the  solution  is  on  the  Hne  of  the  com- 
parison,"   the   correspondence  being    true ;    for    the       . 
fact   that  God  is  not  of  such  a  nature   as  to  need'i/ 
a  friend  postulates  that  man,  who  is  like  God,  also 

16  does  not  need  one.  Yet  according  to  this  argument 
the  virtuous  man  will  not  think  of  anything  ;  for 
God's  perfection  does  not  permit  of  this,  but  he  is 
too  perfect  to  think  of  anything  else  beside  himself. 
And  the  reason  is  that  for  us  well-being  has  reference 
to  something  other  than  ourselves,  but  in  his  case 
he  is  himself  his  own  well-being. 

17  As  to  seeking  for  ourselves  and  praying  for  many  Practical 
friends,  and  at  the  same  time  saying  that  one  who  has  '"^'^^^lons. 
many  friends  has  no  friend,  both  statements  are  correct. 

For  if  it  is  possible  to  live  with  and  share  the  per- 
ceptions of  many  at  once,  it  is  most  desirable  for  them 
to  be  the  largest  possible  number  ;  but  as  that  is 
very  difficult,  active  community  of  perception  must 

18  of  necessity  be  in  a  smaller  circle,  so  that  it  is  not 
only  difficult  to  acquire  many  friends  (for  probation 
is  needed),  but  also  to  use  them  when  one  has  got 
them. 

One  for  whom  we  feel  affection  we  sometimes  Presence 
wish  to  prosper  in  absence  from  us,  but  sometimes  of  Γη^ιΐάΓί^η 
to  share  the  same  experiences.     And  to  wish  to  be  prosperity 
together  is  a  mark  of  friendship,  for  if  it  is  possible  adversity. 
to  be  together  and  to  prosper  all  choose  this  ;    but 
if  it  is  not  possible  to  prosper  together,  then  we 
choose   as  the  mother  of  Heracles  perhaps  would 
have  chosen  for  her  son,  to  be  a  god  rather  than  to 

19  be  with  her  but  in  service  to  Eurystheus.  For  men 
Avould  say  things  like  the  jest  which  the  Spartan 
made  when  somebody  told  him  to  invoke  the  Dioscuri 
in  a  storm.'' 

44,5 


ARISTOTLE 

1245  b 

Αοκ€Ϊ  he  τοΰ  μ€ν  φιλοΰντος  το  αττΕίργαν  elvai  τ'ής 

35  σνμμ€θέζ€ως  των  χαλξπών,  τον  he  φίλονμ€νον  το 

βovλeσθaι  συμμeτ€χet.v.     καΐ  ταύτα  άμφότ€ρα  συμ- 

βaLveι  ευλογώ?"  hei  γαρ  τω  φίλω  μηθ€ν  elvat  οντω 

λνπηρόν  ώς  rjhv  τον  φίλον,  hoKel  he  helv  αίρβΐσθαί 

μη    το    αύτοΰ.     διό    κωλνουσί    συμμeτeχeLV•    lkcwol  2 

γαρ    avTOL    KaKonadouvTeg,    ίνα    μη    φαίνωνται    το 

ί2Μ&αύτών  OKOTTovvTes  καί  αιρεΓσ^αι  το  xaipetv  λυττον- 

μ4νου  τοΰ  φίλου,  ctl  he^  κovφότepoι  eii^at  μη  μόνοι 

φ€ροντ€ς  τα  κακά.     eirel  δ'  alpeTov  τό  τ'  ev  καΐ  το  2 

άμα,   hrjXov   οτι   και  το   άμα   elvai  μ€τ'   ίΧάττονος 

αγαθού   αΙρ£τώτ€ρόν^  πως  η  χωρίς  μ€τά  μζίζονϋς. 

ί>  eTTei    he^    άhηλov  το    πόσον    δύναται    τό    άμα,    ηhη 

hιaφepovτaι,  καΐ  οι  μ€ν*  οΐονται^  τό  μeτ€χeιv  άμα 

πάντων  φιλικόν,  /cat*  ώσττβρ  CΓυvh€ιπveΐv  άμα  φασιν 

'qhiov^  ταύτα  €χοντας•  οι  δ'  άμα^  μ^ν  του  €u*  βοΰ- 

λονται,  eπeιhη  «Γ"  τις  ύπ€ρβολάς  ποιησ€ΐ,  ομολόγους 

€ΐναι"     άμα     κακώς     πράττοντας     σφόhpa     τ)*^    ev 

10  σφόhpa  χωρίς,    παραπλήσιον  he  τοντω  και  περί  τάς  2 

ατυχία?•    ότ€  μ€ν   γαρ  βovλόμeθa  τονς   φιλονς   άπ- 

etvat/^   ovhe   λυπeΐv   όταν  μηθ€ν  μάλΧωσι   ποιησ€ΐν 

πλέον,  ότ6   he   αυτούς^*  jjhiaTov  πapeΐvaι.     τό  he^^ 

της  vπevavτLωσeως  ταύτης  και  μάΧ'  eΰλoγov.     δια 

γαρ  τα  πpoeιpημeva  τοΰτο   συ/χ^αινει,  και  οτι  μ€ν 

15  το    λυπoύμevov   η    ev   φαύλη    οντά    e^ei   τόν   φίλον 

^  U  (et  lacunam  ante  in)  Bk. :  δί  τό. 

*  Sp. :   aiperbu.  '  Sp. :  έπΐώτη. 
*  oi  μβν  add.  Sus.                    ^  Cas. :  ohv  καΐ. 

*  και  om.  Γ.  '  ■ήδιον  <7j  Ιδία>  Fr. 

*  Sp. :   &v.  *   lac:  μέντοι  ov. 

^^  lac. :  iird  δ^  y^.  ^^  lac. :  6μο\(τ^ονσιν, 

1*  ή]  καΐ  ?  Rac.  13  Cas. :  elvai. 

1*  Syl. :  τούϊ.  "  rb  δ'  <αΐτιον>  Fr. 

44() 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  VII.  xii.  19-22 

It  seems  to  be  characteristic  of  one  who  feels 
affection  for  another  to  debar  him  from  sharing 
his  troubles,  and  of  the  person  for  whom  affection 
is  felt  to  wish  to  share  them.  Both  these  things 
happen  reasonably  ;  for  to  a  friend  nothing  ought 
to  give  so  much  pain  as  his  friend  gives  pleasure,  yet 
it  is  felt  that  he  ought  not  to  choose  his  own  interest. 

20  Hence  people  hinder  their  friends  from  sharing 
their  sorrows  ;  they  are  content  to  be  in  trouble  by 
themselves,  in  order  that  they  may  not  appear  from 
selfish  considerations  actually  to  choose  the  joy  of 
their   friend's    grief   and  furthermore   to   find    it    a 

21  relief  not  to  bear  their  misfortunes  alone.  And  as 
both  well-being  and  companionship  are  desirable,  it 
is  clear  that  companionship  combined  with  even  a 
lesser  good  is  in  a  way  more  desirable  than  separation 
with  a  greater  good.  But  as  it  is  not  clear  how  much 
value  companionship  has,  at  this  point  men  differ, 
and  some  think  it  is  friendly  to  share  everything  in 
company,  and  say,  for  instance,  that  it  is  pleasanter 
to  dine  with  company  though  having  the  same  food  ; 
others  wish  to  share  only  in  well-being,  because,  they 
say,  if  one  supposes  extreme  cases,  people  experi- 
encing  great   adversity   in   company   or   great   pro- 

22  sperity  separately  are  on  a  par.  And  it  is  much  the 
same  as  this  in  regard  to  misfortunes  also  ;  sometimes 
we  wish  our  friends  to  be  absent,  and  do  not  want 
to  give  them  pain  when  their  presence  is  not  going 
to  do  any  good,  but  at  other  times  for  them  to  be 
present  is  most  pleasant.  And  the  reason  of  this 
contrariety  is  very  easily  explained  ;  it  comes  about 
because  of  the  things  stated  before,"  and  because  to 
behold  a  friend  in  pain  or  in  a  bad  state  is  a  thing 

"  Cf.  1245  b  26—1246  a  2. 

447 


ARISTOTLE 

1246  a 

dewpelv  φ^υγομ^ν  απλώς,  ωσττερ  καΐ  ημάς  αντονς, 
το  δ  οραν  τον  φίλον  η^ν  ωσπβρ  άλλο  τι  των  ηΒίστων, 
δια  την  ζίρημβνην  αΐτίαν,  καΐ  μην^  κάμνοντα  el 
αντος•  ωστ6  οττότ^ρον  αν  τούτων  η  μάλλον  rjSv,  2ί 
20  ποΐ€Ϊ  την  ροπην  του  βούλ^σθαι  παρ€Ϊναι  η  μη.  καΐ 
τοΰτο^  €7Γΐ  των  χ€ίρόνων  συμβαίνα^  και  δια  την 
αύτην  αιτιαν  γίν^σθαΐ'  μάλιστα  γαρ  φιλοτιμούνται 
τους  φίλους  μη  ττράττειν  eu  μη8'  άττ€Ϊναι*  άν^ 
ανάγκη  -η^  αύτοΐς  κακώς,  διό  eViore  τους  Ιρω- 
μ^νους  συναποκτιννύασιν  μάλλον  γαρ  του  οικείου 
25  aia^arcCT^ai  κακοϋ,  ώσπβρ  αν,  el  και  μβμνημενος 
ΟΤΙ  7Τοτ€  €ύ  €7τραττ€,  μα?^ον  η  €ΐ  ω€το  άει  κακώς 
πράττ€ΐν. 

^  Sol.  :   μη.  2   γ,.  .   ^^^^_ 

'  Camot :  συμβαίνειν.  *  Rac. :  elvai. 

^  ac  add.  Fr.  «  ^  add.  Fr. 


448 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  VII.  xii.  22-23 

we  absolutely  shun,  as  we  shun  it  in  our  own  case, 
but  to  see  a  friend  is  as  pleasant  as  anything  can 
be,  for  the  reason  stated,"  and  indeed  to  see  him  ill 
23  if  one  is  ill  oneself ;  so  that  whichever  of  these  is 
more  pleasant,  it  sways  the  balance  of  wishing  him 
to  be  present  or  not.  And  it  fits  in  that  the 
former  occurs  in  the  case  of  inferior  people,  and  for  the 
same  reason ;  they  are  most  eager  for  their  friends 
not  to  prosper  and  not  to  be  absent  if  they  them- 
selves have  to  suffer  adversity.  Hence  sometimes 
suicides  kill  those  whom  they  love  with  themselves, 
as  they  think  that  they  feel  their  own  misfortune 
more  if  their  loved  ones  are  to  survive  ^  ;  just  as, 
if  a  man  in  trouble  had  the  memory  that  he  had  once 
been  prosperous,  he  would  be  more  conscious  of  his 
trouble  than  if  he  thought  that  he  had  always  done 
badly. 

"  Cf.  1245  a  26-b  9. 
^  In  the  Greek  this  clause  is  left  to  be  understood. 


2g  4.49 


Θ 

1240  *τ»»  /  ί>»  '»'  ''  1  '  1 

1.    Απορησ€ί€  ο    αν  τις  et  cgtlv  €καστω   χρησα-  1 
σθαι   και   e<j^'  ο^   7Τ€φνκ€   καΐ   άλλως,  καΐ   τοΰτο   fj 
αυτό   Tj   αυ^   κατά  συμβ^βηκός•   οΐον  rj*  οφθαλμός, 

30  IBelv  rj  καΐ  αλλω?  Trapihelv  Βίαστρ4φαντα  ware  δυο 
το  ev  φανηναί,  αύται  μ€ν  Srj  χρ€Ϊαί^  άμφω  οτι  μβν 
οφθαλμός  €στιν,*  ην  δ'  όφθαλμώ  αλλτ^'  δε,  κατά 
σνμβββηκός,  οϊον  el  rjv  άπο^όσθαι  η  φαγ€Ϊν.  ομοίως  2 
δ€*  καΐ  €τηστ'ημΎ^•  και  yap  άλτ^^ώ?  και  άμαρτείν, 
οίον  όταν  €κών  μη  ορθώς  γράφη,  ώς  αγνοία  Srj  νυν 

35  χρησθαι,  ώσπερ  μεταστρίφασαι^"  την  χ€Ϊρα  και 
τον  τΓοδα^^  τω  ττοδι  ττοτβ  ώς  χ^ιρι  και  ταντη  ώς 
ττοδι  χρώνται  αΐ^'  όρχηστρί^ες.  el  δη  πασαι  αϊ  3 
άρ€ται"  ίττιστημαι,  e'ίη  άν^*  και  τη  δικαιοσύνη  ώς 
αδικία  χρησθαΐ'  άδικτ^σει^^  αρα  από  δικαιοσυι^τ^? 
τα  άδικα  πράττων,  ώσπep  και  τα  άγνοητικα  από 
\2Aeb  eπιστημης•  el  Be  τοντ    αδύνατον,  φαν€ρ6ν  οτι  ουκ 

^  Ρΐ":  έκάστψ  φί\φ  Μ^.  ^  Sp. :  <^  ant  &. 

'  lac. :  τοΰτο  fj  aiVo  ηδύ.  *  lac. :  rj. 

^  Xpelai  add.  Sp.  *  έστιι^  lac. :  δτι. 

'   lac.  :   Λλλτ;.  *  Sp. :   δη. 

*  Sp. :  επιστήμη.  ^^   lac. :  μΐταστρέψα^, 

^^  rbv  πόδα  add.  lac.  ^^  αί  add.  Sp. 

^'  Sp. :  6.ρι.σταί.  ^*  ef?;  Blv  Sp. :   eljrai'. 

"  Sp. :  d  δίκηί  d. 

'  In  M*'  the  remainder  of  the  work  forms  part  of  the  pre- 
450 


BOOK  VIII « 

1  I.  But  one  may  raise  the  question  whether  it  is  c.  i.  Good- 
possible  to  use  any  given  thing  both  for  its  natural  Know- 
purpose  and  otherwise,  and  in  the  latter  case  to  use  ^^^^™;^  ^^'® 
it  qua  itself  or  on  the   contrary   incidentally  :    for  are  not 
instance,  with  an  eye  qua  eye,  to  see,  or  also  just  ^nowiedge,^ 
to  see  wrong,  by  squinting  so  that  one  object  appears  which  is 
tΛVO — both  these  uses  of  the  eye,  then,  use  it  because  ^suae?  ° 
it  is  an  eye,  but  it  would  be  possible  to  make  use  of 

an  eye  but  to  use  it  in  another  way,  incidentally, 
for  example,  if  it  were  possible  to  sell  it  or  to  eat  it. 

2  And  similarly  with  the  use  of  knowledge  :  one  can 
use  it  truly,  and  one  can  use  it  wrongly — for  instance, 
when  one  spells  a  word  incorrectly  on  purpose,  then 
at  the  time  one  is  using  knowledge  as  ignorance,  just 
as  dancing-girls  sometimes  interchange  the  hand  and 

3  the  foot  and  use  foot  as  hand  and  hand  as  foot.**  If 
then  all  the  virtues  are  forms  of  knowledge,  it 
would  be  possible  to  use  even  justice  as  injustice — 
in  that  case  a  man  will  be  behaving  unjustly  by 
doing  unjust  acts  as  a  result  of  justice,  as  when  one 
makes  ignorant  mistakes  from  knowledge  ;  but  if 
this  is  impossible,  it  is  clear  that  the  virtues  cannot 

ceding  Book,  and  some  editors  print  it  as  cc.  xiii.-xv.  of 
Book  VII.  The  text  has  been  fully  treated  by  Jackson, 
/.  Phil.  xxii.  170. 

*  i.e.  stand  on  their  hands  and  wave  their  feet  in  the  air, 
see  Diet.  Ant.^  "  Saltatio." 

451 


ARISTOTLE 

αν  €L€V  €7Τίστημαι  αι  aperat.  ουο  ei  /χή  εστίν 
άγνο€Ϊν  άπο  €πίστήμης  αλλ'  αμαρτάν^ιν  μόνον  καΙ 
τά  αυτά  /cat  άττό  ayvota?  ttolcZv,  οϋη  άττό 
Βικαιοσύνης  ye  ώ?  από  αδικία?  7τράζ€ί.  αλλ'  εττεΓ 
5  φρόνησις  €7τιστήμη  και  άληθ€ς  τι,  το  αυτό  ποιήσει 
κάκ^ίνη•  ivSexoLTO  γαρ  αν  άφρόνως  άπο  φρον'ησ€ως 
και  άμαρτάνειν  ταΰτά  απερ  ό  άφρων  el  δε  άπλ•^ 
•!^ν*  1^  έκαστου  χρ^ία  fj  €καστον,  καν  φρονίμως 
€πραττον  ούτω  πράττοντας.  επι  μ€ν  οΰν  ταΐς  4 
αλλαι?  Ιπιστ-ημαις  άλλη  κυρία  ποι,ΐΐ  την  στροφην 

10  αύτης  δε  τ-ί^?  πασών  κυρίας  τις ;  ου  γαρ  έτι  επι- 
στημη  γε  η  νους.  άλλα  μην  ούδ'  άρεττ)•  χρηται 
γαρ  αύτη,^  η  γαρ  του  άρχοντος  αρετή  τη  του 
αρχομένου  χρηται.  τις  οΰν  εστίν;  η  ώσπερ  λε'yεται  5 
άκρασία  η*  κακία  του  αλόγου  της  φνχης,  και  πω?' 
ακόλαστο?    ό    άκραττ^?,    αχών    νουν,    άλλ'    ■^δτ^    άν 

15  ισχυρά  η  η  επιθυμία,  στρέφει  και  λoy ιεΓται  τάναν- 
τια;  η  ξ.στι'^  ^ηλον  δτι,  καν  iv  μέν  τούτω  αρετή  εν 
δε  τω  λόγω  άνοια  η,  έτερα'  μεταποιούνται;  ώστε 
εσται  δικαιοσυνι^  τ'  ου*  δικαι'ω?  χρησθαι  και  κακώς 
και  φρονήσει  άφρόνως•  ώστε  και  τάναντία.     άτοπον 

20  γαρ  ει  την  ρ,έν  ε'ν  τώ  λoytστtκώ  άρετην*  μοχθηρία 
ποτέ    έγγενομένη     εν^"    τώ     άλόγω^^    στρέφει    και 

1  ^7re2  ή  ?  Rac.  ^  9ji>  add.  Rac.  {'ή"  pro  ή  Bus.) 

*  αύτη  aiirfj  ?  Rac.  *  ή  add.  Rac. 

*  lac. :  irws.  *  lac. :  ^  σ^ί. 

'  lac. :  irepai.  *  r'  ού  lac. :   τό. 

*  Γ :  TTJs  ,  .  .  dper^.  '■  Sp. :  /u.ii'. 

^^  Sus. :  \6y<f). 

452 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  VIII.  i.  3-5 

be  branches  of  knowledge.  And  also  if  it  is  not  pos- 
sible from  knowledge  to  be  ignorant,  but  only  to 
make  mistakes  and  do  the  same  things  as  one  does 
from  ignorance,  a  man  will  assuredly  never  act  from 
justice  in  the  same  way  as  he  will  act  from  injustice. 
But  since  wisdom  is  knowledge  and  a  form  of  truth, 
wisdom  also  will  produce  the  same  effect  as  know- 
ledge, that  is,  it  would  be  possible  from  wisdom  to 
act  unwisely  and  to  make  the  same  mistakes  as 
the  unwise  man  does  ;  but  if  the  use  of  anything 
qua  itself  were  single,"  when  so  acting  men  would 

4  be  acting  wisely.  In  the  case  of  the  other  forms  of 
knowledge,  therefore,  another  higher  form  causes 
their  diversion  ;  but  what  knowledge  causes  the  diver- 
sion of  the  actually  highest  of  all  ?  Obviously  there 
is  no  longer  any  knowledge  or  any  mind  to  do  it. 
But  moreover  goodness  does  not  cause  it  either  ;  for 
wisdom  makes  use  of  goodness,  since  the  goodness 

5  of  the  ruling  part  uses  that  of  the  ruled.  Who  then 
is  there  in  whom  this  occurs  ?  or  is  it  in  the  same 
way  as  the  vice  of  the  irrational  part  of  the  spirit 
is  termed  lack  of  control,  and  the  uncontrolled  man 
is  in  a  manner  profligate — possessing  reason,  but 
ultimately  if  his  appetite  is  powerful  it  will  turn  him 
round,  and  he  will  draw  the  opposite  inference  ? 
Or  is  it  manifest  that  also  if  there  is  goodness  in  the 
irrational  part  but  folly  in  the  reason,  goodness  and 
folly  are  transformed  in  another  way  ?  so  that  it 
will  be  possible  to  use  justice  unjustly  and  badly, 
and  wisdom  unwisely  ;  and  therefore  the  op- 
posite uses  also  will  be  possible.  For  it  is  strange 
if  whereas  when  wickedness  at  any  time  arises  in 
the  irrational  part  it  will  pervert  the  goodness  in 

"  As  in  §  1  above  it  was  shown  not  to  be. 

453 


ARISTOTLE 

1246  b  ^ 

■ποί-ησβι  αγνοεΐν,  η  δ  άρετη  rf  ev  τω  αλόγω 
ev  τω  λογιστικά)^  άνουας  ζνονσης  ον  στρ€φ€ΐ  ταυττ^ι^ 
καΐ  ποίησβι  φρονίμως  κρίν€ΐν  και  τα  δεον'τα/  καΙ 
πάλιν  η  φρόνησις  η  Ιν  τω  Χογισηκω  την  ev  τω 
αλόγω  άκολασίαν'^  σωφρόνως  πράττ€ΐν,  οττερ  δο/cet 

25  etvai^  η  εγκράτεια,  ωστ  έ'σται  και'  άττό  άνοια?' 
φρονίμως.  Ιστι  δε*  ταύτα  άτοττα,  άλλως  τ€  και  6 
άττο  άνοιας^  χρησθαι  φρονήσει  φρονίμως•  τοΰτο 
γαρ  €πΙ  των  άλλων  ουδαμώς  6ρωμ€ν•  ωσττΐ,ρ  την 
ιατρικτην  η  γραμματικην  στρζφβι  ακολασία,  αλλ 
ού^°  την  άγνοιαν,  iav  -η  εναντία  δια  το  μη   eveivai 

30  -την  ύπ€ροχην,  αλλά  την  άρετην  δλως  μάλλον  etrat 
ττρος  την  κακίαν  οϋτως  εχονσαν  και  γαρ  α}^  ό 
άδικος  πάντα  6  δίκαιος  δύναται,  και  δλως  eveoTii' 
iv  τη  8υνάμ€ΐ  η  άΒυναμία.  ωστ€  8ηλον  δτι  άμα  φρό-  7 
νιμοι  και  αγαθοί,  eKeivai^^  δ'  άλλου  (.ζεις,  και  όρθον^^ 
το  Ίίωκρατικον^*  δτι  ovSev  ίσχυρότερον  φρονησεως . 

35  αλλ     ΟΤΙ   βπιστημην    εφη,   ουκ    όρθώς^^'   άρ€τη   γάρ 
€στι,  και  ουκ  επιστήμη  άλλα  γένος  άλλο  γνώσεως  }^ 

II.     Επει    δ      ου  μόνον     η     φρόνησις    ποιεί    την  ι 
εύπραγίαν  κατ    άρετην,^''  άλλα  φαμεν  και  τους  εύ- 

1247  a  TU^et?  εΰ  πράττειν  ώς  και  της  ευτυχίας  εμποιούσης^^ 

εύπραγίαν  κατά^^  τα  αυτά.  τη  επιστήμη, ^°  σκεπτεον 

^  η  add.  Rac.  *  ^u  τψ  λο-γιστικφ  add.  Sus. 

^  δέονται  <7Γράττείΐ'>  vel  ^ττοιεΊρ"^  ?  Rac. 

*  Γ :  κόλασιν  Άν.  '  είναι  add.  Rac. 

*  και  Γ  :  και  ή.  '   (liis)  lac. :  ayvolas. 

*  (στι  δέ  Sp. :  έττί  re.  *  φρονήσει  add.  Sp. 

^'  ου  Rac. :  ονν  ό  {ονν  ον  lac). 

^^  &  add.  lac.  (post  πάντα  Γ). 

^^   lac.  :  καΐ  ayadai  έκεΐναι  αι. 

^'  Rac. :  όρθωί.  ^*  Bek. :  το  σώμα  κραττητικίιν. 

^*  Rac. :   ορθόν.  1*  Sp. :  yvwa  .  .  . 

^'  lac. :  και  άρετήν  (καΙ  αρετή  Sp.). 

454 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  viii.  i.  5— ii.  1 

the  rational  and  cause  it  to  be  ignorant,  yet  good- 
ness in  the  irrational  part  when  there  is  folly  in 
the  rational  should  not  convert  the  folly  and  make 
it  form  wise  and  proper  judgements,  and  again 
wisdom  in  the  rational  part  should  not  make  profli- 
gacy in  the  irrational  act  temperately — which  seems 
to  be  what  self-control  essentially  is.     So  that  there 

6  will  actually  be  wise  action  arising  from  folly.  But 
these  consequences  are  absurd,  especially  o'J?^^^.-/ 
using  wisdom  wisely  as  a  result  of  folly  ;   -j-t^.^t 

is  a  thing  which  we  certainly  do  not  &^^  .^ 

cases — for  instance  profligacy  perverts  one's  medical 
knowledge  or  scholarship,  but  it  does  not  pervert 
one's  ignorance  if  it  be  opposed  to  it,  because  it 
does  not  contain  superiority,  but  rather  it  is  good- 
ness in  general  that  stands  in  this  relation  to  bad- 
ness ;  for  example,  the  just  man  is  capable  of  all 
that   the    unjust    man  is,  and    in   general   inability     yV 

7  is    contained   in   ability.     So    that    it   is   clear   that  M-* 
men    are  wise   and   good   simultaneously,  and  that     ^^r 
the  states  of  character  above  described  belong  to  \Γ 

a  different  person,  and  the  Socratic  dictum  '  Nothing     \3^\ 
is  mightier  than  wisdom,'  is  right.     But  in  that  by       J^f^ 
'  wisdom  '    he  meant  '  knowledge,'   he  was   wrong  ;     \ 
for  wisdom  is  a  form  of  goodness,  and  is  not  scien- 
tific knowledge  but  another  kind  of  cognition. 
1       II.  But   wisdom    is    not    the    only    thing    which  c.  ϋ.  Good 
acting  in  accordance  with  goodness  causes  welfare,  luo™*'^' 
but  we  also  speak  of  the  fortunate  as  faring  well,  ^^^^^° 
which    imphes    that    good    fortune    also    engenders  nature/not 
welfare  in  the  same  way  as  knowledge  does  ;    we  ^y  w'sdom 
must  therefore  consider  whether  one  man  is  fortu-  dence. 


^*  έμΐΓθίθύσ'η3  Fr. :  eC  ττοιούσ-η^. 
"  Sp. :   καΐ.  ^°  Sp.  :  τη?  επιστήμης. 

^55 


ARISTOTLE 

1247  a   „,,,,  ,,  ,  ^        ,       ,     ,  v«w 

ap'  earl  φνσ^ι  ό  μεν  ευτυχής  6  δ  άτυχης  η  ου, 
καΐ  πώς  e^et  περί  τούτων,  οτι  μεν  yap  είσί  Tires'  2 
ευτυχείς  όρώμεν  άφρονες  γαρ  οντες  κατορθοϋσι 
5  ττοΧλοΙ^  εν  οΐς  η  τύχη  κυρία,  οι  Βέ  καΐ  εν  οΐς  τέχνη 
εστί,  πολλη^  μεντοι  καΐ  τύχη'  ενυπάρχει,  οίον  εν 
στρατηγία  καΐ  κυβερνητική,  πότερον  οΰν  άπό  τίνος  3 
e^v^c  ουτοί  είσιν,  η  ου  τω*  αυτοί  ποιοι  τίνες  eirai 
γαατικοί    είσι   των   ευτυχημάτων ;      νυν   μεν    γαρ 

10  ούτως  οϊονται  ως  φύσει  τινών  όντων  η  8e  φύσις 
ποιους  τίνα?  ποιεί,  και  ευθύς  εκ  γενετής  Βιαφερου- 
σιν,  ώσπερ  οι  μεν  γλαυκοί  οι  δε  μελανόμματοι 
τω  τοδι*  τοιονδι  εχειν,  ούτω  και  οι  ευτυχείς  και 
ατυχείς.  οτι  μεν  γαρ  ου  φρονήσει  κατορθοϋσι  4 
SrjXov,  ου  γαρ  άλογος  η  φρόνησις  αλλ'  έχει  λόγον 

15  δια  τι  ούτω  πράττει,  οι  δ'  ουκ  αν  εχοιεν  ειπείν  δια 
τι  κατορθοϋσι,  τέχνη  γαρ  αν  ην  ετι  Βε  φανερον  οτι*  5 
οντες  άφρονες,  ούχ  οτι  περί  άλλα  {τούτο  μεν  γαρ 
ούθεν  άτοπον,  οίον  Ιπποκράτης  γεωμετρικός  ων, 
άλλα  περί  τά  άλλα  εΒόκει'  βλάζ  και  άφρων  efvai, 
κ:αι   τΓολύ    χρυσίον    πλέων*   άπώλεσεν   ύπο   των   εν 

20  Βυζαντιω    πεντη κοστολόγων  δι'    εύηθειαν,  ως   λε- 
γουσιν)    αλλ'   οτι    και   εν  οι?*  εύτυχοΰσιν   άφρονες, 
περί   γαρ   ναυκληρίαν   ούχ   οι   δεινότατοι   ευτυχείς,  6 
αλλ'   {ωσπερ  εν  κύβων  πτώσει  ό  μεν  ούΒεν,  άλλος 

^   lac. :   ΤΓολλά.  *  Rac. :  ττολλοί  (πολύ  Cas.). 

*  Rac. :  τύχη!.  *  Γ :  oiku. 

*  Sp. :  τό  δ(ΐν.  «  δτί  add.  Sp. 

'   Β' :   δοκΐΐ.  *  Sp. :   πλέον.  *   Β' :  iV/ois. 

456 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  VIII.  ii.  1-6 

nate  and  another  unfortunate  by  nature  or  not,  and 

2  how  it  stands  with  these  matters.  For  that  some 
men  are  fortunate  we  see,  since  many  though  fool- 
ish succeed  in  things  in  which  luck  is  paramount, 
and  some  even  in  things  which  involve  skill  although 
also   containing    a    large    element    of  luck — for  ex- 

3  ample  strategy  and  navigation.  Are,  then,  these  men 
fortunate  as  a  result  of  a  certain  state  of  character, 
or  are  they  enabled  to  achieve  fortunate  results  not 
by  reason  of  a  certain  quality  in  themselves  ?  As  it 
is,  people  think  the  latter,  holding  that  some  men  are 
successful  by  natural  causes  ;  but  nature  makes  men 
of  a  certain  quality,  and  the  fortunate  and  unfortu- 
nate are  different  even  from  birth,  in  the  same 
way  as  some  men  are  blue-eyed  and  others  black- 
eyed  because  a  particular  part  of  them  is  of  a  par- 

4  ticular  quality.  For  it  is  clear  that  they  do  not 
succeed  by  means  of  wisdom,  because  wisdom  is 
not  irrational  but  can  give  reason  why  it  acts  as  it 
does,  whereas  they  could  not  say  why  they  succeed 

5  — for  that  would  be  science  ;  and  moreover  it  is 
manifest  that  they  succeed  in  spite  of  being 
unwise  —  not  unwise  about  other  matters  (for 
that  would  not  be  anything  strange,  for  example 
Hippocrates "  was  skilled  in  geometry  but  was 
thought  to  be  stupid  and  unwise  in  other  matters, 
and  it  is  said  that  on  a  voyage  owing  to  foolish- 
ness he  lost  a  great  deal  of  money,  taken  from  him 
by  the  collectors  of  the  two-per-cent  duty  at  Byzan- 
tium), but    even    though    they   are    unwise    about 

6  the  matters  in  which  they  are  fortunate.  For  in 
navigation  it  is  not  the  cleverest  who  are  fortunate, 
but  (just  as  in  throwing  dice  one  man  throws  a 

"  A  Pythagorean  philosopher  of  Chios,  /.  460  b.c. 

457 


ARISTOTLE 

1247  a      ,    ^ 

δ    e^^  βάλλ€ΐ)  καθά  rjv^  φύσα  iarlv  (ύτυχης.     η  τώ 
φιλβΐσθαί,  ώσπΐρ  φασίν,  νττο  Oeov,  καΐ  εζωθίν  τι 

25  elvaL  το  κατορθοϋν ,  οίον  ττλοΐον  κακώς  vevavm)- 
γημ€νον  αμβινον  πολλάκις  διαττλεί/  αλλ'  ου  δι' 
αυτό  αλλ'  οτι  e^et  κνβ€ρνήτην  aya^ov;  αλλ'  όντως 
ο  ευτυχών*  τον  δαι/χον  e^et  κυβερνητην.^  αλλ 
άτοπον  9e6v  η  δαίμονα  φίλείν  τον  τοιούτον,  άλλα 
μ,ή   τον   βέΧτι,στον    καΐ   τον   φρονιμώτατον .       el  δη 

30  ανάγκη  η  φύσει  τ)  νόίρ  η  επιτροπια  tlvl  κατορθοϋν, 
τα  δε  δυο  μη  εστί,  φύσει  αν  elev  οι  ευτυχείς,  άλλα 
μην  η  γε  φύσις  αίτια  η  τον  άει  ώσαυτω?  η  του  ώς 
επι  το  πολύ,  η  δε  τυχτ^  τουναντίον,  ει  μεν  ουν  το* 
παραλόγως  επιτυ'^/χάνειΐ'  τύχης  Βοκεΐ  είναι/  άλλ  , 
ε'ίπερ  δια   τύχην  ευτυχής,  ουκ  αν  Βόζειε^  τοιούτον 

35  είναι  το  αίτιον  οΐον  άει  του  αύτοΰ  η  ώς  επι  το  πολύ- 
έ'τι  ει  οτι'  τοιοσδι  ε7Γΐτυ•)/χάνει  η  αποτυγχάνει,^" 
ωσπερ  ότι^^  γλαυκός  ουκ  οζύ  όρα,  ου  τύχη  αίτια 
άλλα  φύσις'  ουκ  άρα  εστίν  ευτυχής  άλλ'  οΓον  ευ- 
φυης.  ώστε  τοΰτ'  άν  ε'ίη  λεκτέον,  οτι  ους  λεγομεν 
1247  b  ευτυχείς,  ου  δια  τνχην  εισίν  ουκ  άρα  είσιν  ευτυχείς, 
εύτυχεΐς^^  γαρ  οσοις^^  αιτία  τύχη   άγαθη   ά•)/α^ών. 

1  Ιί  add.  hie  Rac.  (post  βάλ\€ΐ  Β',  lac). 

*  lac.  (et  post  φύσ^ι,  <τ  ψ  ττην  φύσιν  ixeif  (ύτνχη^) :  καθ'  ijv. 
'  Syl. :   δέ  ΊτΧΐϊ.  *  Syl. :  ouros  ευτυχή?  (ευτυχώ»»  edd.). 

*  post  κνβ(ρνητΊ}ν  add.  άγαέ'όΐ'  codd.  plur. 

*  οδί»  <οί'τω>  τό  Bus. 

'   treat    <ό   δέ   δια  τύχην  ει)τιιχτ;5>   lac,   <ό  δί  δίά   τύχην  ΐνι- 
τνγχάνων  εντνχηί^  ?  Rac. 

*  δόξ€ΐ€  add.  lac.  *  ότι  add.  Fr. 

^*•  ^  airoTiyxavei  add.  Siis.  ^^  δτι  ό  codd.  plur. 

^^   B' :  εΰτύχτ)!.  ^'  lac. :  ΰσων. 

458 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  VIII.  π.  6-9 

blank  and  another  a  six)  a  man  is  fortunate  accord- 
ing as  things  were  arranged  by  nature."  Or  is  it 
because  he  is  loved  by  God,  as  the  phrase  goes,  and 
because  success  is  something  from  outside  ?  as  for 
instance  a  badly  built  ship  often  gets  through  a 
voyage  better,  though  not  owing  to  itself,  but  be- 

7  cause  it  has  a  good  man  at  the  helm.  But  on  this  ^ 
showing  the  fortunate  man  has  the  deity  as  steers-  «^ 
man.     But  it  is  strange  that  a  god  or  deity  should  Yet  nature 

1  ii_  J  i'*  uniform, 

love  a  man  of  this  sort,  and  not  the  best  and  most  luck  is  not. 
prudent.     If,  then,  the  success  of  the   lucky  must 
necessarily  be  due  to  either  nature  or  intellect  or 
some  guardianship,  and  of  these  three  causes  two 
are  ruled  out,  those  who  are  fortunate  will  be  so  by 

8  nature.  But  again,  nature  of  course  is  the  cause 
of  a  thing  that  happens  either  always  or  generally 
in  the  same  way,  whereas  fortune  is  the  opposite. 
If,  then,  unexpected  achievement  seems  a  matter  of 
fortune,  but,  if  a  man  is  fortunate  owing  to  fortune, 
it  would  seem  that  the  cause  is  not  of  such  a  sort 
as  to  produce  the  same  result  always  or  generally 

9  — further,  if  a  man's  succeeding  or  not  succeeding 
is  due  to  his  being  of  a  certain  sort,  as  a  man  does 
not  see  clearly  because  he  has  blue  eyes,  not  fortune 
but  nature  is  the  cause  ;  therefore  he  is  not  a  man 
who  has  good  fortune  but  one  who  has  as  it  were 
a  good  nature.  Hence  we  should  have  to  say  that 
the  people  we  call  fortunate  are  so  not  by  reason 
of  fortune  ;  therefore  they  are  not  fortunate,  for  the 
fortunate  are  those  for  whom  good  fortune  is  a  cause 
of  good  things. 

"  Or,  with  Jackson's  emendations, '  another  a  six  according 
as  nature  determines,  so  here  a  man  is  lucky  because  his 
nature  is  such.' 

459 


ARISTOTLE 

1247  b  ,       ,        „ 

Et  δ'  οϋτω,  TTorepov  ούκ^  εσται  τνχ•η  όλως,  η 
εσται  /tev,  αλλ  ουκ  αΐτία^ ;  αλλ'  ανάγκη  και  etvat 
καΐ  αίτίαν  elvai.  ear  at  άρα  καΐ  αγαθών'  τισίν  Κ 
5  αίτια  r)  κακών  et  δ'  δλως  i^aipereov,  καΐ^ 
ovBev*  από  τνχης  φατέον  γίν€σθαι,  αλλ'  ly/xets• 
άλλης  οϋσης  αιτίας  δια  το  μη  όράν  τνχην  etvai 
φαμεν  αιτιαν  διό  και  οριζόμενοι  την  τύχην  τιθβασιν 
αιτιαν  αλογοί'*  άνθρωπίνω  λογισμω,  ώς  ούσης  τινό? 
φύσεως,      τοΰτο   μεν   ονν    άλλο    πρόβλημα    αν    εϊη' 

10  επει  δε*  ορώμεν  τινας  άπαζ  εύτνχησαντες ,  δια  τι 
ου  και  πάλιν  αν  δια  το  αυτό  κατορθώσαιεν ,^  και 
πάλιν,  και  πάλιν^ ;  του  γαρ  αύτοϋ  το  αυτό'  αίτιον. 
ουκ  άρα  εσται  τύχης  τοΰτο^°•  αλλ'  oVar  τό  αυτό  1] 
αποβαίνη  άττ'"  απείρων  και  αορίστων,  εσται  μεν 
τω^^  αγαθόν  η  κακόν,  επιστήμη  δ'  ουκ  εσται  αύτοϋ 
η  δι    εμπειρίαν ^^  επεί  εμάνθανον  άν  τινε?  ευτυχείς,^* 

15  η  και  ττασαι  άν  αί  βττιστη/χαι,  ώσπερ  εφη  Έωκράτης, 
εύτυχιαι  ήσαν.  τί  οΰν  κωλύει  συμβηναί  τινι  εφ-  U 
εζης  τα  τοιαύτα  πολλάκις  ούχ  οτι  τοιοσδί/'  αλλ' 
ΟΙΟΙ'  αν  εΐη^^  το  κύβους  άει  μακαρίαν^^  βάίλλειν; 
τι  δε  Βη;  άρ'  ουκ  ένεισιι^  όρμαι  εν  τη  φυχη  αί  μεν 
απο    λογισμού    αί    δ'    άπο    όρεζεως    αλόγου;      και 

20  προτεραι  αύται;     ει  γάρ  εστί  φύσει  η  δι'  επιθυμίαν 

^  ούκ  Sp. :  ή.  *  Sp. :  άλλ'  ούκέτι. 

'   [καΙ]  Sp.  *  μ-ηζ^ν  Sus. 

*  lac. :   avoKoyou.  •   Β' :  έιτβιδί}. 

'  lac. :  δια  τό  άττοκατορθωσαι  (propter  idem  dirigere  unuvi 

'  καΐ  ττάλιν  και  πάλιν  Μ":   και  ιτάλιν  Ρ*•. 

*  Β':   τό  yap  αυτό  τοντ'.  ^^   Β':   ού  τό. 
'^  Β':  άττ'  cm.  codd.                                 **  lac. :  τό. 

'^   Β':   aireip'iav.  ^*  ίΐ/τυχί?»' Sp. 

'*  lac. :  roij  Set.  ι*  Syl. :  ffei'. 

^'  Fr. :  μακρό.!/. 

460 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  VIII.  ii.  9-12 

But  if  so,  shall  we  say  that  there  is  no  such  thing 
as  fortune  at  all,  or  that  it  does  exist  but  is  not  a 

10  cause  ?  No,  it  must  both  exist  and  be  a  cause.  Con- 
sequently it  will  furthermore  be  a  cause  of  goods  or 
evils  to  certain  persons  ;  whereas  if  fortune  is  to  be 
eliminated  altogether,  then  nothing  must  be  said 
to  come  about  from  fortune,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that, 
although  there  is  another  cause,  because  we  do  not 
see  it  we  say  that  fortune  is  a  cause — owing  to  which 
people  give  it  as  a  definition  of  fortune  that  it  is  a 
cause  incalculable  to  human  reasoning,  implying  that 
it  is  a  real  natural  principle.  This,  then,  would  be  a 
matter  for  another  inquiry.  But  since  we  see  that 
some  people  have  good  fortune  on  one  occasion,  why 
should  they  not  succeed  a  second  time  too  owing 
to  the  same  cause  ?  and  a  third  time  ?  and  a  fourth  ? 

11  for  the  same  cause  produces  the  same  effect.  There- 
fore this  will  not  be  a  matter  of  fortune  ;  but  when 
the  same  result  follows  from  indeterminate  and  in- 
definite antecedents,  it  will  be  good  or  bad  for  some- 
body, but  there  will  not  be  the  knowledge  of  it  that 
comes  by  experience,  since,  if  there  were,  some  fortu- 
nate persons  would  learn  it,  or  indeed  all  branches 
of  knowledge  would,  as  Socrates  said,*^  be  forms  of 

12  good  fortune.  What,  then,  prevents  such  things  from 
happening  to  somebody  a  number  of  times  running 
not  because  he  has  a  certain  character,  but  in  the 
way  in  which  for  instance  it  would  be  possible  to 
make  the  highest  throw  at  dice  every  time  ?  And 
what  then  ?  are  there  not  some  impulses  in  the 
spirit  that  arise  from  reasoning  and  others  from  ir- 
rational appetition  ?  and  are  not  the  latter  prior  ? 
becaxise  if  the  impulse  caused  by  desire  for  what  is 

"  Plato,  Euthydemus  279  d. 

461 


ARISTOTLE 

1247  b    ,     ^  ^     ,    V 

η8€ος,  και  ή  ope^is  φνσ€ΐ  ye  εττι  το  αγαθόν  βαΒίζοί 
αν  TTavTore}     el  hr]  τίνες  elaiv  εύφυέις   {ωσπ€ρ  οι  1 
wSlkoL•^  ουκ  ετηστάμενοί  αδειι^  οϋτως  ev  ττβφνκασι) 
και   oivev   λόγου   όρμώσιν    fj^  η   φύσις   ττίφυκε   καΐ 
€πιθυμοΰσι  και  τούτου  καΐ  τότ€*  καΐ  οϋτως  ώς  Set 

25  /cat  ού  8et  και  δτ€,  ούτοι  κατορθώσουσι^  καν 
τυχωσιν  άφρονες  οντβς  και  άλογοι,  ωσπερ  και  eu 
ασονται^  ού'  διδασκαλικοί  οντες.  οΐ  δε'  ye  τοιούτοι 
εύτυχβΐς,  όσοι  άνευ  λόγου  κατορθοΰσιν  ώς  επί  το 
πολύ.      φύσει  άρα  οΐ  ευτυχείς  εΐεν  άν. 

Η   πλεοναχώς  λέγεται  η  ευτυχία;     τα  μεν  γαρ  1 

30  πράττεται  από  της  ορμής  και  προελομενων  πράξαι, 
τα  δ  ου,  άλλα  τουναντίον  και  ei*  εν  εκείνοις 
κακώς  λογίσασθαι  δοκουσι  κατορθοΰντες,  και*  εύ- 
τυχησαί  φαμεν  και  πάλιν  εν  τούτοις,  ει  εβούλοντο 
άλλο^"  η  ελαττον  η^^  ελαβον  τάγαθόν.  εκείνους  li 
μεν   τοίνυν    εύτυχεΐν   δια    φύσιν    ενδέχεται-    ή    γαρ 

35  όρμη  και  η  ορεξις  ούσα  ου  ε'Βει^^  κατώρθωσεν,  ό 
8ε  λογισμός  ην  ηλίθιος'  και  τους  μεν  ενταύθα, 
όταν  ό^'  μεν  λογισμός  μη  8οκών  όρθός^*  eiv-at  τύχη,^^ 
ορμη^^  δ  αύτοίϊ  αιτία  ούσα,  αύτη^^  όρθη  ούσα 
εσωσεν^^•  αλλ'  ενίοτε  δι'  επιθυμίαν  ελογίσαντο^" 
πάλιν  ούτω  και  ητύχησαν .''''     εν  δε  8η  τοις  ετεροις  1* 

^  lac.  {semper  Β'):  παν. 

*  Syl. :  άδικοι  {άδίδακτοι  ωδικοί  lac,  indocti  Β')• 

*  ri  add.  lac.  {secundum  quod  W). 

*  Sp.  {tunc  W)  :  iroTk.  *  Fr.  {dirigeiit  W) :   κατορθονσι. 

«  Syl. :  ίσονται.  '  Fr.  {non  BO :  oi  P",  ^i  M»». 

*  fl  add.  Rac.  (post  έκείνοΐί  Sp.). 

*  [καΐ]  (vel  κατεντί'χησαι)  Bus. 

"  lac:  Af.  "  ^add.  lac.  ^*  Fr. :  M. 

"  ό  add.  Rac.  "  v.l. :  όρθωί  Ρ»,  Μ". 

"  Sp. :  τύχη.  1'  όρμη  add.  Rac.  (ή  add.  Sp.). 

^'  Sp. :  ai'Tj;  δ'.  "  Sp.  {saluauit  B') :  i^wffev. 

462 


EUDPLMIAN  ETHICS,  VHI.  ii.  12-15 

pleasant  exists  by  nature,  appetition  also  would  merely 
by  nature  proceed  towards  what  is  good  in  every 

13  case.  If,  therefore,  some  men  have  good  natures — - 
just  as  musical  people  though  they  have  not  learnt 
to  sing  "  have  a  natural  aptitude  for  it — and  without 
the  aid  of  reason  have  an  impulse  in  the  direction 
of  the  natural  order  of  things  and  desire  the  right 
thing  in  the  right  way  at  the  right  time,  these  men 
will  succeed  even  although  they  are  in  fact  foolish 
and  irrational,  just  as  the  others  will  sing  well 
although  unable  to  teach  singing.  And  men  of  this 
sort  obviously  are  fortunate — men  who  without  the 

aid  of  reason  are  usually  successful.     Hence  it  will  ^ 

follow  that  the  fortunate  are  so  by  nature.  ^ 

14  Or  has  the  term  '  good  fortune  '  more  than  one  Luck  an 
meaning  ?     For  some  things  are  done  from  impulse  term^"^it"* 
and  as  a  result  of  the  agents'  purposive  choice,  other  includes 
things  not  so  but  on  the  contrary  ;  and  if  in  the  former  really*^ 
cases  when  the  agents  succeed   they  seem  to  have  caused  by 
reasoned  badly,  we  say  that  in  fact  they  have  had 

good  fortune  ;    and  again  in  the  latter  cases,  if  they 
wished  for  a  different  good  or  less  good  than  they 

15  have  got.  The  former  persons  then  may  possibly 
owe  their  good  fortune  to  nature,  for  their  impulse 
and  appetition,  being  for  the  right  object,  suc- 
ceeded, but  their  reasoning  was  foolish  ;  and  in  their 
case,  when  it  happens  that  their  reasoning  seems 
to  be  incorrect  but  that  impulse  is  the  cause  of  it, 
this  impulse  being  right  has  saved  them ;  although 
sometimes  on  the  contrary  owing  to  appetite  they 
have  reasoned  in  this  way  and  come  to  misfortune. 

"  Or,  with  Jackson's  additions,  '  just  as  untaught  musical 
geniuses,  without  professional  knowledge  of  singing.' 

^*  Sp. :  eXoyLaaro.  *"  Sp. :  ήτύχησεί'. 

4-63 


ARISTOTLE 

1247b       ^       „  ,        ,  ,  »        w    ■*  '     'έ 

ττως  earat  η  βντυχια  κατ  ευφυιαν  ορζξβως  και 
i2i8  Λ  εττίθυμίας ;  αλλά  μην  η  ivravda  βντνχία  κάκίίνη 
■η  αύτη.  η  vXeiovg  at  euTUVtat  και  τνχη  διτττί^; 
€7T€i  Ο  ορωμ€ν  τταρα  ττασας  τας  €τηστημας  και  τους  ■ 
λογισμούς  τους  ορθούς  βύτυχονντάς  rcvas",  hrjXov 
b  ότι  €Tepov  αν  τι  €Ϊη  το  αίτιον  της  ζύτυχίας.  €Κ€ίνη 
8e  TTOTcpov  ζστιν^  €ύτυχία  η  ούκ  ecniv,  fj^  επεθύμη- 
aev  ων  e8et  και  δτ€  e8et  ω*  λογισμός  ανθρώπινος 
ουκ  αν  τούτου  €Ϊη ;  ου  γαρ  δη  πάμπαν  άλόγιστον 
τούτο  ου  γε"  φυσική  ioTiv  ή  επιθυμία,  άλλα  8ια- 
φθειρβται  υπό  τίνος,     εύτυχ^εΐν  μεν  οΰν  Βοκεΐ  ότι  ή  ] 

10  'τνχΐ]  T<J^v  πάρα  λόγον  αιτία,  τούτο*  δε  πάρα  λόγον, 
παρά,  γαρ  την  επιστήμην  και  το  καθόλου,  αλλ'  ώς  ] 
εοικεν,  ούκ  άπο  τύχης,  άλλα  δο/cet  δια  τούτο, 
ωσθ  ούτος  μεν  ό  λόγος  ού  Βείκνυσιν  ότι  φύσει  εύ- 
τυχεΐται,^  αλλ  οτι  ού  πάντες  οι  8οκούντες  εύτυχεΐν 
δια  τύχην  κατορθοΰσιν,  αλλά'  διά  φύσιν  ούδ'  οτι 
ού^εν  εστί   τύχη    ^ούδ'   οτι  ούκ  εστί  τύχη^  αίτια 

15  ούθενός    ^είκνυσιν,  αλλ'    οτι^"  ού   των    πάντων  ων 
Βοκεΐ. 

Τούτο  μεντ    αν  άπορήσειε  τις,  άρ'  αυτοϋ  τούτου  ί 
τύχη  αιτία,  του  «πι^υ/χησαι  ου  δει  και  δτε  δει;    η 
ούτω  γε  τταν'τα»!'  εσται;     και  γαρ  του  νοησαι   και 
βουλεύσασθαΐ'   ού  γαρ   δή   εβουλεύσατο  βουλευσά- 
μενος    και    πριν^^    tout'    εβουλεύσατο   οι)δ'   ενόησε 

^  καΐ  τύχη  διττή  hic  Sp. :  ante  κάκΐίνη  codd. 
^  ^τιν  Sp. :  ή  Mb,  om.  Ρ•».  '  Fr. :  ή.  *  lac:  τό. 

'  o5  ye  lac. :  οϋτΐ.  '  Vict,  {hoc  B') :  τούτου. 

'  lac.  {bene  fortunate  agatur  W):  εύτυχΐΐν. 

*  άλλ'  <einoTe>  ?  Rac. :  άλλα  <7Γολλοί>  ?  Sus. 

»  lac.  1»  Stl  add.  Cas. 

"  πριν  add.  Rac.  {anteqiiam.  consiliaretur  B'). 

<•  Cf.  1247  b  30  τά  δ•  οι»  (Solomon). 
464 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  VIII.  ii.  16-20 

16  But  in  the  case  of  the  others,"  then,  how  will  good 
fortune  be  due  to  natural  goodness  of  appetition  and 
desire  ?  The  fact  is  that  the  good  fortune  here  and 
that  in  the  other  case  are  the  same.  Or  is  good 
fortune  of  more  than  one  kind,  and  is  fortune  two- 

17  fold  ?  But  since  we  see  some  people  being  fortu- 
nate contrary  to  all  the  teachings  of  science  and 
correct  calculation,  it  is  clear  that  the  cause  of  good 
fortune  must  be  something  different.  But  is  it  or  is 
it  not  good  fortune  whereby  a  man  formed  a  desire 
for  the  right  thing  and  at  the  right  time  when  in 
his  case  human  reasoning  could  not  make  this  calcu- 
lation .''  For  a  thing  the  desire  for  which  is  natural 
is  not  altogether  uncalculated,  but   the   reasoning 

18  is  perverted  by  something.  So  no  doubt  he  seems 
fortunate,  because  fortune  is  the  cause  of  things 
contrary  to  reason,  and  this  is  contrary  to  reason, 
for  it  is  contrary  to  knowledge  and  to  general  prin- 

19  ciple.  But  probably  it  does  not  really  come  from 
fortune,  but  seems  to  do  so  from  the  above  cause. 
So  that  this  argument  does  not  prove  that  good 
fortune  comes  by  nature,  but  that  not  all  those 
who  seem  fortunate  succeed  because  of  fortune,  but 
because  of  nature  ;  nor  does  it  prove  that  there  is 
no  such  thing  as  fortune,  nor  that  fortune  is  not  the 
cause  of  anything,  but  that  it  is  not  the  cause  of  all  ',  ι 
the  things  of  which  it  seems  to  be  the  cause.  i 

20  Yet   someone   may   raise   the    question   whether  Right  desire 
fortune  is  the  cause  of  precisely  this — our  forming  chancrbut 
a  desire  for  the  right  thing  at  the  right  time.     Or,  a  gift  of 
on   that   showing,   will   not   fortune    be   the   cause    ^''^*"• 

of  everything — even  of  thought  and  deliberation  ? 
since  it  is  not  the  case  that  one  only  deliberates 
when  one  has  deliberated  even  previously  to  that 

2  Η  465 


ARISTOTLE 

1248  8 

20  νοησας  rrporepov  η^  νοησαι,  /cat  τοΰτ'  εΙς  ατταρον, 
αλλ'  €στιν  άρχη  τι?.^  ουκ  άρα  του  νοησαι  6  νοΰς^ 
αρχή,  ούδε  του  βουΧ^νσασθαι  βουλή,  τι  ow  άλλο 
ττλήν  τύχη ;  ώστ'  άττό  τύχης  άπαντα  έ'σται.  ■^^  έ'στι 
Tts  Ο'ΡΧ''?  'ή^  ουκ  eoTLV  άλλη  €ζω,  αύτη  he  δια  το 
τοιαύτη    ye    eWt    τοιούτο^     δύναται*    ττοΐέΐν;     το  2 

25  δε  ζητούμ€νον  τοΰτ^  εστί,  τι?  ij  τί^?  κινησ€ως  άρχη 
ev  τη  φυχη.  8ηλον  Βη'  ωσπ€ρ  ev  τω  ολω,  deos  και 
ττάν  cKel  KiveV  •  Kivei  γάρ  πως  πάντα^  το  ev  ημίν 
deZov.  λόγου  δ'  άρχη  ου  λόγος  αλλά  τι  KpeiTTOV.  2 
τι  οΰν  άν  KpeiTTOV  και  €πιστημης  εϊη^  και  νοΰ^^ 
πλην  θ€Ος;     η  γάρ  άρ€τη  του  νου  όργανον  και  δια 

30  τοΰτο,  ο"  ττάλαι  eλeγov,  eύτυχeΐς  καλούνται  οι 
οΓ^  άν  όρμησωσι  κατορθοΰσιν^^  άλογοι  6vτeς.  και 
βoυλeύeσθaι  ου  συμφ€peι  αύτοΐς•  €χουσι  γάρ  άρχην 
τοιαύτην  η  κρ€ίττων^*  του  νου  και  βουλ€ύσ€ως 
[οι  δε  τον  λόγον,  τούτο  δ'  ουκ  €χουσι),  και  ev-  2 
θουσιασμόν ^^    τοΰτο  δ'   ου    δύνανται,    άλογοι   γάρ 

35  6vτeς  €πιτυγχάνουσι^^  και  του  των"  φρονίμων  και 

σοφών  ταχειαν   είναι  την  μαντικήν   και  μόνον  ου 

την  από  του  λόγου  δει  ά7Γολα)8εΓν,  αλλ'  οι  μ€.ν  δι' 

€μπ€ΐρίαν,   οι  δε   δια  συντ^^ειαν  του"  τω   σκoπeιv 

1  ii  add.  Sp. 
^  ά\\'  .   .   .  ris  hie  Rac. :  ante  ούδ'  ένόησε  codd. 
*  ό  vovs  Cas. :  σννοΰσα.. 
*  ^  Sus.  {aut  B') :   ei  (ei  </iT/>  Sp.). 
*   lac. :  5ia  rl  τοιαύτη  τό  elvai  τό  τοΰτο. 
•  Syl.  {potest  Β') :  δύνασθαι. 
'  έκεΐ  Kivel  lac. :  έκΐίνφ.  ®  ττάντα  <τά  ^ι»  ήμΓί'>  lac. 

*  Sp. :  efTTot.  ^^  κα'ί  νοΰ  add.  Sp.  {et  intellectu  W). 

^^  lac. :  oi.  *^  of  add.  Ross. 

^'  Fr.  (dirigunt  B') :  κατορθονν. 
"  Aid. ;  KpeiTTOV.  ^^  Sp. :  ενθουσιασμοί. 

"  Syl. :  ά7Γοτι;7χάνοΐ'σι• 
"  ToD  τώΐ'  Syl. :  τούΓωί»  (horum  B').  "  τοΟ  Sol. ;  re  iv. 

4,66 


EuDEMIAN  ETHICS,  VIII.  ii.  20-23 

deliberation,  nor  does  one  only  think  when  one  has 
previously  thought  before  thinking,  and  so  on  to 
infinity,  but  there  is  some  starting-point ;  therefore 
thought  is  not  the  starting-point  of  thinking,  nor 
deliberation  of  deliberating.  Then  what  else  is,  save 
fortune  ?  It  will  follow  that  everything  originates 
from  fortune.  Or  shall  we  say  that  there  is  a  cer- 
tain starting-point  outside  which  there  is  no  other, 
and  that  this,  merely  owing  to  its  being  of  such 
and  such    a    nature,  can    produce  a  result  of  such 

21  and  such  a  nature  ?  But  this  is  what  we  are  in- 
vestigating— what  is  the  starting-point  of  motion 
in  the  spirit  ?  The  answer  then  is  clear  ;  as  in  the 
universe,  so  there,  everything  is  moved  by  God  ; 
for  in  a  manner  the  divine  element  in  us  is  the  cause 

22  of  all  our  motions.  And  the  starting-point  of  reason 
is  not  reason  but  something  superior  to  reason. 
What,  then,  could  be  superior  even  to  knowledge 
and  to  intellect,  except  God  ?  Not  goodness,  for 
goodness  is  an  instrument  of  the  mind  ;  and  owing 
to  this,  as  I  was  saying  some  time  ago,"  those  are 
called  fortunate  who  although  irrational  succeed  in 
whatever  they  start  on.  And  it  does  not  pay  them 
to  deliberate,  for  they  have  within  them  a  principle 
of  a  kind  that  is  better  than  mind  and  deliberation 

23  (whereas  the  others  have  reason  but  have  not  this)  : 
they  have  inspiration,  but  they  cannot  deliberate.  For 
although  irrational  they  attain  even  what  belongs  to 
the  prudent  and  wise — swiftness  of  divination  :  only 
the  divination  that  is  based  on  reason  we  must  not 
specify,  but  some  of  them  attain  it  by  experience 
and  others  by  practice  in  the  use  of  observation  ; 

«  See  1247  b  26. 

467 


ARISTOTLE 

1248  a 

χρησθαΐ'  τω  θ^ίω^  δε  ούτοι. ^  τούτο  yap*  ev 
ορα  και  το  μ€λλον  και  το  6ν,  καΐ  ών  άττολυεται  ό 
40  Aoyo?  οΰτοί.*  διό  οΐ  μελαγχολικοί  και  evuvoveipoi• 
1248  b  eoi/ce  yap  τ^  ο,ρχη  άττολνομενου  του  Aoyot»*  io;)(ueiv 
μάλλον,  ωστίβρ^  οι  τυφλοί  μνημονβυουσι  μάλλον, 
απολυθέντες  του  προς  τοις  όρωμενοις''  e?vai  το 
μνημόνευαν  .^ 

Φανερον  hrf  οτι  δυο  εί'δη   ευτυχίας,  η  μεν  θεία•  2' 

διό  και  δο/ί€ΐ  ό  ευτυχής  δια  θεον  κατορθοΰν,  οΰτος 

5  δ     εστιι^   ό    «τατά   την   όρμην   κατορθωτικός,^"  6  δ' 

έτερος  6  παρά  την  όρμην.      άλογοι  δ'   αμφότεροι. 

και  η  μεν  συνεχής  ευτυχία  μά?0^ον,  αΰτη  δε  ου  συν- 

III.   Κατά   μέρος   μεν   οΰν   περί   εκάστης  αρετής  1 
ειρηται    πρότερον    επει    δε    χωρίς    8ιείλομεν    την 
10  Βυναμιν  αυτών,  και  περί  της  αρετής  ^ιαρθρωτεον^^ 
της   εκ  τούτων  ην   καλοΰμεν^^    η^η   καλοκάγαθίαν. 

^  Sp. :  θίψ.       *  Von  Arnim:  αΰται.       ^  VonArnim:  καΐ. 

Sol. :  oOros  (11.  37  fF.  συνήθΐίαν  rb  έν  τφ  σκοπεΐν  χρησθαι  τφ 
θεψ  δύνανται  τοντο  καΐ  e5  όραν  καΐ  τό  μέλλον  καΐ  τό  6ι>,  και  ών 
άίΓολύβται  ό  λό-γο^  outws  lac). 

Sp.  (cum  B^)  :   άπολνομέρονί  τούί  λόγου?, 

*  Von  Arnim :  καΐ  ώσπερ. 

'  Rac. :  €ίρηυ.4νοΐί  {του  πρόί  rotj  <.όρατοΐ$  etvai  τφ  ττρό?  TOis> 
€ΐρημένοΐί  <.στΓουδαιότερον>  elvai  τό  μνημόνευαν  lac,  ad  mirabilia 
uirtuosius  esse  quod  memoratur  W). 

*  [to  μνημόνευαν]  ?  Rac.  •  Fr.  (itaque  W) :  bi. 
"  Von  Arnim :  διορθωτικός.  "  v.l.  δωρθωτέαν. 
^*  Γ,  lac.  {uocamus  B') :  έκαλοΰμεν. 

"  The  MS.  reading  gives  '  and  experience  and  habit  use 
God.' 

*  Or,  with  Jackson's  text,  '  But  some  of  them  by  experi- 
468 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  VIII.  ii.  23— iii.  2 

and  these  men  use  the  divine."  For  this  quality 
discerns  aright  the  future  as  well  as  the  present, 
and  these  are  the  men  whose  reason  is  disengaged.  ** 
This  is  why  the  melancholic  even  have  dreams  that 
are  true  ;  for  it  seems  that  when  the  reason  is  dis- 
engaged principle  has  more  strength — ^just  as  the 
blind  remember  better,  being  released  from  having 
their  faculty  of  memory  engaged  with  objects  of 
sight.*' 

It  is  clear,  then,  that  there  are  two  kinds  of  good 
fortune — one  divine,  owing  to  which  the  fortunate 
man's  success  is  thought  to  be  due  to  the  aid  of  God, 
and  this  is  the  man  who  is  successful  in  accordance 
with  his  impulse,  while  the  other  is  he  who  succeeds 
against  his  impulse.  Both  persons  are  irrational. 
The  former  kind  is  more  continuous  good  fortune, 
the  latter  is  not  continuous. 

III.  We  have,  then,  previously  spoken  about  each  c.  ui. 
virtue  in  particular  ;    and  as  we  have  distinguished  x^e  com^" 
their  meaning  separately,  we  [must  also  describe  in  binatioa  of 
detail  the  virtue  constituted  from  them,  to  which  we  *^^  virtues. 
now  give  the  name  <*  of  nobility.®     Now  it  is  mani- 

ence  and  others  by  habituation  have  this  capacity  of  con- 
sulting God  in  examining  things,  and  of  discerning  aright 
both  the  future  and  the  present ;  and  those  also  have  it 
whose  reason  is  disengaged  in  the  manner  described.' 

"  Jackson  (with  some  hints  from  the  Latin  version) 
emends  to  give  '  just  as  blind  men,  who  are  released  from 
attention  to  visibles,  remember  better  than  others,  because 
the  faculty  of  memory  is  thus  more  earnestly  addressed  to 
what  has  been  said.' 

■*  The  MS.  reading  gives,  '  we  were  already  giving  the 
name,'  but  if  that  is  correct,  the  passage  referred  to  has  been 
lost. 

'  Καλοκά•γα.θία,  like  '  nobility  ',  connotes  both  social  status 
and  moral  excellence  ;  so  κα.λοκά•γαθό$  may  be  rendered 
'  gentleman.' 

469 


ARISTOTLE 

1248  b   ^^  ^ 

OTt  fxev  ovv  ανάγκη  τον  ταύτης  αληθώς  τ€νζόμ€νον  2 
της    προσηγορίας    €χ€ίν    τάς    κατά    μέρος    άρ€τάς, 
φαν€ρόν•  ουδέ  γαρ  eirl  των  άλλων  ονθζνος  οΙόν  τ 
αΧλως  e^etv,  ούθ^Ις  γαρ  οΧον  μβν  το  σώμα  uyiatVet 

15  μέρος  δ'  ονθάν,  αλλ'  άναγκαιον  πάντα  η  τα  πλα,στα 
καΐ  κυριώτατα  τον  αυτόν  €.χ&ιν  τρόπον  τώ  δλω. 
έ'στι  δι^  το  aya^ov  etvat  καΐ  το  καλόν  κάγαθον  ου  3 
μόνον  κατά  τα  ονό^υ,ατα  άλλα  καΐ^  καθ^  αυτά 
€χοντα  ^ιαφοράν.  τών  γάρ  αγαθών  πάντων  τέλη 
εστίν  α  αυτά  αυτών  €ν€κά  εστίν  αιρετά,     τούτων  δε  i 

20  καλά  δσα  δι'  αυτά  οντά  ττάντα^  επαινετά  εστίν 
ταΰτα  γάρ  εστίν  άφ'^  ων  α?  τε  πράζεις  εισιν 
ετταινεται  και  αυτά  επαινετά,  δικαιοσύνη*  και 
αΰτη  και  αϊ  πράξεις,  και  αί*  σώφρονες,  επαινετή 
γάρ  και  η  σωφροσύνη•  άλλ'  ούχ  ύγιεια  ετταινετόν, 
ουδέ  γάρ  το  έργον,  ουδέ  το   ισχυρώς,  ουδέ  yap  η 

25  ισχύς,  άλλ'  aya^a  /χε'ν,  ετταινετά  δ'  ου.  ομοίως  5 
δέ  τοΰτο  δτ^λον  και  έπι  τών  άλλων  διά  τη? 
επαγωγής.  αγαθός  μεν  ουν  εστίν  ω  τά  φύσει 
aya^a  έστιν  aya^a.  τά  yap  περιμάχητα  και 
μέγιστα  είναι  δοκουντα  aya^a,  τι/χή  και  ττλοΰτο? 
και    σώματος    άρεται    και    εύτυχίαι    και    Βυνάμεις, 

30  aya^a  ρ,έν  φύσει  εστίν,  ενδε'χεται  δ'  είναι  βλαβερά 
τισι  διά  τά?  έξεις,  ούτε  γάρ  άφρων  ούτ  άδικο?  η 
ακόλαστο?  ών  ουδέν  αν  ονησειε*  χρώμενος  αύτοΐς, 
ώσπερ  ούδ'  ό  κάμνων  τη  του  ύγιαίνοντος  τροφή 
χρώμενος,  ούδ'  6  ασθενής  και  ανάπηρος  τοις  του 
υγιούς    και    τοις   του  ολοκλήρου   κόσμοις.      κάλος  6 

85  δέ  Kaya^o?  τώ  τών  άyα^ώv  τά  καλά  ύπάρχειν 
αύτώ  δι'  αυτά,  και  τω  πρακτικός  είναι  τών  καλών 

^  καΐ  add.  Bus.  ^  aipera.  pro  ιτάντα  ?  Sp. 

*  Syl. :  ΐφ'.  *  ζοΐον^  δικαιοσύνη  Syl. 

4,70 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  VIII.  in.  2-6 

fest  that  one  who  is  to  obtain  this  appellation  truly 
must  possess  the  particular  virtues  ;  for  it  is  im- 
possible for  it  to  be  otherwise  in  the  case  of  any 
other  matter  either — for  instance,  no  one  is  healthy 
in  his  whole  body  but  not  in  any  part  of  it,  but  all 
the  parts,  or  most  of  them  and  the  most  important, 
must  necessarily  be  in  the  same  condition  as  the 

3  whole.  Now  being  good  and  being  noble  are  really  More  than 
different  not  only  in  their  names  but  also  in  them-  ^"(iness. 
selves.     For  all  goods  have  Ends  that  are  desirable 

4  in  and  for  themselves.  Of  these,  all  those  are  fine 
which  are  laudable  as  existing  for  their  own  sakes, 
for  these  are  the  Ends  which  are  both  the  motives 
of  laudable  actions  and  laudable  themselves — ^justice 
itself  and  its  actions,  and  temperate  actions,  for 
temperance  also  is  laudable  ;  but  health  is  not 
laudable,  for  its  eiFect  is  not,  nor  is  vigorous  action 
laudable,  for  strength  is  not — these  things  are  good 

5  but  they  are  not  laudable.  And  similarly  induction 
makes  this  clear  in  the  other  cases  also.  Therefore 
a  man  is  good  for  whom  the  things  good  by  nature  are 
good.  For  the  things  men  fight  about  and  think  the 
greatest,  honour  and  wealth  and  bodily  excellences 
and  pieces  of  good  fortune  and  powers,  are  good  by 
nature  but  may  possibly  be  harmful  to  some  men 
owing  to  their  characters.  If  a  man  is  foolish  or 
unjust  or  profligate  he  would  gain  no  profit  by  em- 
ploying them,  any  more  than  an  invalid  would  bene- 
fit from  using  the  diet  of  a  man  in  good  health,  or 
a  weakling   and   cripple   from   the   equipment   of  a 

6  healthy  man  and  of  a  sound  one.     A  man  is  noble  its 
because   he   possesses   those   good  things   that   are  psychology. 
fine  for  their  own  sake  and  because  he  is  a  doer  of 

*  Sol. ;  4,  '  Γ,  Sp. :  ονδ'  6ρήσ€ΐ€, 

471 


ARISTOTLE 

1248  b         ^ 

καΐ  αυτών  evcKa•  καλά  δ'  εστίν  at  re  άρεταΐ  και 
τά  €.ργα  τά  από  rrjs  aperrjs. 

"Εστί    8e    τι?    e^i?    ττολιτικτ^,    οΓαν    οι    Αάκων^ς  7 
€χουσιν  η  άλλοι  τοιούτοι  €χοΐ€ν  άν,  αντη  δ'  €στΙν 
40  e^t?  τοιαύτη,     elal  γαρ  οι  οΐονται  την  άρΐτην  Beiv 

1249  a  y^ev    €χ€ΐν,   άλλα   τών    φύσ€ΐ    aya^oiv    evcKev    διό 

aya^ot  μβν  dvSpes  €ΐσίν  (τά  yap  φύσ€ΐ  μ,βν^  αγαθά 
aya^a^  αυτοΓ?  εστίν),  καλοκάγαθίαν  δε'  ou/c 
εχονσιν  ου  γαρ  υπάρχει  αύτοΐς  τά  καλά  δι'  αυτά 
και    προαιρούνται    καλά    κάγαθά*'    και    ού    μόνον 

5  ταύτα,  αλλά  και  τά  μη  καλά  μεν  φύσει  οντά, 
αγαθά  δε  φύσει  οντά,  τούτοις  καλά.  καλά  γάρ  8 
εστίν  όταν  ου  ένεκα  πράττουσι  και  αιροϋνται 
καλόν  fj.  διό  τω  καλώ  κάγαθω  καλά  εστί  τά 
φύσει  aya^a•  καλόν  γάρ  τό  δίκαιον,  τοΰτο  δε  το 
κατ'  άζίαν,  άζιος  δ'  ουτο?  τούτων  και  τό  πρέπον  9 

10  καλόν,  πρέπει  δε  ταΰτα  τούτω,'  ττλουτο?  εΰyεvεια 
δυνα/χι?.  ώστε  τω  καλώ  Kaya^o)  τά  αυτά  και* 
συμφέροντα  και  καλά  εστίν  τοις  δε  ττολλοι?  δια- 
φωνεί ταΰτα,^  ού  γάρ  τά  άττλώ?  aya^a  κάκείνοις 
aya^a  εστί,  τω  δ'  άγαθω  dya^a•  τω  δε  καλώ 
Kaya^oi*  και  καλά,  ττολλά?  γάρ  και  καλά?  πράζεις 

15  δι'  αυτά  επραζεν.     6  δ'  οίόμενος  τάς  άρετάς  εχειν  10 
δειν  ένεκα  τών   εκτός  άyα0ώv  κατά  τό   συμβεβη- 
κός  καλά  πράττει. 

"Εστίν  οΰν  καλοκαγαθία  άρετη  τέλειος. 

Και   ττερι   τ^δοντ^?   δ'    εϊρηται   ποιόν   τι   και   πώς  11 

1  [μέν]  ?  liac. 

2  ά7αβά  alterum  add.  Sol.  (cf.  1248  b  26). 

^  Γ :  γάρ.  *  Ross :  καλοί  κά•/αθοί. 

*  Γ  :  νλούτψ.  *  Brandis  :  «ai  αυτά  τά  aut  καϊ  αι/τά. 

'  Rac. :  τοΰτο.  '  Sp. :  τφ  δ'  ά-γαΟφ, 

47  a 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  VIII.  in.  6-11 

fine  deeds  even  for  their  own  sake  ;  and  the  fine 
things  are  the  virtues  and  the  actions  that  arise  from 
virtue. 

7  But  there  is  also  a  state  of  character  that  is  the  itisnon- 

'  civic  '  character,  such  as  the  Spartans  have  or  "  "  *'^'*"' 
others  hke  them  may  have ;  and  this  character 
is  of  the  following  sort.  There  are  those  who  think 
that  one  ought,  it  is  true,  to  possess  goodness,  but 
for  the  sake  of  the  things  that  are  naturally  good  ; 
hence  though  they  are  good  men  (for  the  things 
naturally  good  are  good  for  them),  yet  they  have  not 
nobility,  for  it  is  not  the  case  with  them  that  they 
possess  fine  things  for  their  own  sake  and  that  they 
purpose  fine  actions,  and  not  only  this,  but  also  that 
things  not  fine  by  nature  but  good  by  nature  are 

8  fine  for  them.  For  things  are  fine  when  that  for 
which  men  do  them  and  choose  them  is  fine.  There- 
fore to  the  noble  man  the  things  good  by  nature  are 
fine  ;  for  what  is  just  is  fine,  and  what  is  according 
to  worth  is  just,  and  he  is  worthy  of  these  things  ; 

9  and  what  is  befitting  is  fine,  and  these  things  befit 
him — wealth,  birth,  power.  Hence  for  the  noble 
man  the  sarfte  things  are  both  advantageous  and 
fine  ;  but  for  the  multitude  these  things  do  not 
coincide,  for  things  absolutely  good  are  not  also 
good  for  them,  whereas  they  are  good  for  the  good 
man  ;  and  to  the  noble  man  they  are  also  fine,  for 
he   performs   many   fine    actions   because   of  them. 

10  But  he  who  thinks  that  one  ought  to  possess  the 
virtues  for  the  sake  of  external  goods  does  fine  things 
only  by  accident. 

Nobility  then  is  perfect  goodness. 

11  We  have  also  spoken  about  the  nature  of  pleasure  itspieas- 

-,  - antness. 

473 


ARISTOTLE 

1249  a 

αγαθόν,  καΐ  otl  τά  τ€  απλώς  ηδέα  icat  καλά.  τά  re 

απλώς  dya^o,  καΐ^  τ^δεα.      ου  yLverai  hk  rjSov-η  μη 

20  iv  πράζζΐ'  δια  τοΰτο  6  αληθώς  βν^αίμων  καΐ  η^ιστα 

ζησβι,  καΐ  τοΰτο  ου  μάτην  οι  άνθρωποι  άζιοΰσιν. 

Έττει   δ     eart   τ駕   ορός   καΐ  τω    Ιατρώ   προς   ον  15 

άναφβρων   κρίν€ί    το    ΰγιαΖνον^   σώμα   και    τ6^  μη, 

και   προς    ον   μ^χρι    ποσοϋ   ποιητβον    βκαστον    και 

ύγΐ€ΐνόν,*  €1  he  έ'λαττον  η  πλ4ον  ούκέτι,  οϋτω  και 

25  τω   σπουΒαίω   π€ρΙ  τάς  πράζ€ΐς   και  αΙρ€σ€ΐς  τών 

1249  b  φνσ€ΐ  μ€ν  aya^cDv  ουκ  iπaιveτώv  δε  δει  τιρ'ά  etvat 

δρον  και  eζeως  και  της   alpeσeως  και  φυγής,  και 

πepι  χρημάτων  πλήθος  και  όλιγότητα^   και  τών  βύ- 

τυχημάτων.      iv  μέν  ουν  τοις  πρότ€ρον  ζλέγβη  το  1' 

ώς    6    λόγος'    τοΰτο    δ'    eoTiv    ώσπβρ    αν    ei    τις 

5  iv  τοις  πepι  την  τροφην  €Ϊπ€ΐ€ν  ώς  η  ιατρική  και 

6  λόγος   ταύτης,   τοΰτο   δ'    αληθές   μ€ν    ου    σαφές 

84.     Sei   δη    ώσπep    καΐ    iv    τοις    άλλοις    προς    το  h 

άρχον    ζην,  και  προς  την    e^iv  /cat'  την   iv€pγeιav 

την  του  άpχovτeς,  οίον  Βοΰλον  προς  δεσττότου  και 

eKaoTov  προς  την  ΙκάσταΡ  καθηκουσαν  άρχην.    €7Γ€ι  Ιί 

10  he    και    άνθρωπος    φύσ€ΐ    συν€στηκ€ν   i^    άρχοντος 

και    αρχομένου,   και    €καστον    αν*    Beoi    προς    την 

αύτου*    άρχην    ζην    (αύ'ττ^    Se   Βιττη,  άλλως   γαρ  η 

ιατρική  άρχη  και  άλλως  η  uyteia,  ταύτης  he  eveKa 

βκείνη),  οϋτω  δη"  eχeι  και"  κατά  το  θ€ωρητικόν. 

ον  γαρ  €πιτακτικώς  άρχων  6  θ€Ος,  αλλ'  οΰ  eveKa 

^  καΐ  hie  Rac. :  ante  τά  re  άπΧωί.  *  Vat. :  vytfivov. 

'  τό  add.  Rac.  *  Ross :  καΐ  e5  uyiaivov. 

*  Zeller  :   καΙ  περί  φνγηί  χρημάτων  πλήθον$  και  όλι-γότητοί. 

*  και  Ross :  κατά.  '  Rac. :  έκάστον. 

*  Άν  Sp.  :   δη.  •  Sp. :   βουτώ»'  {εν  αντφ  ?  Rac). 

"  Rieckher:  Set.  "  »coi  add.  Sus. 

«  1222  a  6-10,  b  7,  1232  a  32  f. 

474 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  VIII.  in.  11-15 

and  the  manner  in  which  it  is  a  good,  and  have  said 
that  things  pleasant  absolutely  are  also  fine  and  that 
things  good  absolutely  are  also  pleasant.  Pleasurle"•  . 
does  not  occur  except  in  action  ;  on  this  account  the 
truly  happy  man  will  also  live  most  pleasantly,  and 
it  is  not  without  reason  that  people  demand  this. 

12  But  since  a  doctor  has  a  certain  standard  by  refer-  Limit  of 
ring  to  which  he  judges  the  healthy  body  and  the  goods  ** 
unhealthy,  and  in  relation  to  which  each  thing  up 

to  a  certain  point  ought  to  be  done  and  is  wholesome, 
but  if  less  is  done,  or  more,  it  ceases  to  be  whole- 
some, so  in  regard  to  actions  and  choices  of  things 
good  by  nature  but  not  laudable  a  virtuous  man 
ought  to  have  a  certain  standard  both  of  character 
and  of  choice  and  avoidance  ;  and  also  in  regard 
to  large  and  small  amount  of  property  and  of  good 

13  fortune.  Now  in  what  preceded "  we  stated  the 
standard  '  as  reason  directs  '  ;  but  this  is  as  if  in 
matters  of  diet  one  were  to  say  '  as  medical  science 
and  its  principles  direct,'   and  this  though  true  is 

14  not  clear.  It  is  proper,  therefore,  here  as  in  other 
matters  to  live  with  reference  to  the  ruling  factor,  and 
to  the  state  and  the  activity  of  the  ruling  factor,  as 
for  example  slave  must  live  with  reference  to  the  rule 
of  master,  and  each  person  with  reference  to  the  rule 

15  appropriate  to  each.  And  since  man  consists  by 
nature  of  a  ruling  part  and  a  subject  part,  and  each 
would  properly  live  with  reference  to  the  ruling 
principle  within  him  (and  this  is  twofold,  for  medical 
science  is  a  ruling  principle  in  one  way  and  health  is 
in  another,  and  the  former  is  a  means  to  the  latter), 
this  is  therefore  the  case  in  regard  to  the  faculty  of 
contemplation.  For  God  is  not  a  ruler  in  the  sense 
of  issuing  commands,  but  is  the  End  as  a   means 

475 


ARISTOTLE 

1249  b 

15  η  φρόνησις  εττιτάττει  φίττον  Be  το  ου  eVe/ca, 
διώρισται  δ'  iv  άλλοίς),  CTret  €Κ€Ϊνός  γ€^  ονθβνός 
δειται.  ητίς  οΰν  αίρ€σις  καΐ  κτησις  των  φύσ€ΐ,  h 
άγαμων  ποίήσα  μάλιστα  την  τον  deov  θεωρίαν,  η 
σώματος  η  χρημάτων  η  φίλων  η  των  άλλων  αγα- 
θών, αϋτη  αρίστη   καΐ  ούτος  6  ορός  κάλλιστος•   et 

20  τις    δ     η    δι'    ένδειαν  η  δι'   νττβρβολην  κωλυ€ΐ  τον 
θεον  θ€ραπ€ν€ΐν  και  θεωρεΐν,  αϋτη  δβ  φαύλη.     €χ€ΐ  Γ 
δε  τοΰτο  οντω"  τη  φνχη,  και  οΰτος  της  φνχης  ορός 
άριστος,  το'  ηκιστα  αίσθάνεσθαι  του  αλόγου*  μέρους 
της  φυχης,  fj  τοιούτον. 

Ύίς  μεν   ουν   ορός   της   καλοκαγαθίας   και  τίς   6 

25  σκοπός  τών  απλώς  aya^cav  έστω  είρημενον. 

^  Syl. :  re.  ^  οντω  add.  Rac. 

3  Zeller:  τά.  *  Fr. :  όίλλοί'. 

"  End  or  '  final  cause  '  {οΰ  ΐνεκα)  denotes  (1)  the  person  or 
thing  for  whose  good  something  is  done,  (2)  the  purpose  for 
which  it  is  done.     God  is  the  Final  Cause  in  the  latter  sense : 


476 


EUDEMIAN  ETHICS,  VIII.  in.  15-17 

to  which  wisdom  gives  commands  (and  the  term 
'  End '  has  two  meanings,  but  these  have  been 
distinguished  elsewhere  *)  ;   since  clearly  God  is  in 

16  need    of   nothing.     Therefore    whatever    mode    of  as  means 
choosing  and  of  acquiring  things  good  by  nature —  tempiation 
whether  goods  of  body  or  wealth  or  friends  or  the  of  God. 
other  goods — will  best  promote  the  contemplation 

of  God,  that  is  the  best  mode,  and  that  standard  is 
the  finest ;  and  any  mode  of  choice  and  acquisition . 
that  either  through  deficiency  or  excess  hinders  us 
from  serving  and  from  contemplating  God — that  is  a 

17  bad  one.  This  is  how  it  is  for  the  spirit,  and  this  is 
the  best  spiritual  standard — to  be  as  far  as  possible 
unconscious  of  the  irrational  part  of  the  spirit,  as 
such. 

Let  this,  then,  be  our  statement  of  what  is  the 
standard  of  nobility  and  what  is  the  aim  of  things 
absolutely  good.  i/~>Oc) 

cf.  Phys.  194  a  32-36,  Be  An.  415  b  2,  Met.  1072  b  2 
(Solomon). 


477 


INDEX  I.— PROPER  NAMES 


References  are  to  the  pages,  columns  (a  and  b)  and  lines  of  the  Berlin  edition 
of  Aristotle,  1831,  marked  in  the  left-hand  margin  of  the  text.  The  two  first 
figures  of  the  page-numbers  are  omitted,  14  α  ίο  51  ft  standing  for  1214  a  to 
1251  6.     The  first  line  only  of  each  passage  referred  to  is  given  in  most  cases. 

Short  foot-notes  on  some  of  the  nomes  ivill  be  found  below  the  translation. 


Achilles,  30  a  19 
Aenicus,  38  b  38 
Agathon,  30  a  1,  32  b  8 
Anaxagoras,  15  b  6,  16  a  11 
Aiitiphon's  Andromache,  39  a  38 
Antiphon  the  orator,  32  b  7 
Apis,  16  a  1 
Athenians,  36  a  36,  42  b  25 

Byzantium,  47  a  19 

Celts,  29  b  28 
Cheiron,  30  a  2 
Cimon,  33  b  13 
Clazomenae,  15  b  7 
Coriscus,  20  a  19,  40  b  25 
Crete,  29  a  24 

Delos,  14  a  1 
Dioscuri,  45  b  33 

Egypt,  16  a  1,  35  b  2 

Bryxis,  31  a  17 

Euripides,  35  a  16,  b  21,  38  a  12, 

34,  39  b  22,  44  a  11 
Eurysthenes,  45  b  31 
Bvenus,  23  a  31 

Glaucus,  36  a  35 

Hector,  30  a  18 
Heracleitue,  23  b  22,  35  a  25 
Heracles,  45  a  30,  b  30 
Herodicus,  43  b  23 
Herodotus,  36  b  9i 
Hesiod,  35  a  18,  12  b  34 


Hippocrates,  47  a  17 
Homer,  30  a  18,  34  a  2 

Indians,  26  a  29 

Laconians,  see  Spartans 
Leto,  14  a  2 

Megara,  36  a  37,  42  b  25 
Metapontium,  29  a  23 

Olympia,  33  b  12 

Pammenes,  43  b  21 
Peliades  25  b  4 
Philolaus,  25  a  33 
Philoxenus,  31  a  17 
Plato,  29  a  15 

Plato's  ethic  refuted,  17  b  1 
Polydamas,  30  a  20 
Pytho,  43  b  20 

Sardanapallus,  16  a  16 

Sireng,  30  b  35 

Smindyrldes,  16  a  16 

Socrates,  16  b  2,  29  a  15,  30  a  7, 

35  a  37,  46  b  34,  47  b  15 
Solon,  19  b  6 
Sophocles,  42  a  37 
Spartans,  45  b  32,  48  b  38 
Stratonicus,  31  a  11 
Sybarite,  16  a  17 

Themistocles,  33  b  11 

Theognis,  30  a  12,  37  b  14,  43  a  17 

I    Zeus,  42  a  39,  44  a  14 

479 


INDEX  II.— SUBJECTS 


lleferences  as  in  Index  I. 


Activity  better  than  state,  19  a  31, 
28  a  13,  41  a  40 ;  constitutes 
happiness,  19  a  28 

Agreement  of  feeling,  41  a  2 

Analytics,  17  a  17,  22  b  38 

Appetition,  23  a  26,  25  b  25,  26  a  17, 
47  a  li) 

Architecture,  16  b  9 

Astronomy,  16  b  12 

Boars,  wild,  29  a  26 
Boastfulness,  21  a  6,  24 
Boors  in  comedy,  30  b  19,  34  a  5 
Brotherhoods,  41  b  20 
Buffoonery,  34  a  5 

Categories,  the  ten,  17  b  27 
Colourinji,  protective,  35  a  12 
Concord,  41  a  2  n. 
Constitutions,    normal    and    per- 
verted, 41  b  27 
Courage,  28  a  28,  30  a  30 
Cowardice,  20  b  20,  28  a  32 
Crocodile,  36  b  10 
Culture,  14  b  8 

Diagonal  incommensurable,  26  a  3 
Dog,  35  a  12 

Downrightness,  29  a  20,  31  a  19 
Drunkenness,  29  a  30,  31  a  19 

Effeminacy,  29  b  1 

Encomia,  19  b  9 

Endurance,  21  a  9 

Envy,  21  a  3,  33  b  19,  34  a  30 

Equality,  arithmetical  and  pro- 
portional, 41  b  38 

Eternal,  18  a  12 

Experience,  courage  of,  29  a  15, 
30  a  5 

480 


Extraneous  discourses,   17    b  22, 

18  b34 

Extremes    unequally   opposed    to 
mean,  22  a  22  ;  meet,  34  b  1 

Felicitation,  19  b  14 

Flattery,  21  a  7,  33  b  30,  30  a  24 

'  Forms  '  a  logical  fiction,  17  b  20 

Fortune,  15  a  12,  47  a  1 

Freewill,  23  a  21 

Friend  another  self,  45  a  29  ;  must 

be  an   equal,   39  a  5 ;    number 

limited,  45  b  20 
Friendship,  Bk.  VII 

Gentleness,  22  b  1,  31  b  5 

Geometry,  16  b  8,  22  b  32,  47  a  17 

Gimlet,  42  a  IS 

Gluttony,  31  a  19 

God,    17    a    24,    43    b  12,    44    b  8, 

45  b  17,  48  a  26,  b3;   the  prime 

mover.  22  b  23 
Good,    Plato's   Absolute,    refutwl, 

17  b  1 
Good  feeling,  41  a  2 
Good  genius,  33  b  3 
Goo<lness  (virtue)  defined,  18  b  37, 

19  b  20,  20  a  2,  b  20 
Goodwill,  41  a  2  n. 
Grammar,  2(5  a  36,  46  b  28 
Greatness  of  spirit,  21  a  10,  32  a  19 
Gullet,  31  a  15 

Happiness  defined,  19  a  28 
Health,  17  a  37 

Honour,  14  b  8,  82  b  10,  42  b  19, 
44  a  15,  48  b  28 

Ideal  good,  the,  17  b  1 
Ideas,  see  '  Forms ' 


INDEX  Π.  TO  THE  EUDEMIAN  ETHICS 


Imagination,  19  b  24 
Induction,  TO  a  1,  20  a  29,  48  b  26 
Insensitiveness,  21  a  2,  22  a  3 
Inspiration,  25  a  28 
Intellectual  virtue,  20  a  5,  21  b  29 
Involuntary  action,  25  b  1 
Irascibility,  20  b  38,  31  b  6 
Irrational,  19  b  31,  20  a  10,  b  6,  21  b 
31,  46  b  13,  47  a  13,  b  19 

Justice,  16  b  4,  18  a  10,  34  a  31, 
42  a  33,  46  a  86,  48  b  21 

Knowledge,  use  of,  25  b  11 ;  misuse 
of,  46  a  33 

Lechery,  31  a  19 
Liberality,  31  b  28 
Life,  love  of,  44  b  28 
Lives,  three  typical,  15  b  1 
Luxuriousness,  21  a  9,  30 

Magnanimity,     see    Greatness    of 

spirit 
Magnificence,  21  a  11,  33  a  31 
Mathematics,  nature  of,  22  b  23 
Mean,  the  moral,  20  b  22,  22  a  10, 

31  b  38,  32  a  12 
Meanness,  21  a  11 
Mind,  17  b  31,  40  b  34 
Modesty,  21  a  1,  33  b  27 

Natural  goodness,  48  a  1 
Natural  science,  16  b  12 
Nature  not  in  our  power,  23  a  11  ; 

uniformity  of,  47  a  31 
Nemesis,  see  Righteous  indignation 
Nobility,  4S  b  10 
Nutritive  part  of  spirit,  19  b  21 

Odours,  31  a  6 

Passion,  23  b  18 

Philosophy,  14  a  13,  15  a  2,  16  a  29, 

17  a  1,  45  a  22 
Philtre,  21  b  5 
Phratries,  see  Brotherhoods 
Physics,  16  b  12  n. 
Plants,  16  a  5,  22  b  18 
Pleasure  and  Pain,  20  a  34,  22  b  10 
Politicians,  16  a  23 
Prodigality,  21  a  15,  31  b  38,  32  a  16 
Prophecy,  25  a  28 
Prot(ictive  colouring,  35  a  12 


2  I 


Psychology,  ethical,  Bk.  II.  ch.  i. 
Purpose,  25  b  18 

Revenge,  29  b  32 

Righteous  indignation,  21  a  3, 
33  b24 

Salt,  38  a  3 

Sandpiper,  36  b  9 

Schedule  of  virtues  and  vices,  20  b 
30,  28  a  28 

Sciences,  theoretical  and  pro- 
ductive, 16  b  11 

Self-control,  23  b  1,  24  a  32 

Self-depreciation,  21  a  6,  25,  33  b  39 

Self-knowledge,  44  b  26 

Shabbiness,  21  a  11,  35 

Shamelessness,  21  a  1,  33  b  27 

Sight,  18  a  32,  19  a  6,  27  a  24,  31  a  22 

Skinflint,  32  a  12 

Slave  defined,  41  b  23 

Sleep,  19  b  20 

Smell,  31  a  22 

Soft,  32  a  12 

Spirit  (soul),  parts  of,  18  b  35 

Squeamish,  34  a  6 

Stitt;  34  a  5 

Stubborn,  21  a  8,  28,  33  b  34 

Taste,  30  b  25,  33  a  39 
Teaching,  18  b  17 
Teetotallers,  23  b  3 
Temperance,  30  a  36 
Tile,  35  a  12 
Tongue,  31  a  14 
Tool  defined,  41  b  24 
Touch,  31  a  14 
Truthfulness,  33  b  38 

Unanimity,  41  a  16 

Vanity,  21  a  10,  32,  33  a  11 

Vegetative,  see  Nutritive 

Vices  of  excess  and  defect,  21  a  13, 

Virtue,  see  Goodness 

Virtues  and  vices,  schedule  of,  20 

b  36  ;  voluntary,  23  a  9 
Visions,  19  b  24 
Voluntary,  23  a  21,  25  b  8 

Wealth,  14  b  8,   17  a  37,    27  a  14, 

30  a  11,  32  b  10,  48  b  28,  49  a  10 
Wish,  23  a  27,  b  26,  25  b  25,  27  a  3, 
Wittiness,  34  a  4 

481 


ON  VIRTUES  AND  VICES 


INTRODUCTION 
Contents 

This  essay  is  of  interest  as  an  example  of  the  way  in 
which  Aristotle's  reduction  to  scientific  form  of  the 
ethical  system  adumbrated  by  Plato  was  later  sys- 
tematized and  stereotyped  by  smaller  minds.  It 
classifies  the  various  kinds  of  good  and  bad  conduct 
under  the  virtues  and  vices  of  which  they  are  mani- 
festations. It  starts  from  the  ethical  psychology  of 
Plato,  dividing  the  Soul  or  personality  of  man  into 
three  parts,  the  reason,  the  passions  and  the  appetites. 
Then  turning  to  conduct,  it  ranges  the  various  actions 
and  emotions  under  the  virtues  and  vices  which  they 
exemplify. 

Affinities 

The  list  of  Virtues  or  forms  of  Goodness  "  is  Aris- 
totelian, as  in  addition  to  the  four  cardinal  virtues  of 
Plato,  Wisdom  or  prudence.  Courage  or  manliness. 
Temperance  or  sobriety  of  mind,  and  Justice  or  right- 
eousness, it  includes  Gentleness,  Self-control,  Liber- 

"  The  word  '  virtue '  to  the  modern  English  ear  denotes 
only  one  department  of  αρετή,  viz.   ήθικη  άρΐτή   or  '  moral 

f goodness.'  The  Greek  mind  saw  the  imity  of  human  excel- 
ence  behind  its  various  forms. 

484 


ON  VIRTUES  AND  VICES 

ality  or  generosity,  and  Magnanimity  or  greatness 
of  spirit.  But  the  analysis  of  these  virtues  adopted 
is  not  Aristotle's.  He  exhibited  them  as  forms  of 
moderation,  lying  midway  between  vicious  extremes 
of  excess  and  deficiency  ;  but  here  each  virtue  is 
merely  contrasted  with  a  single  vice  as  its  opposite. 
And  near  the  end  of  the  essay  (c.  viii.)  there  is  an 
allusion  to  the  comparison  drawn  by  Plato  in  the 
Republic  between  the  well-ordered  Soul  and  the  well- 
constituted  State. 

It  is  true  that  the  rigorously  systematic  arrange- 
ment of  the  matter  and  the  concise  fullness  of  detail 
(in  cc.  vii.,  viii.  three  of  the  Vices  are  neatly  sub- 
divided into  three  species  each)  are  more  character- 
istic of  the  Peripatic  School  than  of  the  Academy  ; 
the  formal  exposition  of  a  subject  already  fully 
explored  has  replaced  the  tentative  heuristic  method 
which  Plato  in  his  dialogues  inherited  from  Socrates. 
The  descriptive  treatment  of  the  virtues  and  vices 
(a  method  that  had  been  first  foreshadowed  in  the 
Nicomachean  Ethics,  in  for  instance  the  portrait  of 
the  Magnanimous  Man)  links  the  work  with  the 
Characters  of  Theophrastus,  and  seems  to  have  been 
customary  in  the  Peripatetic  School  from  his  time 
onward.  Zeller  <*  points  out  that  the  recognition  of 
an  order  of  beings  between  gods  and  men,  the 
daimones,  in  the  passages  dealing  with  piety  and  god- 
liness (cc.  v.,  vii.),  also  indicates  a  late  period.  A 
faint  trace  of  Stoic  influence  may  be  seen  in  the 
formal  antithesis  of  praiseworthy  and  blameworthy 
actions  at  the  beginning  and  the  end  of  the  treatise. 

"  Eclectics,  p.  145. 

485 


ARISTOTLE 


Date 


Susemihl  "■  agrees  with  Zeller  that  the  book  prob- 
ably belongs  to  the  eclectic  period  ;  he  dates  it  not 
earlier  than  the  first  century  b.c.  and  perhaps  in  the 
first  century  a.d.,  and  sees  in  it  an  author  of  no  great 
ability,  apparently  a  Peripatetic,  attempting  to 
reconcile  the  moral  philosophy  of  Aristotle  with  that 
of  Plato. 

The  earlier  date  suggested  brings  it  within  range 
of  Andronicus  of  Rhodes,  who  was  head  of  the  Peri- 
patetic School  at  Athens  in  Cicero's  student  days. 
Andronicus  edited  and  commentated  on  the  Master's 
works,  making  some  modifications  of  his  own  in  logic 
and  psychology.  Under  his  name,  though  scholars 
usually  assign  it  to  a  later  date,  there  has  come  down 
to  us  a  treatise  Hepl  τταθων,  and  appended  to  this 
treatise  is  an  essay  On  Virtues  and  Vices  which  is  a 
copy  of  the  one  before  us,  though  the  order  of  the 
contents  has  been  rearranged.  This  book  serves  as 
additional  evidence  for  our  text. 

Some  further  evidence  is  supplied  by  the  mss.  of 
the  Florilegium  of  Joannes  Stobaeus  (John  of  Stobi 
in  Macedonia,  fifth  century  a.d.  or  later),  of  which 
miscellany  the  present  essay  forms  c.  xviii  of 
Book  I. 

Manuscripts  and  Texts 

The  text  of  this  edition  is  based  on  that  of  Bekker 
in  the  Berlin  Aristotle,  1833,  where  liepl  άρίτων 
και  κακ-ιώΐ'  occupies  pp.  1249-1251  in  the  second 
volume  ;  Bekker  gives  no  critical  notes.    The  Berlin 

"  Teubner  ed.,  p.  xxxi. 
486 


ON  VIRTUES  AND  VICES 

page-numbers,  columns  (a  and  b)  and  lines  are  printed 
in  the  margin  here.  The  only  considerable  later  work 
on  the  text  is  that  of  Susemihl,  who  included  this 
essay  in  the  volume  containing  the  Eudemian  Ethics 
(Teubner,  Leipzig,  1884)  ;  his  text  has  full  critical 
notes,  a  few  selections  from  which  are  given  here. 
Susemihl  uses  chiefly  four  mss.  :  L'',  the  twelfth- 
century  Paris  MS.  of  the  Nicomachean  Ethics  which, 
lias  Of  Virtues  and  Vices  appended,  in  a  hand  dating 
probably  at  the  beginning  of  the  thirteenth  century  ; 
F',  the  fourteenth-century  Laurentian  ms.  ;  and  two 
at  Madrid,  one  grouping  with  F"  and  the  other  vvdth 
L'',  as  do  six  others  of  the  fifteenth  and  sixteenth 
centuries  (one  in  the  Bodleian)  which  he  has  collated, 
and  the  oldest  extant  edition,  published  at  Basel  in 
1539  :  an.  older  edition  has  now  disappeared. 

In  the  brief  critical  notes  beneath  tlie  present  text 
the  variants  of  U'  and  F'•  are  sometimes  quoted,  and 
the  readings  of  one  or  more  other  mss.  are  denoted 
by  v.l.  The  sources  of  conjectural  emendations  are 
indicated  by  the  following  abbreviations  : 

And.  =  Andronicus 
Rac.  =Rackham 
St.     =  Stobaeus 
Sus.  =  Susemihl 

A  few  conjectures  of  Bussemaker  and  of  Sylburg  are 
quoted  from  Susemihl. 

H.  R. 
December  1934. 


487 


ΠΕΡΙ   ΑΡΕΤί2Ν    ΚΑΙ 
ΚΑΚΙί2Ν 

1249  a 

26  Ι.     Έι7ταιν€τα  μ€ν   ianv   τα   καλά,   φ^κτα   8e   τα  1 
αισχρά•   καΐ  των  μβν   καλών   ήγοΰνται   αϊ  aperai, 
των  δε  αΙσχρών  αϊ  κακίαι•  ωστ€  €ΤΓαιν€ταΙ  μ€ν  αί  2 
άρεται/  ετταινετά  δε  εστί  καΐ  τά  αΐτια  των  άρ€τών 
καΐ  τά  παρ€πόμ€να  ταΐς  άρβταΐς  καΐ  τά  γινόμενα  άττ' 

30  αυτών  καΐ  τά  €ργα  αυτών,'  φεκτά  δε  τά  εναντία. 

Τρίμερους    δε    της    φυχης    λαμβανομένης    κατά  3 

1249  b  Πλάτωνα,     του    μ€ν    λογιστικού     άρβτή     εστίν    η 

27  φρόνησις,  του  δε  θυμο^ώοΰς  η  τε  πραότης  και  η 
ανδρεία,  του  δε  βττιθυμητικοΰ  η  τε  σωφροσύνη  και 
η  €γκράτ€ΐα,  όλης  δε  της  φυχης  η  τε  8ικαιοσύνη 
και  η   €λ€υθ€ριότης   και  η   μξγαλοφυχία-   κακία   δε  4 

30  εστίν  του  μέν  λογιστικού  η  αφροσύνη ,  του  δε 
θυμο^ώοΰς   η   τε   όργιλότης   και   η   δείλια,   τοΰ   δε 

1250  a  €πιθυμητικοΰ  η  τε  ακολασία  και  η  άκρασία,  όλης 

δε  της  φνχης  η  τε   αδικία   και  η  άνελευ^ερια   και 
η  μικροφυχία. 

II.  "Εστίν  δε  φρόνησις  μ€ν  άρετη  τοΰ  λογιστικού  1 
7ταρασκ€υαστικη   τών   προς   ευδαι/χονιαν   συντεινόν- 
6  των.     πραότης  δε'  εστίν  άρ€τη  τοΰ  θυμο€ώοΰς  καθ^  2 
ην    προς    οργάς    γίνονται    δυσκίνητοι.     άνδ/3εια    δε  3 
488 


ON  VIRTUES  AND  VICES 

1  I.  Fine  things  are  the  objects  of  praise,  base  things  Moral 
of  blame  ;    and  at  the  head  of  the  fine  stand  the  ^*'*^^• 

2  virtues,  at  the  head  of  the  base  the  vices  ;  con- 
sequently the  virtues  are  objects  of  praise,  and  also 
the  causes  of  the  virtues  are  objects  of  praise,  and  the 
things  that  accompany  the  virtues  and  that  result 
from  them,  and  their  M^orks,  while  the  opposite  are 
the  objects  of  blame. 

3  If  in  accordance  with  Plato  the  spirit  is  taken  as  Psychology 
having  three  parts,  wisdom  is  goodness  of  the  rational 

part,  gentleness  and  courage  of  the  passionate,  of  the 
appetitive  sobriety  of  mind  and  self-control,  and  of 
the  spirit  as  a  whole  righteousness,  liberality  and 

4  great-spiritedness  ;  while  badness  of  the  rational  part 
is  folly,  of  the  passionate  ill-temper  and  cowardice,  of 
the  appetitive  profligacy  and  uncontrol,  and  of  the 
spirit  as  a  whole  unrighteousness,  meanness  and 
smallmindedness. 

1  II.  Wisdom  is  goodness  of  the  rational  part  that  is  applied  to 
productive  of  the  things  contributing  to  happiness. 

2  Gentleness  is  goodness  of  the  passionate  part  that 

3  makes  people  difficult  to  move  to  anger.     Courage  is 

^  ώστΐ  .  .  .  aperai  And. :  om.  codd. 
*  και  τα  ipya  αύτων  om.  F*^. 

489 


ARISTOTLE 

1250  a 

ianv  aperrj  τοΰ  θνμοΐώοΰς  καθ'  rjv  8νσ€κπληκτοί 
ασιν   νπο   φόβων   των  περί   θάνατον,      σωφροσύνη  4 
8e  εστίν  αρεττ]  τοΰ  επιθυμητικοΰ  καθ    ην  άνόρβκτοί 
γίνονται  των  ττ€ρι  τας  άπολαύσβις  φαύλων  ηΒονών. 

10  €γκράτ€ία   δε   εστίν   άρ€τη   τον   €πιθυμητικοΰ   καθ'  5 
ην  κατ4χουσι  τω  λογισμω  την  εττίθυμίαν  όρμώσαν 
CTTt    φαύλας   η8ονας.      8ίκαίοσύνη    δε    εστίν    άρ€τη  g 
φυχης   διανεμητική   τοΰ   κατ     άζίαν.     ελευθεριότης  η 
δε    εστίν    αρετή    φυχης    εύΒάπανος    ει?    τα    καλά. 
μεγαλοφυχία  δε'  εστίν  άρετη  φυχης  καθ    ην  δυναν- 

15  ται  φερειν  εύτυχίαν  καΐ  άτυ^^ιαν,  τιμήν  καΐ  ατιμιαν. 
III.    'Αφροσύνη   δε'   εστίν   κακία  τοΰ  λογιστικοΰ  1 
αίτια   τοΰ   ζην   κακώς,      οργιλότης   δε   εστί    κακία  2 
τοΰ   θυμοειΒοΰς    καθ     ην   ευκίνητοι   γίνονται   ττρος 
όργην.     δείλια  δε'  εστί  κακία  τοΰ  θυμοειΒοΰς  καθ'  3 

•20  ην    εκπλήττονται    υπό    φόβων,    και    μάλιστα    των 
ττερι   θάνατον,     ακολασία   δε   εστί   κακία   τοΰ   επι-  4 
θυμητικοΰ    καθ'    ην    ορεκτικοί    γίνονται    των    περί 
τάς  απολαύσεις  φαύλων  ήΒονών.^     άκρασία  δε'  εστί  5 
κακία    τοΰ    επιθυμητικοΰ    καθ     ην    αίροΰνται    τας 
φαύλας  ήΒονάς  κωλύοντος^  τοΰ  λογισμοΰ .'     αδικία  6 

■2ό  δε  εστί  κακία  φνχης  καθ'  ην  πλεονεκτικοί  γίνονται 
τοΰ*  παρά  την  άζίαν.     άνελευθερία  δε  εστίν  κακία  η 
φυχης  καθ'  ην  ορέγονται  τοΰ  πανταχόθεν  κερ8ους. 
μικροφνχία  δε'  εστί  κακία  φνχης  καθ'  ην  αδύνατοι  g 
εισι    φερειν    εύτυχίαν    και    άτυχίαν   και   τι/Αΐ)ν    και 
άτιμιαν. 

ao      IV.   Tt^s"    δε    φρονήσεώς    εστί    το    βονλεύσασθαι,  ι 
το  κρΐναι  τά  αγαθά  και  τά  κακά  και  πάντα  τα"  εν 

*•  opeKTiKol  .   .  .  ήδονων  :  ν.Ι.  αίροΰνταί.  ras  φαύλαί  ijSovas. 
*  </*ή>  KwXvovTos  St. 

490 


ON  VIRTUES  AND  VICES,  ii.  3— iv.  1 

goodness  of  the  passionate  part  that  makes  them  un- 

4  dismayed  by  fear  of  death.  Sobriety  of  mind  is  good- 
ness of  the  appetitive  part  that  makes  them  not 
desirous  of  the  base  pleasures  of  sensual  enjoyment. 

5  Self-control  is  goodness  of  the  appetitive  part  that 
enables  men  by  means  of  reason  to  restrain  their 

6  appetite  when  it  is  set  on  base  pleasures.  Righteous- 
ness is  goodness  of  the  spirit  shown  in  distributing 

7  what  is  according  to  desert.  Liberality  is  goodness  of 
spirit  shown  in  spending  rightly  on  fine  obj  ects.  Great- 
spiritedness  is  goodness  of  spirit  that  enables  men  to 
bear  good  fortune  and  bad,  honour  and  dishonour. 

1  III.  On  the  other  hand  folly  is   badness   of  the  and  to  the 

2  rational  part  that  causes  bad  living.     Ill-temper  is    '*'^^" 
badness  of  the  passionate  part  that  makes  men  easy 

3  to  provoke  to  anger.  Cowardice  is  badness  of  the 
passionate  part  that  causes  men  to  be  dismayed  by 

4  fear,  and  especially  by  fear  of  death.  Profligacy  is 
badness  of  the  appetitive  part  that  makes  men  de- 
sirous of  the  base  pleasures  of  sensual  enjoyment. 

5  Uncontrol  is  badness  of  the  appetitive  part  that 
makes  men  choose  base  pleasures  when  reason  tries 

6  to  hinder.  Unrighteousness  is  badness  of  spirit  that 
makes  men  covetous   of  what   is  contrary  to  their 

7  desert.     Meanness  is   badness  of  spirit  that  makes 

8  men  try  to  get  profit  from  all  sources.  Smallminded- 
ness  is  badness  of  spirit  that  makes  men  unable  to 
bear  good  fortune  and  bad,  honour  and  dishonour. 

1      IV.  It  belongs  to  wisdom  to  take  counsel,  to  judge  virtuous 
the  goods  and  evils  and  all  the  things  in  life  that  are  fg'e^ij""^*"'^ 

classified. 

^  αίρουνταί  .  ■.   .   \ο-^ίσμ.οΰ :     v.l,    παρασύρουσι    rrj  oKoyiq.   την 
έτηθυμίαν  ώθοΰσαν  έπΙ  ras  των  φαύλων  ήδονων  άττοΧαύσεΐί. 

«  τοΰ  add.  Rac.  (cf.  1.  13). 

^  τά  add.  Rac. 

491 


ARISTOTLE 

1250  a 

τω  βίω  αιρετά  /cat  φβυκτά,  το  χρησασθαι  καλώς 
ττασιν  τοις  ύπάρχουσιν  άγαθοΐς,  το  όμίλησαι  ορθώς, 
το   συνώβΐν  τους   καιρούς,   το   άγχίνως  χρήσασθαι 

3•''  καΐ  λόγω  και  €ργω,  το  την  €μττ€ΐρίαν  €χ€ίν  τών 
χρησίμων  'πάντων.  μνήμη  δε  καΐ  €μπ€ίρία  καΐ  2 
αγχινοια  ήτοι  απο  της  φρονησ^ως  εκάστη  αύτώΐ' 
εστίν  η  7ταρ€7Τ€ται  τη  φρονήσει•  η  τα  μεν  αυτών 
οίον  συναίτια  της  φρονησεώς  εστί,  καθάπερ  η  εμ- 
πειρία και  η  μνήμη,  τά  8ε  οίον  μερη^  οίον  ευβουλία 
και  άγχίνοια. 

40  ΐΐραότητος  8ε  εστί  το  8ύνασθαι  φερειν  μετρίως  3 
εγκλήματα  και  ολιγωρίας,  καΐ  το  μη  ταχέως 
ορμαν  εττι  τας  τιμωρίας,  και  το  μη  εύκίνητον  eti^at 
προς  τας  οργάς,  άπικρον  8έ  τω  ηθει  και  άφιλό- 
νεικον,  έχοντα  το  ηρεμαΐον  εν  τη  φνχη  και 
στασιμον . 

^Αν8ρείας    8ε    εστί    το    8υσεκπληκτον    είναι    ύπο  4 

4Γ,  φόβων  τών  περί  θάνατον  και  ευθαρσή^  εν  τοις 
1250  b  8εινοΐς  και  εϋτολμον  προς  τους  κιν8ύνους,  και  το 
μάλλον  αίρεΐσθαι  τεθνάναι  καλώς  η  αίσχρώς 
σω^τ^ι^αι,  και  το  νίκης  αίτιον  etvat.  ετι  8ε  άν8ρείας 
εστί  και  το  πονεΐν  και  καρτερεΐν  και  άν8ραγαθι- 
Γ.  ζεσ^αι.^  παρεπεται  8ε  τη  άν8ρεία  η  τε  εύτολμια 
και  η  εύφυχία  και  το  θάρσος,^  ετι  8ε  η  τε  φιλο- 
πονία και  η  καρτερία. 

Έωφροσύνης  8ε  εστί  το  μη  θαυμάζειν  τα?  απο-  5 
λαυσει?    τών     σωματικών    η8ονών,^    και    το    eti'at 
πάσης  απολαυστικής  [αίσχράςΥ  η8ονης   άνόρεκτον, 

10  και   το   φοβέΐσθαι   την  άταξίαν,^   και  το    τετάχθαι 
περί  τον  βίον  ομοίως  εν  τε  μικροΐς  και  μεγάλοις. 
παρεπεται   8ε  τη   σωφροσύνη   ευταξία,   κοσμιότης, 
αιδώ?,  ευλάβεια. 
492 


ON  VIRTUES  AND  VICES,  iv.  1-5 

desirable  and  to  be  avoided,  to  use  all  the  available 
goods  finely,  to  behave  rightly  in  society,  to  observe 
due  occasions,  to  employ  both  speech  and  action  with 
sagacity,  to  have  expert  knowledge  of  all  things  that 
are  useful.  Memory  and  experience  and  acuteness 
are  each  of  them  either  a  consequence  or  a  con- 
comitant of  wisdom  ;  or  some  of  them  are  as  it  were 
subsidiary  causes  of  wisdom,  as  for  instance  experience 
and  memory,  others  as  it  were  parts  of  it,  for  example 
good  counsel  and  acuteness. 

To  gentleness  belongs  ability  to  bear  reproaches 
and  slights  with  moderation,  and  not  to  embark  on 
revenge  quickly,  and  not  to  be  easily  provoked  to 
anger,  but  free  from  bitterness  and  contentiousness, 
having  tranquillity  and  stability  in  the  spirit. 

To  courage  it  belongs  to  be  undismayed  by  fears 
of  death  and  confident  in  alarms  and  brave  in  face  of 
dangers,  and  to  prefer  a  fine  death  to  base  security, 
and  to  be  a  cause  of  victory.  It  also  belongs  to 
courage  to  labour  and  endure  and  play  a  manly  part. 
Courage  is  accompanied  by  confidence  and  bravery 
and  daring,  and  also  by  perseverance  and  endurance. 

To  sobriety  of  mind  it  belongs  not  to  value  highly 
bodily  pleasures  and  enjoyments,  not  to  be  covetous 
of  every  enjoyable  pleasure,  to  fear  disorder,  and  to 
live  an  orderly  life  in  small  things  and  great  alike. 
Sobriety  of  mind  is  accompanied  by  orderliness, 
regularity,  modesty,  caution. 

^  μέρη  Sus. :  μέρη  ttjs  φρονήσΐίύί  aut  φρονήσεων  aut  αύτη%. 

*  ευθαρσή  v.l. :  τό  ευθαρσή  elvai. 

^  άνδρα'γαθίξ'εσθαί  St. :  αΙρεΊσθαι  καΐ  δύνασθαι  (viz.  lipography 
+  gloss).  *  TO  θάρσοί  καΐ  τό  θράσος  codd.  plur. 

°  ηδονών  :   έττιθυμιών  St. 

*  [αίσχραί]  Rac. :  v.l.  και  αισχρά^. 

'  St.  :  την  (/cat  την  F")  δικαίαν  άδοξίαν  (aiit  &δειαν). 

493 


ARISTOTLE 

1250  b 

V.     Έιγκρατξίας   δε   εστί  το   8waa^ai   κατασχ€Ϊν  1 
τω   λογισμώ   την   επιθυμ,ίαν   ορμώσαν   €ττΙ   φαυλας 
άπολανσ€ΐς    και    ηΒονάς,^    καΐ'    καρτ€ρ€Ϊν,    και    το 

15  ύττομενετικον     elvai    της    κατά    φύσιν    ivSeias    re* 
και  λυττης. 

δικαιοσύνης   84  εστί   το   8ιαν€μητικ6ν   eti^at   τοΰ  2 
κατ'  άζίαν,  και  το  σωζ^ιν  τά  πάτρια  €θη  και  τα 
νό/χι/χα    και*    τους    γεγ ραμμένους    νόμους,    και   το 
αληθεύζΐν   iv  τω   Βιαφέροντι,   και  το   8ιαφυλάττ€ΐν 

20  τα?  ομολογίας,  έ'στι  8e  πρώτα  των  δίκαιων*  τά 
προς  τους  θ€ούς,  είτα  τά  ττρο?  δαίμονας,  €ΐτα  τά 
7Γ/3θ5•  πατρίδα  και  yoveis•,  βιτα  τά  ττρο?  του?  κατ- 
οιχομ€νους•  iv  οΐς  εστί  και  τ^  ^ύσίβ^ια,  ήτοι 
μέρος  ούσα  της  δικαιοσύνης  η  παρακολουθούσα, 
ακολουθεί  δε  τη  δικαιοσύνη  και  η  οσιότης  και  3 
η  άλτ^^εια  και  η  πίστις  και  η  μισοπονηρία. 

^^  Έιλευθεριότητος  δβ  «στι  το  προετικόν  elvai  4 
χρημάτων  €ΐς  τά  επαινετά  και  Βαφιλη^  επι  τω  εις 
τά  δέοντα'  άναλω^τ^ναι,  και  το  βοηθητικον  είναι 
εν  τω  8ιαφόρω,  και  το  μη  λαβείν  όθεν  μη  δει. 
εστί  δε  6  ελευθέριος  και  περί  εσθητα  καθάριος 
και  περί  οϊκησιν^  και  κατασκευαστικός  των  περιτ- 

30  των  και  καλών  και  δια'}/α>7ΐ7^  εχόντων  η^εΐαν  άνευ 
τοΰ  λυσιτελοΰντος ,  και  θρεπτικός  των  ζωών  των 
ίδιον  εχόντων  τι  η  θαυμαστόν.  ακολουθεί  δε  τη  5 
ελευθεριότητι  η  τοΰ  ήθους  ύγρότης  και  εuαyα>'ytα 
και  φιλανθρωπία  και  το  είναι  ελεητικόν  και  φιλο- 
φιλον  και  φιλόζενον  και  φιλόκαλον . 

^  υ* :  άτΓολοι^σευ  ηδονών. 

*  L" :  καΐ  τό.  8  re  add.  St.,  And. 

*  «at  Rac. :  τό  (aut  καΐ  τό)  σφζίΐν. 

'  V.].  ίστι  δέ  πρώτη  τών  δικαιοσυνών. 

494 


ON  VIRTUES  AND  VICES,  v.  1-5 

V.  To  self-control  belongs  ability  to  restrain  desire 
by  reason  when  it  is  set  on  base  enjoyments  and 
pleasures,  and  to  be  resolute,  and  readiness  to  endure 
natural  want  and  pain. 

To  righteousness  it  belongs  to  be  ready  to  dis- 
tribute according  to  desert,  and  to  preserve  ancestral 
customs  and  institutions  and  the  established  laws, 
and  to  tell  the  truth  when  interest  is  at  stake,  and 
to  keep  agreements.  First  among  the  claims  of 
righteousness  are  our  duties  to  the  gods,  then  our 
duties  to  the  spirits,"  then  those  to  country  and  parents, 
then  those  to  the  departed  ;  and  among  these  claims 
is  piety,  which  is  either  a  part  of  righteousness  or  a 
concomitant  of  it.  Righteousness  is  also  accompanied 
by  holiness  and  truth  and  loyalty  and  hatred  of 
wickedness. 

To  liberality  it  belongs  to  be  profuse  of  money  on 
praiseworthy  objects  and  lavish  in  spending  on  what 
is  necessary,  and  to  be  helpful  in  a  matter  of  dis- 
pute, and  not  to  take  from  wrong  sources.  The  liberal 
man  is  cleanly  in  his  dress  and  dwelling,  and  fond  of 
providing  himself  with  things  that  are  above  the 
ordinary  and  fine  and  that  afford  entertainment 
without  being  profitable  ;  and  he  is  fond  of  keeping 
animals  that  have  something  special  or  remarkable 
ί  about  them.  Liberality  is  accompanied  by  elasticity 
and  ductihty  of  character,  and  kindness,  and  a  com- 
passionate and  affectionate  and  hospitable  and 
honourable  nature. 

"  Deities  of  a  minor  order,  in  some  cases  the  souls  of  dead 
men  of  the  heroic  age ;  often  the  object  of  only  local  worship. 

β  δαι/Ίλή  Sylburg :  έπιδαψιλΐία  F^,  δαψιλΐΐ  L•^,  ^πίδα.\{/ίλ€ν€ΐν 
Gaisford. 

'  τά  δάορτα  v.l.  :   δέορτι  L»>,  δάον  F^,  δ^ον  τι  edd. 
*  και  irepi  οικησιν  om.  V.l. 

^95 


ARISTOTLE 

1250  b 

36  Μβγαλοφυχίας  8e  iart,  το  καλώς  eveyKelv  /cat  β 
€ύτνχίαν  καΐ  άτνχίαν,  /cat  τψην  /cat  άημίαν,  /cat 
το  μη  θανμάζίίν  μήτ€  τρνφην  μήτ€  θεραττ^ίαν  μητ€ 
i^ovaiav  μήτ€  τάς  νίκας  τας  εναγώνιους,  €χ€ΐν 
δε  TC  βάθος  της  φνχης  /cat  μίγ^θος.  eart  δε^ 
μεγαλόψυχος   οϋθ^    ό*   το    ζην  ττερί  πολλοΰ  ττοιού- 

40  μ€νος     οϋθ^     ό"    φιλόζωος.       απλούς    δε    τω    ηθει 
και  γενναίος  ά8ικεΐσθαι  δυνάμενος  /cat  ου  τιμωρη- 
τικος.      ακολουθεί  8e  τη  μεγαλοφυχία  άττλότης  και  7 
aAT^^eta. 

VI.    Αφροσύνης    he    εστί   το    κρΐναι     κακώς    τα  1 
πράγματα,  το   βουλενσασθαι   κακώς,   το   ομιλησαι 

45  κακώς,  το  χρησασθαι  κακώς  τοις  τταροΰσιν  άγαθοΐς, 

1251  a  το  φευΒώς  Βοζάζειν  περί  τών  εις  τον  βίον  καλών 

και     aya^oiv.        παρακολουθεί     δε     τη     αφροσύνη  2 
απειρία,    a/xa^ta,    άκρασία,    επαριστερότης,    άμνη- 
μοσύνη . 

^Οργιλότητος  δε'  εστίν  εΐ8η  τρία,  άκροχολία  3 
πικρία  βαρυθυμία.  εστί  δε  του  όργίλου  το  μη 
5  δυι^ασ^αι  φερειν  μητε^  τάς  μικράς  ολιγωρίας  μήτε 
τάς  ελαττώσεις,*  εt^'αt  δε  /coAaaTi/cot'  και  τιμωρη- 
τικόν  και  εύκίνητον  προς  όργην  και  υπό  έργου  και 
νπο  λόγου  του  τυχόντος.  ακολουθεί  δε  τη  6ρ-  i 
γιλότητι  το  παροζυντικον  τοΰ  ήθους  και  το* 
εύμετάβολον  και  ή  πικρολογία^  και  το  επι  μικροΐς 
10  λυπεΐσθαι  και  ταύτα  πάσχειν  ταχέως  και  παρά 
βραχύν  καιρόν. 

Δεtλtαs•    δε'   εστt    το    υπό    τών   τυχόντων   φόβων  5 
εύκίνητον    είναι,    και    μάλιστα    τών    περί    θάνατον 
και  τάς  σωματικάς  πηρώσεις,  και  το  ύπολαμβάνειν 
κρεΐττον    εtvαt    όπωσοΰν    aw^T^j^at    η    τελευτήσαι 
καλώς,     ακολουθεί  δε  τη  δεtλtα  μαλακία,  avavSpia,  6 
496 


ON  VIRTUES  AND  VICES,  v.  6— vi.  6 

6  To  greatness  of  spirit  it  belongs  to  bear  finely  both 
good  fortune  and  bad,  honour  and  disgrace,  and  not 
to  think  highly  of  luxury  or  attention  or  power  or 
victories  in  contests,  and  to  possess  a  certain  depth 
and  magnitude  of  spirit.  He  who  values  life  highly 
and  who  is  fond  of  life  is  not  great-spirited.  The 
great-spirited  man  is  simple  and  noble  in  character, 

7  able  to  bear  injustice  and  not  revengeful.  Greatness 
of  spirit  is  accompanied  by  simplicity  and  sincerity. 

1  VI.  To  folly  belongs  bad  judgement  of  affairs,  bad  Vicious 
counsel,  bad  fellowship,  bad  use  of  one's  resources,  feeihig^s* ' 
false  opinions  about  what  is  fine  and  good  in  life,  classified. 

2  Folly  is  accompanied  by  unskilfulness,  ignorance,  un- 
control,  aAvkwardness,  forgetfulness. 

3  Of  ill-temper  there  are  three  kinds,  irascibility, 
bitterness,  sullenness.  It  belongs  to  the  ill-tempered 
man  to  be  unable  to  bear  either  small  slights  or 
defeats  but  to  be  given  to  retaliation  and  revenge, 
and  easily  moved  to  anger  by  any  chance  deed  or 

4  word.  Ill-temper  is  accompanied  by  excitability 
of  character,  instability,  bitter  speech,  and  liability  to 
take  offence  at  trifles  and  to  feel  these  feelings  quickly 
and  on  slight  occasions. 

5  To  cowardice  it  belongs  to  be  easily  excited  by 
chance  alarms,  and  especially  by  fear  of  death  or  of 
bodily  injuries,  and  to  think  it  better  to  save  oneself 

6  by  any  means  than  to  meet  a  fine  end.  CoAvardice  is 
accompanied  by  softness,  unmanliness,  faint-hearted- 

1  oe  ό  Ι>. 

*  οΰθ'  6  (bis)  Bekker :  οι)δ'  ό  L",  ouoe  F=. 

*  μηδέ  Bussemaker. 

*  [μήτε  raj  έ\αττώσει$]  idem :  ras  <Μ€7άλα5>  έλαττώσεΐί  Sus. 

*  και  τό  And. :  καΐ. 

*  St. :  μικρό\ο•γία  καΐ  η  μεταμέλεια  codd. 

2  κ  4.97 


ARISTOTLE 

1251  a    ^      ^ 

10  αττονοια,    φι,λοφυχία•    υττεστι    δβ    ης    καΙ    €νλάβ€ΐα 
καΐ  το  άφιλόνεικον  του  ήθους} 

Ακολασίας  δε  εστί  το  αΙρ€Ϊσθαί  τάς  άττολαυσει?  7 
των     ηΒονών     τών    βλαβζρών    καΐ     αισχρών     και' 
ύπολαμβανΐΐ,ν    €ύ8αιμον€Ϊν    μάλιστα    τους    iv    ταΐς 
τοιαΰταις  ηΒοναΐς  ζώντας,  και  το  φιλογίλοιον  etv-at 

-Ό  και  φιλοσκώτττην  και  φιλ^υτράττ^λον  και  το  ραΒιουρ- 
γον  eti^at  iv  τοις  λόγοις  και  iv  τοις  βργοις.     άκο-  8 
λουθ^ΐ  he  Tfj  ακολασία  άταζία,  άΐ'αιδεια,  άκοσμία, 
τρυφη,  ραθυμία,   a/xe'Aeia,   ολιγωρία,   €κλυσις. 

Ακρασίας   δε    ε'στι  το  κωλύοντας   τοΰ  λογισμού  ^ 
τας  αττολαύσζΐς  τών  ηΒονών  αΙρ€Ϊσθαι,  και  το  ύπο- 

'■i''  λαμβάνοντα  κρ€Ϊττον  ειι^αι  μη  μ€τασχ€Ϊν  αυτών 
μ€Τ€χ€ΐν^  μη^ΐν  ήττον,  και  το  οΪ€σθαι  μ€ν  Seiv 
πραττ€ΐν  και  τα  καλά  και  τα  συμφέροντα  άφ- 
ιστασ^αι  δε  αυτών  δια  τάς  ηΒονάς.  άκολουθζΐ  δε  Κ 
TTJ  ακρασία  μαλακία  και*  ά^Με'λεια  και  τά  ττλεΐστα 
ταύτα  ά  και  τη  ακολασία. 

30      VII.     Αδικίας  δε'  iστιv  €Ϊ8η  τρία,  άσε)8εια  ττλεοι/-  1 
ε^ια    ΰβρις.       άσε'/3εια    μkv    η    π€ρι    θ^ούς    πλημ-  2 
/ζε'λεια    καΐ   περί   δαίμονας,   η^   περί   τους   κατοιχο- 
μ€νους  και  nepi  γον€Ϊς  και  πατρίδα•  ττλεονε^ια  δε  3 
η  π€ρι  τά  συ/χ,^όλαια,   παρά  την  άζίαν  αίρουμ^νη 
το   διάφορον   ύβρις  δε  καθ^  ην  τάς  ηδονάς  αύτοΐς  4 

35  7ταρασκ€υάζουσιν  ίίς  ονζώος  άγοντες  έτερους,  όθεν 
Έιύηνος  ττερι  αύτης  λέγει 

ήτις  κερΒαίνουσ^   ούδεν  όμως  αδικεί. 

εστί    δε    της    αδικίας    το    τταραβαίνειν    τά    πάτρια  5 
εθη^   και  τά    νό/χι/χα,  το  άπειθεΐν  τοις    νόμοις  και 
1251  b  τοις  άρχουσι,  το  φενδεσθαι,  το  επιορκεΐν,  το  παρα- 

^  καΐ  .  .  .  ήίίουί  οηι.  ν.Ι.  *  /cai  cet. :  χαϊ  τό  Ι/^^χ 

49S 


ON  VIRTUES  AND  VICES,  vi.  6— vii.  5 

ness,  fondness  of  life  ;   and  it  also  has  an  element  of 
cautiousness  and  submissiveness  of  character. 

7  To  profligacy  belongs  choosing  harmful  and  base 
pleasures  and  enjoyments,  and  thinking  that  the 
happiest  people  are  those  who  pass  their  lives  in 
pleasures  of  that  kind,  and  being  fond  of  laughter  and 
mockery  and  jokes  and  levity  in  words  and  deeds. 

8  Profligacy  is  accompanied  by  disorder,  shamelessness, 
irregularity,  luxury,  slackness,  carelessness,  negli- 
gence, remissness. 

9  To  uncontrol  it  belongs  to  choose  the  enjoyment  of 
pleasures  when  reason  would  restrain,  and  although 
one  believes  that  it  would  be  better  not  to  participate 
in  them,  to  participate  in  them  all  the  same,  and 
while  thinking  one  ought  to  do  fine  and  expedient 
things  yet  to  abstain  from  them  for  the  sake  of  one's 

10  pleasures.  The  concomitants  of  uncontrol  are  soft- 
ness and  negligence  and  in  general  the  same  as  those 
of  profligacy. 

1  VII,  Of  unrighteousness   there   are   three   kinds, 

2  impiety,  greed,  outrage.  Transgression  in  regard  to 
gods  and  spirits,  or  even  in  regard  to  the  departed 

3  and  to  parents  and  country,  is  impiety.  Transgres- 
sion in  regard  to  contracts,  taking  what  is  in  dispute 

4  contrary  to  one's  desert,  is  greed.  Outrage  is  the 
unrighteousness  that  makes  men  procure  pleasures 
for  themselves  while  leading  others  into  disgrace  ;  in 
consequence  of  which  Evenus  says  about  outrage  : 

She  that  wrongs  others  e'en  when  she  gaineth  nought. 

5  And  it  belongs  to  unrighteousness  to  transgress 
ancestral  customs  and  regulations,  to  disobey  the 
laws  and  the  rulers,  to  lie,  to  perjure,  to  transgress 

*  And. :  μ,ΐτέχΐΐν  δέ.  *     καΐ  v.l. :  om.  L^^F*^. 

*  V.ll.  κα.1  ή,  καΐ.  *   ?θη  om.  L•^  F^. 

2  Κ  2  499 


ARISTOTLE 

1251  b         ^ 

^atVeiv  τα?  ομολογίας  καΐ  τάς  πίστ€ΐς.     άκολονθ€Ϊ  6 
δβ  ΤΎ]  αδικία  συκοφαντία,  αλαζονεία,  φιλανθρωπία 
ττροσττοίητος,   κακοήθεια,  πανουργία. 

Ανελενθερίας  δε  εστίν  εΐ8η  τρία,  αΙσχροκερ8εια  7 
5  φει8ωλία    κιμβικία.      αισχροκερ8εια    μεν    καθ^    ην  8 
κερ8αίνειν  ζητοΰσι  πανταχόθεν  και  το  κέρδος  της 
αίσγυνης    περί    πλείονος    ποιούνται'    φει8ωλία    8ε  9 
καθ    ην   ά8άπανοι   γίνονται   των  χρημάτων   εις   το 
Βεον    κιμβικία    8έ    καθ*    ην    δατται^ώσι    μεν,    κατά  10 

10  μικρόν  δε  και  κακώς,  και  πλείω  βλάπτονται  τω 
μη  κατά  καιρόν  προεσθαι  το  8ιάφορον.  εστί  δε  11 
της  άνελευθερίας  το  περί  πλείστου  ποιεΐσθαι  χρή- 
ματα και  το  μη8εν  6νει8ος  τ^τ/εΓσ^αι  των  ποιούντων 
κερ8ος,  βίος  θητικός  και  8ουλοπρεπης  και  ρυπαρός, 
φιλοτιμίας    και    ελευθερίας    αλλότριος.      ακολουθεί  12 

15  δε  τη  ανελευθερία  μικρολογία,  βαρυθυμια  [μικρό - 
φυχία],^  ταπεινότης,  άμετρία,  αγένεια,  juiaav- 
θρωπία. 

Μικροφυχίας  δε'  εστί  το  μήτε  τιμήν  μήτε  άτιμίαν,  13 
μήτε  εύτυχίαν  μήτε  άτυ;(ΐαν'  8ύνασθαι  φερειν,  άλλα 
τιμώμενον  μεν  χαυνοΰσθαι'  μικρά  δε  εύτυχήσαντα 

20  εζαίρεσθαι,  άτιμίαν  δε  μη8ε  την  ελαχίστην  ενεγκεΐν 
8ύνασθαι  άπότευγμα  δε  οτιοΰν  άτυχιαν  κρινειν 
μεγάλην,  ό8υρεσθάι  δε  επΙ  πάσιν  και  8υσφορεΐν. 
ετι  δε  τοιούτο?  εστίν  6  μικρόφυχος  οίος  πάντα  τά 
όλιγωρήματα  καλεΐν  ΰβριν  και  άτιμίαν,  και  τά  δι' 
άγνοιαν  ή  λήθην  γινόμενα,     ακολουθεί  δε  τη  μικρό-  14 

25  φυχία  μικρολογία,  μεμφιμοιρία,  8υσελπιστία,  ταπει- 
νότης. 

VIII.   Καρόλου  δε  της  μεν  αρετής  εστί  το  ποιεΐν  1 
σπουδαία^  την  8ιάθεσιν  περί  την  φυχήν,  ήρεμαίαις 
και  τεταγμεναις  κινήσεσι  χρωμενην  και  συμφωνοΰ- 
500 


ON  VIRTUES  AND  VICES,  vii.  6— viii.  1 

6  covenants  and  pledges.  Unrighteousness  is  accom- 
panied by  slander,  imposture,  pretence  of  kindness, 
malignity,  unscrupulousness. 

7  Of  meanness  there  are  three  kinds,  love  of  base 

8  gain,  parsimony,  niggardliness.  Love  of  base  gain 
makes  men  seek  profit  from  all  sources  and  pay  more 

9  regard  to  the  profit  than  to  the  disgrace  ;  parsimony 
makes  them  unwilling  to  spend  money  on  a  necessary 

10  object  ;  niggardliness  causes  them  only  to  spend  in 
driblets  and  in  a  bad  way,  and  to  lose  more  than 
they  gain  by  not  at  the  proper  moment  letting  go 

11  the  difference.  It  belongs  to  meanness  to  set  a 
very  high  value  on  money  and  to  think  nothing 
that  brings  profit  a  disgrace — a  menial  and  servile 
and  squalid  mode  of  life,  alien  to  ambition  and  to 

12  liberality.  Meanness  is  accompanied  by  pettiness, 
sulkiness,  self-abasement,  lack  of  proportion,  ignoble- 
ness,  misanthropy. 

13  It  belongs  to  small-mindedness  to  be  unable  to 
bear  either  honour  or  dishonour,  either  good  fortune 
or  bad,  but  to  be  filled  with  conceit  when  honoured 
and  puffed  up  by  trifling  good  fortune,  and  to  be 
unable  to  bear  even  the  smallest  dishonour  and  to 
deem  any  chance  failure  a  great  misfortune,  and  to  be 
distressed  and  annoyed  at  everything.  Moreover  the 
small-minded  man  is  the  sort  of  person  to  call  all 
slights  an  insult  and  dishonour,  even  those  that  are 

14  due  to  ignorance  or  forgetfulness.  Small-mindedness 
is  accompanied  by  pettiness,  querulousness,  pessim- 
ism, self-abasement. 

1       VIII.  In  general  it  belongs  to  goodness  to  make  the  Psychology 
spirit's  disposition  virtuous,  experiencing  tranquil  and  «^  ^*^1"^^• 
ordered  emotions  and  in  harmony  throughout  all  its 

■•■  Sylburg.  ^  v.l.  άναχαννοΰσθαι  L^'F'^  cet. 

501 


ARISTOTLE 

1251  b 

σαν  κατά  πάντα    τά   μζρη'    διό    καΐ    δο/cet    τταρά- 

30  ^€ΐγμα  TToXiTeias  άγαθτίς  etvai  φνχης  σπουδαίας 
Βιάθίσις.  εστί  8e  της  αρετής  καΐ  το  βύεργετείν  2 
τους  άζίους  και,  το  φιλείν  τους  αγαθούς  και  το 
μίσ€Ϊν  τους  φαύλους,^  καΐ  το  μήτί  κολαστικόν 
etvat  μήτε  τιμωρητίκόν ,  άλλα  ϊλεων  καΐ  βύμενίκον 
/cat  συγγνωμονικόν .  ακολουθεί  δε  ttj  άρεττ]  χρη-  3 
στότης,  επιείκεια,  ευγνωμοσύνη,  ελπις  άγαθη^  ετι 

35  δε  και  τά  τοιαύτα  οΐον  φίλοικειον  είναι  και  φιλό- 
φιλον  και  φιλεταιρον  και  φιλόζενον  και  φιλάνθρω- 
πον  και  φιλόκαλον  ά  Srj  ττάντα  των  επαινουμενων 
εστί. 

Της  δε  κακίας  εστί  τά  εναντία,  και  παρακολουθεί  4 
τά  ερ'αντια  αύττ)•  άτται^τα  δε  τά  της  κακίας  και  τά 
παρακολουθοΰντα  αυτί^  των  φεγομενων  εστίν». 

^  και  τό  μίσεΐν  τού%  φαυΚον:  om.  ν.Ι. 
*  post  ά-^αθη  add.  μνήμη  ayaOTj  ¥''-. 


502 


ON  VIRTUES  AND  VICES,  viii.  1-4 

parts  ;   this  is  the  cause  of  the  opinion  that  the  dis- 
position of  a  good  spirit  is  a  pattern  of  a  good  constitu- 

2  tion  of  the  state.  It  also  belongs  to  goodness  to  do 
good  to  the  deserving  and  love  the  good  and  hate  the 
wicked,  and  not  to  be  eager  to  inflict  punishment  or 
take  vengeance,  but  gracious  and   kindly   and  for- 

3  giving.  Goodness  is  accompanied  by  honesty,  reason- 
ableness, kindness,  hopefulness,  and  also  by  such 
traits  as  love  of  home  and  of  friends  and  comrades  and 
guests,  and  of  one's  fellow-men,  and  love  of  what  is 
noble- — all  of  which  qualities  are  among  those  that 
are  praised. 

4  To  badness  belong  the  opposite  qualities,  and  it  has 
the  opposite  concomitants  :  all  the  qualities  and  con- 
comitants of  badness  are  among  the  things  that  are 
blamed. 


503 


INDEX 


Animals,  v.  4 

Caution,  vi.  6 
Courage,  i.  2,  ii.  3,  iv.  4 
Cowardice,  i.  4,  iii.  2,  vi.  5 
Custom,  vii.  5 

Daiinones,  see  Spirits 

Death,  fear  of,  ii.  3,'iii.  3,  vi.  5 

Dishonesty,  vii.  3 

Evenus,  vii.  4 

Folly,  1.  4,  iii.  1,  vi.  1 
Friendliness,  viii.  3 

Gentleness,  i.  3,  ii.  2,  iv.  3 
Great-spiritedness,  i.  3,  ii.  8,  v.  6 

Harmony  of  character,  viii.  1 
Hospitality,  v.  5 

Ill-temper,  i.  4,  iii.  2,  vi.  3 
Injustice,  see  Unrighteousness 

Justice,  see  Righteousness 

Liberality,  i.  3,  ii.  7,  v.  4 
Lies,  vii.  5 
Luxury,  vi.  8 

Magnanimity,    see    Great-spirited- 
ness 
Meanness,  i,  4,  iii.  7,  vii.  7  ff. 


Misanthropy,  vii.  12 
Misfortune,  vii.  13 

Niggardliness,  vii.  8 

Outrage,  vii.  1  ff. 

Parsimony,  vii.  7 
Patriotism,  v.  2,  vii.  2 
Perjury,  vii.  5 
Pettiness,  vi.  4,  vii.  14 
Piety,  V.  2 
Plato,  i.  3 
Pleasure,  vi.  7 
Profligacy,  iii.  4,  vi.  7 
Prudence,  see  Wisdom 
Psychology,  i.  3 

Righteousness,  i.  3,  ii.  6,  v.  1 

Self-control,  i.  3,  v.  1 
Small-mindedness,     i.     4,     iii.     8, 

vii.  13 
Sober-mindedness,  i.  3,  iv.  5 
Spirits,  V.  2,  vii.  2 
Sulkiness,  vii.  12 

Temperance,  see  Sober-mindedness 
Truth,  v.  21 

Uncontrol,  iii.  5,  vi.  0 
Unrighteousness,  i.  4,  iii.  6,  v.  6, 
vii.  1 

Wisdom,  i.  3,  ii.  1,  iv.  1  f. 


505 


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ACHILLES  TATIUS.     S.  Gaselee. 

AENEAS  TACTICUS  :    ASCLEPIODOTUS  and  ONA- 

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(Vol.  I.  5th  Imp.,  Vol  II.  4iA  Imp.) 
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ARATUS.     Cf.  CALLIMACHUS. 
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{3rd  Imp.)     Verse  trans. 
ARISTOTLE  :    "  ART  "  OF  RHETORIC.     J.  H.  Freese. 
ARISTOTLE  :    ATHENIAN  CONSTITUTION,  EUDE- 

MIAN  ETHICS,  VICES  and  VIRTUES.    H.  Rackham. 
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Vols. 
ARISTOTLE:     NICOMACHEAN   ETHICS.     H.    Rack- 
ham.     {2nd  Imp.  revised.) 
ARISTOTLE:     OECONOMICA    and    MAGNA    MOR- 

ALIA.     G.  C.  Armstrong ;    with  Metaphysics.     Vol.  II. 
ARISTOTLE  :   ON  THE  SOUL,  PARVA  NATURALIA, 

ON  BREATH.     W.  S.  Hett. 
ARISTOTLE  :   PHYSICS.     Rev.  P.  Wicksteed  and  F.  M. 

Cornford.     2  Vols.     (Vol.  II.  2nd  Imp.) 
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ton   Fyfe;     DEMETRIUS    ON    STYLE.     W.     Rhys 

Roberts.     {2nd  Imp.  revised.) 
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ARRIAN  :   HISTORY  OF  ALEXANDER  and  INDICA. 

Rev.  E.  Iliffe  Robson.     2  Vols. 
ATHENAEUS:    DEIPNOSOPHISTAE.     C.   B.  Gulick. 

7  Vols.     Vols.  I-V. 
CALLIMACHUS    and    LYCOPHRON.     A.    W.    Mair ; 

ARATUS.     G.  R.  Mair. 
CLEMENT   OF   ALEXANDRIA.     Rev.    G.   W.    Butter- 
worth. 
COLLUTHUS.     Cf.  OPPIAN. 
DAPHNE  AND  CHLOE.     Thornley's  Translation  revised 

by  J.  M.  Edmonds;  and  PARTHENIUS.     S.  Gaselee. 

(3rd  Imp.) 
DEMOSTHENES:     DE    CORONA    and    DE    FALSA 

LEGATIONE.     C.  A.  Vince  and  J.  H.  Vince. 
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MINOR  ORATIONS  :   I-XVII  and  XX.     J.  II.  Vince. 
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)IOCASSIUS:  ROMAN  HISTORY.     E.  Gary.     9  Vols. 

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Vol.  I. 
DIOGENES  LAERTIUS.     R.  D.  Hicks.     2  Vols.     (Vol. 

I.  2nd  Imp.) 
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5th  Imp.,  Vol.  III.  3rd  Imp.)     Verse  trans. 
EUSEBIUS:    ECCLESIASTICAL  HISTORY.     Kirsopp 

Lake  and  J.  E.  L.  Oulton.     2  Vols. 
GALEN:    ON  THE   NATURAL  FACULTIES.     A.  J. 

Brock.     {2nd  Imp.) 
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GREEK  ELEGY  AND  IAMBUS  with  the  ANACRE- 

ONTEA.     J.  M.  Edmonds.     2  Vols. 
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vised.) 
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Imp.,  Vols.  II.-IV.  2nd  Imp.) 
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CLEITUS.    W.  H.  S.  Jones  and  E.  T.  Withington.    4  Vols. 
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ISAEUS.     E.  W.  Forster. 

ISOCRATES.     George  Norlin.     3  Vols.     Vols.  I.  and  II. 
JOSEPHUS.      H.   St.   J.  Thackeray  and   Ralph   Marcus. 

8  Vols.     Vols.  I.-V. 
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I.  and  II.  3rd  Imp.) 
LYCOPHRON.     Cf.  CALLIMACHUS. 
LYRA   GRAECA.     J.    M.    Edmonds.     3  Vols.     (Vol.   I. 

3rd  Imp.,  Vol.  II.  2nd  Ed.  revised  and  enlarged.) 
LYSIAS.     W.  R.  M.  Lamb. 
MARCUS   AURELIUS.     C.    R.   Haines.     {3rd   Imp.   re- 

vis  Sill  ^ 
MENANDER.     F.  G.  AUinson.     {2nd  Imp.  revised.) 
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OPPIAN,    COLLUTHUS,    TRYPHIODORUS.     A.    W. 

Mair. 
PAPYRI  (SELECTIONS).     A.  S.  Hunt  and  C.  C.  Edgar. 

4  Vols.     Vols.  I.  and  II. 
PARTHENIUS.     Cf.  DAPHNIS  and  CHLOE. 
PAUSANIAS:  DESCRIPTION  OF  GREECE.     W.  H.  S. 

Jones.     5  Vols,    and    Companion    Vol.     (Vol.    I.    2nd 

Imp.) 
PHILO.     F.  H.  Colson  and  Rev.  G.  H.  Whitaker.     9  Vols. 

Vols.  I. -VI. 
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TYANA.     F.  C.  Conybeare.     2  Vols.     (Vol.  I.  Srd  Imp., 

Vol.  II.  2«d  Imp.) 
PHILOSTRATUS.       IMAGINES  ;      CALLISTRATUS. 

DESCRIPTIONS.     A.  Fairbanks. 
PHILOSTRATUS  and  EUNAPIUS  :    LIVES  OF  THE 

SOPHISTS.     Wilmer  Cave  Wright. 
PINDAR.     Sir  J.  E.  Sandys.     {5th  Imp.  revised.) 
PLATO  :  CHARMIDES,  ALCIBIADES,  HIPPARCHUS 

THE  LOVERS,  THEAGES,  MINOS  and  EPINOMIS; 

W.  R.  M.  Lamb. 
PLATO:      CRATYLUS,     PARMENIDES,    GREATER 

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PLATO  :    EUTHYPHRO,  APOLOGY,  CRITO,  PHAE- 

DO,  PHAEDRUS.     H.  N.  Fowler.     {Ith.  Imp.)  X 

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DEM  US.     W.  R.  M.  Lamb. 
PLATO  :  LAWS.     Rev.  R.  G.  Bury.     2  Vols. 
PLATO  :   LYSIS,  SYMPOSIUM,  GORGIAS.     W.  R.  M. 

Lamb,     {βηά  Imp.  revised.) 
PLATO  :  REPUBLIC.     Paul  Shorey.     2  Vols.  lA 

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ION.     W.  R.  M.  Lamb. 
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{2nd  Imp.) 
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NUS,  EPISTULAE.     Rev.  R.  G.  Bury. 
PLUTARCH:     MORALIA.     F.    C.    Babbitt.     14    Vols. 

Vols.  I.-III. 
PLUTARCH:     THE    PARALLEL    LIVES.     B.    Perrin. 

11  Vols.     (Vols.  I.,  II.,  III.  and  VII.  2nd  Imp.) 
POLY BI  US.     W.  R.  Paton.     6  Vols. 
PROCOPIUS:     HISTORY    OF    THE    WARS.     H.    B. 

Dewing.     7  Vols.     Vols.  I.-VI.     (Vol.  I.  2nd  Imp.) 
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5UINTUS  SMYRNAEUS.     A.  S.  Way.     Verse  trans. 

>T.  BASIL  :    LETTERS.     R.  J.  Deferrari.     4  Vols. 

3T.    JOHN    DAMASCENE:     BARLAAM    AND    lOA- 

SAPH.     Rev.  G.  R.  Woodward  and  Harold  Mattingly. 
SEXTUS  EMPIRICUS.     Rev.  R.  G.  Bury.     In  3  Vols. 

Vols.  I.  and  II. 
SOPHOCLES.     F.  Storr.     2  Vols.     (Vol.  I.  6th  Imp.,  Vol. 

II.  ith  Imp.)     Verse  trans. 
STRABO  :    GEOGRAPHY.     Horace  L.  Jones.     8  Vols. 

(Vols.  I  and  VIII.  2nd  Imp.) 
THEOPHRASTUS  :    CHARACTERS.     J.  M.  Edmonds  ; 

HERODES,  etc.     A.  D.  Knox. 
THEOPHRASTUS:     ENQUIRY   INTO   PLANTS.     Sir 

Arthur  Hort,  Bart.     2  Vols. 
THUCYDIDES.     C.  F.  Smith.     4  Vols.     (Vol.  I.  Srd  Imp., 

Vols.  II.,  III.  and  IV.  2nd  Imp.  revised.) 
TRYPHIODORUS.     Cf.  OPPIAN. 
XENOPHON  :    CYROPAEDIA.     Walter  Miller.     2  Vols. 

{2nd  Imp.) 
XENOPHON  :   HELLENICA,  ANABASIS,  APOLOGY, 

AND  SYMPOSIUM.     C.  L.  Brownson  and  O.  J.  Todd. 

Q    V' ols         i^Thd  Iti'l'O    I 

vENOPHON  :   MEMORABILIA  and  OECONOMICUS. 

E.  C.  Marchant. 
:EN0PH0N  :   SCRIPTA  MINORA,     E.  C.  Marchant. 

VOLUMES  IN  PREPARATION 


GREEK    AUTHORS 


RISTOTLE:  ON  HISTORY,  MOTION  AND  PRO- 
GRESSION OF  ANIMALS.  E.  S.  Forster  and 
A   Peck 

•RISTOTLE:  ORGANON.  H.  P.  Cooke  and 
H.  Tredennick. 

ARISTOTLE:  RHETONICA  AD  ALEXANDRUM. 
H.  Rackham. 

DEMOSTHENES  :  MEIDIAS,  ANDROTION,  ARISTO- 
CRATES,  TIMOCRATES,  ARISTOGEITON.  J.  H. 
Vince. 

DEMOSTHENES:  PRIVATE  ORATIONS.  A.  T. 
Murray. 

DIONYSIUS  OF  HALICARNASSUS  :   ROMAN  ANTI- 
QUITIES.    Spelman's  translation  revised  by  E.  Cary. 
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NONNUS.    W.H.D.  Rouse. 


LATIN    AUTHORS 


γ'τγτ  mis      W  G.  Spencer. 

iif :  ^°N«lrτίi!5^?^   ?«ACCO,  rao 

cSr^fe''0^KA^0A'i^  ct^iesWSo.  a„a  W.  E. 
ClSo,  ORATOR  BRUTUS  Η  Μ  Hubbejj  ^^^^^ 
•^'Slub   5rPRSv!™is  CONSULARIBUS.  PIUI 

ρί,ΝΥ^^'Νίϊυ^Αΐ  HISTORY     WHS  Jones. 
VMiRot  Di  UNGUA  LATINA.    R.  G.  Kent. 

DESCnIPTIVB  PEOSPEOTVS  0»  APPLICATION 


WILLIAM  HEINEMANN  LTl 
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